2009-2010

F01: The School used ASB funds for curricular and administrative purposes, and for the benefit of faculty, which is contrary to District Procedures.3

F02: The School has disregarded and failed to apply required internal controls. District Administrative Procedures 2225, 2227, 2245, 2247, 2250, and 2375 regarding Administration of Student Body Funds and Associated Student Body Accounting Manual & Desk Reference, published by Fiscal Crisis & Management Assistance Team, 2005 (FCMAT ASB Manual), 10 Things You Should Know (ASB) Office of Audits and Investigations. District Procedure Number 2225, effective January 29, 2002, provides, in relevant part: that student body funds are to be used to finance non-curricular activities beyond those provided by The District, that under no conditions shall student body money be expended for the benefit of faculty, and that student body funds in secondary schools may not be used to purchase instructional supplies and equipment for instructional use. 3

F03: School personnel are not following the 10 Things You Should Know publication.

F04: Approximately seventy-five percent of district schools, audited by the District Auditor, misused ASB funds for curricular and administrative purposes and for benefit of faculty, in violation of District Procedure 2225 regarding ASB funds.

F05: Various district schools have disregarded internal control procedures required by The District and set forth in the FCMAT ASB Manual.

F06: The Certified Public Accountant serving as District Independent Auditor repeatedly found common internal control deficiencies in the handling of ASB funds at various district schools.

F07: The District Auditor, with a staff of only seven auditors and investigators (one dedicated to the Hotline), identified at least 4.1 million dollars in recoverable district funds over a period of twenty months, thus saving The District approximately three times the annualized cost of the staff of the District Auditor.

F08: The Hotline, established contemporaneously with the District Ethics Code, is an essential enforcement arm for the guidelines set forth in the District Ethics Code.4

F09: The combined effect of the audits and investigations undertaken by the District Auditor and the Hotline are necessary to combat waste, abuse and corruption and to maintain the efficiency, transparency and reputation of the District.

F10: The Hotline has contributed an invaluable service for the District, but an additional Hotline investigator is needed to deal with the backlog.

F11: The reports from the Hotline indicate that there are some district employees at all levels who have engaged in unethical, and sometimes illegal, activities. The District Ethics Code is composed of 10 principles, dealing for example with conflicts of interest, nepotism in hiring, waste, fraud, abuse and corruption, and abuse of authority www.sandi.net/depts/ethics/. 7

F12: An annual six hour site visit once per year is insufficient oversight for District charter schools.

F13: The District is empowered and directed to exercise oversight in order to assure the efficient and effective academic, financial, governance and management performance of District charter schools.

F14: The 2009/2010 catalog requirement that students of The School purchase choir outfits and provide their own instrument and text for brass, woodwinds, and small strings is in violation of California law10 and the guidelines issued by District Counsel.

F15: To the extent that the 2010/2011 policy implicitly requires that students of The School for whom no instruments for loan are available must purchase or otherwise provide their own instrument and text for brass, woodwinds, and small strings or forego the class, the policy is unlawful.11

F16: The assessment of student fees for activities, including mandated purchases of services, materials, supplies, equipment, or uniforms associated with the activity, is prohibited, except as expressly allowed by law.14

F17: The shortfall resulting from those who cannot or will not donate must be filled. Otherwise, many activities may well be reduced or even canceled.

F01: The modification of the SARMS Program includes the elimination of the role of SARMS case managers who generally follow a case from start to finish and ensure that all court ordered requirements are being followed by substance abusing parents.

F02: CWS Social Workers will be assigned the case management function heretofore performed by SARMS staff.

F03: There is a lack of communication between the social workers and CWS administration. As of May 1, 2010, many of the social workers had no knowledge of the pending modification to the SARMS Program and were unaware that they would be assuming the duties and responsibilities of case management services previously provided by SARMS case managers.

F04: With an increase in workloads, County social workers will be hard pressed to balance the new responsibility of monitoring compliance with substance abuse treatment with other ongoing responsibilities such as mandatory visits, court appearances, and organizing visitation with foster children and their families.

F05: Modification of the SARMS Program will impact the compliance reporting system and create a gap and a delay in obtaining pertinent up-to-date information such as 7 compliance by parents, their current status in the program, and if and when they may have tested positive.

F06: Delays resulting from the increased social worker workloads may result in a longer time to achieve family reunification.

F07: Clients who fail to meet court-ordered treatment standards, will be summarily removed from the drug abuse program putting at risk their opportunity to be reunited with their families. The timely transfer of information is necessary for the social worker to determine when and if a client is ready for reunification.

F08: Delayed or unsuccessful outcomes in reunification efforts will cost the County more in foster care payments and supportive services.

F09: Human service programs stimulate the economy and investing in these programs substantially reduces the need for and the cost of future services.

F10: There are costly long-term effects associated with reducing human services expenditures and case worker staffing levels such as ongoing poverty, a rise in child maltreatment, an increase in the number of domestic violence cases, and an advance towards continued substance abuse.

F11: Social workers have concerns regarding the pending cuts to SARMS, such as their inability to effectively serve their clients and manage caseloads.

F12: Social workers are anticipating even higher levels of stress and are concerned about the retention of their colleagues.

F13: There is no central source to coordinate services between treatment programs, CWS and other service providers. The creation of the position of a resource coordinator, who would have familiarity with all substance abuse treatment programs throughout the County and maintain waiting lists for client placement, would help facilitate the program placement efforts of CWS Social Workers.

F01: Qualcomm Stadium has a seating capacity of about 70,500 and a remaining obligation of about $52 million on the 1997 Renovation Bonds.

F02: Regular net rent received by the City from the Chargers after deducting the ADA payments and rent credits, is less than $1 million per season.

F03: The City’s direct operating losses on Qualcomm Stadium after crediting net rents paid by the Chargers, and excluding efforts by the City to mitigate the shortfall with other events, are at least $17.1 million for 2010

F04: The City partially reduces the deficit with other events and subsidizes the balance with City Transient Occupancy Tax (TOT) revenues of $11.8 million in 2010.14 10 San Diego Business Journal, “Critical Part of Chargers’ Financing Deal Out of Play”, February 1, 2010. Union-Tribune, Sign On San Diego, April 20, 2010. Econ Journal Watch, Volume 5, Number 3, September 2008, -315, Sports Economist Robert A. Baade, PhD, Economist D. Coates, PhD, Charles A. Santo, PhD. Evolution Media Capital, NFL Stadium Financing Background, January 2010 (Presentation to Centre City Development Corporation). City of San Diego, FY 2010 Annual Budget. 4

F05: The Tampa Bay Buccaneers pay the Tampa Sports Authority fixed rent of $3.5 million per season, a minimum of $3.5 million on account of premiums from the sale of Club Seats and a ticket surcharge of $2.50 per ticket, all with no rent credits, for a total of at least $8.1 million.

F06: San Diego taxpayers oppose the use of public monies for the construction of a new Charger stadium.

F07: The Chargers are proposing to invest about $200 million to build a 62,000 seat stadium at a cost of $800 million, with the balance of about $600 million to come from tax increment bonds to be paid from property, sales and Transient Occupancy Taxes.

F08: The $800 million estimate may be significantly increased by the addition of a retractable roof.

F09: The $52 million balance due on the 1997 stadium Renovation Bonds must be dealt with if a new Chargers stadium is built.

F10: There is almost no evidence that professional sports franchises and facilities have a positive impact on real per capita income or employment, and may have a negative affect.

F11: If public financing is the source of funding for a new Charger stadium, the City should demand a lease with terms that will protect the City such as a long-term lease with fixed rents and no credits, no risk of cost overruns, and City use of the stadium for other public events.

F01: As a consequence of closing Descanso Detention Facility, its staff was dispersed throughout the remaining adult detention facilities in San Diego County. As a result, facilities are now staffed at an operational level which in turn allows them to run more smoothly and efficiently.

F02: The County’s General Services Construction Manager is expecting to issue a Request for Proposal in the Fall of 2010 for the contract to build a new woman’s prison to replace Las Colinas.

F03: Although no official requests for funds have been made, the Grand Jury concludes that complimenting, supplementing, or augmenting video recording equipment will prevent further financial burden to tax paying citizens of San Diego County. Some of the present deficiencies prohibiting sufficient surveillance in the facilities are:  Video equipment that does not run continuously  Video equipment that is not complimented with audio capabilities  Lack of cameras monitoring areas where inmates congregate, some of which are known volatile areas such as booking rooms, sober cells and dayrooms. 3

F04: Single beds may assist in reducing suicide attempts at Kearny Mesa Juvenile Detention Facility.

F05: Providing free passes for the I-125 toll road would halve lengthy commutes for the employees of East Mesa Juvenile Facility.

F06: Pet Encounter Therapy should be implemented because the financial benefits of curbing the recidivism rate far outweighs the financial burden that “revolving door” criminals impose on taxpayers.

F07: The Juvenile Ranch Facility’s exterior maintenance has been neglected and is deteriorating. Clarification needs to be made regarding whose responsibility it is to maintain and repair the buildings on this historic site. If any physical upgrades or changes are questionable, within the scope of repair and maintenance, there needs to be communication among San Diego County’s General Services, San Diego’s Historic Site Board, and the Juvenile Ranch Facility’s management. 7

F08: The Juvenile Ranch Facility’s badly worn carpet poses a trip and fall hazard which is dangerous to the children and employees.

F09: The badly worn surface of the floors at the Kearny Mesa Juvenile Detention Facility poses a safety hazard for the youth and employees. Potential accidents and possible lawsuits amount to monetary loss that inevitably trickles down to taxpayers.

F01: Homelessness in San Diego County is a region-wide problem that calls for region-wide solutions.

F02: Homelessness in the City of San Diego is an ongoing issue in the downtown area and is most apparent in the East Village neighborhood.

F03: The PTECH report identified many of the homelessness problems and their solutions; however, the lack of an ongoing source of funding has limited the implementation of the Housing First/Housing Plus Plan.

F04: The San Diego region has numerous resources to reduce the impact of homelessness in the community. It is necessary for San Diego governments, homeless service providers and advocates, religious groups, business leaders, and citizens to work cooperatively.

F05: Many chronic homeless in San Diego County do not have shelter at night.

F06: A multitude of homeless service providers exist in San Diego County.

F07: A need exists for permanent intake facilities with supportive services.

F08: Year-round, temporary homeless shelters with supportive services are critical until permanent facilities are operational.

F09: The City destroyed the personal property of homeless people who were attending a religious service. There was no personal contact by the police with the homeless persons or homeless agencies prior to the destruction of their belongings.

F10: The San Diego Police officers on the scene would not allow anyone to retrieve their personal belongings.

F12: The City needs to select the locations for downtown winter shelters earlier in the year to allow for community input and more time for the setup of the structures.

F13: The current winter shelters, because they are seasonal, do not adequately support the chronic homeless living on the streets in San Diego.

F14: Many of the homeless sleep on the sidewalks and in doorways throughout the City.

F15: A need exists for year-round shelters.

F16: To effectively address the human needs of these individuals, on-site social services must be provided at homeless shelters including medical care, mental health counseling, employment counseling and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Medi- Cal enrollment support.

F17: Adequate permanent outdoor toilet facilities in the downtown and East Village areas do not exist.

F18: Additional portable, automatic, and permanent toilets would reduce the fecal deposits and urine odors in the downtown and East Village.

F19: An outbreak of illness caused by unsanitary conditions in the downtown and East Village areas could result in liability to the City.

F20: Additional sidewalk and street cleaning equipment is necessary to reduce fecal matter, urine deposits, and odors in the downtown area to ensure the protection of the public’s health and safety. Many of the East Village residents and businesses have to clean up fecal waste.

F21: The NGDC requires necessary improvements to be in compliance with ADA requirements.

F22: The NGDC requires repairs to the facility which will cost approximately fifty to one hundred thousand dollars.

F23: The appearance of the NGDC requires landscaping to improve the appearance from the street side of the facility.

F24: NGDC showers are limited to disabled persons only by Father Joe’s Villages.

F01: There is a negative impact on the quality of life for persons and animals living in areas of eye gnat infestation.

F02: Efforts by the County of San Diego to address eye gnat infestation have not reduced the number of complaints or the severity of the eye gnat infestation as described by residents in the affected areas.

F03: The County of San Diego has the ability and authority, through existing County regulatory codes, to increase the focus and effectiveness of efforts to control the eye gnat problem.

F01: Many TAY do not obtain necessary transition training because they are reluctant to volunteer for this training.

F02: Sufficient TAY programs are established and supervised by appropriate agencies; however, many of the agencies and departments practice a “silo” type of operation that does not result in maximum cooperation and sharing of information for the greatest benefit for the TAY. A “silo” type operation occurs when an agency or department develops appropriate programs, but the information is not shared with other entities that could utilize the same programs.

F03: The funds for TAY programs, which are within the MHSA funding for San Diego County, are within proper audit standards.

F04: TAY training should be started at the earliest possible age; some sources suggest at age five or younger. Fact—Set Two San Pasqual Academy Fact: Attendance at San Pasqual Academy (Academy) is a unique placement option for youth age twelve to eighteen. Fact: The Academy’s enrollment requires a youth’s voluntary application. Fact: On average, there are fifty vacant beds at the Academy on a monthly basis. Fact: The Academy is located in an isolated, rural area of San Diego County, which is one of the reasons that some eligible youth elect not to apply for enrollment. FINDINGS

F05: Fifty vacant beds each month at the Academy is cause for concern as many more TAY could participate in the program. 5

F06: In order to maximize Academy enrollment, additional site tours should be scheduled, and consideration by various TAY agencies should be given to overnight and weekend visits by eligible foster youth and their siblings.

F01: The MTS Trolley system policies and procedures comply with ADA requirements. However, improvements are needed in or carrying out those policies and procedures that impact the visually impaired.

F02: Trolley operators do not consistently follow the mandatory announcement policies and procedures.

F03: Trolley operator evaluations and audits by supervision are announced in advance allowing the operators knowledge of the date of their audit review.

F04: MTS is in the process of standardizing platform entry levels for trolley cars to help facilitate accessibility into cars for persons with disabilities, as described in the ADA.

F05: The FTA also provides ADA grant funds for programs to improve accessibility of transportation systems.

F01: In November 2006 the voters of the City of San Diego amended Section 117(c) of the City Charter to permit the City to employ independent contractors to perform city services and requiring that the City Council enact an ordinance implementing the amended City Charter. .

F02: The City has expended many hours in numerous sessions attempting to negotiate with City unions the terms of the implementing ordinance and managed competition guide.

F03: The City has yet to enter a contract under the charter amendment passed by the voters on November 7, 2006.

F04: Managed Competition is stalled in a political and ideological battle that may ultimately have to be resolved: by enactment in November 2010 of the alternative Competition and Transparency in City Contracting Initiative 2010, an election result that alters the partisan split, or by some other means.

F05: The Grand Jury is empowered to make recommendations to the Mayor and City Council; but lacks the jurisdiction to make recommendations to the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 127, and the Municipal Employees Association. If the Grand Jury had such jurisdiction it would include these employee organizations in its recommendation.

F06: The City Facilities Division completed its Business Process Reengineering in June 2008, but the BPR has not been implemented because the Union will not meet and confer on implementation.

F07: The Grand Jury is empowered to make recommendations to the Mayor and City Council; but lacks the jurisdiction to make recommendations to the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 127, and the Municipal Employees Association. If the Grand Jury had such jurisdiction it would include these employee organizations in its recommendation.

F01: Without the protections afforded by being designated as an independent entity in the City Charter, the San Diego City Ethics Commission is subject to elimination by repeal of the ordinance that established it.

F02: Some officials who have been fined for minor violations have expressed a concern that they may be perceived as unethical. Finding # 03: The majority of the activity of the Ethics Commission deals with monitoring compliance with the City's election campaign and lobbying laws and providing training in those laws. Finding # 04: A change of the name of the Ethics Commission to something analogous to that of the State's Fair Political Practices Commission would allay the concerns of City officials and more accurately reflect the actual work of the Commission. Finding # 05: The power to subpoena witnesses granted to the Ethics Commission by ordinance is provided only for administrative hearings and does not extend to investigations. Finding # 06: The power to subpoena witnesses for formal investigations would streamline the process and could eliminate the need for more costly administrative hearings.

F07: The two vacancies on the seven member Ethics Commission endanger its ability to levy fines and to establish a quorum for its meetings. Finding # 08: The State Fair Political Practices Commission is not equipped to perform regular audits of County elections, does not have sufficient staff to investigate conflict of interest allegations against local officials, and does not enforce City and County lobbying laws.

F01: The Grand Jury did not find any evidence that the agendas were posted late or inadequately worded.

F02: The phrase starting with “Consideration of…” in the two agenda items was consistent with other Current Business Items where a vote was taken

F03: The Grand Jury determined that, given the circumstances, three of the Board members having prior knowledge of the Health Care Benefit agenda item did not constitute collective concurrence or a Brown Act violation. Medical Benefits Fact: About 50% of the California Water agencies offer medical benefits to Directors. Fact: The total monthly premium for health care benefits for all Directors and their dependents was $5,472.58 in December 2009 which amounts to a $65,671 annualized cost.

F04: The adoption of health care benefits for members of the Board is a legitimate business expense. Legal Expenses Fact: Legal expenses increased from approximately $47,000 in FY 2005-06 to $220,000 in FY 2007-08.

F05: The 364% increase in legal expenses was adequately explained. Conflict of Interest Fact: There was a concern that there could be (or could have been) conflicts of interest on the part of some District employees and some District contractors. Fact: The State Fair Political Practices Act requires consultants to government agencies to file a Statement of Economic Interests (Form 700), unless the agency’s chief executive determines that such filing is not required.

F06: No current conflict of interest situations were found.

F07: None of the District’s consultants have filed a Form 700 since 2007 and the General Manager’s written determination was not made until January 2010. Public Input Fact: The ability for the public to testify on both agenda and non-agenda items at an open meeting of a governmental body is required under the Brown Act.

F08: No restriction on public discussion of agenda items was found.

F09: The limit of three minutes per speaker on non-agenda public comment was found to be consistent with the practice of other governmental agencies, such as the San Diego County Board of Supervisors, San Diego Association of Governments, and the San Diego City Council. Reserve Funds Fact: A Grand Jury audit reviewed and analyzed the Borrego Water District’s (District’s) audited financial statements from FY 2004-05 through FY 2008-09 and made comparisons with several other water districts. Fact: The District currently has unrestricted total reserves of $5,385,891.

F10: All the reserves of the compared water districts are unrestricted, and the District’s amount of reserve funds ranked fourth out of the five districts compared. Audio Recordings Fact: Audio recordings of all public meetings used to be held for five years. This policy was changed at the Board meeting of February 13, 2008, when audio recordings retention was changed to a minimum of 30 days in compliance with the Brown Act minimum requirements. Fact: Many residents do not live in Borrego Springs year-round; rather, they are seasonal or part time residents.

F11: A longer retention time would provide additional time for all residents to inspect, or obtain a copy of, the audio recordings and would be in the best interests of the residents. District Auditor Fact: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 reformed auditing standards for private corporations. Fact: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires private corporations to change principal auditors every five years. Fact: The District has used the same auditing firm for fifteen years.

F12: Many governmental entities, including the City of San Diego, have voluntarily adopted the Sarbanes-Oxley standards as best practice.

F01: The District Auditor, with a staff of only seven auditors and investigators (one dedicated to the District Hotline) over a period of twenty months, identified recoverable District funds that (annualized) equaled three times the cost of the staff of the District Internal Auditor.

F02: Through December 2009, approximately 107 Hotline cases remained under investigation.

F03: Investigations and audits by the District Auditor, whether initiated by District Hotline calls or otherwise, often result in savings due to prevention and increased efficiency.

F04: The District Auditor needs additional auditors to expand the sampling of the books and records of the District; the District Hotline needs an additional investigator to mitigate the backlog of complaints; and the District Hotline phone number needs to be more prominently posted.

F05: The City appears to have no integrated comprehensive Code of Ethics designed, for example, for classified employees and parties dealing with the City and addressing basics such as fraud, waste, abuse and conflict of interest. However, the City Auditor publishes, on the departmental web page, explicit definitions of fraud, waste and abuse, accessed either as a separate link or through the City Employee Fraud Hotline Policy and Procedures Manual.

F06: The City has an effective charter-based internal audit and hotline process managed by the City Auditor and resulting in identification of significant recoverable funds and cost savings.

F07: Investigations and audits by the City Auditor, whether initiated by City Hotline calls or otherwise, often result in savings due to prevention and increased efficiency, not quantified in dollars.

F08: The City Hotline phone number is not posted on the Home page of the City website.

F09: The County appears to have no integrated comprehensive Code of Ethics designed, for example, for classified employees and parties dealing with the County and addressing basics such as fraud, waste, abuse and conflict of interest.

F10: The County has neither fraud, waste, abuse and conflict of interest anonymous hotline contracted to an independent third party provider, nor other process that addresses these issues specifically and assures the anonymity of the complainant.

F11: Most of the surveyed cities have some sort of Code of Ethics, but excepting the City of San Diego, few have internal auditors or hotlines outsourced to a third party provider assuring anonymity.

F12: Excepting the San Diego Unified School District, most school districts have a Code of Ethics for various subject matters such as sports, but most have neither internal auditors nor fraud hotlines outsourced to third party providers assuring anonymity.

F13: Most community college districts have a Code of Ethics of some sort, but few have internal auditors or fraud, waste, abuse and conflict of interest hotlines and none are outsourced to third party providers assuring anonymity.

F14: The Unified Port of San Diego has a Code of Ethics, an internal auditor and an internal ethics (fraud, waste, abuse and conflict of interest) hotline outsourced to a third party provider assuring anonymity, but available only to employees.

F15: The Airport Authority has a Code of Ethics, internal auditor and Ethics Violation Form which may be accessed online and filed anonymously but does not appear to have a fraud, waste, abuse and conflict of interest hotline outsourced to a third party provider assuring anonymity. Finding #16: The Grand Jury finds that most of the governmental organizations within San Diego County lack either an integrated comprehensive fraud, waste, abuse and conflict of interest Code of Ethics, a consistently applied internal controls process compliant with Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards and/or Generally 135 Accepted Accounting Principles, or a fraud, waste, abuse and conflict of interest hotline outsourced to a third party provider assuring anonymity.

F16: The Grand Jury finds that most of the governmental organizations within San Diego County lack either an integrated comprehensive fraud, waste, abuse and conflict of interest Code of Ethics, a consistently applied internal controls process compliant with Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards and/or Generally 135 Accepted Accounting Principles, or a fraud, waste, abuse and conflict of interest hotline outsourced to a third party provider assuring anonymity. Finding 17: Governmental organizations within San Diego County are no less subject to fraud, waste, abuse and conflict of interest than the average American organization (including public and private sector), which on average loses seven percent of its annual revenues to such activities. Finding 18: Cities, school districts, community college districts, and other governmental organizations within San Diego County not named herein could benefit by considering the facts, findings and recommendations in this report and should consider adoption and implementation of some, if not all, of the recommendations set forth below.

F17: Governmental organizations within San Diego County are no less subject to fraud, waste, abuse and conflict of interest than the average American organization (including public and private sector), which on average loses seven percent of its annual revenues to such activities.

F18: Cities, school districts, community college districts, and other governmental organizations within San Diego County not named herein could benefit by considering the facts, findings and recommendations in this report and should consider adoption and implementation of some, if not all, of the recommendations set forth below.

F01: San Diego County’s proportion of MHSA funding is commensurate with its proportion of the population of the State.

F02: The State allocation of $27.9 million (FY 2010) Prevention & Early Intervention was double counted in Capital Facilities &Technological Needs and in Prevention & Early Intervention, which inflated the Capital Facilities & Technological Needs allocation amounts in the State MHSA agreement and internal tracking report.

F03: The State approved $1.5 million (FY 2010) for Innovation was double recorded under Prevention & Early Intervention and Innovation in the State MHSA agreement and the County internal tracking report. Also, State documentation understated the Prevention & Early Intervention service approval amount by $2.2 million.

F04: As of March 2010, the County has no funding at risk of reversion to the State.

F05: About $65.2 million, or 17% of the funds allocated to San Diego County are not approved.

F06: MHS has submitted no proposals for approval of Capital Facilities (CF). A balance of $34.4 million, or 92%, of the CFTN allocation is not approved, according to MHS, due to current economic conditions and liability risk of property ownership.

F07: About $24 million of the funds allocated to San Diego County for MHSA housing development but administered by the State are not approved.

F08: About $9.1 million of the MHSA funds allocated to San Diego County for MHSA housing development but administered by the State has been approved; $18.9 million is in the pre-development pipeline; and $5 million of other possible projects are under consideration.

F09: Implementation of proposed MHSA projects is often delayed due to the lengthy public outreach process, lack of effective coordination, and labor intensive processes requiring extensive administrative tasks.

F01: The District Attorney’s Office has not published guidelines for the operation of legal medical marijuana cooperatives and collectives in San Diego County which would address the concerns of operators of those programs who are trying to comply with State law.

F02: There is currently no forum through which the operators of legitimate medical marijuana collectives and cooperatives could engage in dialogue with representatives of the District Attorney’s Office on a regular basis.

F03: There are no clear and uniform guidelines for law enforcement personnel in San Diego County which would protect the rights of legitimate qualified medical marijuana patients.

F04: The San Diego City Council is empowered by Government Code Section 65858 to enact a moratorium on the opening of additional medical marijuana dispensaries.

F05: Adopting cost neutral zoning and land use ordinances is an effective method for the licensing, regulation and periodic inspection of cooperatives and collectives distributing medical marijuana in the unincorporated areas and eighteen cities of San Diego County.

F06: The recommendations of the City of San Diego’s Medical Marijuana Task Force for zoning and land use ordinances for cooperatives and collectives may serve as a model for adoption by other cities in the County.

F07: Annual financial reporting and periodic auditing of cooperatives and collectives, predominantly cash operations, are not currently required in San Diego County.

F08: The current ban on the opening of medical marijuana collectives in the Cities of El Cajon, Escondido, San Marcos and Vista deprives some qualified medical marijuana patients of access to marijuana in their communities.

F09: The lack of zoning and land use ordinances for the licensing, regulation and periodic inspection of cooperatives and collectives distributing medical marijuana in the cities of Carlsbad, Coronado, Del Mar, Encinitas, La Mesa, Lemon Grove, Poway and Solana Beach deprives some qualified medical marijuana patients of access to marijuana in their communities.

F10: The current moratorium on the opening of cooperatives and collectives distributing medical marijuana in the unincorporated areas of San Diego County and the cities of Chula Vista, Imperial Beach, National City, Oceanside and Santee deprives some qualified medical marijuana patients of access to marijuana in their communities.

F11: The imposition of regulatory fees and associated costs could create a financial hardship for the smaller medical marijuana cooperatives and collectives.

F01: The City contracts with the Uptown Partnership to act in the best interest of the communities it serves.

F02: From FY 1999 to FY 2009 the Uptown Partnership spent three times more on salaries and other overhead expenses than on projects.

F03: City of San Diego elected officials and staff has a favorable opinion of the Partnership’s management of the Uptown Community Parking District. However, this opinion is not shared by all of the stakeholders in the community.

F04: The Uptown Partnership has implemented changes recommended by City officials to enhance transparency of management activities.