Gran Jurado del Condado de Santa Clara

2004-2005

14 informes

From the annual report
The consolidated year-end volume. The individual investigations it contains are listed separately below.
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The full consolidated volume; individual reports are listed below.
Individual reports (14)
Hallazgos & Recomendaciones 7 hallazgos
F1: The Project Manager of the SJPD CAD project did not have the skills, training or experience to manage such a large scale, technical project. The Project Manager had ancillary duties in addition to managing this large project.
Recomendaciones relacionadas (1)
R1: City of San Jose management should dedicate qualified Information Technology staff or consultants, who are subject matter experts, to collaborate in planning, procuring, and implementing mission-critical technologies. The job performance assessments of these individuals should reflect success or failure of assigned projects.
F2: SJPD personnel, highly trained and highly paid to provide law enforcement services, are assigned to IT positions within the department. Such a use of law enforcement personnel is inefficient and ineffective.
Recomendaciones relacionadas (1)
R2: City of San Jose management should assign a sufficient number of qualified, civilian personnel to specialized IT positions within the San Jose Police Department, freeing police officers to provide law enforcement service to the community. This practice ensures that highly technical IT tasks are being performed by qualified experts, and that law enforcement coverage is maximized.
F3: SJPD command staff and civilian management did not take a proactive and visible role in preparing City Communications Center personnel and police officers for the changes that took place with the IPS CAD system.
Recomendaciones relacionadas (1)
R3: Command staff and top civilian management of the SJPD should assume a more proactive and visible role in program planning, development, and practice to assure participation, cooperation and two-way communication throughout the department. City management should establish a process whereby City department managers are held accountable for projects occurring within their area of responsibility. 15
F4: The City does not have a formalized process by which end-users, such as Public Safety Dispatchers, police officers and firefighters can provide suggestions and criticisms for improving CAD and MDC functions in an environment which values problem reports and improvement suggestions.
Recomendaciones relacionadas (2)
R4A: City of San Jose and SJPD management should establish procedures by which end- users can be part of the solution process so that IT deficiencies can be quickly detected and adequately addressed.
R4B: In future IT project development, City of San Jose management should mandate that representatives from all levels affected by the IT project be included in every stage of specification, development and deployment.
F5: The mapping data and interface software were not verified for accuracy and operational status prior to being utilized for mission-critical functions within the SJPD.
Recomendaciones relacionadas (1)
R5: Mapping data and related IT programs should be checked regularly for errors through a quality control program administered by qualified, trained personnel.
F6: Technical documentation on the operation, function, and design of the IPS CAD system has apparently not been provided by IPS to the City on a timely basis. This has impeded IT personnel in troubleshooting and rectifying problems raised by PSDs and police officers, because of the long turnaround times in getting questions answered through IPS.
Recomendaciones relacionadas (1)
R6: City of San Jose management should obtain CAD system design, implementation, and operations documentation from IPS sufficient to give IT staff the ability to support, maintain, and ensure the operational functionality of the IPS CAD system. 16
F7: The electronic mobile mapping system is unreliable and printed copies of beat maps previously provided to SJPD police officers have been discontinued. Such maps are also needed in case of a serious system problem or failure.
Recomendaciones relacionadas (1)
R7: SJPD should immediately reinstate the production of printed beat maps and provide them to police officers for their use in the field. PASSED and ADOPTED by the Santa Clara County Civil Grand Jury on this 26th day of May, 2005. ________________________________ Michael A. Smith Foreperson 17
Hallazgos & Recomendaciones 17 hallazgos
F1A: Prior to the Council’s first vote on Norcal in October 2000, the Mayor, his Policy and Budget Director, and Norcal knew that CWS would have to pay Teamsters wages instead of Longshoremen wages, and that this would cost CWS an extra $2 million or more a year. Thus, the Mayor, Norcal, and CWS anticipated the extra labor costs incurred by CWS. The Mayor and his Policy and Budget Director should have advised the Council of this information, but they did not do so, in apparent violation of the City Charter.
F1B: When initially interviewed by the Grand Jury in March 2005, the Mayor and his Policy and Budget Director insisted that the Mayor never met with the representatives of Norcal or CWS. At that time, the Mayor contended that, in order to avoid the appearance of impropriety, he did not meet face-to-face with Norcal or CWS because he did not want to be criticized about “backroom discussions.” In the second interview with the Mayor and in the third interview with his Policy and Budget Director, they admitted that indeed such a meeting had occurred on October 6, 2000, in the Mayor’s conference room, four days prior 22 to the Council’s vote on October 10, 2000 to approve Norcal as a vendor. The Grand Jury finds that the Mayor indeed met with the Norcal and CWS representatives on October 6, 2000. Either the Mayor and his Policy and Budget Director had a memory lapse or they did not tell the truth initially. In any event, the Mayor took part in “backroom discussions,” and this conduct was improper and appears to be in violation of the City’s Independent Judgment Policy and/or City Charter.
F1C: At this October 6, 2000 meeting, the Mayor asked Norcal and CWS representatives what the extra labor costs would be, and the President of CWS estimated the first year cost would be approximately $2 million, with additional increases each succeeding year. The Mayor assured Norcal and CWS that he would take the steps necessary to see that San Jose paid the increased costs.
F1D: For a period of almost four years, between October 2000 and early September 2004, the Mayor and his Policy and Budget Director concealed from the Council: (a) the occurrence of the October 6, 2000 “backroom discussion” the Mayor had with Norcal and CWS; (b) the Mayor’s October 6, 2000 assurance to Norcal and CWS that the Mayor would take the steps necessary to have San Jose pay the increased costs; (c) that the increased costs were known and anticipated prior to the Council’s October 10, 2000 vote; (d) that Norcal was willing to take less than the $11.25 million it requested; (e) that the primary purpose of the proposed nine percent garbage rate increase in FY 2003-2004 was to cover the increased costs to Norcal; and (f) that the threatened strike by the Teamsters in February 2003 was primarily caused by the Mayor’s delay in asking the Council to pay Norcal the $11.25 million.
F1E: The Mayor and his Policy and Budget Director made several misrepresentations to the City Council and the public, including: (a) that the increased costs were unanticipated prior to the October 10, 2000 vote, when in fact they were anticipated; (b) that the Mayor found out about the increased costs after the October 10, 2000 vote to approve Norcal as a vendor, when in fact he knew beforehand; (c) that the proposed nine percent garbage rate increase in FY 2003-2004 was needed for reasons other than to reimburse Norcal; and (d) that the Mayor stated that there would be no garbage rate increases as a result of the Council’s decision to pay Norcal the $11.25 million, when other City representatives have admitted that further increases would be required to fund the $11.25 million payment to Norcal. 23
F1F: The Grand Jury agrees with the two Councilmembers’ September 20, 2004 memorandum opposing payment of $11.25 million, including the assertions that: (a) The payment of $11.25 million appears to be a gift of public funds. The only way San Jose would have been justified in paying Norcal $11.25 million was if Norcal had provided consideration of $11.25 million in additional services; instead Norcal was offering at most $150,000 in additional services; (b) The October 2000 promise or representation by the Mayor to Norcal was not disclosed to the Council when the Council voted to approve Norcal as the preferred vendor in October 2000; (c) The Mayor’s assurance to Norcal to pay Norcal the extra labor costs, without Council approval, appears to be a violation of the City Charter and void under California law; (d) Allowing a side deal to alter the terms of the contract was not fair to the other vendors who participated in the Request For Proposal process but were not made aware of this arrangement; and (e) The additional labor costs amount to $11.25 million and will have to come from reserves and additional rate increases.
F1G: There were many discrepancies or versions of the facts related by the 18 people who were interviewed in this investigation by the Grand Jury. It appears that some of these individuals were not telling the truth, but at times it was difficult for the Grand Jury to determine, with reasonable certainty, fact from fiction. By the nature of this inquiry, these individuals were not under oath and their statements were not recorded. The Grand Jury finds that the only way to ascertain all of the facts, and the ultimate truth, is to have everyone testify under oath and under penalty of perjury.
F2: At the October 6, 2000 meeting, the President of Norcal advised the Mayor that, if the City of San Jose agreed to pay for the increased costs, Norcal would pass San Jose’s payment on to CWS. After this meeting, outside the presence of the other parties, Norcal and CWS then signed an addendum to their contract that was kept secret from the City of San Jose. This addendum, dated October 9, 2000, expressly stated that Norcal would pay CWS for the increased costs CWS would incur as a result of CWS having to use Teamsters. This addendum was not contingent upon the City of San Jose reimbursing Norcal. The terms of this addendum were not divulged to anyone at the City of San Jose for a period of four years, until October 7, 2004, when Norcal’s attorney provided it to the City Attorney. By that time the City Council had already voted on September 21, 2004 to authorize the City Manager to negotiate the terms of the increased payment to Norcal. The Grand Jury finds that Norcal, not the City of San Jose, owed CWS the $11.25 million, and that Norcal appears to have defrauded the City of San Jose by not disclosing the secret contract addendum.
Recomendaciones relacionadas (1)
R2: The City Attorney or special investigator (see Recommendation 1) retained by the San Jose City Council should take the legal steps necessary to rescind the amended contract with Norcal. The rescission would be based on the fact that Norcal did not disclose to the Council the secret contract addendum between Norcal and CWS, and that Norcal thereby defrauded the City of San Jose. A rescission would result in the return of the millions of dollars San Jose has already paid to Norcal and CWS, and preclude any further payments to Norcal and CWS related to the amended contract. The return of the money would be subject to a reduction of the so-called extra “consideration” given by Norcal, which the Grand Jury believes has a value of approximately $150,000.
F3: No one on the Council, including the Mayor, could recall another time when the Council voted to amend a contract to pay a vendor additional funds, when the vendor knew, in advance of signing a contract with the City of San Jose, that the vendor would incur additional labor costs. The reason for this is fundamental: once a contract is signed, the parties are required to adhere to the terms of the contract. The Grand Jury has difficulty understanding how the Council could be duped into paying Norcal an extra $11.25 million when San Jose had no contractual obligation to do so. 25
Recomendaciones relacionadas (1)
R3: San Jose should place in its Charter a provision that henceforth it shall never consider amending an existing contract with any vendor, wherein the vendor is aware of actual anticipated additional costs prior to being approved as the vendor.
F4: The Mayor and his Policy and Budget Director knew that Norcal was willing to take less than $11.25 million, but the Mayor chose not to negotiate, and the Mayor did not advise the Council that Norcal would take less than the $11.25 million. Further, the City Manager and Director of Environmental Services were authorized to negotiate with Norcal, but they made no effort to negotiate a lower settlement before the Council voted to approve the $11.25 million reimbursement. The Grand Jury observed that the Mayor and Councilmembers received contributions from Norcal and CWS, but could not determine what might have motivated the City’s actions.
Recomendaciones relacionadas (2)
R1: The San Jose City Council should retain the services of a special investigator to: (a) Determine if the Mayor and/or the Mayor’s Policy and Budget Director or other key City employees violated San Jose’s Charter, Municipal Code, Independent Judgment Policy, ordinance, or any state code; (b) Determine if the Council’s vote to pay Norcal $11.25 million constituted a gift of public funds; (c) Determine if a reprimand, censure, or other sanction should be recommended against the Mayor, his Policy and Budget Director, or other key employees of the City of San Jose, if any are found to have acted inappropriately; and 24 (d) Conduct an open hearing wherein the Mayor, his Policy and Budget Director, the City Attorney, the City Manager, the Director of Environmental Services, the members of the Council, and other key employees of the City of San Jose will be asked questions under oath by the special investigator to ascertain what they knew, when they knew it, and what actions they took. If such conduct is inappropriate, the special investigator should recommend what reprimand, censure, or other sanctions to impose.
R4: In addition to the steps detailed under Recommendation 1, the special investigator should determine why the City Council chose to pay the entire $11.25 million to Norcal rather than, at a minimum, trying to settle for a lesser amount. The special investigator should: (a) Determine if some influence, such as political contributions from Norcal, CWS, their employees, and the Teamsters, played a role in the conduct of the Mayor or the Councilmembers who voted in favor of the $11.25 million payment; and (b) Determine if a reprimand, censure, or other sanction should be recommended against the Mayor, his Policy and Budget Director, other key employees, or the members of the Council who voted in favor of paying Norcal the $11.25 million, should any be found to have acted inappropriately.
F5: The October 6, 2000 meeting was initiated and chaired by the Mayor and it was held at the Mayor’s conference room at City Hall. The Mayor made it clear to the Norcal and CWS representatives that he wanted labor peace and he wanted the Teamsters to represent the CWS workers. It appears that the Mayor’s intervention on behalf of the Teamsters may have been a violation of federal and/or state labor law. 26
Recomendaciones relacionadas (2)
R1: The San Jose City Council should retain the services of a special investigator to: (a) Determine if the Mayor and/or the Mayor’s Policy and Budget Director or other key City employees violated San Jose’s Charter, Municipal Code, Independent Judgment Policy, ordinance, or any state code; (b) Determine if the Council’s vote to pay Norcal $11.25 million constituted a gift of public funds; (c) Determine if a reprimand, censure, or other sanction should be recommended against the Mayor, his Policy and Budget Director, or other key employees of the City of San Jose, if any are found to have acted inappropriately; and 24 (d) Conduct an open hearing wherein the Mayor, his Policy and Budget Director, the City Attorney, the City Manager, the Director of Environmental Services, the members of the Council, and other key employees of the City of San Jose will be asked questions under oath by the special investigator to ascertain what they knew, when they knew it, and what actions they took. If such conduct is inappropriate, the special investigator should recommend what reprimand, censure, or other sanctions to impose.
R5: The special investigator (see Recommendation 1) should determine if the Mayor violated federal and/or state labor laws and, if so, report the result to the appropriate authorities.
F6: The current Councilmembers who were part of the Council in September 2000, and who were interviewed by the Grand Jury, acknowledged that they never read the documents pertaining to Norcal’s history and Norcal’s reply to the Request for Proposal, and, as a result, were unaware of Norcal’s problematic history in San Bernardino County.
Recomendaciones relacionadas (2)
R6: Councilmembers should be required to review staff reports pertaining to long-term contracts involving millions of dollars of public funds. Each Councilmember should sign a check-off sheet to verify that: (a) they received the staff report; and (b) they reviewed and considered it prior to voting.
R7: When a new Councilmember is elected, and thereafter a vote is to be taken on a contract in excess of one million dollars that has been previously discussed and voted on, the new Councilmember should be required to review the prior staff reports and the prior minutes, and file a statement with the City Clerk that the prior staff reports and minutes have been reviewed.
F7: The current Councilmembers who were not part of the Council in September 2000, and who were interviewed by the Grand Jury, acknowledged that they never read the documents pertaining to Norcal’s history and Norcal’s reply to the RFP, and, as a result, were unaware of Norcal’s problematic history in San Bernardino County.
Recomendaciones relacionadas (2)
R6: Councilmembers should be required to review staff reports pertaining to long-term contracts involving millions of dollars of public funds. Each Councilmember should sign a check-off sheet to verify that: (a) they received the staff report; and (b) they reviewed and considered it prior to voting.
R7: When a new Councilmember is elected, and thereafter a vote is to be taken on a contract in excess of one million dollars that has been previously discussed and voted on, the new Councilmember should be required to review the prior staff reports and the prior minutes, and file a statement with the City Clerk that the prior staff reports and minutes have been reviewed.
F8: Between January 2000 and December 31, 2004, every Councilmember received political contributions, including from Norcal. 27
Recomendaciones relacionadas (2)
R4: In addition to the steps detailed under Recommendation 1, the special investigator should determine why the City Council chose to pay the entire $11.25 million to Norcal rather than, at a minimum, trying to settle for a lesser amount. The special investigator should: (a) Determine if some influence, such as political contributions from Norcal, CWS, their employees, and the Teamsters, played a role in the conduct of the Mayor or the Councilmembers who voted in favor of the $11.25 million payment; and (b) Determine if a reprimand, censure, or other sanction should be recommended against the Mayor, his Policy and Budget Director, other key employees, or the members of the Council who voted in favor of paying Norcal the $11.25 million, should any be found to have acted inappropriately.
R8: Prior to any vote on a contract in excess of one million dollars involving any party or entity that has contributed to one or more of the members of the City Council, the City Clerk’s office should prepare a staff report that identifies the names and affiliations of the contributors, the names of the recipients, and the dates and amounts of the contributions. This staff report should be available prior to any discussion or consideration of such proposed contract.
F9: The Mayor and/or his Policy and Budget Director received several relevant communications from Norcal, CWS and Teamsters. The Mayor and his Policy and Budget Director had a duty to disclose and provide those documents to the Council, but failed to do so.
Recomendaciones relacionadas (3)
R1: The San Jose City Council should retain the services of a special investigator to: (a) Determine if the Mayor and/or the Mayor’s Policy and Budget Director or other key City employees violated San Jose’s Charter, Municipal Code, Independent Judgment Policy, ordinance, or any state code; (b) Determine if the Council’s vote to pay Norcal $11.25 million constituted a gift of public funds; (c) Determine if a reprimand, censure, or other sanction should be recommended against the Mayor, his Policy and Budget Director, or other key employees of the City of San Jose, if any are found to have acted inappropriately; and 24 (d) Conduct an open hearing wherein the Mayor, his Policy and Budget Director, the City Attorney, the City Manager, the Director of Environmental Services, the members of the Council, and other key employees of the City of San Jose will be asked questions under oath by the special investigator to ascertain what they knew, when they knew it, and what actions they took. If such conduct is inappropriate, the special investigator should recommend what reprimand, censure, or other sanctions to impose.
R9: When the Mayor’s office or any Councilmember receives written communications from a vendor, a lobbyist or union representative involving a planned contract or existing contract in excess of one million dollars, the Mayor or Councilmember should assure that copies of all such communications are provided in a timely fashion to the City Clerk, who will have the responsibility to provide copies to every member of the Council.
R10: When the Mayor’s office authors written communications to a vendor, a lobbyist or union representative involving a planned contract or existing contract in excess of one million dollars, the Mayor’s office shall ensure that copies of all such communications, and any responses thereto, are provided in a timely fashion to the City Clerk, who will have the responsibility to provide copies to every member of the Council. 28
F10: The Mayor’s Policy and Budget Director authored several communications to Norcal and CWS. Copies of those communications apparently were not provided to the Council prior to the Council’s vote.
Recomendaciones relacionadas (2)
R9: When the Mayor’s office or any Councilmember receives written communications from a vendor, a lobbyist or union representative involving a planned contract or existing contract in excess of one million dollars, the Mayor or Councilmember should assure that copies of all such communications are provided in a timely fashion to the City Clerk, who will have the responsibility to provide copies to every member of the Council.
R10: When the Mayor’s office authors written communications to a vendor, a lobbyist or union representative involving a planned contract or existing contract in excess of one million dollars, the Mayor’s office shall ensure that copies of all such communications, and any responses thereto, are provided in a timely fashion to the City Clerk, who will have the responsibility to provide copies to every member of the Council. 28
F11: The three Councilmembers from Districts 1, 4 and 8 are commended for their efforts in opposing the increased payments to Norcal. These three Councilmembers demonstrated exceptional integrity and courage in voicing their concerns, in criticizing the Mayor’s conduct, and in attempting to save the City $11.25 million.
Recomendaciones adicionales 1

No vinculadas a hallazgos específicos.

R11: None. PASSED and ADOPTED by the Santa Clara County Civil Grand Jury on this 26th day of May 2005. ________________________________ Michael A. Smith Foreperson 29
Hallazgos & Recomendaciones 1 hallazgos
F1: The Social Services Agency is not aggressive in pursuing fraud. The County ranks among the lowest counties in pursuing fraud and among the highest in fraud dollar overpayments. SSA caseworkers lack incentive to deny benefits to welfare applicants, and are less aggressive than their statewide counterparts in referring cases for fraud investigation. The authority and accountability for investigating welfare recipient dishonesty reside in the Special Investigative Unit of the Office of the District Attorney, while the funding for and direction for the fraud investigation activities reside in the organizationally separate SSA. Properly tailored in-home visits for welfare applicants have survived recent legal challenges to their constitutionality.
Recomendaciones relacionadas (2)
R1A: The Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors should direct the Social Services Agency to make available to the Special Investigative Unit all pertinent information regarding welfare applicants who have been accepted by SSA and are in the process of receiving benefits and/or assistance.
R1B: The Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors should direct the Social Services Agency to develop a memorandum of understanding with the Office of the District Attorney that would establish: (1) a protocol designed to comply with legal requirements for in-home 12 visits to be conducted unobtrusively at the discretion of SIU investigators after eligibility has been decided and assistance begun by SSA; and (2) an allocation to SIU of a standardized amount (such as 1%) of SSA’s annual budget to assure appropriate funding for the operations of SIU. PASSED and ADOPTED by the Santa Clara County Civil Grand Jury on this 26th day of May 2005. ________________________________ Michael A. Smith Foreperson 13
Hallazgos & Recomendaciones 4 hallazgos
F1: Until the end of 2004, the County Communications Department’s 9-1-1 information technology infrastructure relied on hardware and software already obsolete in the late 1990s. The upgrade of the Computer-Aided Public Safety System, in the planning stages since the mid-1990s, took much too long. This delay exposed County residents to the possibility of a failure in a critical service.
Recomendaciones relacionadas (1)
R1: The County Executive and Chief Information Officer should ensure that an inventory of indispensable (mission-critical) IT systems exists covering all County departments and service providers. This inventory should be reviewed regularly to be sure all systems: • Are operating efficiently and with professional supervision; • Are based on modern and maintainable hardware, software, communications, and security technologies; • Have fully functional plans for system backups and contingency replacements in place; and • Pose acceptable risks for maintaining effective and continuous operation of mission-critical County services. The evaluation criteria should include a periodic comparison of features, performance, and cost-effectiveness of alternative systems available in the commercial marketplace or from other governmental providers.
F2: The decision to develop the replacement CAPSS system in-house, as opposed to considering alternative commercial-off-the-shelf systems or contracted development, appears to be flawed. The consultant, whose study was used as background and justification for the “build” decision, did not document any detailed evaluation of capabilities and costs of alternative systems to justify this decision objectively. The CAPSS system, developed over the past six years, does appear to work reliably and with full function. However, the consequences of deciding on an in-house development leave the County exposed to the full range of risks inherent in this kind of idiosyncratic system. For example, the full cost of maintenance must be borne locally, the departure of key personnel exposes the County to risks of inadequate maintenance and support, it may be hard to attract professional IT staff to work on a one-of-a-kind local system, and the system may fall behind in terms of technology because of lack of investment by the County in on-going development. The delays in completing this system to date mean that it is based on already outdated software technology. 13
Recomendaciones relacionadas (1)
R2: The Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors and County Executive should institute immediately a county-wide requirement to justify in detail any decision to build, operate, and maintain in-house a mission-critical software system or service. It should be expected that the most common approach will be to purchase commercial-off-the-shelf systems and services wherever possible. Any decision to approve an in-house solution should be revisited regularly, on a time scale appropriate to the evolution of relevant technologies, to revalidate such an in-house implementation decision.
F3: The management of the project to upgrade the IT infrastructure of the County 9-1-1 dispatch operation does not conform either to industry standards for prudent software engineering practice or to the current standards used by the County CIO in projects controlled centrally. While a collection of memos and documents related to system development exists, there are no formal system and interface specification documents, design documents, development milestone schedules, testing and rollout plans, or total system cost accounting. The project appears to have overlooked the impact that Year 2000 information technology upgrades would have on its schedule. New programmers on the project, who replace the key developers who recently retired, must study the system code to understand the system and perform their functions of supporting, maintaining, and extending the system.
Recomendaciones relacionadas (1)
R3: The County CIO has already established project management and software engineering standards for information technology projects that come directly under his control. These standards should be mandatory for any other mission-critical information technology projects that may be delegated by the CIO to be managed directly under other autonomous County Departments. There should be no exceptions to the enforcement of software engineering practices that conform to best practices in commercial software development and service enterprises.
F4: The County Executive and the Communications Department appear to lack a clear commitment to the Silicon Valley Regional Interoperability Project and its evaluation of Internet-based technologies to try to achieve better interoperation and information-sharing among emergency response services. The County 9-1-1 service, while highly professional in the services it offers, appears to operate within a limited scope of providing the services within its mandate, to the exclusion of providing longer range vision, leadership, and collaboration to other jurisdictions and agencies in the region. 14
Recomendaciones relacionadas (1)
R4: The Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors and the County Executive should reaffirm their commitment to information-sharing, infrastructure-sharing, system-interoperation, and collaboration among all emergency service providers in the County and region. This commitment should include the County taking an active leadership and coordinating role in on-going projects such as the Silicon Valley Regional Interoperability Project and in initiating other efforts seeking to develop more responsive, reliable, integrated, and cost-effective approaches to providing emergency public safety response capabilities, including the possible consolidation of some of the current 13 separate 9-1-1 operations in the County. The County should take an active role in seeking state and/or federal funding to facilitate such projects. PASSED and ADOPTED by the Santa Clara County Civil Grand Jury on this 18th day of May 2005. ________________________________ Michael A. Smith Foreperson 15
Hallazgos & Recomendaciones 5 hallazgos
F1: Among the major health care providers in the County, Santa Clara Valley Health and Hospital System stands alone in not having top management commitment to move aggressively in implementing an integrated EHR system. The Executive Director of SCVHHS asserts that “there are no significant benefits to an EHR and there have been no known successful implementations of EHRs locally or nationally.” To the contrary, the Grand Jury is aware of successful EHR implementations almost everywhere one looks locally, nationally, and internationally and there are many studies that have documented successful implementations and benefits of EHRs. The Grand Jury believes that by taking a more aggressive approach, the patients who use SCVHHS each year (632,000 outpatients and 117,000 inpatients) will benefit because there will be fewer medical errors, more efficient healthcare, and better management tools to ensure long-range savings to County taxpayers.
Recomendaciones relacionadas (1)
R1: The Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors should direct the Executive Director of SCVHHS and his staff to visit local healthcare organizations that are implementing EHRs and to review the current medical literature that clearly documents the value of EHRs. Decisions about implementing an EHR for SCVHHS facilities should be based on up-to- date, objective information. An objective, outside advisory group, drawn from local experts at Palo Alto Medical Foundation, Sutter Healthcare, Kaiser Permanente, and El Camino Hospital, and including other outside subject matter experts might be effective in collecting and assessing relevant information to help guide SCVHHS decisions about an EHR. 13
F2: The County healthcare system is in an excellent position to take a leadership role in working toward the development of interoperable EHR systems among County and regional providers. The Executive Director of SCVHHS has stated an explicit unwillingness and/or an inability to take on such a leadership role.
Recomendaciones relacionadas (1)
R2: If the Executive Director of SCVHHS is unwilling or unable to bring the County into a leadership role in the region, the Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors should direct that this role be delegated to an individual who will have the authority and resources needed to undertake such a responsibility, including authority over SCVHHS EHR efforts.
F3: Despite the reservations of the Executive Director of SCVHHS, a number of efforts are currently underway within SCVHHS, DOC, Probation Department, and Social Services Agency to implement partial EHR systems, several without the knowledge or interest of key members of the senior management team at SCVHHS. The management of these efforts is chaotic – the projects are largely uncoordinated and the Grand Jury could find no documented long-range vision or integrated plan for these projects. The Grand Jury believes this managerial neglect is a recipe for long-term failure – in fact the County seems headed for one of the most inefficient, costly, and failure-prone approaches possible by doing nothing to coordinate efforts and letting each local stakeholder and organization with an immediate need implement their own idiosyncratic system.
Recomendaciones relacionadas (3)
R3a: to develop an appropriate phased plan and “fast track” it through development and implementation. The urgent healthcare needs of groups like adult inmates must be factored into the phasing of implementation plans. In the future, the task force must work effectively and proactively to understand the business needs of the parts of the healthcare enterprise and to work cooperatively to meet those needs based on negotiated priorities.
R3A: The Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors should direct the County Executive to ensure that the SCVHHS Executive Director, the County CIO, and other relevant County leadership form a comprehensive task force to define, plan, coordinate, implement, and fund an interoperating set of EHR systems that encompass the needs of all of the SCVHHS patient population. The scope of this planning should include inpatient care, outpatient care, inmate care, mental health care, drug and alcohol care, and public health. The taskforce should include a wide range of subject matter expert consultants from both inside and outside SCVHHS to ensure that the system(s) meet end user needs. The leadership group must have backing from the BOS affirming that the program is critical in the short- and long-term for the well-being of patients and for the more effective management of the SCVHHS healthcare enterprise. 14
R3B: The Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors should direct the task force identified in
F4: The current “incremental” approach being taken by the SCVHHS CIO to developing SCVHHS EHR technology is ineffective, costly, and slow. This approach appears to be the result of limited management support, limited resources, and correspondingly limited goals of the SCVHHS CIO. Other local healthcare enterprises, such as Palo Alto Medical Foundation, Sutter Healthcare, El Camino Hospital, and Kaiser Permanente, are moving energetically and successfully to implement fully re-engineered EHR systems based on modern vendor technologies.
Recomendaciones relacionadas (1)
R4: The Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors should direct the SCVHHS CIO, in conjunction with the enterprise EHR task force outlined in Recommendation 3a, to revisit current EHR design plans and reconfirm that they are rooted in systems, computer, and communications technologies appropriate for today, not the 1990s. Top management, including the BOS, should not require as a design condition of this effort that the vendor choices made ten years ago be maintained.
F5: Despite its overall criticism directed toward SCVHHS senior management, the Grand Jury would like to acknowledge that there are several noteworthy efforts at developing EHR components underway at SCVHHS. The systems implemented by Pharmacy Services of SCVHHS are one such example. Another is the planning for an inmate healthcare record system under the Associate Director for Custodial Healthcare Services and County CIO. Finally, in spite of limitations noted in this report, the partial EHR implemented for SCVHHS inpatient and outpatient care incorporates a number of good ideas and has made progress despite limited management support. 15
Recomendaciones relacionadas (1)
R5: The Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors should direct the task force identified in
Hallazgos & Recomendaciones 4 hallazgos
F1: Security of the James Ranch is compromised because no barrier controls are in place to prevent a juvenile housed at the facility from escaping into the nearby neighborhoods. The reported increase in the severity of juvenile crime of the James Ranch residents is an adequate basis for Probation to re-evaluate its no-barrier philosophy for the James Ranch. Area residents concerned for the safety of their families due to escapes by juvenile offenders housed at the James Ranch have started a grassroots organization to participate in dialogues with Probation, law enforcement and County officials.
Recomendaciones relacionadas (2)
R1A: The Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors should review options and funding to enhance security of the James Ranch, monitor the use of the recently approved Global Positioning System, and, if use of GPS does not prove successful in deterring escapes, consider alternatives such as a perimeter fence.
R1B: Probation should continue to sponsor regularly scheduled, well-publicized community outreach programs with residents of Morgan Hill neighborhoods adjacent to, and in the vicinity of, the James Ranch.
F2: Since no fencing is currently in place to prevent escapes by James Ranch juveniles, a temporary contract with the Sheriff provides added security inside and outside the James Ranch facility. Extra James Ranch staff has also been added to augment security by providing more personnel to detect and discourage escape attempts.
Recomendaciones relacionadas (2)
R2A: The Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors should secure funding and extend the contract with the Sheriff to provide full-time deputies to patrol the James Ranch property and vicinity.
R2B: Probation should keep in place the additional staff already allocated to the James Ranch so that the heightened internal security measures at the James Ranch can be sustained.
F3: Limited funds allocated to Probation by the Board of Supervisors make it difficult to implement new juvenile programs such as rehabilitation methods similar to the “Missouri Model”.
Recomendaciones relacionadas (2)
R3A: The Board of Supervisors should direct Probation to seek alternate funding sources, such as private endowments, partnership grants and the Federal government, to cover the 12 cost of enhancements to security and to facilitate the implementation of programs to rehabilitate juveniles housed at the James Ranch, including aftercare programs once the juveniles are released back into the community.
R3B: To improve the chance of success of program implementation, the Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors should provide funding for increased training of Probation staff so they become more knowledgeable and proficient in the core skills relating to their juvenile rehabilitation duties. Orientation sessions for incoming juveniles should be intensified and supervised by staff trained in juvenile rehabilitation.
F4: Programs are currently structured and limited to 120 days for juveniles sent to the James Ranch for rehabilitation.
Recomendaciones relacionadas (1)
R4: Probation should request the extension of treatment/rehabilitation programs at the James Ranch to range from 120 days up to 240 days, allowing additional rehabilitation time to enhance the potential for a more promising positive outcome for the juveniles enrolled in these programs. PASSED and ADOPTED by the Santa Clara County Civil Grand Jury on this 5th day of May, 2005. ________________________________ Michael A. Smith Foreperson 13
Recomendaciones adicionales 1

No vinculadas a hallazgos específicos.

R71-01: degA selinevuJ 000,1 rep stserrA latoT Figure 5: Overall National Juvenile Crime Index – Total Arrests per 1,000 Juveniles Ages 10-17 As shown in Figure 6, the overall national index of juvenile violent crime increased from about 3.1 per 1,000 arrests in the early 1980s to peak at about 5.3 per 1,000 in 1994 (a 71% increase). Since 1994, the juvenile violent crime index has dropped to a rate of about 2.7 per 1,000 (a 49% decrease), which is below the rate of the early 1980s. The proportion of murders among juvenile violent crimes peaked in 1993 at 2.9% and then dropped to 1.2% in 2003 — the lowest level since 1980. The proportion of forcible rapes among juvenile arrests for violent crimes peaked in 1986 at 6.7% and had fallen to 4.6% in 2003. The proportion of robberies among juvenile arrests for violent crimes had fallen from a high of 50.1% in 1980 to 27.8% in 2003. In contrast, the proportion of aggravated assaults among juvenile arrests for violent crimes had risen steadily from about 43% in 1980 to 66.4% in 2003. The proportion of Property Crime Index offenses among all juveniles arrested fell from 35% in 1980 to 21% in 2003. 6.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 8

Hallazgos y recomendaciones aún no extraídos.

Hallazgos & Recomendaciones 5 hallazgos
F1: The fee charged by ROV for a school board candidate's Statement on the Sample Ballot is a financial hardship, and, in some cases, a disincentive for potential candidates to run.
Recomendaciones relacionadas (2)
R1A: The Board of Supervisors should review its current policy of mandating that ROV recoup all costs from the school board candidates. Recouping the total costs of publishing candidates’ Statements in the Sample Ballot should not be the primary criterion for determining fees. The Board, in conjunction with ROV, should investigate more creative solutions such as a flat fee or a fee based on a reasonable percentage of school board compensation.
R1B: ROV should make its pre-election estimate of candidates’ fees based on four candidates per page instead of two.
F2: School board candidates from the lowest income districts often had to pay the highest fees for placing a Statement on the ballot.
Recomendaciones relacionadas (1)
R2: See Recommendation 1A.
F3: Many in the general public have a negative perception of those school board candidates who do not publish a Statement in the Sample Ballot. In addition, the public is often not aware that a large fee is involved.
Recomendaciones relacionadas (2)
R3A: In lieu of a candidate’s Statement, the Sample Ballot should contain a generic notice that the candidate declined to pay the fee necessary for publication of the Statement and refer the reader to the League of Women Voters website, www.smartvoter.org. 11
R3B: ROV should modify its webpage to refer the voter to the League of Women Voters website at www.smartvoter.org for further information on candidates. An effective way to accomplish this would be to place the link to www.smartvoter.org in a more prominent position on the ROV website instead of at the bottom of the "Candidate Profiles" page.
F4: School board candidates pay a disproportionate share for their Statement (on average over 50% of any annual compensation) while other elected County officials, such as Board of Supervisors, Sheriff, District Attorney and Assessor are exempt from this Statement fee and only pay one percent of their starting annual compensation as a filing fee. This exemption is based on the current voter-approved County Charter.
Recomendaciones relacionadas (1)
R4: At the time of future Charter review, the fee exemption provision should be reviewed to determine if a change should be recommended to either remove the existing exemptions or to add exemptions for other offices.
F5: The cost for a Statement has escalated due to the federal requirement for ROV to print ballots in as many as five different languages. The Grand Jury notes that ROV is innovatively and aggressively addressing the higher costs associated with multiple languages.
Recomendaciones relacionadas (1)
R5: ROV, based on its Voter Language Survey, should continue to explore its legal options to reduce printing/translation/mailing costs while still meeting federal requirements. PASSED and ADOPTED by the Santa Clara County Civil Grand Jury on this 7th day of April, 2005. ________________________________ Michael A. Smith Foreperson 13
Hallazgos & Recomendaciones 2 hallazgos
FI: A process to ensure timely reporting of information from the LPJUSD to the COC has been established. The COC is now receiving financial reports from the LPJUSD in a timely manner.
FII: When this investigation was initiated, the LPJUSD website was out of date. The relevant parts pertaining to Measure K have now been updated.
Hallazgos & Recomendaciones 4 hallazgos
F1: Access to the vast majority of the vocational/industrial classes at Elmwood is not available to female inmates. While the DOC Inmate Programs-Unit Directory of Classes indicates that classes are open to all minimum security inmates, the investigation has revealed that female inmates are not given the opportunity to participate in almost 90% of the vocational/industrial classes (see Table 1).
Recomendaciones relacionadas (1)
R1: DOC and MUSD should work together to more fairly allocate available resources to achieve gender parity in vocational/industrial course offerings and access for all minimum security inmates.
F2: DOC does not allow female inmates equal access to vocational/industrial classes provided by MUSD, which is a recipient of funds for Institutionalized Adults at Elmwood. This denial is a possible violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681. 7
Recomendaciones relacionadas (1)
R2: DOC should recognize MUSD’s legal responsibility to conform to the provisions of Title IX and should provide the necessary resources and facilities to ensure compliance with Title IX.
F3: A disproportionate focus on substance abuse classes prevents female inmates from engaging in vocational/industrial classes.
Recomendaciones relacionadas (1)
R3: DOC should work to balance the requirements of substance abuse programs, mandated by the courts, with vocational/industrial classes for female inmates. The existing richness of the course offerings and the balance between substance abuse training and vocational/industrial training for male inmates appears to be good. The program for female inmates should be upgraded to be comparable in all respects to the program for male inmates.
F4: Substantially more monies from the IWF were used in 2004 to fund expenses for DOC salaries and benefits than in earlier years. In FY 2003, the rate of salary/overhead withdrawals was 45%. This rate rose, in the Grand Jury’s opinion, to an unacceptable level of 99% in FY 2004, resulting in a 70% cut in IWF funds for inmate programs and thereby jeopardizing their overall effectiveness.
Recomendaciones relacionadas (2)
R4A: In fairness, the IWF Committee should limit salary and overhead withdrawals from the IWF to an amount not greater than 50% of the total income before expenses.
R4B: Inmates should have greater advocacy on the IWF Committee A representative from DOC involved in inmate programs or vocational/industrial training should be a member of the IWF Committee. PASSED and ADOPTED by the Santa Clara County Civil Grand Jury on this 13th day of January 2005. ________________________________ Michael A. Smith Foreperson 8

Hallazgos y recomendaciones aún no extraídos.

Hallazgos & Recomendaciones 1 hallazgos
F1: Guidelines for taser training, usage and tracking are not coordinated among law enforcement agencies in Santa Clara County.
Recomendaciones relacionadas (2)
R1a: Law enforcement agencies in Santa Clara County should create a professional forum which meets on a regular basis to share and evaluate agency training and experience with tasers.
R1b: Law enforcement agencies in Santa Clara County should establish defined protocols and guidelines for using tasers, including tracking any use of tasers. PASSED and ADOPTED by the Santa Clara County Civil Grand Jury on this 28th day of April 2005. ________________________________ Michael A. Smith Foreperson 4
Hallazgos & Recomendaciones 3 hallazgos
F1: An agreement was authorized under proper authority of the Council for the joint use of dedicated City park property with the PAUSD allowing exclusive use of the four tennis courts contiguous to Terman Middle School and playing fields during certain hours of the school day. Subsequently, the City authorized the expansion and reconfiguration of two of those tennis courts into basketball courts. The process for defining and implementing the Joint Use Agreement appears to have evolved in an ad hoc fashion. 5
Recomendaciones relacionadas (1)
R1: It is recommended that the City create, adopt, and enforce a City policy that any agreements to share dedicated parkland must explicitly specify the terms of use and the conditions for access by the general public. Further, the agreement should include public posting of such use and access regulations at entrances to the shared parkland.
F2: Dedicated Rinconada parkland was transferred to the PAUSD by Council Ordinance instead of by a vote of the electorate as required by the Charter.
Recomendaciones relacionadas (1)
R2: The City should adhere to its Charter requiring an affirmative vote by the electorate for any transfer, disposal, abandonment or discontinuance of use of City parkland. Alternatively, that provision of the Charter could be modified by a vote of the electorate as prescribed by the Charter.
F3: The PAUSD located and constructed buildings on dedicated City parkland at Rinconada Park, causing an illegal encroachment.
Recomendaciones relacionadas (1)
R3: Any construction, reconstruction or development adjacent to dedicated City parkland should be designed and implemented to conform with a certified site survey to prevent any future encroachments. PASSED and ADOPTED by the Santa Clara County Civil Grand Jury on this 10th day of March, 2005. ________________________________ Michael A. Smith Foreperson 6
Hallazgos & Recomendaciones 3 hallazgos
FI: The CUSD is not legally required to have a policy preventing contributions to individual school foundations or to parent groups from being used for staffing and/or materials costs at individual schools. 3
FII: The CUSD encourages individual school foundations and parent groups to contribute to staffing and/or materials costs at individual schools.
FIII: The CUSD enrolls students from other districts into its alternative programs according to the rules governing such enrollments.