San Francisco County Grand Jury

2002-2003

10 reports

Findings and recommendations not yet extracted.

Findings & Recommendations 7 findings
F1: In passing the Ordinance, the Board has relied only on disparity studies (or other statistics) and anecdotal evidence to establish that the City has actively or passively discriminated against MBE/WBEs, and not on evidence of actual incidents of discrimination by the City.
Related Recommendations (2)
R1: The Human Rights Commission should comply with the Minority Business Ordinance by recording instances of discriminatory conduct by the City. If it cannot demonstrate instances of discrimination by the City, the Board of Supervisors should consider alternatives to renewing the MBE/WBE ordinance, such as instituting a local economically disadvantaged business enterprise program.
R1c: may be stored and retrieved for statistical and reporting purposes.
F2: There exist no records or evidence of specific incidents of discrimination that identify wrongful conduct by the City. There exist no documents that describe discriminatory 10 conduct by the City. There exist no documents describing what the City has done to remedy any supposed discriminatory conduct.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2: All HRC functions related to post-award contract compliance should be transferred to the Office of Contract Administration.
F3: It is difficult to rectify wrongful conduct without knowing what that conduct is. HRC has not done so although discrimination in City contracting purportedly has occurred over and over, year after year, for 19 consecutive years.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3: Price quotes given by available MBE/WBEs exceed competitive levels beyond amounts attributable to costs inflated by the present effects of discrimination. (Sec. 12.D.A.(17)E-G.) Enforcement Provisions • If the Director has reason to believe that a contractor, acting in good faith, has failed to comply with “the race and/or gender-conscious requirements” of the Ordinance, she notifies the department that awarded the contract, and attempts to resolve non-compliance issues through conciliation. If the conciliation process fails, the department may impose sanctions against the contractor, which might include: 9 a) refusal to grant the award of contract; b) an order suspending the contract; c) an order withholding funds; d) an order revising the contract due to material breach, or e) disqualification from eligibility from City contracts for a period not to exceed five years. (Secs. 12D.A.9(A)(7), 12D.A.16(B).) • In cases in which the Director believes that the contractor has acted willfully and in bad faith in failing to comply with the Ordinance, she may, after an investigation and hearing, impose sanctions for violations that may include: a) declaring the contractor non-responsive and ineligible to receive the award; b) declaring the contractor ineligible to bid on City contracts for a five-year period; c) revoking the certification of the business if it is an MBE/WEB, or d) assessing liquidated damages, pursuant to a liquidated damages clause that is present in each contract awarded under the ordinance. (Secs. 12D.A.16(C), 12D.A.9(D)(3).) D. The City Works Actively To Combat Discrimination and Remedy the Past Effects of Discrimination. • In addition to the creation of the HRC itself, the City has established other programs to foster the participation of minorities and women in City contracting. Among these steps are: o A financial assistance program to enable small firms to obtain bonding o Community outreach on an ongoing basis o Pre-bid conferences at which MBEs/WBEs can meet prime contractors and learn about City procedures o Administrative proceedings when bad faith or non-compliance is suspected o Audits by the Controller to identify any contractor’s failure to comply with the Ordinance o Adjusting bid bonding and insurance requirements where appropriate o Providing technical assistance to MBEs/WBEs to increase their ability to compete effectively for City contracts o HRC and Controller cooperation to create a system for prompt payment to MBEs/WBEs o Inviting joint ventures to promote MBE/WBE participation.
F4: Without documentation it cannot be determined whether the underutilization of MBE/WBE contractors reflected in the disparity studies is attributable to discrimination by the City, or rather is attributable to non-discriminatory causes such as lack of availability, lack of capacity, lack of funding, lack of interest, waiver, lack of insurability, or other causes.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4: if the failure to achieve the goals was at all due to the conduct of the department head, project manager, or any other City employee, or any contractor employed by the City, an identification of the person involved, a description of the conduct at issue, the remedial steps taken, and the impact of such conduct upon MBE/WBE participation, or the goals set for such participation. 1d. The City should establish a software program in which the data recorded under Recommendation 1c may be stored and retrieved for statistical and reporting purposes.
F5: Although the courts accept disparity studies to support an inference of discrimination, without identifying and discovering the cause of the actual instances of discrimination purported to occur by the City, the problem will not be solved.
F6: The HRC’s explanation for the lack of any records of instances of discrimination by the City – that it successfully resolves discrimination through conference and conciliation – is inconsistent with the assertion that the City continues to discriminate. If the HRC is able to prevent discriminatory conduct from adversely affecting MBEs/WBEs, then it is natural that there would be no records of discriminatory conduct by City officials. If, however, the HRC believes that discrimination persists, then its failure to record instances of discrimination is less understandable.
F7: If utilization of MBE and WBE contractors is so low (for example, 22% of the goals set by the HRC), a discriminatory cause should be easy to discern and substantiate if one exists.
Findings & Recommendations 8 findings
F1: Helicopters are essential to adequate disaster response.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1: The Mayor and the Director of Emergency Services should create an integrated and comprehensive structure for emergency planning, assure inter-agency communications, and provide emergency training on an ongoing basis. The Mayor should participate in the planning and communications of Emergency Services, and communicate to all city departments the high priority it holds in his or her administration.
F2: Coordinated and comprehensive emergency planning has not occurred on a continuing basis. An unofficial group of department heads, the Kawa-Harrington group, has come into existence to fill the resulting void. 7
Related Recommendations (1)
R2: The Mayor should reconvene the Disaster Council, which has not met since October 2001, and it should review and approve departmental emergency plans.
F3: Involvement of department heads and elected officers in emergency planning through the Disaster Council is necessary if City departments are to assume responsibility and devote the departmental time, resources, and personnel necessary to train for and carry out the response activities called for in the integrated City emergency plan. Their involvement is also essential if they are to recognize the need to prepare and maintain their own departmental response plans on an ongoing basis. This goal cannot be achieved if the Disaster Council does not meet regularly, if the members of the Council do not represent all key personnel involved emergency response, or if neither the City emergency plan nor department plans are reviewed and updated continuously.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3: All City departments involved in emergency response should adopt the Incident Command System.
F4: Members of the Board of Supervisors may be required to perform significant executive as well as legislative functions in an emergency including serving as Mayor/Commander in Chief; concurring in the declaration of emergency and the actions taken to meet it; amending a declaration of emergency as long as the emergency exists; taking away emergency powers; reviewing the Emergency Declaration every 14 days, and, finally terminating the Emergency Declaration. The Director of Emergency Services has not ensured that members of the Board understand these emergency responsibilities.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4: City departments should conduct annual multi-agency disaster response simulations.
F5: The Director of Emergency Services has failed to meet the regulatory responsibilities imposed by Sections 7.6.l and 7.9 of the San Francisco Administrative Code to develop and maintain an integrated emergency plan that is continuously reviewed.
Related Recommendations (1)
R5: The Director of Emergency Services should annually test recall process that is intended to enable employees of first responder departments to successfully return to San Francisco in an emergency.
F6: All city officials who may assume leadership in a major emergency must be informed of and understand the emergency procedures. Without proper preparation, members of the Board of Supervisors could inadvertently communicate erroneous information to residents or to providers of emergency resources. The failure to ensure that members of the Board receive training and are fully knowledgeable about emergency response plans could have serious negative consequences leading to chaos and disorganization rather than the effective leadership needed most during a major disaster. If the leaders in a city emergency are not knowledgeable about and comply with State mutual aid requirements, the City may not be eligible to receive mutual aid or reimbursement from State and Federal governments for response-related costs under disaster assistance programs.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6: The Mayor’s Office should improve the security of City facilities and assets, and institute proper evacuation plans for all City facilities.
F7: The Mayor through the Director of Emergency Services and the Mayor’s Office of Emergency Services is responsible for ensuring that members of the Board of Supervisors and all City officials with emergency response duties receive adequate training for and understand those duties. The Mayor has not fulfilled this responsibility.
Related Recommendations (2)
R7: As detailed in this report, the City should address the inadequacy of its emergency resources in the following specific areas: communications and technology; shelter, blankets, cots, and food; hazardous materials suits; and helicopters.
R7r: San Francisco should analyze the costs and benefits of securing one or more helicopters and develop a specific proposal for helicopter services, including funding alternatives.
F8: If radio and telephone communications fail in a disaster, HAM radios may be the only mode of communication available.
Related Recommendations (1)
R8: The City should improve its methods of budgeting for emergency response.
Findings & Recommendations 3 findings
F1: Creation and implementation of a security plan and program would lessen the vulnerability of the water system to contamination, terrorism and crime.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1: SECURITY PLANS MUST BE IMPLEMENTED FACTS • SFPUC has contingency plans for operations in an emergency following a natural or man made disaster, but does not have a plan to implement increased security for all parts of its water delivery system. • SFPUC hired the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to conduct the vulnerability assessment mandated by the federal Bioterrorism Act. The Lawrence Livermore Laboratory Vulnerability Assessment was submitted to the EPA and the Office of Homeland Security on March 31, 2003. This was the first security assessment of the entire water system. The risk reduction section of that assessment recommends steps that should be taken to make the SFPUC water system more secure.3 • SFPUC management has denied requests by SFPUC departments for funding for security. The few security upgrades made by SFPUC departments to date have been funded out of existing department operating budgets. For example, the SFPUC city distribution department made security improvements such as installing sensory badge access, re-keying locks and installing fencing. • Although SFPUC has not implemented and has no plan for implementation of comprehensive, system wide, security, it has contracted with the National Park Service to assign rangers, trucks and radios to provide security for the O’Shaughnessy Dam and Hetch Hetchy reservoir. The $300,000 annual cost is paid for out of the existing Hetch Hetchy budget. • The SFPUC budget for fiscal year 2003-2004 includes one security related item – $1.2 million to be spent on lab assistants and equipment to be used in the Water Quality Bureau for screening for contaminants which are either natural or intentional. • In November 2002, the voters approved a $1.6 billion revenue bond measure to fund the SFPUC long-term capital improvement program. The Capital Improvement Plan includes 77 water infrastructure projects designed to replace or repair aging facilities, seismically upgrade facilities, provide safe water in increasing demand, and improve water supply. Those projects, which affect only 60 to 70 percent of the system, will include upgraded security in the design. Because the vulnerability assessment contains sensitive information, the Grand Jury has not detailed specifically identified vulnerabilities of the water delivery system nor the steps recommended by Lawrence Livermore Act to make the system more secure. 5 • SFPUC has recently created a security director position. SFPUC is conducting interviews and expects to fill the position within the next few months.
F2: The Capital Improvement Program does not cover all of the security upgrades that may be needed for the system
F3: A specific budget item for needed security upgrades is needed to ensure that those projects are adequately funded.
Findings & Recommendations 5 findings
F1: The perception that undue influence from outsiders affects DBI operations and that favored, politically well-connected customers receive preferential treatment from DBI managers is in fact true. Further, DBI directors are not committed to eradicating 5 undue influence in the department. Longstanding relationships with outside individuals and organizations influence decisions and actions of DBI personnel at all levels.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1: Eliminate the undue influence of and pr eferential treatment received by certain DBI customers.
F2: DBI directors are not committed to the implementation of measures geared to ensure that no customer is given preferential treatment as to the order in which his or her permit application is processed, and that all customers receive evenhanded and consistent code application during inspections.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2: Institute quality control procedures in bo th Plan Check and Inspection Services divisions of DBI.
F3: An improved permit tracking system, coupled with a system of bar-coding of plans, would enable the department and customers to track each step in the permit and inspection process, identify repeat violators, and reduce the opportunity for preferential treatment of favored customers.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3: Comply with state law by determining t he actual costs of providing services of DBI, and adjust fees accordingly.
F4: The failure to implement an adequate quality control program and to schedule regular intra- and inter-division meetings to discuss code interpretation and application contributes to questionable “discretionary” rulings and inconsistent treatment of customers in both plan check and field inspection. This allows directors and managers to overrule line personnel on behalf of favored customers.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4: Improve management and leadership skills of those in positions of responsibility. OVERVIEW The San Francisco Department of Building Inspection (DBI) serves its “customers” – primarily developers, contractors, and homeowners seeking building or related permits – in a professional and courteous manner. Most permits are issued and inspections conducted promptly with a minimum of bureaucratic inefficiency. A 2001 audit by the Office of the Controller found this, but noted that the department lacked adequate quality control measurement standards and suffered from the perception that undue influence and preferential treatment existed in the way it performed some of its services. The Controller recommended that the department develop a Code of Professional Conduct to guide its employees in the performance of their duties; that the Department develop quality control measures; and that it make changes in the operation of the department to dispel the perception of undue influence. The 2002-2003 Civil Grand Jury investigated DBI operations in its Plan Checking and Building Inspection programs1 to determine whether the perception of undue influence and preferential treatment of favored permit applicants had a basis in fact, whether the Controller’s recommendations had been implemented, and whether actions taken by DBI in response to the Controller’s audit recommendations have been adequate. The Grand Jury also considered other steps DBI can and should take to avoid actual or perceived inequalities in the way its customers are served, and generally to serve them better. The Grand Jury did not investigate the operation of the Housing Inspection Program, which handles code enforcement related to reported code violations in existing buildings with three or more units including transient and residential hotels. The Grand Jury notes, however, that staffing shortages have contributed to a backlog in inspection of residences for illegal units and for unsafe decks and balconies in multiple unit buildings. The investigation confirmed that DBI has many competent employees in managerial and line capacities. Those employees are dedicated to protecting the public, providing equal services to all customers, and to evenhanded code enforcement. Nonetheless, the Grand Jury repeatedly heard from sources inside and outside DBI that the directors (mangers in appointive positions) and some of the managers of departments within the Plan Check and Inspection Services divisions are subject to undue influence from certain segments of the construction industry and that certain customers receive preferential service. This information was corroborated in part by records obtained from DBI. The Grand Jury concludes that undue influence by outsiders over DBI decisions and preferential treatment of some customers is actual, not simply perceived. This favoritism is deeply ingrained in DBI operations and is embraced by some directors and managers. Directors have failed to institute a Code of Professional Conduct, to update the department’s conflict of interest policy, or to impress on employees the importance of giving equally prompt and professional service to all customers. They have not provided employees with a concise, easily understood summary of ethical obligations imposed by state and local laws and regulations that are applicable regardless of the status of the proposed Code of Professional Conduct. Whistleblowers are not assured of protection. Employees are reluctant to report improper conduct because they fear retaliation and ostracism. DBI management has failed to devise adequate quality control measures to be consistently followed throughout the Department. Management has failed to complete the development of a computerized permit and record tracking system that would significantly aid in reducing inadvertent or intentional delays in the processing of permit applications and make preferential and unequal treatment of customers apparent. The Grand Jury has concluded that these failings result from directors and managers at DBI who either lack the competence to make institutional changes in the department or are unwilling or uninterested in doing so. Political, rather than professional considerations in appointments to management positions in DBI may account for individuals who, while technically competent, lack management background and skills. These appointees appear to lack incentive to make administrative changes that are necessary to eradicate outside influence and preferential treatment, which would not be welcomed by those DBI customers whose influence permeates DBI. The Grand Jury recommends that DBI directors prepare and circulate to all employees a simple statement of the ethical rules that should govern their conduct. The director should impress on DBI employees that they are personally committed to these rules and they insist the employees follow these rules without exception. The department should finalize and implement the proposed Code of Professional Conduct. It should immediately implement a new permit tracking system that gives members of the public access to the status of a permit application, including required inspections. Additional in- house training for plan checkers and field inspectors, specific to their duties, should be designed and required. Regular Plan Check and Inspection staff meetings should be instituted to eliminate inconsistent application of codes and regulations. Directors should survey the quality control programs instituted in its Plan Check and Inspection Services divisions and revise them when necessary to ensure that code compliance and public 2 safety have priority equal to the department's dedication to promptness in all aspects of plan checking and inspection.
F5: The City would enjoy enhanced service if DBI were to acquire the technology and equipment necessary to permit remote entry of inspection data directly into the main computer system, train field inspectors in its use, and require them to utilize it.
Findings & Recommendations 4 findings
F1: RPD has failed to comply with the translation requirements of the Equal Access to Facilities regulations. As a result of this failure and the limited publicity about Camp Mather, RPD has not made information about the availability of Camp Mather available to a wide cross-section of San Francisco residents. English speaking residents who see the fliers at RPD sites may become aware of the facility, but many others who either have limited English or do not visit RPD sites and might be interested in Camp Mather are not being reached through RPD’s current publicity.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1: Improve publicity and accessibility to Camp Mather.
F2: Although the reservation lottery appears to be a fair and equitable means of selecting campers from those who apply, the proportion of applications from prior campers to applications from others suggests that in other respects the RPD procedures favor prior campers.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2: RPD, engaging a consultant if necessary, should investigate means by which more San Franciscans can make use of Camp Mather and the camp can generate more revenue. To that end, the investigation should consider raising fees, adding more cabins and tent sites, and extending the camp season. The investigation should also consider rental of the camp to additional private parties. The study should consider both the impact of increased use of Camp Mather the for campers and the impact of use of the campgrounds for activities that draw large crowds.
F3: The low number of campership applications may reflect a failure of RPD to do outreach into low-income communities, and the difficulty in reaching Camp Mather without a private automobile.
F4: The omission from the application form itself of notice that a check and proof of residence and age of children may result in rejection of applications that would otherwise be timely and complete.
Findings & Recommendations 5 findings
F1: A non-punitive truancy mediation program under the direction of the District Attorney’s office would encourage school attendance and eliminate the need for many SST and SART hearings.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1: SFUSD should create the structure and policies necessary to enforce attendance laws.
F2: A Supervisor of Attendance is needed to supervise attendance tracking, record keeping, truancy mediation, SARBs, and district attorney referrals as necessary to enforce compulsory education laws.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2: SFUSD should commence prompt and consistent enforcement of attendance laws, including more systematic use of truancy notices, conferences, and the appropriate cooperation with the District Attorney when necessary.
F3: SFUSD is unable, with its present attendance accounting procedures, to comply with state law governing truancy reporting and enforcement of compulsory education.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3: SFUSD should work with the District Attorney’s office or the Chief Probation Officer to establish a non-punitive truancy mediation program.
F4: Attendance enforcement requires compliance with current truancy accounting that complies with state law.
F5: Attendance monitoring personnel are not adequately instructed and often do not know when a truancy occurs and how to perform necessary record keeping; however, since they have sufficient data collection in place and other required procedures and forms are available, with proper instruction they could start required record keeping and truancy notices in the coming school year.
Related Recommendations (1)
R5: SFPD and SFUSD should increase, not curtail, the number of SROs to serve all middle schools. SRO responsibility should include (1) serving as part of a homeroom team for habitual truants, and (2) having SROs deliver the first written warning for the truant to take home and be signed by a parent or guardian.
Additional Recommendations 1

Not linked to specific findings.

R6: SFUSD should establish attendance award programs in all schools.
Findings & Recommendations 11 findings
F1: Although the Chief of Police has imposed responsibility on Commanding Officers to ensure that personnel under their command promptly serve OCC notices, track the officer’s response, and ensure that MRFS are returned to OCC within the specified time limits, insufficient emphasis has been placed on the importance of doing so. The consequence of this lack of emphasis is investigative delays. 5
Related Recommendations (1)
R3: The SFPD should institute better tracking of OCC investigations so as to minimize the number of complaints dismissed for not being completed within one year, and the Police Commission should exercise more ov ersight to enforce this.
F2: SFPD tolerates officer failure to comply with the General Order concerning prompt return of MRFs. It does not impose discipline for such failures promptly and consistently, and thus SFPD internal practices provide no incentive for officers to comply with an OCC investigation.
F3: SFPD is not complying with the Charter mandate that it provide full cooperation and assistance to OCC in the investigations of citizen complaints (Charter section 4.127).
Related Recommendations (1)
R1: SFPD must adopt procedures to ensure compliance with the City Charter requirement that it cooperate with the OCC and minimize the number of meritorious citizen complaints dismissed as a result of SFPD delays.
F4: Delays in OCC investigations are caused in part by delays in prompt receipt of needed documents from SFPD. These delays contribute to the eventual dismissal of valid citizen complaints because the investigation could not be concluded within one year (Section 3304(d)).
Related Recommendations (1)
R3: The SFPD should institute better tracking of OCC investigations so as to minimize the number of complaints dismissed for not being completed within one year, and the Police Commission should exercise more ov ersight to enforce this.
F5: In some cases, an ongoing SFPD crime investigation might be affected if an OCC investigator were to interview a witness and disclose SFPD investigative material, and that is a legitimate concern. However, many categories of documents that OCC sometimes needs in the course of an investigation of a citizen complaint do not present that threat and can be routinely – and promptly – released to OCC. For example, search and arrest warrants, ballistic reports, forensic reports, crime scene photographs, diagrams, DMV traffic accident report forms and suspension orders, reports of Vehicle Code violations (such as driving without a license or with suspended or revoked license) appear to fall within this category.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2: The SFPD should identify those documents which can be routinely released to OCC so as to speed up OCC investigations.
F6: Prompt, unbiased, and thorough investigation of civilian complaints of improper conduct by on-duty law enforcement officers, and the sure and swift imposition of appropriate sanctions, are crucial to public confidence in and cooperation with peace officers. When meritorious complaints do not result in imposition of discipline, public confidence in its police force and the disciplinary process is eroded.
F7: The dismissal of sustained, presumably meritorious, civilian complaints for untimeliness is due in part to MCD’s handling of OCC’s requests for documents and of sustained complaints.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3: The SFPD should institute better tracking of OCC investigations so as to minimize the number of complaints dismissed for not being completed within one year, and the Police Commission should exercise more ov ersight to enforce this.
F8: Although SFPD recognizes the importance of the civilian complaint process, SFPD and the MCD unit have not made and are reluctant to make changes in their procedures that would avoid the need to dismiss many sustained complaints for untimeliness. 10
Related Recommendations (1)
R3: The SFPD should institute better tracking of OCC investigations so as to minimize the number of complaints dismissed for not being completed within one year, and the Police Commission should exercise more ov ersight to enforce this.
F9: The failure to apply apparently applicable exceptions to the statutory one-year time limit results in unnecessary dismissals of meritorious complaints and to a consequent erosion of public confidence in the civilian complaint process.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1: SFPD must adopt procedures to ensure compliance with the City Charter requirement that it cooperate with the OCC and minimize the number of meritorious citizen complaints dismissed as a result of SFPD delays.
F10: The failure of MCD to generate for itself and the Chief of Police a monthly list of OCC sustained complaints pending in MCD and/or before the Chief for action, with the one-year time limit highlighted, might contribute to inadvertent or intentional delays in acting on those complaints within the time limits, leading to their dismissal.
F11: OCC must maintain its independence from SFPD if the public is to have confidence in the impartiality of its investigations. Nonetheless, cooperation and mutual trust between OCC management and MCD in the handling of sustained complaints are essential to their shared goal of maintaining public confidence in SFPD officers. Any adversarial relationship between OCC and MCD might interfere with the prompt, impartial process of sustained complaints.
Findings & Recommendations 5 findings
F1: Spreading election operations over six main facilities is both undesirable and inefficient. Ballots are handled and moved more often than necessary.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1: The City should identify and secure a single site for consolidation of DOE operations.
F2: Failure to centralize DOE election processing reduces the transparency of the processing by making it difficult or impossible for citizens to observe all aspects of the post-balloting procedure, which they have the right to do.
F3: Consolidation of DOE operations into a single facility would reduce the costs of Sheriff-provided security, ballot transportation, facilities management, and the expense of temporary employees, would eliminate the need to renovate 240 Van Ness Avenue, and would largely satisfy the need created by the ejection from Pier 29.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3: DOE should provide each deputy sheriff assigned to Election Day precinct closing duties with a supply of generic ballots for delivery to precincts in his or her assigned area after 5:00 p.m. pending receipt of precinct-specific ballots from DOE.
F4: The findings in the September 30, 2002 Strategica report are well founded.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4: DOE should identify the amount and types of work that should be performed by permanent employees, hire additional permanent employees to fill those positions, and eliminate the imbalance between understaffing for budgeted permanent positions and overspending for temporary employees.
F5: Poll workers lack adequate incentive to attend training sessions. Workers who already have a promise of $87 may value the prospect of an additional $25 as less valuable and thus less enticing than a promise of $112 for the entire election.
Related Recommendations (1)
R5: DOE should provide a blank inner envelope in the materials supplied to voters with an absentee ballot, with instructions to place the completed ballot in the blank envelope, which should then be inserted in the outer, signed envelope.
Findings & Recommendations 3 findings
F1: The continued use of detention cells that do not have fire resistive exit corridors and do not meet state standards for fire resistance not only poses a danger of injury and death to arrested persons, station personnel, and other rescuers, but also creates potential financial liability for the City and County of San Francisco should such injury to or death of a person detained therein result from a fire in the station.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1: SFPD should discontinue use of the detention cells in the Northern, Richmond, and Ingleside district stations.
F2: Continued use of the detention cells in the Northern, Ingleside, and Richmond district stations violates state regulations and is unnecessary as arrested persons can be transported directly to the county jail at 850 Bryant Street for booking and further investigation.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2: The SFPD should institute procedure s to ensure compliance with State Board of Corrections regulations.
F3: Taking prisoners directly to 850 Bryant Street would make the transporting officer unavailable for other duties for periods ranging from 30 minutes to an hour. However, if the use of the detention cells in the three non-complying district stations were discontinued, no booking and detention officer would have to be on duty in those stations, SFPD would save more than $500,000 in remodeling costs, and SFPD would save the costs associated with pick-up of arrested persons at those stations by the Sheriff for delivery to 850 Bryant Street.

* This report's PDF did not contain easily extractable text and required Optical Character Recognition (OCR) for analysis. There may be minor errors in the extracted findings and recommendations due to OCR limitations with scanned documents.