Gran Jurado del Condado de Sacramento
2008-2009
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Hallazgos & Recomendaciones
5 hallazgos
F1:
– The Natomas Unified School District Board and Superintendent did not exercise proper oversight of the land acquisition process. Their lack of due diligence reflects an abdication rather than a delegation of oversight responsibilities.
F2:
– Obtaining a single appraisal under the protection of attorney client privilege does not allow for full disclosure and transparency of the purchasing process. The appraiser hired and directed by the attorney was provided information based on erroneous facts which were incorporated into the appraisal that was submitted to the Natomas Unified School Board.
F3:
– The Superintendent’s solicitation of a contribution from a related party to West Lakeside LLC, for a foundation on whose board the Superintendent sat, during the 48 course of purchasing negotiations, reflects poor judgment. The solicitation lays open the appearance of a “quid pro quo” agreement for purchase of the Natomas land site at an inflated price.
F4:
– The attorney retained by the School Board failed in his fiduciary responsibility to make the Natomas School District and Superintendent aware of his past dealings with West Lakeside LLC and AKT Development and the conflict of interest.
F5:
–The Assistant Superintendent and the School District’s attorney were involved in instructing the appraiser as to the assumptions that he should use. The appraisal contained false and misleading assumptions which greatly inflated the sales price paid by the Natomas Unified School District. Standard appraisal practices were not followed. The appraiser failed to recognize his obligations to maintain his objectivity and independence.
Recomendaciones adicionales
5
No vinculadas a hallazgos específicos.
R1:
1– The California School Board Association should be invited to conduct training in land acquisition for both the Natomas Unified School District Board and Superintendent.
R2:
1 – The School District and Superintendent should always have direct control over the hiring of any appraiser.
R3:
- The Superintendent should be sanctioned by the Natomas Unified School District Board for carrying out such an ill timed solicitation.
R4:
– A complaint should be filed with the California State Bar by the Natomas Unified School District Board against the attorney and his law firm.
R5:
– This matter should be referred to the Sacramento District Attorneys Office and the State Attorney General as well as any other governmental agency for any further investigation they deem appropriate. 49
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Hallazgos & Recomendaciones
8 hallazgos
F1:
Have buildings been erected at Haggin Oaks Golf Course without building permits?
F2:
Is water drainage from washing golf carts contaminating a creek?
F3:
Did the contractor who was awarded the project file bankruptcy before the cart washing equipment was operational?
F4:
Are oak trees endangering the golfers? Reason for the Investigation The Grand Jury initiated this investigation as a result of a citizen's complaint. Method of Investigation Building Permits: The Grand Jury contacted the City of Sacramento Development Services Department to obtain a print-out of all building permits that have been issued for construction at any time at the Haggin Oaks Golf Course. Copies of permits for the cart washing machine were also reviewed. Water Drainage: The Grand Jury made an on-site inspection to determine the extent of drainage into the creek. The EPA website was examined and personal interviews conducted. Contractors Business Status: The Grand Jury, conducting web searches of Sacramento Business (a website on Sacramento businesses by the California Secretary of State), Sacramento Better Business Bureau, and Contractors State License Board to determine the business status of the contractor. Oak Trees: The Grand Jury conducted a site visit with the Operations Manager to
F5:
Have buildings been erected at Haggin Oaks Golf Course without building permits?
F6:
Is water drainage from washing golf carts contaminating a creek?
F7:
Did the contractor who was awarded the project file bankruptcy before the cart washing equipment was operational?
F8:
Are oak trees endangering the golfers? Reason for the Investigation The Grand Jury initiated this investigation as a result of a citizen's complaint. Method of Investigation Building Permits: The Grand Jury contacted the City of Sacramento Development Services Department to obtain a print-out of all building permits that have been issued for construction at any time at the Haggin Oaks Golf Course. Copies of permits for the cart washing machine were also reviewed. Water Drainage: The Grand Jury made an on-site inspection to determine the extent of drainage into the creek. The EPA website was examined and personal interviews conducted. Contractors Business Status: The Grand Jury, conducting web searches of Sacramento Business (a website on Sacramento businesses by the California Secretary of State), Sacramento Better Business Bureau, and Contractors State License Board to determine the business status of the contractor. Oak Trees: The Grand Jury conducted a site visit with the Operations Manager to
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Hallazgos & Recomendaciones
4 hallazgos
F1:
1: The City of Sacramento does not require a permit when work is completed on City property; however, the CCL did obtain permits for these projects.
F2:
1: The cart washing machine was added to eliminate water standing in and around the cart barn. This machine conserves water by recycling and filtering it as carts are washed without polluting the creek.
F3:
1: This installation used the Request For Quote process to identify the most responsive contractor.
F4:
1:The City is aware of the tree problem and is addressing the issue by hiring an arborist to visually inspect the trees.
Recomendaciones adicionales
3
No vinculadas a hallazgos específicos.
R1:
None. The Grand Jury commends the Department of Convention, Culture and Leisure for going beyond the City’s construction requirements.
R2:
It is recommended that the course Operations Manager notify CCL as soon as the equipment is operational.
R4:
The Grand Jury recommends that the CCL post along the course signs warning of possible falling trees Response Requirements Penal Code sections 933 and 933.5 require that specific responses to both the
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Hallazgos & Recomendaciones
1 hallazgos
F1:
Sacramento Board of Supervisors 51
Recomendaciones adicionales
1
No vinculadas a hallazgos específicos.
R1:
Sacramento Board of Supervisors 51
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Hallazgos & Recomendaciones
5 hallazgos
F1:
Firefighters in both Sac Fire and Metro departments took advantage of a poorly developed and poorly administered policy of providing salary enhancement for college degrees without regard to the source or quality of the education provider.
F2:
Management of both departments were remiss in approving requests for incentive pay without verifying that they were complying with the spirit if not the letter of the appropriate policy.
F3:
Reviewing the master list of card users and their spending limits;
F4:
Comparing the City’s Purchasing Card Program User’s Guide (policy and procedure manual) to actual usage; and
F5:
Reviewing a June 24, 2008 Internal Audit Report, Management Controls: Inventory and Debit Card Usage for the Department of Utilities. Background and Recommendations The DOU purchasing system uses debit cards, not credit cards. The purpose of the card program is to establish an efficient, cost effective method of purchasing and paying for small dollar transactions. Too many users of debit cards exacerbate managerial controls.
Recomendaciones adicionales
5
No vinculadas a hallazgos específicos.
R1:
None. Steps have been taken by both departments to more clearly define and ensure accreditation compliance.
R2:
Leaders in both departments should be reminded that they are guardians of the public trust and that it is their responsibility to ensuring that public funds are spent in a cost-effective and appropriate manner. Response Requirements Penal Code sections 933 and 933.5 require that specific responses to both the
R3:
Reviewing the master list of card users and their spending limits;
R4:
Comparing the City’s Purchasing Card Program User’s Guide (policy and procedure manual) to actual usage; and
R5:
Reviewing a June 24, 2008 Internal Audit Report, Management Controls: Inventory and Debit Card Usage for the Department of Utilities.
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Hallazgos & Recomendaciones
32 hallazgos
F1:
There is a longstanding absence on the part of HHS and CPS management to accept responsibility and accountability for the role of CPS in meeting its community responsibilities. This is a recurring criticism found for over a decade of many published reports.
F2:
A shield of privacy and secrecy that surrounds much of the operations of CPS is unwarranted. This lack of transparency serves to raise questions and leads to inaccurate conclusions being made regarding what takes place in CPS. The acknowledged need to protect the confidentiality of case information can be accomplished without adopting a “closed door” attitude.
F3:
1: CPS personnel have rarely had performance evaluations.
F4:
The County’s Human Resources Department (HR) disseminated annual evaluation reminders to CPS management. However no follow-up action was done to see if such evaluations actually took place.
F5:
HR has neglected to train supervisory personnel in the proper method of personnel evaluation.
F6:
Substantial finger pointing exists between CPS and HR personnel regarding quality of service. 20
F7:
Disciplinary proceedings are compromised by the absence of evaluations of all employees.
F8:
There is an average time of one year from the start of paid administrative leave to resolution. This contributes to the caseload of other employees, and decreases staff morale.
F9:
According to sworn testimony, the recent HR reorganization increased the ratio of CPS disciplinary cases per HR analyst.
F10:
Poor communication between HR and CPS contributes to lengthy disposition of discipline cases.
F11:
A 22 percent annual turnover rate in CPS social workers is a major impediment to program efficiency and effectiveness.
F12:
Skilled social workers who do not want to be supervisors have no way to be promoted.
F13:
1: Except for the first year of employment, employees are not compliant with the 30-hour training requirement. In a sample review of 60 employee records, 50 were not in compliance.
F14:
Training entries for new employees do not show the correct total number of training hours those employees actually took.
F15:
1: A caseload is not defined.
F16:
Social workers do work that could be done by support staff.
F17:
Management has not required personnel to take full advantage of their available software. CPS management acknowledges its failures to fully use these systems. 23
F18:
The Grand Jury found that supervisory personnel and upper management were not adequately using IRIS. The current design of the software changes each case entry information to a red font when the case exceeds certain limits. This is helpful but does not provide enough information about the urgency of the case.
F19:
The CWS/CMS software package is provided and controlled by the State and cannot be modified by CPS IT personnel. These personnel can recommend appropriate change through statewide user-councils to improve the software.
F20:
There is a lack of management control of SDM usage. It was reported to the Grand Jury that at most 60 percent of the social workers adequately use SDM. The Self Assessment Report states: “. . . its use remains inconsistent and inaccurate.” 24
F21:
The SafeMeasures program has not been used adequately by many of the supervisors and managers. Usage is reportedly less than 20 percent.
F22:
Quality Assurance (QA) personnel are not knowledgeable in the use of all the software and were not using the SafeMeasures software to assess the quality of services provided.
F23:
The CPS in-take phone lines currently do not have recording capability. CPS personnel have investigated this issue and found that other counties have this capability and it did not interfere with reporting.
F24:
Testimony from CPS management indicates that social workers do not have electronic devices to record information while they are in the field.
F25:
Currently social workers, with password generation devices called “Tokens” (a secure means of handling sensitive data) can access the CWS/CMS computer system from home. CPS has issued about 80 of these “Tokens.” 25
F26:
Flaws in the SDM may result in children being exposed to dangerous and abusive conditions. The Risk Assessment process requires that CPS respond within 24 hours if a child is under age two. If the child is over two, the response time may be extended to ten days.
F27:
SDM is not been utilized as envisioned. Testimony indicated that this valuable risk assessment tool was frequently completed after the fact and viewed simply as an administrative “requirement” by social workers.
F28:
SDM allows a response of ten days even when there is a history of “physical abuse, domestic violence, caregiver mental health, or substance abuse concerns” if there is a “responsible” adult on the premises. Experts in domestic violence state that if there is domestic violence in the home there is a 50 percent chance that the children will also be abused. When these circumstances exist, no adult on the premises should be considered “responsible. “
F29:
The California Family Risk Assessment Tool can fail to adequately determine the level of risk to which a child may be exposed.
F30:
2: The CPS manual does not have a usable table of contents, index, or electronic search engine capability.
F31:
The law governing reporting does not require that the Mandated Reporter hold or detain a child suspected of being abused. It only requires that he or she report the suspected abuse to the proper authorities.
F32:
The Grand Jury does not have full access to unredacted reports for legitimate investigative purposes.
Recomendaciones adicionales
32
No vinculadas a hallazgos específicos.
R1:
1: The Board of Supervisors conduct a thorough assessment of the performance of HHS and CPS management. These administrators must demonstrate more than subject matter expertise. They must demonstrate an ability to ignite the enthusiasm of CPS supervisory and rank and file professionals and exhibit the creative energy and management skill necessary to lead CPS in the challenges ahead.
R2:
Greater transparency of CPS operations must be exhibited on the part of CPS management. They should do more to aggressively open the doors of CPS activities to the eyes of the public, the County Board of 19 Supervisors, non-profit organizations, K–12 schools and universities, the Legislature, the medical community, and the media. Transparency does not prevent possible negative publicity, but does mean that questions can be asked and answered in an atmosphere of openness and honesty. Evaluations
R3:
The completion of yearly evaluations on all employees must be recognized as a critical, high priority activity required of supervisors and managers.
R4:
HR must accept its responsibility for ensuring the completion of annual performance appraisals as part of their fundamental personnel oversight responsibilities.
R5:
CPS supervisory personnel must attend a training course specifically focused on employee performance evaluations
R6:
Greater interdepartmental cooperation must exist between CPS and the HR Department. CPS management must do more to demand and improve the delivery of services from the HR Department. Management attention and involvement must be brought to the table to reconcile this festering issue. Discipline Procedures
R7:
1: CPS management should work with the Human Resources Department to immediately complete employee evaluations on all CPS personnel.
R8:
1: Given the number of cases referred for discipline and the lengthy time until resolution, the Grand Jury recommends that more of the current HR staff be reallocated to CPS.
R9:
An alternative organizational structure, which would provide more efficient HR disciplinary support to CPS, should be considered.
R10:
HR should develop effective training seminars for all supervisors and managers of CPS to promote greater understanding of the requirements needed for a rapid adjudication of cases. Recruitment and Retention
R11:
CPS management should prepare an analysis of this turnover problem and implement a recommendation plan.
R12:
Establish a “specialist” classification in CPS available to social workers who are able to take on unique and complex cases. Training
R13:
1: Program managers and supervisors must ensure that their employees attend classes and satisfy the 30-hour annual requirement. 22
R14:
CPS should review the training log for accuracy and corrects erroneous entries. Caseload
R15:
1 CPS should define a case and establish caseload and workload criteria.
R16:
Tasks not needing the skills of a social worker should be turned over to support staff. Information Technology
R17:
1: All CPS personnel should be required to pass software proficiency examinations.
R18:
1: Division Managers should provide additional IRIS training and demand greater use of the software by program managers and supervisors. Program Information Notice 08-12, which provides detailed instructions of the use of IRIS, should be strictly followed.
R19:
1: Changes should be made that will not allow deleting, but will require strikeouts and additional comments.
R20:
Social workers should be required to use SDM 100 percent of the time.
R21:
1: All supervisors and management should receive additional training in the use of SafeMeasures.
R22:
QA personnel should receive training in the use of all CPS software and be required to use SafeMeasures in their assessment of CPS programs.
R23:
High priority should be given to purchasing and installing the voice recorder system as soon as possible.
R24:
CPS should investigate electronic devices that could improve social worker efficiency. Factors such as worker safety and client confidentiality should be considered.
R25:
This system should continue but annual reassessments should be conducted to evaluate its value, safety and security. Structured Decision Making and Risk Assessment Tools
R26:
The County should expand this age group to five and under. With this change in place any child who is not of school age would require 24-hour response.
R27:
Social workers should use the SDM tool as designed to adequately assess risk.
R28:
Whenever there is prior history of physical abuse or domestic violence, the response should be 24 hours or less.
R29:
CPS should reexamine this tool and find ways to improve its usage. Policies and Procedures Manual
R30:
The CPS policy manual should be completely rewritten to include an index and expanded table of contents and be in digital form with electronic search capability. Legislative Needs
R31:
1: The County Board of Supervisors should request the State Legislature amend the appropriate sections of the Penal Code to authorize such detention.
R32:
1: The County Board of Supervisors should request the State Legislature amend Welfare and Institutions Code 827 to include the Grand Jury in the list of “Persons Authorized to View Juvenile Records without a Petition or Court Order.” 27
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Hallazgos & Recomendaciones
7 hallazgos
F1:
IHSS does not have adequate program controls to eliminate fraud.
F2:
Service hours are added without verification of recipients’ health needs and Medi-Cal conditions.
F3:
The existing fraud investigation process is cumbersome and ineffective.
F4:
Social workers do not receive adequate training in fraud identification and reporting.
F5:
Recipients lack sufficient information to make informed decisions about their providers.
F6:
The IHSS Information Technology Department has recently developed and implemented a software database name ADAM (Adult Data Automation Module). This has immensely improved the intake, evaluation and tracking of IHSS recipients.
F7:
The Registry, funded last year at $1.6 million, is not cost-effective. The number of employed Registry screened providers is small (less than one percent) as is attendance in various classes.
Recomendaciones adicionales
7
No vinculadas a hallazgos específicos.
R1:
1: Add a supplemental time sheet with clock hour implements versus the current block time accounting to be put in the recipient’s file. A County supplemental time sheet would not require any computer system reprogramming, and the cost would be insignificant.
R2:
1: Establish an independent pool of physicians to periodically review recipient files of Medi-Cal and mental conditions to provide both quality control and certification of claimed needs and services.
R3:
1: Create an operationally independent task force composed of the County Sheriff’s Department and the County District Attorney’s Office to conduct fraud investigations. It would be funded by $1 million currently being expended on fraud by IHSS.
R4:
1: Require management to provide and social workers to successfully complete comprehensive training in fraud detection, with updates to be given annually.
R5:
1: Require that all current providers undergo a face-to-face meeting with an IHSS representative to verify identification and to receive a program orientation that is verified by providers’ signatures.
R6:
The IHSS Information Technology Department is commended and should be recognized for their accomplishment.
R7:
Encourage the County Board of Supervisors to evaluate the Registry functions, workload and level of funding. Response Requirements Penal Code sections 933 and 933.5 require that specific responses to both the
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Hallazgos & Recomendaciones
3 hallazgos
F1:
The Interim Director reduced the number of employees authorized to have a debit card from 33 to 11. This limits the potential for misuse and facilitates the audit process.
F2:
The review of transaction statements did show some questionable transactions, but the dollar amounts were not material and the reduction of authorized employees facilitates oversight of card usage.
F3:
The Internal Audit findings confirmed that the program has received appropriate scrutiny and is currently well managed.
Recomendaciones adicionales
2
No vinculadas a hallazgos específicos.
R1:
Sacramento Assistant City Manager/Interim DOU Director 56
R2:
Sacramento Assistant City Manager/Interim DOU Director 56
Hallazgos & Recomendaciones
32 hallazgos
F1:
There is a longstanding absence on the part of HHS and CPS management to accept responsibility and accountability for the role of CPS in meeting its community responsibilities. This is a recurring criticism found for over a decade of many published reports.
F2:
A shield of privacy and secrecy that surrounds much of the operations of CPS is unwarranted. This lack of transparency serves to raise questions and leads to inaccurate conclusions being made regarding what takes place in CPS. The acknowledged need to protect the confidentiality of case information can be accomplished without adopting a “closed door” attitude.
F3:
1: CPS personnel have rarely had performance evaluations.
F4:
The County’s Human Resources Department (HR) disseminated annual evaluation reminders to CPS management. However no follow-up action was done to see if such evaluations actually took place.
F5:
HR has neglected to train supervisory personnel in the proper method of personnel evaluation.
F6:
Substantial finger pointing exists between CPS and HR personnel regarding quality of service.
F7:
Disciplinary proceedings are compromised by the absence of evaluations of all employees.
F8:
There is an average time of one year from the start of paid administrative leave to resolution. This contributes to the caseload of other employees, and decreases staff morale.
F9:
According to sworn testimony, the recent HR reorganization increased the ratio of CPS disciplinary cases per HR analyst.
F10:
Poor communication between HR and CPS contributes to lengthy disposition of discipline cases.
F11:
A 22 percent annual turnover rate in CPS social workers is a major impediment to program efficiency and effectiveness.
F12:
Skilled social workers who do not want to be supervisors have no way to be promoted.
F13:
1: Except for the first year of employment, employees are not compliant with the 30-hour training requirement. In a sample review of 60 employee records, 50 were not in compliance.
F14:
Training entries for new employees do not show the correct total number of training hours those employees actually took.
F15:
1: A caseload is not defined.
F16:
Social workers do work that could be done by support staff.
F17:
Management has not required personnel to take full advantage of their available software. CPS management acknowledges its failures to fully use these systems.
F18:
The Grand Jury found that supervisory personnel and upper management were not adequately using IRIS. The current design of the software changes each case entry information to a red font when the case exceeds certain limits. This is helpful but does not provide enough information about the urgency of the case.
F19:
The CWS/CMS software package is provided and controlled by the State and cannot be modified by CPS IT personnel. These personnel can recommend appropriate change through statewide user-councils to improve the software.
F20:
There is a lack of management control of SDM usage. It was reported to the Grand Jury that at most 60 percent of the social workers adequately use SDM. The Self Assessment Report states: “. . . its use remains inconsistent and inaccurate.”
F21:
The SafeMeasures program has not been used adequately by many of the supervisors and managers. Usage is reportedly less than 20 percent.
F22:
Quality Assurance (QA) personnel are not knowledgeable in the use of all the software and were not using the SafeMeasures software to assess the quality of services provided.
F23:
The CPS in-take phone lines currently do not have recording capability. CPS personnel have investigated this issue and found that other counties have this capability and it did not interfere with reporting.
F24:
Testimony from CPS management indicates that social workers do not have electronic devices to record information while they are in the field.
F25:
Currently social workers, with password generation devices called “Tokens” (a secure means of handling sensitive data) can access the CWS/CMS computer system from home. CPS has issued about 80 of these “Tokens.”
F26:
Flaws in the SDM may result in children being exposed to dangerous and abusive conditions. The Risk Assessment process requires that CPS respond within 24 hours if a child is under age two. If the child is over two, the response time may be extended to ten days.
F27:
SDM is not been utilized as envisioned. Testimony indicated that this valuable risk assessment tool was frequently completed after the fact and viewed simply as an administrative “requirement” by social workers.
F28:
SDM allows a response of ten days even when there is a history of “physical abuse, domestic violence, caregiver mental health, or substance abuse concerns” if there is a “responsible” adult on the premises. Experts in domestic violence state that if there is domestic violence in the home there is a 50 percent chance that the children will also be abused. When these circumstances exist, no adult on the premises should be considered “responsible. “
F29:
The California Family Risk Assessment Tool can fail to adequately determine the level of risk to which a child may be exposed.
F30:
2: The CPS manual does not have a usable table of contents, index, or electronic search engine capability.
F31:
The law governing reporting does not require that the Mandated Reporter hold or detain a child suspected of being abused. It only requires that he or she report the suspected abuse to the proper authorities.
F32:
The Grand Jury does not have full access to unredacted reports for legitimate investigative purposes.
Recomendaciones adicionales
32
No vinculadas a hallazgos específicos.
R1:
1: The Board of Supervisors conduct a thorough assessment of the performance of HHS and CPS management. These administrators must demonstrate more than subject matter expertise. They must demonstrate an ability to ignite the enthusiasm of CPS supervisory and rank and file professionals and exhibit the creative energy and management skill necessary to lead CPS in the challenges ahead.
R2:
Greater transparency of CPS operations must be exhibited on the part of CPS management. They should do more to aggressively open the doors of CPS activities to the eyes of the public, the County Board of 19 Supervisors, non-profit organizations, K–12 schools and universities, the Legislature, the medical community, and the media. Transparency does not prevent possible negative publicity, but does mean that questions can be asked and answered in an atmosphere of openness and honesty. Evaluations
R3:
The completion of yearly evaluations on all employees must be recognized as a critical, high priority activity required of supervisors and managers.
R4:
HR must accept its responsibility for ensuring the completion of annual performance appraisals as part of their fundamental personnel oversight responsibilities.
R5:
CPS supervisory personnel must attend a training course specifically focused on employee performance evaluations
R6:
Greater interdepartmental cooperation must exist between CPS and the HR Department. CPS management must do more to demand and improve the delivery of services from the HR Department. Management attention and involvement must be brought to the table to reconcile this festering issue. Discipline Procedures
R7:
1: CPS management should work with the Human Resources Department to immediately complete employee evaluations on all CPS personnel.
R8:
1: Given the number of cases referred for discipline and the lengthy time until resolution, the Grand Jury recommends that more of the current HR staff be reallocated to CPS.
R9:
An alternative organizational structure, which would provide more efficient HR disciplinary support to CPS, should be considered.
R10:
HR should develop effective training seminars for all supervisors and managers of CPS to promote greater understanding of the requirements needed for a rapid adjudication of cases. Recruitment and Retention
R11:
CPS management should prepare an analysis of this turnover problem and implement a recommendation plan.
R12:
Establish a “specialist” classification in CPS available to social workers who are able to take on unique and complex cases. Training
R13:
1: Program managers and supervisors must ensure that their employees attend classes and satisfy the 30-hour annual requirement.
R14:
CPS should review the training log for accuracy and corrects erroneous entries. Caseload
R15:
1 CPS should define a case and establish caseload and workload criteria.
R16:
Tasks not needing the skills of a social worker should be turned over to support staff. Information Technology
R17:
1: All CPS personnel should be required to pass software proficiency examinations.
R18:
1: Division Managers should provide additional IRIS training and demand greater use of the software by program managers and supervisors. Program Information Notice 08-12, which provides detailed instructions of the use of IRIS, should be strictly followed.
R19:
1: Changes should be made that will not allow deleting, but will require strikeouts and additional comments.
R20:
Social workers should be required to use SDM 100 percent of the time.
R21:
1: All supervisors and management should receive additional training in the use of SafeMeasures.
R22:
QA personnel should receive training in the use of all CPS software and be required to use SafeMeasures in their assessment of CPS programs.
R23:
High priority should be given to purchasing and installing the voice recorder system as soon as possible.
R24:
CPS should investigate electronic devices that could improve social worker efficiency. Factors such as worker safety and client confidentiality should be considered.
R25:
This system should continue but annual reassessments should be conducted to evaluate its value, safety and security. Structured Decision Making and Risk Assessment Tools
R26:
The County should expand this age group to five and under. With this change in place any child who is not of school age would require 24-hour response.
R27:
Social workers should use the SDM tool as designed to adequately assess risk.
R28:
Whenever there is prior history of physical abuse or domestic violence, the response should be 24 hours or less.
R29:
CPS should reexamine this tool and find ways to improve its usage. 26 Policies and Procedures Manual
R30:
The CPS policy manual should be completely rewritten to include an index and expanded table of contents and be in digital form with electronic search capability. Legislative Needs
R31:
1: The County Board of Supervisors should request the State Legislature amend the appropriate sections of the Penal Code to authorize such detention.
R32:
1: The County Board of Supervisors should request the State Legislature amend Welfare and Institutions Code 827 to include the Grand Jury in the list of “Persons Authorized to View Juvenile Records without a Petition or Court Order.”
Hallazgos y recomendaciones aún no extraídos.
Hallazgos & Recomendaciones
3 hallazgos
F1:
The Interim Director reduced the number of employees authorized to have a debit card from 33 to 11. This limits the potential for misuse and facilitates the audit process.
F2:
The review of transaction statements did show some questionable transactions, but the dollar amounts were not material and the reduction of authorized employees facilitates oversight of card usage.
F3:
The Internal Audit findings confirmed that the program has received appropriate scrutiny and is currently well managed.
Hallazgos y recomendaciones aún no extraídos.
Hallazgos y recomendaciones aún no extraídos.
Hallazgos & Recomendaciones
4 hallazgos
F1:
1: The City of Sacramento does not require a permit when work is completed on City property; however, the CCL did obtain permits for these projects.
F2:
1: The cart washing machine was added to eliminate water standing in and around the cart barn. This machine conserves water by recycling and filtering it as carts are washed without polluting the creek.
F3:
1: This installation used the Request For Quote process to identify the most responsive contractor.
F4:
1:The City is aware of the tree problem and is addressing the issue by hiring an arborist to visually inspect the trees.
Recomendaciones adicionales
3
No vinculadas a hallazgos específicos.
R1:
None. The Grand Jury commends the Department of Convention, Culture and Leisure for going beyond the City’s construction requirements.
R2:
It is recommended that the course Operations Manager notify CCL as soon as the equipment is operational.
R4:
The Grand Jury recommends that the CCL post along the course signs warning of possible falling trees Response Requirements Penal Code sections 933 and 933.5 require that specific
Hallazgos & Recomendaciones
7 hallazgos
F1:
IHSS does not have adequate program controls to eliminate fraud.
F2:
Service hours are added without verification of recipients’ health needs and Medi-Cal conditions.
F3:
The existing fraud investigation process is cumbersome and ineffective.
F4:
Social workers do not receive adequate training in fraud identification and reporting.
F5:
Recipients lack sufficient information to make informed decisions about their providers.
F6:
The IHSS Information Technology Department has recently developed and implemented a software database name ADAM (Adult Data Automation Module). This has immensely improved the intake, evaluation and tracking of IHSS recipients.
F7:
The Registry, funded last year at $1.6 million, is not cost-effective. The number of employed Registry screened providers is small (less than one percent) as is attendance in various classes.
Recomendaciones adicionales
7
No vinculadas a hallazgos específicos.
R1:
1: Add a supplemental time sheet with clock hour implements versus the current block time accounting to be put in the recipient’s file. A County supplemental time sheet would not require any computer system reprogramming, and the cost would be insignificant.
R2:
1: Establish an independent pool of physicians to periodically review recipient files of Medi-Cal and mental conditions to provide both quality control and certification of claimed needs and services.
R3:
1: Create an operationally independent task force composed of the County Sheriff’s Department and the County District Attorney’s Office to conduct fraud investigations. It would be funded by $1 million currently being expended on fraud by IHSS.
R4:
1: Require management to provide and social workers to successfully complete comprehensive training in fraud detection, with updates to be given annually.
R5:
1: Require that all current providers undergo a face-to-face meeting with an IHSS representative to verify identification and to receive a program orientation that is verified by providers’ signatures.
R6:
The IHSS Information Technology Department is commended and should be recognized for their accomplishment.
R7:
Encourage the County Board of Supervisors to evaluate the Registry functions, workload and level of funding. Response Requirements Penal Code sections 933 and 933.5 require that specific
Recomendaciones adicionales
2
No vinculadas a hallazgos específicos.
R1:
1– The California School Board Association should be invited to conduct training in land acquisition for both the Natomas Unified School District Board and Superintendent.
R2:
1 – The School District and Superintendent should always have direct control over the hiring of any appraiser.
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Hallazgos & Recomendaciones
2 hallazgos
F1:
Firefighters in both Sac Fire and Metro departments took advantage of a poorly developed and poorly administered policy of providing salary enhancement for college degrees without regard to the source or quality of the education provider.
F2:
Management of both departments were remiss in approving requests for incentive pay without verifying that they were complying with the spirit if not the letter of the appropriate policy.
Recomendaciones adicionales
2
No vinculadas a hallazgos específicos.
R1:
None. Steps have been taken by both departments to more clearly define and ensure accreditation compliance.
R2:
Leaders in both departments should be reminded that they are guardians of the public trust and that it is their responsibility to ensuring that public funds are spent in a cost-effective and appropriate manner. Response Requirements Penal Code sections 933 and 933.5 require that specific
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