Riverside County Grand Jury
2008-2009
Additional Recommendations
1
Not linked to specific findings.
R1:
Terminate the 401(a) pension plan for TAP employees and let them benefit by paying into Social Security. Report Issued: 06/23/09 Report Public: 06/25/09 Response Due: 09/21/09 4
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Findings & Recommendations
6 findings
F1:
The City of Hemet successfully applied for funds from the California Senior Center Bond Act of 1984, which provided for the sale of $50 million of general obligation bonds to finance acquisition, construction and expansion of senior center programs throughout the state. The City of Hemet sought the funds to add a senior wing to its neighborhood facility, the James Simpson Memorial Center. As part of its application for funds, the City of Hemet agreed to provide an array of senior services, two of which (outreach services and routine information and referral services) were to be provided by Prime of Life. The City of Hemet and Prime of Life signed an agreement for services, dated August 13, 1991. The City of Hemet failed to monitor the contract with Prime of Life to provide senior citizen referral services in the Hemet area. For example, Prime of Life’s operating hours and days open were significantly reduced at least twice, while the City of Hemet continued to pay the contracted amount for services. The contract was never modified to reflect changes in Prime of Life’s operation.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
The City of Hemet should formally cancel the contract with the Prime of Life organization.
F2:
There is a requirement which calls for written reports to be provided to the City Manager by Prime of Life every 60 days; however, testimony revealed there is no evidence of oversight by the City of Hemet.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
The Hemet City Council should perform due diligence and exercise oversight of all organizations to which it approves funding.
F3:
The Prime of Life Executive Director was/is a longtime member of the Hemet City Council. This was well known in the community and by the Hemet City Council. As a member of the council, she participated in budget deliberations and approval of the entire city budget, including funding for the operation of Prime of Life. This is a conflict of interest.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
The City of Hemet should: • Acknowledge publicly that a sitting Hemet City Council member has a conflict of interest with Prime of Life. • Immediately move to prevent any future conflict and/or appearance of a conflict of interest.
F4:
As examination of the FY 2008-2009 budget figures provided by the executive director of Prime of Life revealed that out of a total projected income of $48,300, over 77 percent was allocated to four items: salary of the executive director ($28,000); employment taxes ($5,000); accounting services ($2,000); insurance ($2,500). These expenditures left little for other discretionary operating expenses. On the revenue side, in addition to the City of Hemet’s contractual obligation, the primary funding source has been Central County United Way (whose funding has decreased in the recent past).
Related Recommendations (1)
R4:
The City of Hemet should develop written policies and procedures to ensure requisite oversight on expenditures and immediately cease funding any non-compliant entities.
F5:
The Riverside County Office on Aging has been instrumental in supporting Prime of Life by providing referral operator trainees through its Senior Employee Training Program to answer calls from senior citizens in the Hemet area and refer them to appropriate agencies for assistance. The Riverside County Office on Aging also provides an 800 line for callers as backup to their efforts through Prime of Life. 2
Related Recommendations (1)
R5:
The City of Hemet should spearhead an effort to retain a relationship with the Riverside County Office on Aging, so Office on Aging trainees can continue to handle referral calls.
F6:
For several years Prime of Life (without the necessary city monitoring) failed to submit required annual reports to appropriate state and federal tax agencies. This failure led the Franchise Tax Board to suspend the tax exempt status of Prime of Life until/unless Prime of Life could correct the filing deficiencies. In order to regain tax-exempt status, Prime of Life had to expend approximately $20,000 in back payments and accounting fees.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6:
The City of Hemet should examine its contracts and agreements with other tax-exempt organizations in the community to confirm that those organizations are currently with their tax filing fiduciary responsibilities. Report Issues: 06/25/09 Report Public: 06/29/09 Response Due: 09/23/09 3
Findings & Recommendations
11 findings
F1:
Prior to September 2008, district trustees were negligent in their oversight of the financial affairs of the district. The trustees failed to demand financial accountability from the general manager, who signed blank checks and permitted improper expenditures of district funds. No formal orientation and training program for trustees exists. Testimony from former trustees revealed they were unaware of their basic fiduciary responsibilities. Minutes of their meetings were either incomplete or reflected inadequate decision-making for a governing body. 1
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
The district should immediately establish an orientation and training program for trustees to include proper handling of finances, fiduciary responsibilities, management hiring practices and employee benefits.
F2:
The prior general manager of the district failed in his basic management responsibilities to the district, by: a. not providing appropriate orientation and training to the trustees b. making questionable expenditures for personal use from district funds c. improperly borrowing funds from the district endowment fund to finance operating expenses d. using poor record keeping practices, he ignored recommendations from the outside auditor.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
The district should seek recoupment of funds improperly paid to and/or by the former general manager, including but not limited to: vacation time, compensatory time, sick leave, cell phone expenses, gasoline allotments and other inappropriate expenditures.
F3:
The Riverside County Board of Supervisors, as the appointing authority for district trustees, failed to provide instruction to trustees in their areas of responsibilities and fiduciary obligations.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
The Riverside County Board of Supervisors, as the appointing authority for district trustees, failed to provide instruction to trustees in their areas of responsibilities and fiduciary obligations.
F4:
Over several years the district faced a shortage of revenue to meet increasing operating costs. In an effort to correct this deficit, the board of trustees and general manager borrowed more than $253,000 from the endowment fund principal. This was a violation of California Health and Safety Code Section 9065(e), which states: “The board of trustees shall not spend the principal of the endowment care fund.” The fund is nearly depleted. The fund establishes in perpetuity the care and maintenance of the cemetery.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4:
Over several years the district faced a shortage of revenue to meet increasing operating costs. In an effort to correct this deficit, the board of trustees and general manager borrowed more than $253,000 from the endowment fund principal. This was a violation of California Health and Safety Code Section 9065(e), which states: “The board of trustees shall not spend the principal of the endowment care fund.” The fund is nearly depleted. The fund establishes in perpetuity the care and maintenance of the cemetery.
F5:
The district does not have a policies and procedures manual. This absence of written policies and procedures allowed for the careless implementation of financial and other decisions, which resulted in arbitrary and inappropriate actions taken by the prior general manager. An outdated card system identifying burial plots and financial records contained many errors. Burials were sometimes reserved for plots already occupied.
Related Recommendations (1)
R5:
The district does not have a policies and procedures manual. This absence of written policies and procedures allowed for the careless implementation of financial and other decisions, which resulted in arbitrary and inappropriate actions taken by the prior general manager. An outdated card system identifying burial plots and financial records contained many errors. Burials were sometimes reserved for plots already occupied.
F6:
The prior general manager failed to increase revenue or reduce operating costs over a six-year period, thus leaving the district in a vulnerable financial position. In June 2008, the district placed Measure “I” on the election ballot. This proposition called for an increased property tax assessment of $100 per parcel from voters in the district in order to finance district operations. The measure was defeated by nearly 86 percent of those voting.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6:
The prior general manager failed to increase revenue or reduce operating costs over a six-year period, thus leaving the district in a vulnerable financial position. In June 2008, the district placed Measure “I” on the election ballot. This proposition called for an increased property tax assessment of $100 per parcel from voters in the district in order to finance district operations. The measure was defeated by nearly 86 percent of those voting.
F7:
Financial records are kept in a manual format, thus leading to difficulties in documentation and reconciliation between bank balances and the general ledger. 2
Related Recommendations (1)
R7:
Financial records are kept in a manual format, thus leading to difficulties in documentation and reconciliation between bank balances and the general ledger. 2
F8:
The district has a long-term bonded indebtedness, incurred in 1999, and financed through the Palo Verde Cemetery Financing Authority. According to a recently prepared advisory report from the Riverside County Auditor-Controller, “the district is facing a risk of not meeting its bond obligations. Financing will be required to facilitate the district’s recovery and prevent defaulting on forthcoming bond payments.”
Related Recommendations (1)
R8:
The district has a long-term bonded indebtedness, incurred in 1999, and financed through the Palo Verde Cemetery Financing Authority. According to a recently prepared advisory report from the Riverside County Auditor-Controller, “the district is facing a risk of not meeting its bond obligations. Financing will be required to facilitate the district’s recovery and prevent defaulting on forthcoming bond payments.”
F9:
California Government Code Section 23010 (a) allows the County of Riverside to provide a loan to the Palo Verde Cemetery District with certain provisions.
Related Recommendations (1)
R9:
California Government Code Section 23010 (a) allows the County of Riverside to provide a loan to the Palo Verde Cemetery District with certain provisions.
F10:
Since September 2008, the district has been governed and maintained by three newly appointed trustees and a corps of Blythe community volunteers. Their efforts over these months of financial uncertainty should be commended. According to testimony, three employees should be placed on staff when it is financially able to do so, as volunteerism may not be sustainable.
Related Recommendations (1)
R10:
Since September 2008, the district has been governed and maintained by three newly appointed trustees and a corps of Blythe community volunteers. Their efforts over these months of financial uncertainty should be commended. According to testimony, three employees should be placed on staff when it is financially able to do so, as volunteerism may not be sustainable.
F11:
Provisions of the Ralph M. Brown Act were ignored. This act guarantees the rights of members of the public to attend and participate in meetings of local governmental entities, including special districts.
Related Recommendations (1)
R11:
Provisions of the Ralph M. Brown Act were ignored. This act guarantees the rights of members of the public to attend and participate in meetings of local governmental entities, including special districts. Recommendations Riverside County Board of Supervisors Palo Verde Cemetery District Board of Trustees Blythe City Manager Blythe Redevelopment Agency
Findings & Recommendations
11 findings
F1:
Prior to September 2008, district trustees were negligent in their oversight of the financial affairs of the district. The trustees failed to demand financial accountability from the general manager, who signed blank checks and permitted improper expenditures of district funds. No formal orientation and training program for trustees exists. Testimony from former trustees revealed they were unaware of their basic fiduciary responsibilities. Minutes of their meetings were either incomplete or reflected inadequate decision-making for a governing body. 1
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
The district should immediately establish an orientation and training program for trustees to include proper handling of finances, fiduciary responsibilities, management hiring practices and employee benefits.
F2:
The prior general manager of the district failed in his basic management responsibilities to the district, by: a. not providing appropriate orientation and training to the trustees b. making questionable expenditures for personal use from district funds c. improperly borrowing funds from the district endowment fund to finance operating expenses d. using poor record keeping practices, he ignored recommendations from the outside auditor.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
The district should seek recoupment of funds improperly paid to and/or by the former general manager, including but not limited to: vacation time, compensatory time, sick leave, cell phone expenses, gasoline allotments and other inappropriate expenditures.
F3:
The Riverside County Board of Supervisors, as the appointing authority for district trustees, failed to provide instruction to trustees in their areas of responsibilities and fiduciary obligations.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
The Riverside County Board of Supervisors, as the appointing authority for district trustees, failed to provide instruction to trustees in their areas of responsibilities and fiduciary obligations.
F4:
Over several years the district faced a shortage of revenue to meet increasing operating costs. In an effort to correct this deficit, the board of trustees and general manager borrowed more than $253,000 from the endowment fund principal. This was a violation of California Health and Safety Code Section 9065(e), which states: “The board of trustees shall not spend the principal of the endowment care fund.” The fund is nearly depleted. The fund establishes in perpetuity the care and maintenance of the cemetery.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4:
Over several years the district faced a shortage of revenue to meet increasing operating costs. In an effort to correct this deficit, the board of trustees and general manager borrowed more than $253,000 from the endowment fund principal. This was a violation of California Health and Safety Code Section 9065(e), which states: “The board of trustees shall not spend the principal of the endowment care fund.” The fund is nearly depleted. The fund establishes in perpetuity the care and maintenance of the cemetery.
F5:
The district does not have a policies and procedures manual. This absence of written policies and procedures allowed for the careless implementation of financial and other decisions, which resulted in arbitrary and inappropriate actions taken by the prior general manager. An outdated card system identifying burial plots and financial records contained many errors. Burials were sometimes reserved for plots already occupied.
Related Recommendations (1)
R5:
The district does not have a policies and procedures manual. This absence of written policies and procedures allowed for the careless implementation of financial and other decisions, which resulted in arbitrary and inappropriate actions taken by the prior general manager. An outdated card system identifying burial plots and financial records contained many errors. Burials were sometimes reserved for plots already occupied.
F6:
The prior general manager failed to increase revenue or reduce operating costs over a six-year period, thus leaving the district in a vulnerable financial position. In June 2008, the district placed Measure “I” on the election ballot. This proposition called for an increased property tax assessment of $100 per parcel from voters in the district in order to finance district operations. The measure was defeated by nearly 86 percent of those voting.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6:
The prior general manager failed to increase revenue or reduce operating costs over a six-year period, thus leaving the district in a vulnerable financial position. In June 2008, the district placed Measure “I” on the election ballot. This proposition called for an increased property tax assessment of $100 per parcel from voters in the district in order to finance district operations. The measure was defeated by nearly 86 percent of those voting.
F7:
Financial records are kept in a manual format, thus leading to difficulties in documentation and reconciliation between bank balances and the general ledger. 2
Related Recommendations (1)
R7:
Financial records are kept in a manual format, thus leading to difficulties in documentation and reconciliation between bank balances and the general ledger. 2
F8:
The district has a long-term bonded indebtedness, incurred in 1999, and financed through the Palo Verde Cemetery Financing Authority. According to a recently prepared advisory report from the Riverside County Auditor-Controller, “the district is facing a risk of not meeting its bond obligations. Financing will be required to facilitate the district’s recovery and prevent defaulting on forthcoming bond payments.”
Related Recommendations (1)
R8:
The district has a long-term bonded indebtedness, incurred in 1999, and financed through the Palo Verde Cemetery Financing Authority. According to a recently prepared advisory report from the Riverside County Auditor-Controller, “the district is facing a risk of not meeting its bond obligations. Financing will be required to facilitate the district’s recovery and prevent defaulting on forthcoming bond payments.”
F9:
California Government Code Section 23010 (a) allows the County of Riverside to provide a loan to the Palo Verde Cemetery District with certain provisions.
Related Recommendations (1)
R9:
California Government Code Section 23010 (a) allows the County of Riverside to provide a loan to the Palo Verde Cemetery District with certain provisions.
F10:
Since September 2008, the district has been governed and maintained by three newly appointed trustees and a corps of Blythe community volunteers. Their efforts over these months of financial uncertainty should be commended. According to testimony, three employees should be placed on staff when it is financially able to do so, as volunteerism may not be sustainable.
Related Recommendations (1)
R10:
Since September 2008, the district has been governed and maintained by three newly appointed trustees and a corps of Blythe community volunteers. Their efforts over these months of financial uncertainty should be commended. According to testimony, three employees should be placed on staff when it is financially able to do so, as volunteerism may not be sustainable.
F11:
Provisions of the Ralph M. Brown Act were ignored. This act guarantees the rights of members of the public to attend and participate in meetings of local governmental entities, including special districts.
Related Recommendations (1)
R11:
Provisions of the Ralph M. Brown Act were ignored. This act guarantees the rights of members of the public to attend and participate in meetings of local governmental entities, including special districts. Recommendations Riverside County Board of Supervisors Palo Verde Cemetery District Board of Trustees Blythe City Manager Blythe Redevelopment Agency
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Findings & Recommendations
5 findings
F1:
The aging population in Riverside County is increasing faster than the force of social workers qualified to service their needs. According to the 2000 census, 16.11 percent of the population is age 60 plus. At present there are over 15,000 clients receiving IHSS assistance in Riverside County. In an effort to handle the increasing workload, DPSS authorized APS to utilize caseworkers from Child Protective Services (CPS).
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
Revise the IHSS budget plan to reflect realistic projected needs created by the increasing growth in the senior population.
F2:
IHSS presently has 30 caseworkers, each with a minimum caseload of 420 clients. Their case burden increases at a five to seven percent growth rate yearly. There is no established maximum on the number of clients assigned to caseworkers. 1
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
Be proactive in convincing the state to establish a caseload standard for IHSS caseworkers. *
F3:
In order to be approved for IHSS services, applicants must qualify for Medi-Cal. IHSS caseworkers are presently assessing 1,000 plus applicants per month. (This figure does not account for projected increases.) Of these applicants, 40 percent do not qualify and are eventually denied Medi-Cal benefits. The average assessment time by a caseworker is approximately six hours per applicant. These six man- hours times the approximately 400 Medi-Cal denials per month represent a sizeable unreimbursed county expense.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
Prescreen clients for Medi-Cal eligibility before doing the IHSS assessment. *
F4:
The submission of IHSS and Medi-Cal applications simultaneously creates an untenable situation. Many IHSS applications are not being completed within the 30-day state mandated time frame, per California-DSS-Manual- SS 30-759 Application Process. DPSS cannot approve an IHSS claim until the client has been approved for Medi-Cal. The time frame for Medi- Cal to process a claim is 45 days pursuant to Regulations Manual Medi- Cal Eligibility §50177 (1).
Related Recommendations (1)
R4:
Coordinate with the state to revise the application processing time for Medi-Cal and IHSS assistance to have realistically compatible deadlines. * Establish a policy whereby caseworkers invest no more than one unreimbursed hour on any application other than those that are pre- approved for Medi-Cal benefits. * 2
F5:
Due to a pay increase, previously established to attract more caseworkers, CPS pays caseworkers at a 5.5 percent higher rate of pay than APS. Consequently, when an opening arises, APS caseworkers are inclined to request transfer to CPS.
Related Recommendations (1)
R5:
Standardize the salaries for DPSS caseworkers. *The 2008-2009 Riverside County Grand Jury realizes the County Board of Supervisors must work directly with the state entities involved in implementation of the above recommendations. A copy of this report will therefore be sent to the appropriate state agencies. Report Issued: 06/10/09 Report Public: 06/12/09 Response Due: 09/08/09 3
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Findings & Recommendations
7 findings
F1:
For the months of March and April 2009, ETS interviewed more than 1,700 patients. The only existing triage area, with its two interview rooms, is inadequate to handle the volume of patient interviews. This situation appears to be inconsistent with Welfare and Institutions Code Section 5325.1 (b), relating to patient confidentiality. RCRMC executive administration has shared with the 2008-2009 Grand Jury the proposed plans for expansion of the AC. As of the date of this report construction has not commenced. (The patient confidentiality issue was also a finding of the 2006-2007 Riverside County Grand Jury.)
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
Expedite plans to expand the capacity of ETS at the AC. Consider utilization of portable office units as an immediate solution to the space problem.
F2:
During a February 2009 visit to ITF, it was observed that one of the monitors surveilling a patient room in Unit A, (Intensive Treatment) was not functioning. It was also noted that the images provided by the monitors surveilling other patient rooms were grainy. In October 2008 there were monitors on order with county Facilities Management to replace Unit A monitors, as well as those in ETS and the restraint room in Unit D. In February 2009 the requisition was modified to include additional monitors to cover blind spots in Units B and C. As of this report none has been received.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
Give top priority to the urgent need for receipt and installation of the video monitors that are on order.
F3:
Psychiatric patients are released with a 14-day supply of medication. Because of the minimal number of outpatient clinics available, upon release there can be a lengthy time interval before their scheduled follow- up medical appointments. This lag creates a recurring situation where the patients exhaust their supply of medication before they are seen. Staff refers to this situation as a “revolving door syndrome,” in which patients will return to emergency services for additional medication multiple times in the interim. Of the more than 1,700 ETS patients seen in March and April, 142 of them had returned only for medication. Because they are not acute patients, some wait up to 12 hours before they are evaluated by staff.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
Open an Urgent Care Clinic in the ETS lobby for patients who need to be seen and are not in crisis, thus addressing the “revolving door syndrome”.
F4:
There is a need for RCRMC and the Department of Mental Health to provide outpatient clinics for patients suffering from chronic mental illness.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4:
Create an outpatient clinic at the AC to service patients suffering from chronic mental illness.
F5:
Other than at the AC, uninsured psychiatric clients countywide do not get served unless they are in crisis. When these patients frequent the hospital emergency rooms on a recurring basis, they may become eligible for coverage from Proposition 63 monies. (These state funds are provided to counties to expand mental health services.) 2
Related Recommendations (1)
R5:
Design a program that will qualify uninsured patients for funding based on Proposition 63 / Mental Health Services Act requirements.
F6:
There is a lack of services in the Coachella Valley for uninsured mentally ill individuals not in crisis.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6:
Provide at lease one adequate inpatient psychiatric treatment facility in the Coachella Valley for the uninsured population.
F7:
Interviews revealed that almost daily, patients in the inpatient facility are ready to be released to the next level of care with no immediate place to go. Meanwhile, there are patients in emergency services that have already been evaluated for placement in the inpatient facility with no available inpatient beds.
Related Recommendations (1)
R7:
Take immediate action to expand the ITF capacity. Report Issued: 06/10/09 Report Public: 06/12/09 Response Due: 09/08/09 3
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Findings & Recommendations
7 findings
F1:
For the months of March and April 2009, ETS interviewed more than 1,700 patients. The only existing triage area, with its two interview rooms, is inadequate to handle the volume of patient interviews. This situation appears to be inconsistent with Welfare and Institutions Code Section 5325.1 (b), relating to patient confidentiality. RCRMC executive administration has shared with the 2008-2009 Grand Jury the proposed plans for expansion of the AC. As of the date of this report construction has not commenced. (The patient confidentiality issue was also a finding of the 2006-2007 Riverside County Grand Jury.)
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
Expedite plans to expand the capacity of ETS at the AC. Consider utilization of portable office units as an immediate solution to the space problem.
F2:
During a February 2009 visit to ITF, it was observed that one of the monitors surveilling a patient room in Unit A, (Intensive Treatment) was not functioning. It was also noted that the images provided by the monitors surveilling other patient rooms were grainy. In October 2008 there were monitors on order with county Facilities Management to replace Unit A monitors, as well as those in ETS and the restraint room in Unit D. In February 2009 the requisition was modified to include additional monitors to cover blind spots in Units B and C. As of this report none has been received.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
Give top priority to the urgent need for receipt and installation of the video monitors that are on order.
F3:
Psychiatric patients are released with a 14-day supply of medication. Because of the minimal number of outpatient clinics available, upon release there can be a lengthy time interval before their scheduled follow- up medical appointments. This lag creates a recurring situation where the patients exhaust their supply of medication before they are seen. Staff refers to this situation as a “revolving door syndrome,” in which patients will return to emergency services for additional medication multiple times in the interim. Of the more than 1,700 ETS patients seen in March and April, 142 of them had returned only for medication. Because they are not acute patients, some wait up to 12 hours before they are evaluated by staff.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
Open an Urgent Care Clinic in the ETS lobby for patients who need to be seen and are not in crisis, thus addressing the “revolving door syndrome”.
F4:
There is a need for RCRMC and the Department of Mental Health to provide outpatient clinics for patients suffering from chronic mental illness.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4:
Create an outpatient clinic at the AC to service patients suffering from chronic mental illness.
F5:
Other than at the AC, uninsured psychiatric clients countywide do not get served unless they are in crisis. When these patients frequent the hospital emergency rooms on a recurring basis, they may become eligible for coverage from Proposition 63 monies. (These state funds are provided to counties to expand mental health services.) 2
Related Recommendations (1)
R5:
Design a program that will qualify uninsured patients for funding based on Proposition 63 / Mental Health Services Act requirements.
F6:
There is a lack of services in the Coachella Valley for uninsured mentally ill individuals not in crisis.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6:
Provide at lease one adequate inpatient psychiatric treatment facility in the Coachella Valley for the uninsured population.
F7:
Interviews revealed that almost daily, patients in the inpatient facility are ready to be released to the next level of care with no immediate place to go. Meanwhile, there are patients in emergency services that have already been evaluated for placement in the inpatient facility with no available inpatient beds.
Related Recommendations (1)
R7:
Take immediate action to expand the ITF capacity. Report Issued: 06/10/09 Report Public: 06/12/09 Response Due: 09/08/09 3
Findings & Recommendations
7 findings
F1:
For several years the District followed an annual budget preparation practice of minimizing expected revenue and maximizing expected expenses, thus providing a distorted picture of each year’s anticipated results.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
The District should budget anticipated revenue and expenses more realistically, within a five per cent margin, to present a more useful picture of the financial health of the organization.
F2:
Excessive reserves were accumulated over several years. These reserves were beyond what most special districts would require to cover unanticipated expenditures. The District tried unsuccessfully to increase its assessment in 2007. 1
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
Reserves, both restricted and unrestricted, should be reduced.
F3:
In spite of repeated recommendations from outside auditors, the District has failed to complete a financial policies and procedures manual.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
A financial policies and procedures manual should be completed, providing guidance on accounting practices, purchasing, credit card usage, travel, expense accounts, banking, and other financial matters.
F4:
The 1997 personnel policies and procedures manual is incomplete and outdated. It does not reflect current labor laws, regulations, and District personnel administration.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4:
District personnel policies and procedures should be documented and updated, at the earliest possible time. These revisions should be communicated regularly to employees and updated periodically.
F5:
Investigation and sworn testimony from trustees and employees revealed that the prior general manager and legal counsel together had managed the organization in a heavy-handed and dictatorial manner, thus contributing to the dysfunctionality of the District. The District has been without a permanent general manager since May 2008, and the search for a replacement has taken at least ten months. Investigation revealed that this delay has caused much uncertainty and turmoil among the employees.
Related Recommendations (1)
R5:
The search for a permanent general manager should be expedited.
F6:
An October 2007 study by the Riverside Local Agency Formation Commission (LAFCO) recommended that the District assume vector control responsibility for the eastern portion of Riverside County, from the Coachella Valley to the California – Arizona state line, including the city of Blythe.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6:
A LAFCO recommendation regarding expansion of the District should be deferred until remedial action by the District on these recommendations is considered and completed.
F7:
Control products used in mosquito and vector suppression activities are a large share of the District’s operating budget. These products are budgeted at $2,141,000 in the 2008-2009 budget, and include expenditures for Choice, a product under investigation by the Environmental Protection Agency. Both trustees and management have questioned the use of Choice. 8. (a) In all of the interviews conducted, lack of communication was a constant theme. This lack of effective communication among trustees, appointing bodies and the Riverside County nine cities, management, employees, and the community was evident. This reflects a recurring problem contributing to the dysfunctionality of the District. (b) Sworn testimony revealed that on a regular basis, aside from an annual outside audit, the District failed to consider viewpoints from similar organizations, valley opinion leaders, and the community, thus resulting in insularity of management. (c) Sworn testimony revealed that former management discouraged any outside consultation. As a result, the District has not utilized the services of outside consultants on organizational structure, trustee policies and procedures, updated personnel policies, appropriate financial documentation and reporting, and management practices. 2
Related Recommendations (1)
R7:
Use of the suppression chemical called Choice should be discontinued once the present supply is exhausted. 3
Additional Recommendations
1
Not linked to specific findings.
R8:
The District should consider retention of outside consultation on organizational development, including but not limited to: trustee recruitment and training; trustee policies and procedures; management structure, systems and procedures; and most importantly, communication among trustees, senior management, employees, and communities in the valley. Further, appointing authorities (Riverside County and the nine cities) should develop criteria for trustee qualification and apply more intense vetting of potential trustees prior to appointment, thereby improving the quality of appointments to the District Board of Trustees. Report Issued: 04/14/09 Report Public: 04/16/09 Response Due: 07/13/09 4
Findings & Recommendations
8 findings
F1:
For several years the District followed an annual budget preparation practice of minimizing expected revenue and maximizing expected expenses, thus providing a distorted picture of each year’s anticipated results.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
The District should budget anticipated revenue and expenses more realistically, within a five per cent margin, to present a more useful picture of the financial health of the organization.
F2:
Excessive reserves were accumulated over several years. These reserves were beyond what most special districts would require to cover unanticipated expenditures. The District tried unsuccessfully to increase its assessment in 2007. 1
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
Reserves, both restricted and unrestricted, should be reduced.
F3:
In spite of repeated recommendations from outside auditors, the District has failed to complete a financial policies and procedures manual.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
A financial policies and procedures manual should be completed, providing guidance on accounting practices, purchasing, credit card usage, travel, expense accounts, banking, and other financial matters.
F4:
The 1997 personnel policies and procedures manual is incomplete and outdated. It does not reflect current labor laws, regulations, and District personnel administration.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4:
District personnel policies and procedures should be documented and updated, at the earliest possible time. These revisions should be communicated regularly to employees and updated periodically.
F5:
Investigation and sworn testimony from trustees and employees revealed that the prior general manager and legal counsel together had managed the organization in a heavy-handed and dictatorial manner, thus contributing to the dysfunctionality of the District. The District has been without a permanent general manager since May 2008, and the search for a replacement has taken at least ten months. Investigation revealed that this delay has caused much uncertainty and turmoil among the employees.
Related Recommendations (1)
R5:
The search for a permanent general manager should be expedited.
F6:
An October 2007 study by the Riverside Local Agency Formation Commission (LAFCO) recommended that the District assume vector control responsibility for the eastern portion of Riverside County, from the Coachella Valley to the California – Arizona state line, including the city of Blythe.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6:
A LAFCO recommendation regarding expansion of the District should be deferred until remedial action by the District on these recommendations is considered and completed.
F7:
Control products used in mosquito and vector suppression activities are a large share of the District’s operating budget. These products are budgeted at $2,141,000 in the 2008-2009 budget, and include expenditures for Choice, a product under investigation by the Environmental Protection Agency. Both trustees and management have questioned the use of Choice. 8. (a) In all of the interviews conducted, lack of communication was a constant theme. This lack of effective communication among trustees, appointing bodies and the Riverside County nine cities, management, employees, and the community was evident. This reflects a recurring problem contributing to the dysfunctionality of the District. (b) Sworn testimony revealed that on a regular basis, aside from an annual outside audit, the District failed to consider viewpoints from similar organizations, valley opinion leaders, and the community, thus resulting in insularity of management. (c) Sworn testimony revealed that former management discouraged any outside consultation. As a result, the District has not utilized the services of outside consultants on organizational structure, trustee policies and procedures, updated personnel policies, appropriate financial documentation and reporting, and management practices. 2
Related Recommendations (1)
R7:
Use of the suppression chemical called Choice should be discontinued once the present supply is exhausted. 3
F8:
In all of the interviews conducted, lack of communication was a (a) constant theme. This lack of effective communication among trustees, appointing bodies and the Riverside County nine cities, management, employees, and the community was evident. This reflects a recurring problem contributing to the dysfunctionality of the District. Sworn testimony revealed that on a regular basis, aside from an (b) annual outside audit, the District failed to consider viewpoints from similar organizations, valley opinion leaders, and the community, thus resulting in insularity of management. (c) Sworn testimony revealed that former management discouraged any outside consultation. As a result, the District has not utilized the services of outside consultants on organizational structure, trustee policies and procedures, updated personnel policies, appropriate financial documentation and reporting, and management practices.
Related Recommendations (1)
R8:
The District should consider retention of outside consultation on organizational development, including but not limited to: trustee recruitment and training; trustee policies and procedures; management structure, systems and procedures; and most importantly, communication among trustees, senior management, employees, and communities in the valley. Further, appointing authorities (Riverside County and the nine cities) should develop criteria for trustee qualification and apply more intense vetting of potential trustees prior to appointment, thereby improving the quality of appointments to the District Board of Trustees. Report Issued: 04/14/09 Report Public: 04/16/09 Response Due: 07/13/09 4
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Findings & Recommendations
3 findings
F1:
In 1997, the EVMWD issued a Request For Proposal (RFP) seeking a company to lead the project in development and financing. Only one bidder, a newly formed company incorporated in Nevada, responded. This company, called Nevada-Hydro, then became licensed to operate in California as The Nevada Hydro Corporation (Nevada-Hydro). On May 15, 1997, the EVMWD entered into a Development Agreement with Nevada-Hydro a company lacking history, experience, and financing. Contrary to standard business practice, the Development Agreement had no end date. The President of Nevada-Hydro, the President of the EVMWD Board, and legal counsel for EVMWD, signed this Development Agreement. No follow-up meetings were held with solicited bidders to determine the reasons for the no-bid response.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
EVMWD must follow established contract policies and procedures, which require due diligence, in the selection of bidders in all future contracts. In addition, meeting with all solicited bidders should be mandatory.
F2:
The Development Agreement, signed May 15, 1997, stated on , paragraph 1.4: (In the following quote, FERC refers to Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.) “The Company will provide all necessary funding and will pay all expenses and costs to complete and submit the FERC license application to obtain the FERC license and to obtain related entitlements.” Anticipating repayment from Nevada-Hydro, the EVMWD has spent approximately four million dollars in support of LEAPS. The Development Agreement outlines payment to EVMWD on , paragraph 3.0. It details full repayment plus interest; however, there are disclaimers to the repayment found in the Development Agreement on , paragraph 3.1 which states: “. . . the successful closing of all financing and/or equity contribution required to construct and operate the project and solely contingent upon such successful closing, the company will pay, within (30) days thereafter, District as follows, which amounts, unless otherwise agreed herein, shall comprise the sole consideration to which District is entitled herein.” In essence, this three-man company must acquire financing for an estimated 1.3 billion dollars from outside sources and complete the entire LEAPS project before it is obligated to repay the EVMWD for its expenditures. FERC approved only the TE/VS transmission line portion of the application, potentially leaving EVMWD and its pump/storage plan out of the picture. Nevada-Hydro’s explanation was that this was merely a postponement and not a rejection. The credibility of this position was challenged when Nevada-Hydro requested California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) authorization to be the sole and lead agency on the transmission line. The CPUC controls only transmission lines in California. On November 21, 2006, EVMWD Management promptly responded to this action by issuing a letter to Nevada-Hydro outlining EVMWD’s future course of action. In part it reads: “As a public agency, the District is sensitive to situations which suggest that a private party is representing the District’s interests. . .” There have been three separate reports, which were compiled by outside consultants and paid for by EVMWD. Two by Economic Insight Inc. entitled “An Economic Evaluation of the LEAPS Project” dated January 17, 2006, and February 7, 2006. The executive summary begins by noting that Nevada-Hydro made mistakes in analyzing potential revenue by over valuing the differential between off-peak and on-peak energy. Nevada- Hydro provided a spreadsheet dated July 20, 2005, utilizing peak pricing of sixty-five dollars per megawatt hour (MWh) and twenty-five dollars per non-peak MWh. These values were valid ten years ago when there was escalation in pricing caused by deregulation. They are no longer valid as there is an insignificant difference between peak and non-peak pricing. Essentially, the report concludes that LEAPS is not economically viable. It also states: “. . .of the thousands of pages submitted only ten are devoted to economics.” The third report entitled “A Preliminary Economic Assessment and Strategic Review of the LEAPS Project” by SHIR Consultants Inc. dated April 2008, also indicated that the project is “not economically viable.” Investigation revealed that some board members and members of the public were deliberately excluded from knowledge of the reports for more than two years. In April 2008, an EVWMD Board Member released one of the reports to the media, forcing EVWMD to release the remaining reports. The board and/or management knew years earlier that LEAPS was not financially viable using a market-based approach; however, they proceeded in spite of this knowledge. At a public meeting on June 20, 2007, Nevada-Hydro announced that Morgan-Stanley Commodities, a division of the investment firm of Morgan- Stanley, would serve as the principal investor for the LEAPS project. The announcement did not immediately clarify that funding would cover only the TE/VS transmission line. This excluded the hydro pump/storage portion of LEAPS, thereby leaving EVMWD unsure of repayment. The 1997 Development Agreement requires reimbursement to EVMWD only when the entire project is fully completed. Recognizing the financial vulnerability of the project, Nevada-Hydro requested that the approval for licensing be cost-based rather than market-based. California Independent System Operators (CAISO) 3 stakeholders unanimously rejected this proposal. These stakeholders own the operation of the transmission lines. After more than two years of negotiations, EVMWD’s effort to enter into a new formal contract with Nevada-Hydro to ensure repayment reached an impasse. Worst-case scenario would be that repayment will never be made, nor will the pump/storage portion of the project ever be built. EVMWD’s legal counsel has verified this. In a letter dated July 7, 2006, a board member had inquired: “What happens if the project doesn’t go? How is EVMWD going to get their money back from Nevada-Hydro?” The response from legal counsel was: “If the project does not come to fruition, the amount that has been recorded as a receivable will be written off the District’s financials.” A present board member estimated the current expenditures at four million dollars. At the August 26, 2008, board meeting, EVMWD voted (four to one) to investigate the legal complexities involved in removing itself from the LEAPS project. The investigation will be performed by EVMWD’s legal counsel and reported upon in closed session.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
The EVMWD Board of Directors should accept the results of the consultant reports, which conclude that the LEAPS project is not economically viable, especially the pumped storage portion.
F3:
As a backup approach, EVMWD is justifying the virtues of using the pump/storage for a so-called “black start”. During a wide-area power outage, the fossil fuel or nuclear power generators turn off and need electrical power to restart. In the absence of this grid power, a “black start” needs to be performed to reactivate the power grid because time is of the essence in re-establishing electrical power. One of the stated advantages of hydroelectric power, unlike gas turbines, is the ability to start quickly with very little power (just enough to open the intake gates). This process would provide power online to start up the fossil fueled and/or nuclear operated stations. According to the consulting reports, the LEAPS project, while not economically viable for continuous operation, would provide such a quick start. According to outside experts, building the pumped storage portion solely for a “black start” is economically prohibitive in comparison to gas turbine generation. 4
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
The EVMWD Board of Directors should make available to ratepayers an itemized accounting of the approximately four million dollars spent thus far on the LEAPS project, including direct and indirect expenses and pass- through expenses paid to legal counsel. Report Issued: 02/23/09 Report Public: 02/26/09 Response Due: 05/26/09 5
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Findings & Recommendations
3 findings
F1:
In 1997, the EVMWD issued a Request For Proposal (RFP) seeking a company to lead the project in development and financing. Only one bidder, a newly formed company incorporated in Nevada, responded. This company, called Nevada-Hydro, then became licensed to operate in California as The Nevada Hydro Corporation (Nevada-Hydro). On May 15, 1997, the EVMWD entered into a Development Agreement with Nevada-Hydro a company lacking history, experience, and financing. Contrary to standard business practice, the Development Agreement had no end date. The President of Nevada-Hydro, the President of the EVMWD Board, and legal counsel for EVMWD, signed this Development Agreement. No follow-up meetings were held with solicited bidders to determine the reasons for the no-bid response.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
EVMWD must follow established contract policies and procedures, which require due diligence, in the selection of bidders in all future contracts. In addition, meeting with all solicited bidders should be mandatory.
F2:
The Development Agreement, signed May 15, 1997, stated on , paragraph 1.4: (In the following quote, FERC refers to Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.) “The Company will provide all necessary funding and will pay all expenses and costs to complete and submit the FERC license application to obtain the FERC license and to obtain related entitlements.” Anticipating repayment from Nevada-Hydro, the EVMWD has spent approximately four million dollars in support of LEAPS. The Development Agreement outlines payment to EVMWD on , paragraph 3.0. It details full repayment plus interest; however, there are disclaimers to the repayment found in the Development Agreement on , paragraph 3.1 which states: “. . . the successful closing of all financing and/or equity contribution required to construct and operate the project and solely contingent upon such successful closing, the company will pay, within (30) days thereafter, District as follows, which amounts, unless otherwise agreed herein, shall comprise the sole consideration to which District is entitled herein.” In essence, this three-man company must acquire financing for an estimated 1.3 billion dollars from outside sources and complete the entire LEAPS project before it is obligated to repay the EVMWD for its expenditures. FERC approved only the TE/VS transmission line portion of the application, potentially leaving EVMWD and its pump/storage plan out of the picture. Nevada-Hydro’s explanation was that this was merely a postponement and not a rejection. The credibility of this position was challenged when Nevada-Hydro requested California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) authorization to be the sole and lead agency on the transmission line. The CPUC controls only transmission lines in California. On November 21, 2006, EVMWD Management promptly responded to this action by issuing a letter to Nevada-Hydro outlining EVMWD’s future course of action. In part it reads: “As a public agency, the District is sensitive to situations which suggest that a private party is representing the District’s interests. . .” There have been three separate reports, which were compiled by outside consultants and paid for by EVMWD. Two by Economic Insight Inc. entitled “An Economic Evaluation of the LEAPS Project” dated January 17, 2006, and February 7, 2006. The executive summary begins by noting that Nevada-Hydro made mistakes in analyzing potential revenue by over valuing the differential between off-peak and on-peak energy. Nevada- Hydro provided a spreadsheet dated July 20, 2005, utilizing peak pricing of sixty-five dollars per megawatt hour (MWh) and twenty-five dollars per non-peak MWh. These values were valid ten years ago when there was escalation in pricing caused by deregulation. They are no longer valid as there is an insignificant difference between peak and non-peak pricing. Essentially, the report concludes that LEAPS is not economically viable. It also states: “. . .of the thousands of pages submitted only ten are devoted to economics.” The third report entitled “A Preliminary Economic Assessment and Strategic Review of the LEAPS Project” by SHIR Consultants Inc. dated April 2008, also indicated that the project is “not economically viable.” Investigation revealed that some board members and members of the public were deliberately excluded from knowledge of the reports for more than two years. In April 2008, an EVWMD Board Member released one of the reports to the media, forcing EVWMD to release the remaining reports. The board and/or management knew years earlier that LEAPS was not financially viable using a market-based approach; however, they proceeded in spite of this knowledge. At a public meeting on June 20, 2007, Nevada-Hydro announced that Morgan-Stanley Commodities, a division of the investment firm of Morgan- Stanley, would serve as the principal investor for the LEAPS project. The announcement did not immediately clarify that funding would cover only the TE/VS transmission line. This excluded the hydro pump/storage portion of LEAPS, thereby leaving EVMWD unsure of repayment. The 1997 Development Agreement requires reimbursement to EVMWD only when the entire project is fully completed. Recognizing the financial vulnerability of the project, Nevada-Hydro requested that the approval for licensing be cost-based rather than market-based. California Independent System Operators (CAISO) 3 stakeholders unanimously rejected this proposal. These stakeholders own the operation of the transmission lines. After more than two years of negotiations, EVMWD’s effort to enter into a new formal contract with Nevada-Hydro to ensure repayment reached an impasse. Worst-case scenario would be that repayment will never be made, nor will the pump/storage portion of the project ever be built. EVMWD’s legal counsel has verified this. In a letter dated July 7, 2006, a board member had inquired: “What happens if the project doesn’t go? How is EVMWD going to get their money back from Nevada-Hydro?” The response from legal counsel was: “If the project does not come to fruition, the amount that has been recorded as a receivable will be written off the District’s financials.” A present board member estimated the current expenditures at four million dollars. At the August 26, 2008, board meeting, EVMWD voted (four to one) to investigate the legal complexities involved in removing itself from the LEAPS project. The investigation will be performed by EVMWD’s legal counsel and reported upon in closed session.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
The EVMWD Board of Directors should accept the results of the consultant reports, which conclude that the LEAPS project is not economically viable, especially the pumped storage portion.
F3:
As a backup approach, EVMWD is justifying the virtues of using the pump/storage for a so-called “black start”. During a wide-area power outage, the fossil fuel or nuclear power generators turn off and need electrical power to restart. In the absence of this grid power, a “black start” needs to be performed to reactivate the power grid because time is of the essence in re-establishing electrical power. One of the stated advantages of hydroelectric power, unlike gas turbines, is the ability to start quickly with very little power (just enough to open the intake gates). This process would provide power online to start up the fossil fueled and/or nuclear operated stations. According to the consulting reports, the LEAPS project, while not economically viable for continuous operation, would provide such a quick start. According to outside experts, building the pumped storage portion solely for a “black start” is economically prohibitive in comparison to gas turbine generation. 4
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
The EVMWD Board of Directors should make available to ratepayers an itemized accounting of the approximately four million dollars spent thus far on the LEAPS project, including direct and indirect expenses and pass- through expenses paid to legal counsel. Report Issued: 02/23/09 Report Public: 02/26/09 Response Due: 05/26/09 5
Findings & Recommendations
10 findings
F1:
Currently, the state bills the County of Riverside an administrative charge at the rate of 9.68 percent of the contract. Over the last six years, state administrative charges have increased from a low of $5.5 million in fiscal year 2002-2003 to a high of $12.5 million in fiscal year 2007-2008. For fiscal year 2009-2010 the administrative charges will increase to 11 percent. Fiscal Year State Administrative Increase ($) Increase (%) Administrative Charges ($) Charges (%) 07/08 12,474,646 2,378,673 23.56 10.65 06/07 10,095,973 1,957,257 9.92 24.05 05/06 8,138,716 959,736 13.32 9.10 04/05 7,181,980 888,393 14.12 9.50 03/04 705,769 6,293,686 12.63 10.18 02/03 5,587,818 11.13 ----- -----
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
The Riverside County Executive Officer should conduct a cost/benefit analysis to determine the feasibility of establishing its own fire department in the future.
F2:
For many years CDF employed standard staffing of a three-person crew consisting of an engineer with two firefighters, or a captain, an engineer, and a firefighter. Some county stations still use this standard; however, many stations have now implemented municipal staffing. Municipal staffing consists of a captain, engineer, and firefighter on duty at all times. The firefighter often times is also a paramedic. Note: captains, engineers and paramedics command a higher rate of pay. During a former fire chief's appointment, a judge ruled that employees may not be moved from their assigned station without going to arbitration. For example, if a paramedic engineer calls in sick, is in training, or on vacation, the position must still be filled. If another paramedic engineer is unable to be found, a firefighter paramedic may be assigned to the station to fill that position; however, this still leaves the need for an engineer. When this happens, there are now four employees assigned to a normal three-person shift. Above and beyond the mere addition of an extra member, frequently the replacements are on paid overtime. If a firefighter paramedic and an engineer who are both on overtime replace an engineer paramedic, the additional cost can be considerable. It has been reported that occasionally, there are even two captains and two engineers on an engine at the same time. This is not an anomaly, but happens to some degree every day at quite a substantial impact to the budget.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
The Riverside County Fire Chief should return to standard staffing and establish a policy to ensure that all available volunteer firefighters are utilized to minimize the usage of overtime.
F3:
It has become a practice at some fire stations that CDF firefighters will hold back a second engine and call in paid staff on overtime instead of utilizing readily available volunteer firefighters. This intentional delay could possibly jeopardize the safety of the community if an emergency situation arises.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
In the interest of public safety, the Riverside County Fire Chief should prohibit the holding back of any fire apparatus.
F4:
In May of 2004, the Riverside County Board of Supervisors implemented Policy C-33, mandatory background checks, for all new county employees as well as the volunteer firefighters; however, background checks are neither mandatory nor a requirement for CAL FIRE applicants. (See Attachment 1).
Related Recommendations (1)
R4:
To conform to the Riverside County Human Resources Policy C-33, mandatory background checks should be negotiated into the next CDF/CAL FIRE contract, should the contract be renewed.
F5:
The word "volunteer" is defined as a person who enters any service of his/her own choice and serves without pay. However, volunteer firefighters can apply for compensation when they work a fire lasting over one hour and/or when they are requested to cover a fire station behind an incident to which CDF has responded.
Related Recommendations (1)
R5:
Because volunteer firefighters may choose to apply for monetary compensation in certain situations, the Riverside County Board of Supervisors should redefine the term "volunteer". These firefighters should be classified as "paid-call" or the Riverside County Human Resources Department should conduct a feasibility study to create a Reserve Firefighter Position Series to supplement personnel where needed. This would also eliminate costs to the county such as state administrative charges and State Workers' Compensation and would reduce costly municipal staffing overtime charges.
F6:
The Riverside County Fire Chief estimates the cost of new county purchased personal protective equipment provided to career and volunteer firefighters is approximately $2,525. Investigation revealed that approximately 60 percent of newly hired volunteer firefighters were not issued new personal protective equipment. Frequently, the personal protective equipment actually received exhibited extensive wear and in some cases defective.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6:
Riverside County Executive Officer should conduct a reconciliation to justify the difference between what is/was charged to the county versus the actual value of the equipment issued. The Riverside County Fire Chief must ensure that volunteer firefighters are issued new personal protective equipment that the County of Riverside has purchased.
F7:
There appears to be a lack of inventory control to track unreturned county owned/purchased personal protective equipment. Investigation revealed that some or many CDF Firefighters have illegitimately acquired this personal protective equipment (turnouts) that were issued to former volunteer firefighters and left at the fire station. Pursuant to a Union Local 2881 website column "HUGE STEP FORWARD", amnesty is being offered to holders of these "silent second set of turnouts". (See Attachment 2)
Related Recommendations (1)
R7:
The Riverside County Board of Supervisors should authorize an independent investigation into the illicit acquisition of county property. Once equipment has been located, it should be returned and logged back into inventory. The holders of the "silent second set" of county property should be subject to appropriate disciplinary action. The Riverside County Executive Officer should routinely monitor the links
F8:
For the past several years there has been an ongoing campaign by many CDF Local 2881 Board Members to convince the career firefighters that volunteer firefighters are not as well trained, and are plotting to replace them.* Much of this information has been posted on the CDF official web page that is linked to the Riverside County Fire Department website. This type of propaganda has lent itself to the creation of hostile work environments at some stations (See Attachments 3-6). As an example of the effectiveness of the campaign, when a CDF Captain at a county fire station was asked his opinion of the volunteer firefighters, he immediately became agitated and aggressive and emphatically stated that the volunteers "Suck" and should all be replaced by paid CDF firefighters.
Related Recommendations (1)
R8:
placed on the Riverside County Fire Department's website, to ensure that the contents are not inflammatory, prejudicial or divisive. The Riverside County Fire Chief should take steps to ensure that any form
F9:
It is common practice in many volunteer fire companies that volunteer firefighter auxiliaries, through fundraising ventures, raise money to purchase their own firefighting equipment. In some cases, volunteer firefighters discovered that this equipment was tampered with and/or had literally disappeared.
Related Recommendations (1)
R9:
of malicious mischief toward volunteer firefighters will result in disciplinary action.
F10:
In April 2009, the Riverside County Fire Chief attempted to place a "hiring freeze" on volunteer firefighters to supposedly reduce costs to the Riverside County budget. However, pursuant to the Cooperative Reimbursement Agreement, the Riverside County Fire Chief "...directs and controls coordination with community volunteer fire organizations in order to integrate volunteer efforts with those of full-time personnel." California Health and Safety Code Section 14831 authorize the board of supervisors to regulate the formation and continued existence of volunteer fire companies. *Volunteer firefighters have a minimum of 15 weeks required training at the Volunteer Firefighters Academy. CDF/CAL FIRE and volunteer firefighter instructors conduct the Volunteer Firefighter Academy.
Related Recommendations (1)
R10:
The Riverside County Fire Chief should adhere to the Cooperative Reimbursement Agreement and the California Health and Safety Code Section 14831 as applicable to volunteer firefighters. Report Issued: 06/30/09 Report Public: 07/02/09 Response Due: 09/28/09 COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, CALIFORNIA BOARD OF SUPERVISORS POLICY Policy Number Subject:
Findings & Recommendations
4 findings
F1:
Sworn witnesses testified, that although career Deputy District Attorneys have traditionally been given discretion to manage their assigned cases, in the current DA’s office, discretion has been all but taken away. According to the sworn testimony of current and former prosecutors, they must get approval for everything. Supervisory personnel are reportedly unwilling to make decisions and every issue must go up the chain of command. This makes it more difficult and time-consuming to adjudicate a case. It removes the prosecutor who is most knowledgeable of case factors from decision-making regarding case settlement. Witnesses reported that one reason for case dismissals was delays in the decision making process.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
Allow trial deputies to have input in all phases of case decision-making.
F2:
It is the stated policy of the DA’s office to settle cases: (a) consistent with the charges, and (b) the prosecutors’ assessment of their ability to achieve a conviction. Although the DA’s office Policy and Procedure Manual devotes an entire section to encouraging case settlement where appropriate, witnesses report that current DA’s office practices discourage case settlements. Witnesses reported cases where a settlement offer was considered appropriate and acceptable to the accused, the defense attorney and the court, but was rejected by the prosecutor. Witnesses’ testimony, confirmed by data provided by the court, the DA’s office, and Public Defender’s office, indicates that the prosecutors’ attitude toward case settlement has resulted in less favorable verdicts, than if settlement had been accepted. Investigation revealed that the insistence of the DA’s office to proceed to trial disregarding potential settlements contributes to the congestion of Riverside County Courts. According to sworn witnesses the practice of taking a case to trial is highly valued in the DA’s office. There is a widespread belief that promotions are based upon proceeding with a jury trial resulting in conviction.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
Reduce court congestion by following established written policies and procedures regarding case settlement.
F3:
Former and current prosecutors, as well as members of other County agencies, reported a pervasive climate of fear and intimidation within the DA’s office. Based upon actual experiences, DA’s office witnesses described a prevalent fear of being transferred or reassigned to less desirable positions and/or geographic locations as punitive measures for perceived lack of loyalty. Fear of retaliation was described as inhibiting initiative, particularly in negotiating case settlements. 2
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
Promulgate and enforce written Policies and Procedures prohibiting the use of transfers and reassignments as disciplinary or punitive measures.
F4:
In June 2007, the Board of Supervisors authorized the creation of an Executive Division, consisting of nine personnel, within the DA’s office. Documentation disclosed that the Executive Division resulted in an increase of $296,068 to the DA’s office budget for FY 2007/2008 and $492,190 in FY 2008/2009. Review of the budget proposal reveals that the Executive Division’s functions replicate duties previously performed by existing staff.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4:
Eliminate the Executive Division, returning its functions to the personnel previously performing them. In view of current economic conditions return the unused funds to the County. Report Issued: 05/20/09 Report Public: 05/22/09 Response Due: 08/18/09 3
Findings & Recommendations
4 findings
F1:
The intended application of BRLP is to register businesses in the unincorporated areas of Riverside County. The intent went further by expecting, but not requiring, other county departments to input their permitting information. This would result in the capture of fees not currently collected by the county. 1
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
When this system is properly implemented, its use must be mandated by the Board of Supervisors to enable all county departments and agencies to develop data and share appropriate information with other agencies having similar needs.
F2:
As it now exists, the BRLP does not serve the purpose for which it was intended. This causes many instances of duplication of effort or no action at all, resulting in unnecessary expense and/or loss of revenue. Investigation has shown there is little or no utilization of the program to notify other county agencies, which may have an interest in features of the same business.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
Redesign or replace the BRLP with software providing the necessary data required by all county agencies to meet the needs for which it was originally intended. It is essential that all permitting departments of the county government, which have legal requirements, enter data into and retrieve data from the system on a timely basis. 2
F3:
The BRLP is designed as a two-tier system, the first tier of which contains only information that is not of a personal nature. The casual seeker of information can retrieve no more than the name of the business, address, telephone number and type of business in which it is engaged. The second tier, which is only accessible to personnel of the BRLD, contains much more data protected by privacy statutes. This tier’s data is only given to those who make a formal request to BRLD personnel and can show a legitimate need for the information. The program requires several follow-up efforts via telephone and/or e-mail to finally obtain the necessary data.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
Redesign or replace BRLP to allow direct access to the second tier by those agencies, which require specific information for their operations, which would be more cost effective.
F4:
Due to lack of direction by the Riverside County Board of Supervisors and the County Executive Officer to the implementation of BRLP, the result is an ineffective system, which does not fulfill its original intent.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4:
The Riverside County Board of Supervisors and County Executive Officer must be more active in the implementation and monitoring of the previously approved countywide computer system. Report Issued: 06/10/09 Report Public: 06/12/09 Response Due: 09/08/09 3
Findings & Recommendations
4 findings
F1:
The intended application of BRLP is to register businesses in the unincorporated areas of Riverside County. The intent went further by expecting, but not requiring, other county departments to input their permitting information. This would result in the capture of fees not currently collected by the county. 1
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
When this system is properly implemented, its use must be mandated by the Board of Supervisors to enable all county departments and agencies to develop data and share appropriate information with other agencies having similar needs.
F2:
As it now exists, the BRLP does not serve the purpose for which it was intended. This causes many instances of duplication of effort or no action at all, resulting in unnecessary expense and/or loss of revenue. Investigation has shown there is little or no utilization of the program to notify other county agencies, which may have an interest in features of the same business.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
Redesign or replace the BRLP with software providing the necessary data required by all county agencies to meet the needs for which it was originally intended. It is essential that all permitting departments of the county government, which have legal requirements, enter data into and retrieve data from the system on a timely basis. 2
F3:
The BRLP is designed as a two-tier system, the first tier of which contains only information that is not of a personal nature. The casual seeker of information can retrieve no more than the name of the business, address, telephone number and type of business in which it is engaged. The second tier, which is only accessible to personnel of the BRLD, contains much more data protected by privacy statutes. This tier’s data is only given to those who make a formal request to BRLD personnel and can show a legitimate need for the information. The program requires several follow-up efforts via telephone and/or e-mail to finally obtain the necessary data.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
Redesign or replace BRLP to allow direct access to the second tier by those agencies, which require specific information for their operations, which would be more cost effective.
F4:
Due to lack of direction by the Riverside County Board of Supervisors and the County Executive Officer to the implementation of BRLP, the result is an ineffective system, which does not fulfill its original intent.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4:
The Riverside County Board of Supervisors and County Executive Officer must be more active in the implementation and monitoring of the previously approved countywide computer system. Report Issued: 06/10/09 Report Public: 06/12/09 Response Due: 09/08/09 3
Additional documents
Documents found alongside this year's reports — not grand jury reports or responses.