San Francisco County Grand Jury
• 2010-2011
Central Subway Too Much Money for Too Little Benefit Civil Grand Jury City and County of San Francisco
⚠️ Translation Notice: This content has been automatically translated. The original English text is the official version. Translation may contain errors.
⚠️ Este contenido ha sido traducido automáticamente. El texto original en inglés es la versión oficial. La traducción puede contener errores.
Findings and Recommendations 38 findings
F1
The Central Subway’s financial planning appears seriously flawed. Cost estimates have risen 143% from 2003 to 2011.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1
Given that San Francisco is responsible for any cost overrun of the Central Subway project, SFMTA should hire an independent entity to investigate whether the $1.578 billion budget is a realistic estimate.
F2
Muni has done a very poor job of meeting, or even nearing, the requirements of Proposition E.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2
SFMTA should hire an independent auditor to conduct an analysis of whether its internal goals and the requirements in Proposition E are realistic, why Muni has been unable to meet them, and what should be done to improve Muni’s service levels.
F3
Muni is not providing adequate service to its customers.
Related Recommendations (1)
R5
SFMTA should publicly explain if and when the remaining cuts to Muni service will be restored.
F4
Muni has had financial troubles in recent years and, absent an unforeseen windfall, will continue to have financial troubles in the foreseeable future.
No recommendations for this finding
F5
Given the current and projected state of Muni’s funding, difficult times lie ahead. This will impact the agency’s ability to deliver the level of performance demanded by the charter.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3
Either the City and SFMTA need to increase Muni’s funding, or the City and SFMTA need to lower their expectations for Muni’s performance.
F6
Raising passenger fares can only have a minimal impact on Muni’s financial shortfalls.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4
The SFMTA should hire an outside auditor to evaluate the potential gains in revenue brought by higher fares against the potential loss in total ridership due to such higher prices.
F7
New financial stresses are adding to Muni’s already-existing financial troubles. These stresses will potentially worsen the state of Muni service.
No recommendations for this finding
F8
Maintenance of vehicles impacts the agency’s ability to provide day-to-day service. Poorly maintained vehicles have negatively affected Muni’s ability to operate as many vehicles as needed to meet peak demand.
No recommendations for this finding
F9
As a result of forcing maintenance demands to compete with other system demands, maintenance has regularly been underfunded.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6
Maintenance should be given a higher priority in the budget than it currently is.
F10
Stripping wrecked vehicles for parts is an inefficient way to save money. It would be cheaper to repair the wrecked vehicle and buy new parts for other vehicles than to buy a completely new vehicle to replace the cannibalized one.
Related Recommendations (1)
R7
Muni should end its practice of cannibalizing wrecked vehicles to repair other vehicles.
F11
Following the manufacturer’s suggested preventive maintenance program is inadequate for maintaining Muni’s fleet. This inadequate preventive maintenance negatively impacts Muni’s ability to properly serve its riders.
Related Recommendations (2)
R8
The Board of Supervisors, SFCTA, and SFMTA should determine how to fund adequate preventive maintenance and a targeted component rebuild program on an ongoing basis.
R9
SFMTA should conduct a comparison of Muni’s “mean time between failures” against other cities’ to gauge the impact of Muni’s current maintenance practices on its fleet. It should also take into account any unique aspects of San Francisco transit that might affect its “mean time between failures.”
F12
Mid-life overhauls are not enough to properly maintain Muni’s fleet. Targeted component rebuilds are essential to their maintenance.
Related Recommendations (1)
R8
The Board of Supervisors, SFCTA, and SFMTA should determine how to fund adequate preventive maintenance and a targeted component rebuild program on an ongoing basis.
F13
While Muni has come close to or exceeded its goals for hours of bus use between failures, it is nowhere near achieving its goal for LRV hours. These failures, some due to a lack of maintenance, are impacting Muni’s ability to deliver adequate service to its customers.
Related Recommendations (1)
R11
The SFMTA should look at the peak demand for vehicles at the time it proposes to conduct new operator training and ensure that such training will not impact its ability to meet peak LRV demand.
F14
The SFMTA’s inability to recognize the obvious need to allot time to train new operators causes this Jury to lose faith in the agency’s ability to efficiently manage its own projects.
Related Recommendations (1)
R10
The SFMTA should explain when it plans to hire and train new operators to ensure a smooth rollout of the Central Subway.
F15
Using the numbers supplied by SFMTA, it appears that the problem of insufficient LRV fleet size experienced during the T-Third rollout will also plague the Central Subway rollout. This will translate to either a delayed opening or further diminished service on the other LRV lines.
No recommendations for this finding
F16
There was an 18-month delay on finishing the 3-year T-Third project. This represents a 50% delay. With a commensurate or fractional delay on the 7-year Central Subway project, it will exceed current cost and contingency projections.
No recommendations for this finding
F17
Individuals will sometimes make poor decisions. However, a good management and implementation process will catch and correct these decisions. The SFMTA has not shown that it has corrected the internal management and implementation problems from the T-Third project which allowed poor decision-making to go undetected.
Related Recommendations (1)
R12
The SFMTA should explain what changes to the internal decision-approval processes have been put into practice to prevent the types of problems that affected the T-Third project. It should be noted that merely changing staff does not suffice to fix these problems. If such changes have yet to be made, the SFMTA should hire an external management consultant to advise it on how best to change its processes.
F18
Though there are some differences between the T-Third project and the Central Subway project which suggest the latter might be better managed, such as federal oversight, this will be a more complex, and therefore harder to manage project.
No recommendations for this finding
F19
The SFMTA has allocated an appropriate amount of the budget for the Central Subway project to cover contingencies and cost overruns.
No recommendations for this finding
F20
The SFMTA is unreasonably optimistic that problems with the T-Third project will not reoccur during the Central Subway project.
No recommendations for this finding
F21
Simply having various employees in a common organization or reporting structure does not mean that they necessarily communicate with each other.
Related Recommendations (1)
R13
The SFMTA should explain how its internal communication process will facilitate cooperation and discussion between various people and agencies involved in the Central Subway project.
F22
Though the specific problems of interagency communication during the T-Third project can be avoided due to the creation of the SFMTA, the Central Subway’s effect on a separate agency’s system (BART) can pose new problems.
Related Recommendations (1)
R13
The SFMTA should explain how its internal communication process will facilitate cooperation and discussion between various people and agencies involved in the Central Subway project.
F23
SFMTA appears to be adequately in touch with BART regarding the Central Subway project.
No recommendations for this finding
F24
It is imperative that the SFMTA ensure that all parties involved in the technical aspects of the Central Subway project have access to a unified, official Master Plan.
Related Recommendations (1)
R14
The SFMTA should maintain a single, unified Master Plan for the Central Subway project that can be accessed, though not changed, by all parties involved in the project.
F25
Though it may appear pedantic for this Jury to point out incorrect factual details published by the SFMTA, the Jury sees this as a symptom of a bigger problem. The Jury finds that the lack of care in its public communications can lead to a lack of confidence in the SFMTA’s ability to accurately communicate both internally and with outside entities.
Related Recommendations (1)
R15
All communications and publications regarding the Central Subway project should receive more accurate fact-checking.
F26
Direct connectivity from the T-Third line to the Muni Metro will be eliminated by the Central Subway alignment.
Related Recommendations (2)
R16
The SFMTA should consider a realignment of the Central Subway which allows for a more direct connection to the Muni Metro.
R26
The SFMTA should redesign the Central Subway to better serve the San Francisco population.
F27
If the design of the Union Square/Market Street station does not allow for future connectivity of a possible Geary LRV corridor, the SFMTA made a serious design error.
Related Recommendations (2)
R17
The Union Square/Market Street station should be designed to allow a future Geary light rail vehicle line to access it.
R26
The SFMTA should redesign the Central Subway to better serve the San Francisco population.
F28
A route that benefits both the Chinatown community and the Financial District is preferable to one that only benefits Chinatown.
Related Recommendations (2)
R18
The Central Subway should be redesigned to serve both the Financial District and Chinatown. If SFMTA thinks the current alignment already serves both neighborhoods, it should explain how.
R26
The SFMTA should redesign the Central Subway to better serve the San Francisco population.
F29
There does not seem to be an SFMTA plan to address the current problems on existing bus lines that travel the Stockton corridor. Presumably the quality of service will not improve between now and 2019.
Related Recommendations (1)
R19
The SFMTA should enact a plan to improve service on the Stockton corridor prior to completing the Central Subway.
F30
The transfer between the Union Square/Market Street station and Powell Street station is terrible. The 1,000 foot distance is an unreasonably long transfer, especially for the elderly and disabled.
Related Recommendations (1)
R20
SFMTA needs to fix the transfer between the Central Subway and Muni Metro.
F31
The “Union Square/Market Street” station is incorrectly named because it is not on Market Street.
Related Recommendations (1)
R21
SFMTA should change the name of the “Union Square/Market Street” station to simply “Union Square” for an accurate description.
F32
The SFMTA has designed a subpar escalator system for all three underground stations because they lack redundancy.
Related Recommendations (1)
R22
SFMTA should add escalator redundancy to all stations on the Central Subway.
F33
It seems disingenuous that the SFMTA would point to the station design as the reason for not including moving sidewalks as they themselves designed the stations. Or, as a Central Subway manager attempted to explain, “Perceived design flaws were actually practical decisions.”
No recommendations for this finding
F34
Though designing the Central Subway for hybrid boarding gives SFMTA the benefit of uniformity of its LRV fleet, this benefit is outweighed by the long-term benefit of beginning a transformation to a system using a dedicated level-boarding vehicle.
Related Recommendations (1)
R23
SFMTA should purchase dedicated level-boarding vehicles for the Central Subway.
F35
With proof-of-payment as the sole method of fare collection, there is no apparent justification for mezzanines in the Central Subway stations.
Related Recommendations (1)
R24
The SFMTA should consider eliminating the mezzanines from the Central Subway station designs.
F36
Proof-of-payment is the preferred method of fare collection for the Central Subway.
No recommendations for this finding
F37
The SFMTA has not established that the use of barriers for fare collection instead of proof-of- payment in the Central Subway will reduce fare evasion.
Related Recommendations (1)
R25
The SFMTA should conduct an analysis of whether a proof-of-payment system is preferable to its planned hybrid fare collection system for the Central Subway.
F38
The SFMTA has not established that the use of barriers for fare collection provides a strong advantage in regard to giving passengers visual guidance.
Related Recommendations (1)
R25
The SFMTA should conduct an analysis of whether a proof-of-payment system is preferable to its planned hybrid fare collection system for the Central Subway.
Conclusions 1
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CL1Over the course of a seven-month investigation, the Jury discovered many problems with the Central Subway plan. It has a pattern of increasing cost estimates. San Francisco will be responsible for any cost overruns which could be substantial. The addition of a new subway line will add to an existing operating deficit and could stretch the existing maintenance environment to the breaking point. There are no plans to address existing problems on the Stockton corridor before project completion. There is no effective transfer to the Muni Metro and BART systems. It ignores service to the Financial District. It ignores current transportation trends. In 2006, the SFMTA commissioned an independent engineering firm to review the Central Subway design. The resulting report contained the following passage: “Very broadly, what is the role of capital investment in a transit system? It should represent either an opportunity to reduce operating expenses, or represent the most efficient way to bring better service to additional markets. As proposed, this project does not appear to do that – it promises to combine high capital costs with higher operating costs, and . . . does not, apparently, effectively meet the market needs in the corridor it is intended to serve.”20 The Civil Grand Jury agrees that the present project fails to answer San Francisco’s transportation needs. The Civil Grand Jury supports the expansion of its transit system to fulfill O’Shaughnessy’s Four Corridor vision. The Civil Grand Jury concludes that the project must be redesigned. __________________________________________________________________________ 33 SFMTA AND THE CENTRAL SUBWAY METHOD OF INVESTIGATION The Jury began its investigation in October 2010 with research concerning planning issues and both local and national transit history. In November the Jury continued its research with a series of interviews which lasted until May 2011. These twenty sessions included taped interviews with: Present and former members of the City’s administration A former member of the Board of Supervisors Current and former administrators, managers and employees of SFMTA Current and former employees of SFCTA Neighborhood groups affected by the Central Subway plan including Chinatown A BART official A member of the California Assembly Officers of San Francisco Neighborhood Associations Urban planners, engineers, transit professionals and administrators The Jury also conducted correspondence with the Federal Transit Administration, the SFMTA, the SFCTA, and community organizers. Finally, Jury members attended various public meetings including the Board of Supervisors and the SFCTA. __________________________________________________________________________ 34 SFMTA AND THE CENTRAL SUBWAY ENDNOTES 1 Robert Cherny, “Historical Essay”, 1994 2 SFCTA, “The Four Corridor Plan”, June 1995 3 SFMTA, Third Street Light Rail Phase 1 + 2 Service Integration, Executive Summary, August 2010 4 http://www.sfmta.com/cms/mcsp/cspover.htm 5 http://goldengatebridge.org/research/facts.php#GGBOpened 6 SFMTA, Third Street Light Rail Phase 1 +2, August 2010 7 LTK Engineering Services, “Review of Central Subway Alternatives Project Report,” April 27, 2006 8 SFCTA – Fact Sheet, Jan. 2011 9 SFMTA, 2011 FFGA Financial Plan 10 A review of Muni’s performance, as measured against various metrics, can be found at http://www.sfmta.com/cms/rstd/sstdindx.htm. 11 SFMTA, 2011 FFGA Financial Plan 12 http://sf.streetsblog.org/2010/10/14/sfmta-reveals-breda-light-rail-vehicle-refurbished-with-federal-stimulus- funds/ 13 The actual metric uses the singular “failure.” However, this Jury thinks the plural “failures” makes more sense. 14 For example, the rapid increase in the price of steel in the early 2000s caused a commensurate increase in the construction costs of the new Bay Bridge replacement and the new Laguna Honda Hospital. See http://articles.sfgate.com/2004-06-10/business/17429261_1_steel-price-hot-rolled-steel-steel-plate. 15 http://www.sfmta.com/cms/mcsp/cspover.htm 16 http://www.sfexaminer.com/local/subway-travel-times-disputed 17 http://www.sfexaminer.com/local/transportation/2011/03/central-subway-design-moscone-center-san- franciscio-called-inefficient 18 http://www.sfexaminer.com/local/transportation/2010/12/muni-renews-effort-keep-escalators-moving 19 http://www.ottawa.ca/residents/public_consult/tmp/lrt/discussion_papers/floor_en.html 20 LTK Engineering Services, “Review of Central Subway Alternatives Project Report,” April 27, 2006 __________________________________________________________________________ 35 SFMTA AND THE CENTRAL SUBWAY