San Francisco County Grand Jury
2010-2011
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Findings & Recommendations
7 findings
F1:
The City is relying on the Mayor’s pension reform proposal that will, hopefully, appear on the November, 2011 ballot to address the City’s health care plan’s unfunded liability. However, as presently written the higher contribution rates mandated in the measure would only apply to employees hired after January 2009. Higher contributions for the majority of City workers hired before January 2009 do not take effect until effect until 2016-2017. Therefore, the measure will not begin to have a meaningful impact on the City’s health care costs for several years.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
Until such time as the retiree health trust fund can cover the expense, the Controller, the Mayor and the Board of Supervisors’ Budget and Finance Committee should develop a temporary remedy to the Other Post Employment Benefits unfunded liability, until the retiree health trust fund can cover the expense, in order to reduce its negative impact on funding levels for other city programs.
F2:
A number of employees in the Fire Department and to a lesser extent the Police and other departments continue to receive annual salary increases in excess of 10% in at least one of the three years before they retire. This leads to a deficit in the City’s retirement system account, which is calculated on an anticipated 4.5% annual salary increase. It also unfairly spreads the costs of pension spiking to other departments that do not engage in this practice.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
2.2 Pension spiking occurs when an employee’s final compensation is increased before retiring, causing an increase the pension amount. In the prior report the Jury defined it as an increase of 10% or greater in a single year. Large salary increases associated with spiking are mainly a function of promotions being granted to an employee shortly before their retirement. Responses to the Jury’s recommendations can be found in
F3:
Being proactive now in finding a permanent location is a preferable alternative to waiting for a situation to arise where the Department faces a looming deadline to vacate Pier 48 and has yet to find a suitable alternative location. __________________________________________________________________________ 17 CONTINUITY REPORTS Limiting the geographic scope of a possible Department of Elections move to within the Civic Center is a sound decision.
F4:
Being proactive now in finding a permanent location is a preferable alternative to waiting for a solution arise when the Department faces a deadline to vacate Pier 48. __________________________________________________________________________ 19 CONTINUITY REPORTS PARKING FOR THE DISABLED – ABUSE OR OVER-USE? 2006-2007 Disabled placard abuse is one of the most significant challenges to parking management in San Francisco. It’s a fraudulent way of people being able to park free for an unlimited time. It hurts all motorists, disabled or not. Judson True, SFMTA Spokesperson San Francisco Chronicle, 1/4/10 SUMMARY In its report, “Parking for the Disabled – Abuse or Over-Use?” (hereafter, “2007 report”), the 2006-2007 Civil Grand Jury studied the rapid increase in the number of disabled parking placards (hereafter, the term “disabled parking placard” also covers “disabled license plates”) issued to residents of San Francisco and its impact on the competition for curbside parking. There are more cars registered to San Francisco residents than there are legal on-street parking spaces. The large number of cars that daily enter the City from adjoining counties only exacerbates the parking problem in San Francisco. This in turn is taking a growing financial and emotional toll on the City and its residents. Over the past few years, the growth in the number of disabled placards in California has accelerated rapidly. By 2009/10 the number of disabled placards registered to San Francisco residents had reached roughly 56,000, including temporary placards, one for approximately every 15 residents of the City, and more than double the number of outstanding disabled placards in 1996. In order to obtain a disabled placard, an applicant is not automatically required to undergo an actual full scale medical examination. For applicants whose disabilities are not readily observable and uncontested, the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) merely requires the submission of a certificate substantiating the disability signed by a physician or surgeon, an optometrist, physician assistant, chiropractor, nurse practitioner or certified nurse midwife. A disabled placard permits the registered owner, “…to park at any legitimate curbside space, any green zone, any blue zone or in any City owned parking lot, but not in a City-owned garage, for up to 72 hours without paying any fees.” 2 This applies only when the car is directly transporting the person to whom the placard was issued. __________________________________________________________________________ 20 CONTINUITY REPORTS While the State of California exercises authority over the issuance of disabled placards, the City of San Francisco does have enforcement powers regarding the lawful use of disabled placards. With this in mind, several of the recommendations contained in the “2007 report” offer practical steps the City should take to curb the misuse of disabled placards. UNFINISHED BUSINESS
F5:
While the cornerstone of SFMTA’s current policy for dealing with disabled placard abuse is open ended consultations with its stakeholders, the City’s largest stakeholder, namely those who actually pay to park, is not being entirely neglected. As Mr. Tom Nolan’s refreshingly candid comment made clear, this group will continue to function as the City’s cash cow, filling the revenue hole partially created by disabled placard abuse through paying higher meter rates and parking fines.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4:
The Board of Supervisors should refrain from passing any new legislation that allows for the installation of additional meters, extending hours of operation or raising meter rates and parking fines until such time as meaningful policies are implemented to eliminate the $8.4 million hole in the City’s parking revenue caused by continued disabled placard abuse. The residents of San Francisco deserve no less.
F6:
In combating disabled placard abuse, the Department of Parking and Traffic is currently operating under an overly restrictive enforcement protocol. This has made enforcement unnecessarily cumbersome, expensive and ultimately ineffective.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
The Mayor should urge the SFMTA Board of Directors to instruct the Department of Parking and Traffic to modify its current enforcement protocol with respect to the misuse of disabled placards and initiate a more vigorous approach involving all of their PCOs as permitted under CVC Section 22511.56. Serious consideration should also be given to enlisting the San Francisco Police Department in the effort to combat disabled parking abuse. __________________________________________________________________________ 28 CONTINUITY REPORTS
F7:
These are not easy issues to discuss dispassionately. Our natural inclination is to be compassionate and generous toward those with major physical disabilities. But there are also __________________________________________________________________________ 27 CONTINUITY REPORTS matters of equity and responsibility. It is the government’s responsibility to insure that these privileges are not abused and result in an unfair financial burden being placed on the City’s residents. It is not enough that city residents are forced to witness on a daily basis the flagrant misuse of disabled placards on the streets of San Francisco. They must also suffer the added indignity of having to pay higher parking fees and fines to fill the revenue hole created by that abuse.
Additional Recommendations
4
Not linked to specific findings.
R1:
The nature of the complaint;
R2:
What the investigation determined;
R3:
The name of the respondent; and
R4:
The penalty applied or actions taken. R 6) An independent administrative law judge should deal with retaliation issues. The responsibility for retaliation complaints should be removed from the Ethics Commission. R 7) If an employee who has filed a whistleblower complaint is laid off within two years of having filed the complaint, or within one year of the complaint being closed, an administrative law judge will conduct a full review. Should it be determined that retaliation is a factor in the layoff/termination; the employee shall be awarded up to two years full salary as part of his or her severance package. R 8) CGOBOC must become an effective Whistleblower Program oversight entity by reviewing the number and type of whistleblower complaints, the investigative process used and the final results of investigations at least twice a year. R 9) Anyone filing a non-website initiated complaint should be sent a form letter that indicates the tracking number and an acknowledgment that their complaint has been received. R 10) Create and institute a filter process to allow redirection of non-waste, fraud and abuse complaints to 311. This would require a change to the Charter. R 11) The Office of the Controller should develop and implement training to educate all city employees about the Whistleblower Program. R 12) Establish an appeals process using an independent administrative law judge for whistleblower complaints that qualify for review. Guidelines must be established to determine legitimate reasons for the appeal of a "dismissed", "no violation found" or "closed" complaint. R 13) Establish a reward system for substantiated high-risk13 whistleblower complaints with a $500 minimum or 10% of funds recovered, whichever is greater. R 14) The Jury recommends that a best practices/benchmark study be done of other jurisdictions as to how confidentiality issues might be better managed. GLOSSARY BUMPED To oust usually by virtue of seniority or priority. CSA Central Services Auditor, a division in the Controller's Office. CARB Citizen's Audit Review Board. CGOBOC Citizens General Obligation Bond Oversight committee. COWS Controllers Office Whistleblower System. Tracks whistleblower complaints inside the Central Services Auditor. Proposition F Created CGOBOC review panel established in 1992. Proposition K The 1993 Charter amendment that established the Ethics Commission. ENDNOTES 1 San Francisco Voter Information Pamphlet, November 2003 Election: Rebuttal to Opponent’s Argument Against Proposition C, . Assessor-Recorders FY 2009-2010 Annual Report http://www.sfassessor.org/Modules/ShowDocument.aspx?documentid=696 3 Nov. 2003 Voter Information Guide: http://sfpl.info/pdf/main/gic/elections/November4_2003.pdf 4 The Sunshine Ordinance Task Force advises the Board of Supervisors and provides information to other City departments on appropriate ways to implement the Sunshine Ordinance (Chapter 67 of the Administrative Code); ensures that deliberations of commissions, boards, councils and other agencies of the City and County are conducted before the people; and guarantees that City operations are open to the people's review. Department ranked by number of complaints
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Findings & Recommendations
38 findings
F1:
The Central Subway’s financial planning appears seriously flawed. Cost estimates have risen 143% from 2003 to 2011.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
Given that San Francisco is responsible for any cost overrun of the Central Subway project, SFMTA should hire an independent entity to investigate whether the $1.578 billion budget is a realistic estimate.
F2:
Muni has done a very poor job of meeting, or even nearing, the requirements of Proposition E.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
SFMTA should hire an independent auditor to conduct an analysis of whether its internal goals and the requirements in Proposition E are realistic, why Muni has been unable to meet them, and what should be done to improve Muni’s service levels.
F3:
Muni is not providing adequate service to its customers.
Related Recommendations (1)
R5:
SFMTA should publicly explain if and when the remaining cuts to Muni service will be restored.
F4:
Muni has had financial troubles in recent years and, absent an unforeseen windfall, will continue to have financial troubles in the foreseeable future.
F5:
Given the current and projected state of Muni’s funding, difficult times lie ahead. This will impact the agency’s ability to deliver the level of performance demanded by the charter.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
Either the City and SFMTA need to increase Muni’s funding, or the City and SFMTA need to lower their expectations for Muni’s performance.
F6:
Raising passenger fares can only have a minimal impact on Muni’s financial shortfalls.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4:
The SFMTA should hire an outside auditor to evaluate the potential gains in revenue brought by higher fares against the potential loss in total ridership due to such higher prices.
F7:
New financial stresses are adding to Muni’s already-existing financial troubles. These stresses will potentially worsen the state of Muni service.
F8:
Maintenance of vehicles impacts the agency’s ability to provide day-to-day service. Poorly maintained vehicles have negatively affected Muni’s ability to operate as many vehicles as needed to meet peak demand.
F9:
As a result of forcing maintenance demands to compete with other system demands, maintenance has regularly been underfunded.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6:
Maintenance should be given a higher priority in the budget than it currently is.
F10:
Stripping wrecked vehicles for parts is an inefficient way to save money. It would be cheaper to repair the wrecked vehicle and buy new parts for other vehicles than to buy a completely new vehicle to replace the cannibalized one.
Related Recommendations (1)
R7:
Muni should end its practice of cannibalizing wrecked vehicles to repair other vehicles.
F11:
Following the manufacturer’s suggested preventive maintenance program is inadequate for maintaining Muni’s fleet. This inadequate preventive maintenance negatively impacts Muni’s ability to properly serve its riders.
Related Recommendations (2)
R8:
The Board of Supervisors, SFCTA, and SFMTA should determine how to fund adequate preventive maintenance and a targeted component rebuild program on an ongoing basis.
R9:
SFMTA should conduct a comparison of Muni’s “mean time between failures” against other cities’ to gauge the impact of Muni’s current maintenance practices on its fleet. It should also take into account any unique aspects of San Francisco transit that might affect its “mean time between failures.”
F12:
Mid-life overhauls are not enough to properly maintain Muni’s fleet. Targeted component rebuilds are essential to their maintenance.
Related Recommendations (1)
R8:
The Board of Supervisors, SFCTA, and SFMTA should determine how to fund adequate preventive maintenance and a targeted component rebuild program on an ongoing basis.
F13:
While Muni has come close to or exceeded its goals for hours of bus use between failures, it is nowhere near achieving its goal for LRV hours. These failures, some due to a lack of maintenance, are impacting Muni’s ability to deliver adequate service to its customers.
Related Recommendations (1)
R11:
The SFMTA should look at the peak demand for vehicles at the time it proposes to conduct new operator training and ensure that such training will not impact its ability to meet peak LRV demand.
F14:
The SFMTA’s inability to recognize the obvious need to allot time to train new operators causes this Jury to lose faith in the agency’s ability to efficiently manage its own projects.
Related Recommendations (1)
R10:
The SFMTA should explain when it plans to hire and train new operators to ensure a smooth rollout of the Central Subway.
F15:
Using the numbers supplied by SFMTA, it appears that the problem of insufficient LRV fleet size experienced during the T-Third rollout will also plague the Central Subway rollout. This will translate to either a delayed opening or further diminished service on the other LRV lines.
F16:
There was an 18-month delay on finishing the 3-year T-Third project. This represents a 50% delay. With a commensurate or fractional delay on the 7-year Central Subway project, it will exceed current cost and contingency projections.
F17:
Individuals will sometimes make poor decisions. However, a good management and implementation process will catch and correct these decisions. The SFMTA has not shown that it has corrected the internal management and implementation problems from the T-Third project which allowed poor decision-making to go undetected.
Related Recommendations (1)
R12:
The SFMTA should explain what changes to the internal decision-approval processes have been put into practice to prevent the types of problems that affected the T-Third project. It should be noted that merely changing staff does not suffice to fix these problems. If such changes have yet to be made, the SFMTA should hire an external management consultant to advise it on how best to change its processes.
F18:
Though there are some differences between the T-Third project and the Central Subway project which suggest the latter might be better managed, such as federal oversight, this will be a more complex, and therefore harder to manage project.
F19:
The SFMTA has allocated an appropriate amount of the budget for the Central Subway project to cover contingencies and cost overruns.
F20:
The SFMTA is unreasonably optimistic that problems with the T-Third project will not reoccur during the Central Subway project.
F21:
Simply having various employees in a common organization or reporting structure does not mean that they necessarily communicate with each other.
Related Recommendations (1)
R13:
The SFMTA should explain how its internal communication process will facilitate cooperation and discussion between various people and agencies involved in the Central Subway project.
F22:
Though the specific problems of interagency communication during the T-Third project can be avoided due to the creation of the SFMTA, the Central Subway’s effect on a separate agency’s system (BART) can pose new problems.
Related Recommendations (1)
R13:
The SFMTA should explain how its internal communication process will facilitate cooperation and discussion between various people and agencies involved in the Central Subway project.
F23:
SFMTA appears to be adequately in touch with BART regarding the Central Subway project.
F24:
It is imperative that the SFMTA ensure that all parties involved in the technical aspects of the Central Subway project have access to a unified, official Master Plan.
Related Recommendations (1)
R14:
The SFMTA should maintain a single, unified Master Plan for the Central Subway project that can be accessed, though not changed, by all parties involved in the project.
F25:
Though it may appear pedantic for this Jury to point out incorrect factual details published by the SFMTA, the Jury sees this as a symptom of a bigger problem. The Jury finds that the lack of care in its public communications can lead to a lack of confidence in the SFMTA’s ability to accurately communicate both internally and with outside entities.
Related Recommendations (1)
R15:
All communications and publications regarding the Central Subway project should receive more accurate fact-checking.
F26:
Direct connectivity from the T-Third line to the Muni Metro will be eliminated by the Central Subway alignment.
Related Recommendations (2)
R16:
The SFMTA should consider a realignment of the Central Subway which allows for a more direct connection to the Muni Metro.
R26:
The SFMTA should redesign the Central Subway to better serve the San Francisco population.
F27:
If the design of the Union Square/Market Street station does not allow for future connectivity of a possible Geary LRV corridor, the SFMTA made a serious design error.
Related Recommendations (2)
R17:
The Union Square/Market Street station should be designed to allow a future Geary light rail vehicle line to access it.
R26:
The SFMTA should redesign the Central Subway to better serve the San Francisco population.
F28:
A route that benefits both the Chinatown community and the Financial District is preferable to one that only benefits Chinatown.
Related Recommendations (2)
R18:
The Central Subway should be redesigned to serve both the Financial District and Chinatown. If SFMTA thinks the current alignment already serves both neighborhoods, it should explain how.
R26:
The SFMTA should redesign the Central Subway to better serve the San Francisco population.
F29:
There does not seem to be an SFMTA plan to address the current problems on existing bus lines that travel the Stockton corridor. Presumably the quality of service will not improve between now and 2019.
Related Recommendations (1)
R19:
The SFMTA should enact a plan to improve service on the Stockton corridor prior to completing the Central Subway.
F30:
The transfer between the Union Square/Market Street station and Powell Street station is terrible. The 1,000 foot distance is an unreasonably long transfer, especially for the elderly and disabled.
Related Recommendations (1)
R20:
SFMTA needs to fix the transfer between the Central Subway and Muni Metro.
F31:
The “Union Square/Market Street” station is incorrectly named because it is not on Market Street.
Related Recommendations (1)
R21:
SFMTA should change the name of the “Union Square/Market Street” station to simply “Union Square” for an accurate description.
F32:
The SFMTA has designed a subpar escalator system for all three underground stations because they lack redundancy.
Related Recommendations (1)
R22:
SFMTA should add escalator redundancy to all stations on the Central Subway.
F33:
It seems disingenuous that the SFMTA would point to the station design as the reason for not including moving sidewalks as they themselves designed the stations. Or, as a Central Subway manager attempted to explain, “Perceived design flaws were actually practical decisions.”
F34:
Though designing the Central Subway for hybrid boarding gives SFMTA the benefit of uniformity of its LRV fleet, this benefit is outweighed by the long-term benefit of beginning a transformation to a system using a dedicated level-boarding vehicle.
Related Recommendations (1)
R23:
SFMTA should purchase dedicated level-boarding vehicles for the Central Subway.
F35:
With proof-of-payment as the sole method of fare collection, there is no apparent justification for mezzanines in the Central Subway stations.
Related Recommendations (1)
R24:
The SFMTA should consider eliminating the mezzanines from the Central Subway station designs.
F36:
Proof-of-payment is the preferred method of fare collection for the Central Subway.
F37:
The SFMTA has not established that the use of barriers for fare collection instead of proof-of- payment in the Central Subway will reduce fare evasion.
Related Recommendations (1)
R25:
The SFMTA should conduct an analysis of whether a proof-of-payment system is preferable to its planned hybrid fare collection system for the Central Subway.
F38:
The SFMTA has not established that the use of barriers for fare collection provides a strong advantage in regard to giving passengers visual guidance.
Related Recommendations (1)
R25:
The SFMTA should conduct an analysis of whether a proof-of-payment system is preferable to its planned hybrid fare collection system for the Central Subway.
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Findings & Recommendations
10 findings
F1:
Recommendation 1 The current educational program Increase collaboration among the Juvenile Probation does not take advantage of the San Francisco Conservation Corps, Department. beautiful natural environment of the San Francisco Unified School the site, which offers multiple District and Urban Sprouts to hands‐on teaching opportunities. develop projects which utilize the natural environment for outdoor education opportunities including gardening, landscaping, native plant restoration, pond maintenance, creek habitat restoration, trail creation and hiking.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
Increase collaboration among the San Francisco Conservation Corps, the San Francisco Unified School District and Urban Sprouts to develop projects which utilize the natural environment for outdoor education opportunities including gardening, landscaping, native plant restoration, pond maintenance, creek habitat restoration, trail creation and hiking. Response required: Juvenile Probation Department
F2:
Recommendation 2 Thorough and meaningful As sufficient data become Juvenile Probation program evaluation based upon available, establish relationships Department solid data about Log Cabin with local graduate schools in Residents following graduation is disciplines such as Social Work and needed. The Grand Jury Psychology who may be able to acknowledges that the improved assist with outcome assessment Log Cabin Ranch program does and evaluation as there are a not currently provide sufficient number of thesis topics for their data about its graduates. students. However, program assessment based upon such data is sorely needed.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
As sufficient data become available, establish relationships with local graduate schools in disciplines such as Social Work and Psychology who may be able to assist with outcome assessment and evaluation as there are a number of thesis topics for their students. Response required: Juvenile Probation Department
F3:
Recommendation 3 Log Cabin Ranch needs an Explore the possibilities of Juvenile Probation effective “Enterprise Program” developing a contractual Department which could generate additional relationship with both the San operational and programmatic Francisco Department of Public revenue. Works and the Department of Parks and Recreation for the Log Cabin Ranch residents to sell to them benches and picnic tables made at the Ranch for use on city streets and in city parks.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
Explore the possibilities of developing a contractual relationship with both the San Francisco Department of Public Works and the Department of Parks and Recreation for the Log Cabin Ranch residents to sell to them benches and picnic tables made at the Ranch for use on city streets and in city parks. Response required: Juvenile Probation Department
F4:
Recommendation 4 Juvenile Probation Despite well intentioned efforts The Log Cabin Planning Committee, Department. there still remains “turf battles” which currently meets only on an among the stakeholders. ad‐hoc basis, should become a District Attorney permanent committee meeting quarterly to build on its original Public Defender successes. The Committee should be used as forum to discuss and address long held negative biases and “turf‐battles “ among the stakeholders. Further tasks could include: (1) exploring the expansion of involvement of community‐based organizations with the Ranch; (2) exploring and seeking additional funding opportunities from private foundations and other sources; and (3) expanding and broadening the vocational opportunities currently offered at the Ranch.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4:
The Log Cabin Planning Committee, which currently meets only on an ad hoc basis, should become a permanent committee meeting quarterly to build on its original success. The committee should be used as a forum to discuss and address long held negative biases and “turf‐battles “ among the stakeholders. Further tasks could include: (1) exploring the expansion of involvement of community‐based organizations with the Ranch; (2) exploring and seeking additional funding opportunities from private foundations and other sources; and (3) expanding and broadening the vocational opportunities currently offered at the Ranch. Response required: Juvenile Probation Department, District Attorney, Public Defender
F5:
Recommendation 5 Due to the age of the buildings The Mayor and the Board of Mayor (circa, 1950), structural Supervisors should immediately improvements to the Ranch are provide capital funding for long Board of Supervisors greatly needed. neglected infrastructure needs
Related Recommendations (1)
R5:
The Mayor and the Board of Supervisors should immediately provide capital funding for long neglected infrastructure needs. Response required: Mayor and Board of Supervisors
F6:
Recommendation 6 The Grand Jury believes that the The Mayor and the Board of Mayor Log Cabin Ranch is under‐utilized Supervisor should support funding and the recent positive for a third cohort in the fiscal year Board of Supervisors programmatic changes warrant 2011‐2012 budget cycle and for a expansion to maximum capacity. fourth cohort in the 2012‐2013 budget cycle.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6:
The Mayor and the Board of Supervisors should support funding for a third cohort in the fiscal year 2011‐2012 budget cycle, and for a fourth cohort in the 2012‐2013 budget cycle. Response required: Mayor and Board of Supervisors
F7:
Recommendation 7 Current vocational programs Vocational and apprenticeship Juvenile Probation offered at the Ranch set up the programs should be developed in Department residents for disappointment fields such as auto mechanics, because permanent jobs are not metal working and welding, pipe San Francisco Unified available in those areas of fitting, solar panel installation or School District. training. Additionally, training is other union affiliated positions. not adequate for entry level positions.
Related Recommendations (1)
R7:
Vocational and apprenticeship programs should be developed in fields such as auto mechanics, metal working and welding, pipe fitting, solar panel installation or other union‐affiliated positions. Response required:: Juvenile Probation Department, San Francisco Unified School District
F8:
Recommendation 8 In the opinion of the Grand Jury, . There should regular and on‐going Juvenile Probation not all members of the Log Cabin training in the Missouri Model of all Department Ranch staff have fully embraced Ranch employees, regardless of the tenants of the Missouri their classification or department Model. affiliation. Employee evaluations should include an assessment of the employee’s ability to properly utilize the model in his/her interactions with the residents. For the Ranch to be successful all stakeholders must be using the same language and be on the same philosophical path. .
Related Recommendations (1)
R8:
There should be regular and on‐going training in the Missouri Model for all Ranch employees, regardless of their classification or department affiliation. Employee evaluations should include an assessment of the employee’s ability to properly utilize the model in his/her interactions with the residents. For the Ranch to be successful all stakeholders must be using the same language and be on the same philosophical path. Response required: Juvenile Probation department
F9:
Recommendation 9 The basic high school program in . The San Francisco Unified School San Francisco Unified its current form offers a limited District should explore additional School District education curriculum. educational options that would challenge all Log Cabin Residents. These options could include programs such as the “Big Picture” model currently used at San Francisco court‐appointed schools or a charter school scenario. . . Recommendation 10 . Log Cabin Ranch should develop a Juvenile Probation speakers’ bureau and/or Department mentorship program that would bring people to the Ranch to share information about various occupations and the positives and negatives of those occupations . . . . Finding 10 . Recommendation 11 . . The Juvenile Collaborative . The Juvenile Probation Department . Juvenile Probation Reentry Program is currently only should immediately seek either City Department available to youth returning from or grant funding to expand the out‐of‐home placements such as Juvenile Collaborative Reentry Glen Mills and George Junior Team program to include youth Republic. This very successful reentering society from the Log program should also be available Cabin Ranch to students reentering from the Log Cabin Ranch.
Related Recommendations (1)
R9:
The San Francisco Unified School District should explore additional educational options that would challenge all Log Cabin Residents. These options could include programs such as the “Big Picture” model currently used at San Francisco court‐appointed schools or a charter school scenario. Response required: San Francisco Unified School District
F10:
The Juvenile Collaborative Reentry Program is currently only available to youth returning from out‐of‐home placements such as Glen Mills and George Junior Republic. This very successful program should also be available to students reentering from the Log Cabin Ranch.
Related Recommendations (1)
R10:
Log Cabin Ranch should develop a speakers’ bureau and/or mentorship program that would bring people to the Ranch to share information about various occupations and the positives and negatives of those occupations. Response required: Juvenile Probation department
Additional Recommendations
2
Not linked to specific findings.
R11:
The Juvenile Probation Department should immediately seek either City or grant funding to expand the Juvenile Collaborative Reentry Team program to include youth reentering society from the Log Cabin Ranch. Response required: Juvenile Probation department
R17:
Response Matrix LOG CABIN RANCH: MOVING TOWARDS POSITIVE HORIZONS Log Cabin Ranch circa 1947 “ . . . Well, first of all, this is not a prison, this is not a jail, this is six hundred acres that can be developed into an incredible healing recovery center. There are no bars, there are no locks, it’s healthy, there’s fresh air. There’s this beautiful garden … getting away from the inner‐city, coming out here in this beautiful country area gives them new energy to live life, new spiritual awakenings just like they are somebody and that they have a culture, they have a story of their own and they have a future that’s real.”1 Jack Jacqua, 2003 Co‐founder Omega Boys Club INTRODUCTION California Penal Code Sections 919 (a) and 919 (b) authorize and mandate that the Civil Grand Jury inquire into the jails and public prisons within the county. Every year, in every county in California, one of the primary tasks of the local Civil Grand Jury is to tour and inspect the jails and detention facilities in its county. In September 2010 the San Francisco Civil Grand Jury toured the adult jail facilities located in San Bruno and the Hall of Justice building in San Francisco. The Jury also toured the mental health unit for prisoners located at the San Francisco General Hospital. All of these adult detention facilities are operated under the auspices of the San Francisco Sheriff’s Department. The Jury also toured all of the juvenile detention facilities directed by the Juvenile Probation Department. These facilities include the detention facility located at 375 Woodside Avenue as well as the subject of this report, the Log Cabin Ranch, located in La Honda. The report issued by the 2004‐2005 Civil Grand Jury painted a very negative picture of the Log Cabin Ranch. The 2010‐2011 Civil Grand Jury observed a completely different place. There are clear signs of change and improvement. There is a new operating model in place that focuses on a smaller and more therapeutic approach to dealing with the juveniles. The facilities had undergone a refurbishment and appeared both welcoming and comfortable. The contrast was so striking that the current Jury felt that an updated report was warranted to commend and congratulate the Juvenile Probation Department on the dramatic improvement since the 2005 report. This prompted us to conduct a broader inquiry. Our investigation confirmed these remarkable improvements. However, we also discovered that the opinions and decisions of some stakeholders continue to be influenced by the negative perception of the previously mismanaged Log Cabin Ranch. The Civil Grand Jury hopes that this report will help to change those perceptions, allowing the Log Cabin Ranch to achieve its full potential as an extraordinary place for the rehabilitation of San Francisco’s most at‐risk juvenile offenders. SUMMARY For more than a century, the predominant model for the treatment, punishment and rehabilitation of serious juvenile offenders has been confinement in a large congregate‐care correctional facility. In most states this type of institution still houses most incarcerated youth and still consumes the majority of taxpayer spending on juvenile justice. The success record of these correctional facilities is dismal. Though many youth confined to these institutions are not serious or chronic offenders, the recidivism rates are extremely high. Violence and abuse are commonplace. Long‐term studies indicate that many youth housed in such facilities develop lifelong negative behaviors. A leading juvenile justice scholar at the University of Minnesota reported: “Evaluation research indicates that incarcerating young offenders in large congregate‐care juvenile institutions does not effectively rehabilitate and may actually harm them.”2 A new style of reform is gaining momentum. This is powered by a growing recognition that the conventional practices are not getting the job done. Accumulating evidence shows that better results are possible through a fundamentally different approach. Our investigation shows that there are two fundamental approaches. One is to substantially reduce the population confined in juvenile correctional institutions by screening out youth who pose minimal danger to public safety—placing them instead into cost‐effective, community‐ based rehabilitation and youth development programs. The second approach, devised by the State of Missouri’s juvenile corrections agency, aims at the small minority of youth offenders requiring out‐of‐home placement to protect the public safety. Two out‐of‐home juvenile rehabilitation‐treatment facilities frequently used by the San Francisco Juvenile Court for assignment are Glen Mills in Philadelphia and George Junior Republic (a mental health facility) in Pittsburgh. Both facilities are highly regarded by some members of the juvenile justice system. Numerous San Francisco teen‐offenders have been sent to these East Coast facilities for care and rehabilitation. The questions that beg to be answered are: Why send San Francisco juveniles 3,000 miles from home? Why not place these individuals at Log Cabin Ranch, just 45 miles south of the city?” Unfortunately, through years of neglect and improper management Log Cabin Ranch acquired an unfavorable reputation within the juvenile justice system. Juvenile court judges lost confidence in the effectiveness of the Ranch, became reticent to send offenders there, and began sentencing youth to these well regarded out‐of‐state programs. It is important to note that the Grand Jury received conflicting information regarding the success and the recidivism rates of one of these programs ‐ Glen Mills in Philadelphia. By comparison there is only anecdotal information about the recent success of the Log Cabin program. The good news for San Francisco is that in 2006 Log Cabin Ranch embarked on a transformation. This transformation began with the hiring of a new Chief Juvenile Probation Officer with a clear vision and the implementation of the “Missouri Model” (Appendix A) as a foundational element for change. The new Chief also brought in a strong administrative team, making Log Cabin Ranch a place of respectability once again. Log Cabin Ranch, circa 1950’s WHAT IS THE LOG CABIN RANCH? “We locked up. I mean, we ain’t really locked up but we not home. It’s out in the boonies, in the cuts. Big yard across the way, birds and deers. It’s kind of trippy, like, I ain’t never saw that where I’m from. Deers and stuff just walking heck close by you. I think it’s a good program because they give you a lot of time to think and they, they get you think about what you doing out there. Like this is your last step. The next step is like YA (Youth Authority) or something. So, it’s like a time out. It’s like a big time out for you to just think about what you doing and what you do that affects not only you, but like your peers, your family, you know, your community.”3 Log Cabin Ranch Resident The Log Cabin Ranch is not a youth prison. It is not a typical jail and was never intended for that purpose. It is a ranch camp‐school which provides services to troubled youth ages 14 to 18 years old. The fundamental emphasis is on rehabilitation and self‐empowerment through an academic and therapeutic process. Instead of standard correctional supervision, Log Cabin Ranch offers a structured multi‐layered treatment designed to challenge troubled juvenile males, to help them make lasting behavioral changes, and to prepare for a successful re‐entry to the community. The Ranch is conducive to developing vocational interests and activities sufficient to allow each boy the opportunity to demonstrate his adaptability toward rehabilitation. Located on more than 600 acres in and above the La Honda timberline the remarkable environment surrounding the Log Cabin Ranch is an important characteristic influencing rehabilitation. The juvenile offender who is rehabilitated today through the Log Cabin Ranch program is less likely to reoffend. However, the Grand Jury observed that the current educational program does not take advantage of this extraordinary natural environment for learning opportunities. Log Cabin Ranch is a story of troubled youth with choices to make, almost insurmountable odds, and an opportunity to discover positive alternatives. Steering just one high‐risk teen away from a life of crime saves society $3 million to $6 million in reduced victim costs and criminal justice expenses, plus increased wages and tax payments over the young person’s lifetime. LOG CABIN RANCH HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT Log Cabin Ranch has been in existence for over 70 years. It was approved as a juvenile detention center by the San Francisco Board of Supervisors. (
Findings & Recommendations
6 findings
F1:
Recommendation 1 SFDPH – The Jury found that the SFDPH is not The Department of Public Health Environmental Health in compliance with its pledge to the (SFDPH) should strictly adhere to its Department California Department of Public self‐proclaimed pledge to keep the Health to keep residents informed of residents of San Francisco appraised developments at HPS. The website of developments at HPS by updating is not regularly updated. its HPS Project website ”… on a weekly or monthly basis.”
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
The Department of Public Health (SFDPH) should strictly adhere to its self‐proclaimed pledge to keep the residents of San Francisco appraised of developments at HPS by updating its HPS Project website ”… on a weekly or monthly basis.”
F2:
Recommendation 2 The Jury found the City has placed In order to erase any doubt among SFDPH itself in a potentially compromising the public with respect to its ability situation with Lennar where in to remain independent and essence the wolf is paying the impartial in overseeing the cleanup shepherd to guard the flock. By work at HPS, the SFDPH should having the developer, Lennar, immediately stop accepting money reimburse the city for monitoring from Lennar to pay for monitors at expenses associated with the HPS HPS and cover the cost from its own redevelopment project, the SFDPH resources. has created a situation that could raise doubt in the public’s mind about its commitment to proactively and impartially enforce environmental health regulations even when it might adversely impact Lennar. Public trust in the SFDPH has been further jeopardized by its failure to update its website in a timely manner, and its apparent reluctance to comment publicly on the best method to deal with the cleanup of Parcel E‐2.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
In order to erase any doubt among the public with respect to its ability to remain independent and impartial in overseeing the cleanup work at HPS, the SFDPH should immediately stop accepting money from Lennar to pay for monitors at HPS and cover the cost from its own resources.
F3:
Recommendation 3 These concerns were further In order to avoid even the SFDPH reinforced by the recent release of e‐ semblance of inappropriate mail messages that purportedly behavior, government agencies such show inappropriate communications as the SFDPH should rigorously between senior officials at the enforce conflict of interest SFDPH and the EPA and Lennar and guidelines governing dealings one of its consultants. between its officials and the companies they monitor.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
In order to avoid even the semblance of inappropriate behavior, government agencies such as the SFDPH should rigorously enforce conflict of interest guidelines governing dealings between its officials and the companies they are monitoring.
F4:
Recommendation 4 With the exception of Parcel A, the SFDPH should conduct its own SFDPH – Environmental City has no legal control over the environmental assessment on Health remaining HPS property. capping Parcel E‐2 and make its Consequently, in a technical sense findings available to the public for the City has no authority over comment. This should occur before matters dealing with deadlines and the Board of Supervisors holds its deliverables for environmental next hearing on the HPS clean‐up. However, the City does in redevelopment project. fact have some standing in these matters via the 2004 Conveyance Recommendation 5 Agreement between the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency The Navy still owns the majority of BAAQMD (SFRA) and the Navy. The agreement the land comprising HPS and stipulates that the Navy will work consequently the city has no direct SFDPH – Environmental collaboratively with the SFRA and control over matters dealing with Health share information about cleanup deadlines and deliverables for work. environmental cleanup. It is critical that the Bay Area Air Quality Management and the SFDPH be particularly vigilant in monitoring clean‐up activities at HPS.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4:
SFDPH should conduct its own environmental assessment of the issue of capping Parcel E‐2 and make its findings available to the public for comment. This process should occur before the Board of Supervisors holds its next hearing on the HPS redevelopment project.
F5:
Recommendation 6 Governor Brown’s announcement The City and the SFRA should have Mayor’s Office earlier this year that he intends to contingency plans in place for cut funding to redevelopment continuing SFRA related projects, Board of Supervisors agencies in the next fiscal year including the HPS redevelopment directly threatens the HPS project, in the event that State OEWD redevelopment project. Up to now, redevelopment funds are cut or there has been no indication from eliminated. SFRA either the City or the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency how they intend to continue the HPS redevelopment project should redevelopment funds actually be cut or eliminated by the State.
Related Recommendations (1)
R5:
Due to the fact that the Navy still owns the majority of the land comprising HPS and consequently the city has no direct control over matters dealing with deadlines and deliverables for environmental cleanup, it is critical that the Bay Area Air Quality Management and the SFDPH be particularly vigilant in monitoring clean‐up activities at HPS.
F6:
Recommendation 7 Previous efforts by the City to In order to ensure that the job OEWD implement work force policies at creation goals promised for the HPS city‐funded construction projects redevelopment project are realized, Board of Supervisors such as the HPS redevelopment the City should insure that the Office project have largely proved of Labor Standards Enforcement has OLSE ineffective as they only require a sufficient resources to allow it to contractor to make a good faith effectively enforce the provisions of effort to hire local workers. Earlier the new workforce laws. this year a new work force ordinance came into effect that has stricter requirements and mandates.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6:
The City and the SFRA should have contingency plans in place for continuing SFRA related projects, including the HPS redevelopment project, in the event that State redevelopment funds are cut or eliminated.
Additional Recommendations
1
Not linked to specific findings.
R7:
In order to ensure that the job creation goals promised for the HPS redevelopment project are realized, the City should insure that the Office of Labor Standards Enforcement has sufficient resources to allow it to effectively enforce the provisions of the new workforce laws. METHOD OF INVESTIGATION In preparing this report, the Jury reviewed various reports and conducted interviews with local and state officials, community stakeholders, environmental organizations and county agencies. While investigating the topic, the Jury learned that one of its jurors may have a perceived conflict of interest, or the appearance thereof, due to their past occupation from which the juror has since retired. Due to this fact, the juror voluntarily recused himself from investigating, deliberating, or voting on this report. Finally, in preparing this report the Jury did not utilize any information provided by this juror.
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Findings & Recommendations
5 findings
FI:
Under the traditional CBT, an applicant has the right to appeal to the Commission at almost every point during the examination process. Applicants taking a PBT can appeal at only three points in the process. These differences can be confusing to applicants.
FII:
DHR is not always informing appellants of their right to appeal decisions of the DHR to the Commission.
FIII:
T&E testing relies too heavily on training and experience factors listed on an application form in evaluating whether an applicant is eligible for a position. This is an ineffective method for evaluating job applicants. T&E testing does not verify whether an applicant actually possesses the training/education and experience claimed on the application form. The DHR has indicated that is in the process of reducing its reliance on T&E examinations.
FIV:
Besides a job description, PBT job announcements sometimes advise applicants that the eligibility list from this examination could be used by other City departments for hiring staff. However, the advisory does not identify those departments. This process can deny applicants the information required to become aware of and apply for a position with the City government.
FV:
As the hiring process in the City becomes increasingly decentralized and PBT testing becomes more prevalent, there is growing doubt among some City workers that the Commission as currently staffed is able to protect their rights.
Findings & Recommendations
5 findings
F1:
By not explaining how it will override/resolve potentially conflicting provisions of state law, the Development Agreement does not protect tenants against rent increases as it claims.
F2:
Having no penalties or disincentives for the owner/developer in the Development Agreement should it choose to abandon the project before completion, encourages short term investment speculation over long term collaborative development with the City, and adds risk to the program.
F3:
The owner/developer fails to address the social and financial impact to the Parkmerced citizen/tenants, local businesses and citizen users of the 19th Avenue traffic corridor if it elects to abandon re‐development of Parkmerced and sell the property to another party.
F4:
The Development Agreement presumes demolition is necessary, and presents no alternative, or combination of alternatives, that might satisfy the programmatic goals of re‐ development without the demolition of 1,583 occupied units.
F5:
The Development Agreement’s claim that it provides rent control protection on newly constructed units under the City’s rent stabilization ordinance is uncertain. It may not be enforceable.