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Extraído del Informe Consolidado

Esta investigación fue publicada originalmente como parte de un informe consolidado más amplio que contiene múltiples investigaciones. Consulte el PDF consolidado para ver el documento completo.

San Francisco County Grand Jury • 2020-2021

Planning for a Resilient Future

13 pages
View PDF View Full Original

Findings 21 findings

F1 Page 25
In the aftermath of a major earthquake (magnitude 7.0 or greater), there will likely be severe citywide fuel and power shortages lasting more than 72 hours.
F2 Page 25
If these shortages resulted in lack of power to lifeline infrastructure facilities and/or lack of fuel for critical lifeline vehicles, the resulting cascading failures of other lifelines could have life safety and quality-of-life impacts greater than the fuel and power shortages themselves.
F3 Page 25
The City’s lack of agency sponsorship and dedicated staffing and budgeting for fuel resilience efforts weakens its ability to ensure fuel resilience in an emergency.
F4 Page 25
The cessation of fuel resilience progress during COVID indicates that the City is not prioritizing fuel resilience comparably to other aspects of lifeline resilience.
F5 Page 25
In the aftermath of a major disaster, it will be difficult for emergency responders to catalog the citywide fuel needs of backup generators.
F6 Page 25
It is impossible to determine how much fuel storage is needed to meet emergency demands after a disaster because the City has not prepared proper estimates of fuel needs in a range of disaster scenarios.
F7 Page 25
Compiling inventories of available fuel in a disaster will likely take at least half a day and will rely partly on manual assessment of sites by personnel who might themselves be unavailable under disaster conditions.
F8 Page 25
The City will have a severely limited and unreliable ability in a disaster to get fuel from available reserves to sites such as generator tanks that need fuel urgently.
F9 Page 25
The City has not invested in technological solutions to augment the ability to refuel critical vehicles and generators in a disaster.
F10 Page 25
The usability of privately-held local fuel reserves in a disaster is uncertain due to the lack of partnerships between the City and private gas station operators and incomplete data about which private stations could best augment critical supplies.
F11 Page 25
Opportunities to expand fuel reserves within the City are very rare due to geographic constraints but very valuable for fuel resilience.
F12 Page 25
In the aftermath of a region-wide disaster such as a major earthquake, the ability of the City’s two contracted suppliers to deliver fuel might be compromised temporarily because they would both be susceptible to the same infrastructure failures. 25
F13 Page 26
The City has not contracted with an emergency out-of-region backup vendor in case the two regular vendors cannot deliver fuel, as recommended by the California Energy Commission, despite the risk of region-wide disruptions compromising both.
F14 Page 26
Although the City’s two fuel suppliers are contractually responsible for providing technical support on products and offering assistance required by City personnel, they do not participate actively in the planning, simulation exercises, or ongoing work of the Fuel Working Group.
F15 Page 26
If an emergency fuel delivery by water is needed, the City has not planned adequately for the risk that landing sites might be damaged, thereby compromising their ability to receive fuel delivery vessels or support tanker trucks for city transport.
F16 Page 26
The City has insufficient knowledge about whether restoration of routes on the Priority Routes map will allow effective refueling of critical backup generators and fleet vehicles in the event of a disaster.
F17 Page 26
The lack of a published San Francisco Fuel Plan makes it harder to coordinate on consistent fuel resilience best practices citywide.
F18 Page 26
The lack of fuel resilience-related line items in the 2019 and 2021 Capital Plans indicates that the City is not prioritizing fuel resilience comparably to other aspects of lifelines resilience.
F19 Page 26
Progress on fuel resilience has been impeded by the lack of a dedicated, reliable funding source.
F20 Page 26
The City will likely need to replace some critical backup generators with batteries by 2050 but has not initiated planning for this.
F21 Page 26
The City will likely need to rely at least partially on electric vehicles for critical infrastructure functions by 2050 but has not initiated planning for how this can be done in a disaster-resilient manner. 26

Recommendations 20