San Francisco County Grand Jury
2020-2021
From the annual report
The consolidated year-end volume. The individual investigations it contains are listed separately below.
📑 Year-End Report
The full consolidated volume; individual reports are listed below.
Individual reports (4)
Findings & Recommendations
3 findings
F1:
Eleven percent of the required responses over the past three years were not compliant with California Penal Code Section 933.05 because they did not include a timeframe for implementation.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
in the report Mitigating the Housing Crisis: Accessory Dwelling Units and Modular Housing recommended the Planning Department and the Department of Building Inspection jointly review their codes and submit joint recommendations to the Board of Supervisors for code amendments designed to encourage homeowners and developers to build more accessory dwelling units. This recommendation is mostly implemented. Submission of joint recommendations to the Board of Supervisors was delayed due to the impact of the pandemic but is expected to occur by the end of 2021. The Department of Building Inspection supports renewing permit waivers for accessory dwelling units and offering assistance to ease the permitting process.
F2:
In some cases where more than one agency was required to respond to a finding and
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
Beginning with the required responses to the 2020–21 Civil Grand Jury recommendations, the Board of Supervisors and the Mayor should direct responding agencies to coordinate their responses to the same recommendation to ensure they do not conflict.
F3:
The Office of the Controller’s annual report on the status of responses to previous year’s Civil Grand Jury reports is extremely helpful.
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Findings & Recommendations
14 findings
F1:
The delays in completion of the Van Ness BRT Project were caused primarily by avoidable setbacks in replacement of the water and sewer infrastructure.
F2:
The potential impact of utility replacement on the cost and duration of the overall project was given insufficient consideration in the initial planning process.
F3:
The potential impact of utility replacement was known to City engineers to be a major risk but was only considered a moderate risk and assigned no mitigation strategy in the official risk register.
F4:
Project timelines could not be estimated accurately because documents did not reflect the extent and location of underground utilities accurately.
F5:
The evaluation rubric for preconstruction contract bids weighted cost too heavily, as compared to technical expertise, even after project-specific legislation allowed for a lower weight to be assigned to cost.
F6:
Practical work during preconstruction that could have derisked the subsequent construction phase of the project was insufficient.
F7:
Review of preconstruction deliverables did not sufficiently measure the contractor’s preparedness for construction, which resulted in both inaccurate cost estimates and timelines.
F8:
The effectiveness of the CMGC contract was greatly reduced because the general contractor was brought into the design process too late.
F9:
Underspecification in technical requirements led to additional costs for work that could have been predicted and included in the original contract.
F10:
Contention over underspecified or unclear contract terms and technical requirements led to a deterioration in the relationship between the City and Walsh, the general contractor.
F11:
The removal of Synergy, the underground subcontractor, from the project, partially as a result of poor cost estimates, contributed to the deterioration of the relationship between Walsh, the general contractor, and the City.
F12:
The contentious relationship between Walsh, the general contractor, and the City made it difficult to resolve problems as they arose, despite close collaboration being one of the potential advantages of the CMGC contract.
F13:
Lack of an in-the-field point of contact between Walsh and the City during early stages of construction led to delays and increased costs on the project. 19
F14:
Confusion related to the contractual requirements for pedestrian monitoring contributed to the deterioration of the relationship between Walsh, the general contractor, and the City.
Additional Recommendations
12
Not linked to specific findings.
R1:
By June 2022, the City should adopt a policy that all capital project feasibility plans include an itemized assessment of risks to project timelines and costs, which must be accompanied with specific procedures that will be undertaken to mitigate those risks early in the project.
R2:
By June 2022, the City should adopt a policy that all capital project sponsors publish, before proceeding to the construction phase, an itemized assessment of derisking activities actually performed.
R3:
By June 2022, the Board of Supervisors and SFPUC should review and update policies and regulations to ensure that detailed as-built documentation of both private and public utilities is filed after all underground projects (whether undertaken by SFPUC, another City agency, or a private enterprise), with sufficient resolution and precision to allow accurate design of any future work.
R4:
The Board of Supervisors should direct all City departments to adopt a policy that all projects that involve underground work in the City’s main corridors include, as part of the design process, the use of exploratory potholing, or another equivalent industry best-practice to identify unknown underground obstructions adhering to CI/ASCE 38-02 (“Standard Guideline for the Collection and Depiction of Existing Subsurface Utility Data“) Quality Level A. This policy should take effect for all contracts signed after January 1, 2022, and the work should be required to be performed before final construction terms or prices are agreed to.
R5:
By June 2022, and before entering into future CMGC relationships, the Board of Supervisors should direct all City departments to adopt, publish, and enforce in all future contracts industry-standard best practices for management of CMGC projects.
R6:
The adopted CMGC management policy should specifically include the industry best practice of awarding the contract before project design continues past 30% completion. 20
R7:
By June 2022, the Board of Supervisors should amend Section 6.68 of the Administrative Code to remove the mandatory cost criterion in awarding CMGC contracts.
R8:
SFMTA should establish a policy for review of technical quality of preconstruction and design deliverables, to be used in all CMGC or design contracts signed after January 2022, including in-the-field validation of key assumptions of site conditions by City engineers.
R9:
Beginning January 1, 2022, SFMTA should assign to every CMGC project a dedicated in-the-field contractor liaison to facilitate collaborative problem resolution, and sufficient support staff to monitor actual progress and site conditions.
R10:
By June 2022, the City should adopt a policy that any public communication about a planned or in-progress capital project that includes disruption of public services or right-of-way should include itemized assessments of risk to projected costs and duration.
R11:
Beginning immediately, and in all future capital or maintenance projects that require pedestrian monitors, the City should ensure that associated costs are either specifically included in the primary construction contract, or explicitly planned for and funded by the City, before construction begins. 21
R38-02:
(“Standard Guideline for the Collection and Depiction of Existing Subsurface Utility Data“) Quality Level A. This policy should take effect for all contracts signed after January 1, 2022, and the work should be required to be performed before final construction terms or prices are agreed to. R5. By June 2022, and before entering into future CMGC relationships, the Board of Supervisors should direct all City departments to adopt, publish, and enforce in all future contracts industry-standard best practices for management of CMGC projects. R6. The adopted CMGC management policy should specifically include the industry best practice of awarding the contract before project design continues past 30% completion. 20
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Findings & Recommendations
8 findings
F1:
City College did not have a formal role on the City’s Workforce Alignment Committee while it was active and does not have a role on the current ad hoc committee, and this inhibits effective programmatic coordination between OEWD and City College
F2:
City College of San Francisco’s Office of Workforce Development does not have a formal role on the institution’s Curriculum Committee, and this limits the Curriculum Committee’s knowledge of the specific needs of students participating in the workforce development programs.
F3:
OEWD’s lack of a concerted effort to enroll groups in Eligible Training Provider List programs at City College hurts its ability to maximize limited funds.
F4:
Limited availability of technical courses during City College’s summer semester is a contributing factor to OEWD participants pursuing their studies at alternative educational institutions, thereby incurring additional costs.
F5:
Demand for some City College courses and the lack of priority registration for OEWD participants results in their being denied enrollment for courses needed for their training programs.
F6:
Inaccuracies on the Eligible Training Provider List unnecessarily deter OEWD job seekers from taking needed courses.
F7:
The lack of synchronization and outreach among OEWD, City College, and community-based organizations in promoting Eligible Training Provider List certificate programs at City College results in the underutilization of these programs.
F8:
City College is underutilizing Contract Education and Instruction programs that provide short-term training programs designed specifically for individual business needs. 15
Additional Recommendations
8
Not linked to specific findings.
R1:
The Board of Supervisors should reinstate the Committee on City Workforce Alignment to Chapter 30 of the Administrative Code and add City College as a member. The reinstatement should be completed no later than February 2022.
R2:
City College’s Dean for Workforce Development should begin submitting quarterly reports that outline and seek input on specific Career Technical Education program needs to the Curriculum Committee beginning in January 2022.
R3:
OEWD should convene a joint working group to review current Career Technical Education course offerings at City College and make recommendations to develop content that aligns with the needs of the OEWD participants by December 2021. The joint working group should include City College’s Dean for Workforce Development, the City’s Director of Sector and Workforce Development, and the Eligible Training Provider List Coordinator for Workforce Development Comprehensive Job Centers.
R4:
City College should enhance its number of short-term certificate training programs by February 2022, and these courses should be developed in collaboration with businesses or community-based organizations receiving OEWD funding. This should include an increase in the number of CTE course offerings during City College’s summer semester to at least six.
R5:
City College should allow priority registration for OEWD participants enrolling in certificate program courses on the Eligible Training Provider List. Priority registration should begin with the Fall 2022 semester.
R6:
City College should convene a workgroup to identify and correct inaccuracies in the course descriptions, schedules, and costs included on the Eligible Training Provider List by January 2022.
R7:
OEWD should work with stakeholders who coordinate the Eligible Training Provider List to develop an outreach program that encourages clientele to pursue City College certificate programs. The outreach plan should be approved by the Director of Workforce Development and implemented by April 2022.
R8:
Contract Education and Instructional Services at City College should establish formal outreach guidelines for collaborating with local businesses to develop customized training programs. The outreach guidelines should be submitted for review to City College’s Vice Chancellor for Academic and Institutional Affairs by February 2022. The outreach guidelines should be implemented by March 2022. 16
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Findings & Recommendations
21 findings
F1:
In the aftermath of a major earthquake (magnitude 7.0 or greater), there will likely be severe citywide fuel and power shortages lasting more than 72 hours.
F2:
If these shortages resulted in lack of power to lifeline infrastructure facilities and/or lack of fuel for critical lifeline vehicles, the resulting cascading failures of other lifelines could have life safety and quality-of-life impacts greater than the fuel and power shortages themselves.
F3:
The City’s lack of agency sponsorship and dedicated staffing and budgeting for fuel resilience efforts weakens its ability to ensure fuel resilience in an emergency.
F4:
The cessation of fuel resilience progress during COVID indicates that the City is not prioritizing fuel resilience comparably to other aspects of lifeline resilience.
F5:
In the aftermath of a major disaster, it will be difficult for emergency responders to catalog the citywide fuel needs of backup generators.
F6:
It is impossible to determine how much fuel storage is needed to meet emergency demands after a disaster because the City has not prepared proper estimates of fuel needs in a range of disaster scenarios.
F7:
Compiling inventories of available fuel in a disaster will likely take at least half a day and will rely partly on manual assessment of sites by personnel who might themselves be unavailable under disaster conditions.
F8:
The City will have a severely limited and unreliable ability in a disaster to get fuel from available reserves to sites such as generator tanks that need fuel urgently.
F9:
The City has not invested in technological solutions to augment the ability to refuel critical vehicles and generators in a disaster.
F10:
The usability of privately-held local fuel reserves in a disaster is uncertain due to the lack of partnerships between the City and private gas station operators and incomplete data about which private stations could best augment critical supplies.
F11:
Opportunities to expand fuel reserves within the City are very rare due to geographic constraints but very valuable for fuel resilience.
F12:
In the aftermath of a region-wide disaster such as a major earthquake, the ability of the City’s two contracted suppliers to deliver fuel might be compromised temporarily because they would both be susceptible to the same infrastructure failures. 25
F13:
The City has not contracted with an emergency out-of-region backup vendor in case the two regular vendors cannot deliver fuel, as recommended by the California Energy Commission, despite the risk of region-wide disruptions compromising both.
F14:
Although the City’s two fuel suppliers are contractually responsible for providing technical support on products and offering assistance required by City personnel, they do not participate actively in the planning, simulation exercises, or ongoing work of the Fuel Working Group.
F15:
If an emergency fuel delivery by water is needed, the City has not planned adequately for the risk that landing sites might be damaged, thereby compromising their ability to receive fuel delivery vessels or support tanker trucks for city transport.
F16:
The City has insufficient knowledge about whether restoration of routes on the Priority Routes map will allow effective refueling of critical backup generators and fleet vehicles in the event of a disaster.
F17:
The lack of a published San Francisco Fuel Plan makes it harder to coordinate on consistent fuel resilience best practices citywide.
F18:
The lack of fuel resilience-related line items in the 2019 and 2021 Capital Plans indicates that the City is not prioritizing fuel resilience comparably to other aspects of lifelines resilience.
F19:
Progress on fuel resilience has been impeded by the lack of a dedicated, reliable funding source.
F20:
The City will likely need to replace some critical backup generators with batteries by 2050 but has not initiated planning for this.
F21:
The City will likely need to rely at least partially on electric vehicles for critical infrastructure functions by 2050 but has not initiated planning for how this can be done in a disaster-resilient manner. 26
Additional Recommendations
20
Not linked to specific findings.
R1:
The Mayor’s Office should determine an appropriate agency sponsor for the Fuel Working Group by December 2021.
R2:
The Fuel Working Group should be reconvened by its agency sponsor by February 2022. The working group should meet at least quarterly thereafter.
R3:
The agency sponsor of the Fuel Working Group should select members with strong experience in supply chain logistics and emergency management. The Department of Emergency Management, the Office of Contract Administration, the City Administrator’s Office, and other City departments who are significant users of fuel, including SFPUC, SFMTA, and DPW should dedicate staff time each month through December 2024, or until the subsequent recommendations in this report are implemented.
R4:
By December 2022, the Department of Emergency Management should compile an inventory of generators critical to life safety in the City and their locations, portability, fuel needs, tank storage capacities, and burn rates. This inventory should be updated at least annually thereafter. The inventory should include information including generator location, fuel type, connection type, and any access codes needed for emergency delivery.
R5:
By June 2023, the Department of Emergency Management should perform a team exercise to estimate likely ranges of fuel usage for critical generators in the City’s inventory in the aftermath of a plausible disaster in which those usage needs would have to be met from local sources. The exercise should give lower and upper bounds stemming from possible variations in which generators would have to run and for how long.
R6:
By December 2023, the Department of Emergency Management should develop and test a plan for the quick assessment of local fuel reserves available to City agencies in a disaster, including protocols that ensure incident commanders can assess emergency fuel supply and demand in real-time citywide.
R7:
By December 2023, the City should build, retrofit, or purchase a minimum of two additional tanker trucks that can each extract up to 2,500 gallons of fuel from a tank, even in the absence of grid power, and transport it to where it is needed. These vehicles should have the ability to transport both gasoline and diesel fuel. 27
R8:
By December 2022, the City should enter into Memoranda of Understanding or contracts with a minimum of two local private gas station operators to ensure that emergency vehicles can access fuel stored at their stations, including making that fuel technically accessible even in the event of a grid power outage. The operators chosen should be prioritized based on criteria relevant for usefulness in a disaster, such as: • Amount of fuel stored at the station • Availability of both gas and diesel • 24/7 staffed operation • Ability to dispense fuel without relying on grid power • Proximity to priority routes • Geographical distribution of stations (i.e., not all in the same place)
R9:
In the 2023 Capital Plan, the City should commit to building an additional fueling station with five-ten thousand gallon storage capacity for both gasoline and diesel fuels in the space to be freed up at the Southeast Treatment Plant when the digester replacement work is done, or to identify an alternate site for an additional fueling station if the Southeast plant is not available.
R10:
By December 2022, the Office of Contract Administration should prepare a supply chain vulnerability assessment of the City’s two contracted fuel suppliers.
R11:
If the two contracted fuel suppliers are found to have joint vulnerabilities that cannot be mitigated adequately, the Office of Contract Administration should enter into a Memorandum of Understanding by December 2023 for emergency backup delivery with a vendor whose facilities and equipment are based outside of the Bay Area.
R12:
By December 2021, the Fuel Working Group should ask each City-contracted fuel supplier to send a qualified representative to the Group’s planning meetings, field simulations, and other events where the technical advice and operational experience of fuel distributors are needed to help secure disaster readiness.
R13:
By December 2023, as part of a Fleet Week live exercise, the Department of Emergency Management and the Office of Resilience and Capital Planning should test a scenario in which the City’s normal supply line is damaged and delivery by water is necessary. This exercise should include a full demonstration of marine cargo delivery, readiness of the staging area, performance of the transfer-storage-filling equipment, and performance of the tanker trucks. 28
R14:
By December 2023, the Department of Emergency Management, the Office of Resilience and Capital Planning, and the Port should prepare a seismic vulnerability assessment of likely delivery sites for emergency fuel delivery by water, including Pier 96, Pier 80, Pier 50, and at least one alternative delivery site.
R15:
By December 2022, the Department of Emergency Management should publish an analysis of the priority routes determining whether they will allow sufficiently reliable refueling of critical backup generators and fleet vehicles.
R16:
By June 2022, the City Administrator’s Office should publish a San Francisco Fuel Plan developed in collaboration with the Fuel Working Group. The Fuel Plan should cover key resilience measures such as: • Processes and timescales for identifying fuel on hand in City-accessible storage • Citywide policies for maintaining fuel reserves in available tanks (e.g., keeping fleet vehicles topped up at the end of each day, reserve requirements for generator tanks) • Keeping track of burn rates in normal and plausible emergency scenarios • Information centralization for key sources and users of fuel, (e.g., types of hose connections used by fuel tanks) • Scheduling drills around emergency fuel deliveries including surrounding counties • Functional evaluation of city assets needed for emergency fuel delivery (e.g., piers, roadways, and equipment) • Reviewing city contracts with fuel vendors • Developing specifications for equipment that needs to be purchased The Fuel Plan should also incorporate logistical lessons learned from the COVID pandemic.
R17:
In the 2023 Capital Plan, the City should commit to funding capital projects that are identified in the Fuel Plan as a high priority to improve fuel resilience in the City over the subsequent ten years.
R18:
In the 2023 Capital Plan, the City should specify how it will provide at least $10 million in dedicated funding for fuel resilience capital projects within the next ten years using general obligation bond revenue. 29
R19:
By December 2024, the Office of Resilience and Capital Planning should publish a feasibility study on replacing current City backup generators with battery backup installations or other zero-emission technology by 2050. The study should examine costs, risks, and alternatives, including mobile and stationary battery sources, taking into account not only the present state of battery technology but likely future developments in upcoming decades.
R20:
By December 2024, the Office of Resilience and Capital Planning should publish a plan for achieving disaster resilience with a zero-emissions City vehicle fleet. This plan should analyze the stationary backup power sources that might be needed to recharge critical response vehicles in the event of a disaster and how bidirectional charging technology might be used to enable the batteries in City fleet vehicles to serve as mobile backup power sources analogous to mobile backup generators but also likely future developments.