Gran Jurado del Condado de Placer
2017-2018
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Hallazgos & Recomendaciones
6 hallazgos
F1:
As of this writing, the county has no stated plans to determine a formula for in-lieu fee, or abolish it.
F2:
The building of affordable housing units on the Dewitt Government Center stems from a commitment the county made when Auburn’s Bell Garden Apartments were torn down, resulting in the displacing of the residents.
F3:
The facility does not comply with ADA standards, and compromises safety and full accessibility.
F4:
Fire safety is a serious concern for the safety of arrestees, employees, and visitors to the facility due to the lack of fire sprinklers throughout the facility.
F5:
The Nevada County Jail service contract is automatically renewed annually, with no apparent attempts to re-negotiate the cost.
F6:
The current arrest rate questions the need for a new facility that includes a 96-hour holding facility.
Recomendaciones adicionales
6
No vinculadas a hallazgos específicos.
R1:
Consider a dedicated unit to meet affordable housing requirements;
R2:
Provide a map of available properties within the county to assist in the development of affordable housing;
R3:
Simplify the process for developers to incorporate affordable housing;
R4:
Enforce the 10% affordable housing requirement when applicable;
R5:
Develop a consistent in-lieu fee that enables affordable housing; and
R6:
Focus future housing forums on local developments and include affordable alternatives. Response to -2018 Final Report
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Hallazgos & Recomendaciones
14 hallazgos
F1:
Focus on SEMS requirements was not consistent, i.e., if there are adequate supplies in each classroom in case of an extended shelter-in-place, such as during a HAZMAT incident from a nearby train derailment. These supplies include, but are not limited to, bottled water, snacks, a radio or cell phone for interclass room communication.
F2:
Each school reviewed in the three different districts named its school safety plan by different titles, leading to confusion if someone asks for a safety plan. a. Roseville HS (Roseville Joint Union High School District): Crisis Response Site Plan, as well as the PCOE Comprehensive School Safety Plan for Roseville High School b. Lincoln HS (Western Placer Unified School District): Comprehensive School Site Safety Plan (subtitle: Crisis Response Plan, with a title on the top of the document: District Crisis Response Plan; document is also titled Comprehensive Safe School Plan on pg. 59 inside the plan itself) c. Foresthill High School (Placer Union High School District): Comprehensive Safe School Plan
F3:
Each school safety plan reviewed contained different elements of how to respond to various emergencies (including wildfires or a nearby train derailment with HAZMAT release) versus complying with all elements of the state-mandated SEMS checklist.
F4:
School districts select internal emergency communications systems, such as Catapult and School Messenger, based on a variety of reasons, i.e., budget constraints within their districts, needs of their individual schools, etc.
F5:
There is no central Placer County oversight regarding schools allocating funds for emergency preparedness (supplies, training, etc.) for potential incidents such as HAZMAT release, wildfire evacuation, or surrounding effects of a train derailment.
F6:
Schools are not creating after-action reports following safety drills or actual emergency responses. Lessons learned from the drills and responses are only debriefed verbally among districts.
F7:
District superintendents leave it up to their principals to decide what that school’s budget priorities are (books, athletic equipment, safety equipment, supplies for an extended shelter-in-place due to a disaster threatening the local school area, etc.) 69 Response to -2018 Final Report
F8:
One school had snacks and water stored in each classroom in case there was an extended lockdown or shelter-in-place for the school if there was a nearby natural disaster. In addition, it also had an inexpensive backpack in each classroom to carry these items outside, along with other safety items such as a flashlight, radio, etc., if needed.
F9:
Substitute teachers get inconsistent information about responding to various emergencies. a. They are at a disadvantage moving between districts because of lack of standardization of emergency plans. b. They must have their own cellphones to be notified in case of emergency while they are on the school campus.
F10:
Due to the age of some schools, upgrading facilities to improve safety, such as doors that lock from the inside and reinforced glass, are large budget items which have to be prioritized with other needs at each school.
F11:
While not state-mandated, PCOE initiated quarterly safety meetings, inviting all districts to attend.
F12:
There is not a single, standardized emergency communication system used across the three reviewed school districts.
F13:
Open campuses cannot account for students who leave the campus for lunch.
F14:
The reviewed schools do work with their local first responders (fire, police, EMTs) and include them in emergency planning and training. However, there was no consistent training found for such potential disasters as train derailments, wildfires, and HAZMAT release.
Recomendaciones adicionales
12
No vinculadas a hallazgos específicos.
R1:
Superintendents and principals meet to discuss emergency preparedness planning prior to an emergency occurring.
R2:
PCOE and school districts each consider permanently hiring a safety officer (in addition to the school resource officer) solely dedicated to emergency planning and preparedness to: a. Conduct thorough reviews of all Placer County school districts’ safety plans annually; b. Develop a standardized school safety plan template based on CDE and SEMS guidelines for all districts; c. Standardize the title of school safety plans within Placer County; and d. Assist principals in developing appendices for external site-specific issues, i.e., wildfire near school grounds, school response for a HAZMAT incident after a train derailment in a nearby rail yard, etc. Response to -2018 Final Report
R3:
All district superintendents share information of their respective communication systems (pros and cons) as a main topic during one of PCOE’s quarterly safety meetings. a. All schools need a reliable community-wide vs. site-specific way to communicate with the public, first responders, teachers, parents, and students via email, text, and/or voice in the event of an emergency affecting a campus. b. Lincoln High School is commended for also using the local web- basedcommunication system, Good Neighbors of Lincoln, for an extra way to notifyparents in the event of an emergency.
R4:
All school districts develop an easy-to-read, readily accessible flip-chart showing how to respond to various natural and man-made emergencies. Foresthill High School is commended for using such a flip-chart as shown in (Figure 1).
R5:
There be a sign-in/out log for students who leave an open campus during lunch.
R6:
Roseville High School is commended for requiring visitors to provide a driver’s license or other form of identification during sign-in.
R7:
All schools provide copies of their documented drills to their respective district superintendent..
R8:
District superintendents are commended for having structured meetings with their principals monthly, as well as visiting their campuses periodically.
R9:
Each classroom should have water, snacks, and sanitation supplies available in a convenient location for an extended lock-down or shelter-in-place.
R10:
Schools purchase cell phones connected to its respective internal communication systems for substitute teachers, volunteer staff, etc., to enhance their campus communication access during emergencies.
R11:
School districts research the Federal Emergency Management Agency website for applicable grant monies. (Source: https://www.fema.gov/grants)
R12:
School districts consider sending educational staff to the Center for Domestic Preparedness training site for additional skills necessary to respond to emergency/disaster events. Federal money is available to pay for training/transportation. (Source: (https://cdp.dhs.gov/) 71 Response to thru R12 September 30, 2018 Placer County Superintendent of Schools, Placer County Office of Education (PCOE) 360 Nevada Street Auburn, CA 95603 Roseville Joint Union High School District R1 thru R12 September 30, 2018 School Board 1750 Cirby Way Roseville, CA 95661 Mr. Ron Severson August 31, 2018
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Hallazgos & Recomendaciones
6 hallazgos
F1:
The JDF is clean, well-maintained, and suitable for safely housing juveniles while accommodating their education, counseling, and healthcare needs..
F2:
JDF staff is well-trained and dedicated to the achievement of the organization’s mission statement.
F3:
The current co-ed environment creates challenges for appropriate supervision.
F4:
Exposure to technical career training and opportunities is limited for those juveniles who do not plan to attend college.
F5:
JDF has not enforced the contractual obligation of Aramark to post menus within the facility.
F6:
JDF staff counseling efforts may not be adequately formalized so juveniles recognize the benefits of counseling.
Recomendaciones adicionales
4
No vinculadas a hallazgos específicos.
R1:
JDF staff should develop a plan for Fiscal Year 2018 (FY2018) to address staffing and funding implications required to segregate housing for male and female juveniles.
R2:
In FY2018, JDF augments its efforts to address training of juveniles who do not plan to attend college. JDF should consider developing a plan for local private and public technical training centers to make regular presentations to juveniles to: a) Provide familiarization training about technical (i.e. culinary, auto repair, plumbing, etc.) career opportunities available to them; b) Describe requirements for obtaining necessary training and certification, as appropriate; c) Where logistically feasible, provide demonstrations of these careers, for example. a cooking class; and d) Obtain brochures and other written material, to be maintained at JDF, describing these technical careers and their requirements.
R3:
JDF should require Aramark to comply with the contractual obligation of posting a menu of daily meals.
R4:
JDF management should formalize a program in which staff is assigned to individual juveniles to assure consistency. Response to -2018 Final Report
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Hallazgos & Recomendaciones
4 hallazgos
F1:
PCSO received two faxes they did not interpret as CPRA requests;
F2:
PCSO did not assist in identifying which records the faxes were attempting to request as required by Government Code §6253.1(a): “Assist the member of the public to identify records and information that are responsive to the request or to the purpose of the request, if stated”;
F3:
PCSO currently attaches written requests considered to be valid CPRA requests to the case file; and
F4:
There is no method for tracking phone requests.
Recomendaciones adicionales
5
No vinculadas a hallazgos específicos.
R1:
Review all incoming correspondence, and if not considered a valid request, assist the requester in identifying which records are being requested in compliance with the CPRA.
R2:
Acknowledge all requests received in accordance with the guidelines set forth by the CPRA.
R3:
Ensure compliance with the ten-day deadline required by the CPRA. The Grand Jury recommends that Placer County:
R4:
Identify a public records request coordinator within each department.
R5:
Establish a centralized, countywide tracking system for all verbal, written, phone, and faxed public records requests. This recommendation is for a tracking system and not a single point for submitting or responding to requests. This was also recommended in the 2016-2017 Grand Jury Report. Response to -2018 Final Report
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Hallazgos & Recomendaciones
7 hallazgos
F1:
The Placer County Board of Supervisors has delayed the replacement of the Tahoe Justice center due to cost and priority of other capital improvements taking precedence.
F2:
The Burton Creek Substation is not in compliance with the ADA.
F3:
After most recent efforts to make the building safer for staff and inmates, the facility still lacks necessary safety features that more modern facilities include.
F4:
Multiple unlocked storage locations on the property that contain flammable materials and county owned equipment.
F5:
The ground area has dry plants and dry pine needles, creating a potential conflagration and does not include the required defensive space.
F6:
The ventilation system had not been cleaned.
F7:
Smokers are being careless with discarded butts due to a lack of receptacles in the smoking area. Gibson Courthouse at Santucci Justice Center:
Recomendaciones adicionales
7
No vinculadas a hallazgos específicos.
R1:
Placer County Board of Supervisors consider replacing the Burton Creek Substation as recommended since 2001 by past Grand Jury Reports.
R2:
Make necessary changes in order to bring the facility into compliance with ADA.
R3:
Review staffing needs to ensure safety procedures are followed.
R4:
Lock all storage areas accessible to the public and potentially inmates.
R5:
Maintain the mandatory one hundred-foot defensible space around exterior of buildings.
R6:
Develop maintenance plan for keeping the ventilation system in good working order.
R7:
Install cigarette butt receptacle container near outdoor picnic tables. Response to -2018 Final Report
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Hallazgos & Recomendaciones
2 hallazgos
F1:
The city’s active management and operation of RCDC gives the appearance that RCDC is a privatized arm of a public entity, rather than a separate non-profit corporation.
F2:
Roseville does not have a full accounting of the city employee resources dedicated to the operation of RCDC.
Recomendaciones adicionales
2
No vinculadas a hallazgos específicos.
R1:
If RCDC is to continue operation, or if a new model is developed, Roseville should take steps to more effectively ensure the separation and independence of the corporation to address the Grand Jury’s findings.
R2:
Roseville should publically account for all resources dedicated to RCDC. Response to -2018 Final Report
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Hallazgos & Recomendaciones
4 hallazgos
F1:
The county’s voluntary enforcement philosophy has resulted in relaxed enforcement of the Winery Ordinance permit requirements. The requirement that suspected violations be reported in writing discourages citizens to
F3:
Minimal financial penalties for violation of the winery ordinance relative to permit fees discourage voluntary compliance.
F4:
The termination of the “Weekend On-Call Duty Officer” prevents the immediate investigation by Code Enforcement and prevents investigation of conditions at the time of the complaint.
F5:
Tracking system is not being used effectively.
Recomendaciones adicionales
7
No vinculadas a hallazgos específicos.
R1:
The Grand Jury recommends that the Placer County CDRA:
Develop a winery code enforcement program that balances the interests of wineries and those of the public.
R2:
The Grand Jury recommends that the Placer County CDRA:
Facilitate the public’s ability to lodge complaints..
R3:
The Grand Jury recommends that the Placer County CDRA:
Provide staff to conduct timely complaint investigations.
R4:
The Grand Jury recommends that the Placer County CDRA:
Ensure effective resolution of citizen complaints and confirmed violations.
R5:
The Grand Jury recommends that the Placer County CDRA:
Update the county tracking system for complaints and permits to reflect accurate status.
R6:
The Grand Jury recommends that the Placer County CDRA:
Mediate conflicts between wineries and citizens when appropriate.
R7:
The Grand Jury recommends that the Placer County CDRA:
Review the fines for permit fees and code violations to facilitate compliance with the codes. Response to -2018 Final Report