Nevada County Grand Jury
2010-2011
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Findings & Recommendations
11 findings
F1:
The Jury concludes that the visit to CPS took place and the complainant reported suspected child abuse to a CPS social worker.
F2:
The Jury concludes that a breakdown in the walk-in reporting process allowed this report, and may have allowed other reports, of suspected child abuse to go unrecorded in CWS/CMS.
F3:
CPS does not have a process in place that would confirm a report is entered into CWS/CMS when an individual visits the CPS facility to file a report of abuse or neglect.
F4:
CPS failed to document, by entry into CWS/CMS, this complainant’s initial report of suspected child abuse.
F5:
Since the report was not entered into CWS/CMS, CPS took no action to investigate the allegations until the Jury encouraged the complainant to contact CPS management.
F6:
The actions of CPS personnel, relative to the complainant’s initial report, were not in accordance with CPS policies requiring that all reports of suspected child abuse be entered into CWS/CMS.
F7:
Children remain at risk if CPS fails to reliably record and investigate reports of suspected child abuse or neglect.
F8:
During this investigation the Jury observed that CPS had no log, recording or other process to determine whether an individual visited the CPS office.
F9:
There is no procedure at the CPS facility for management to reconcile the total number of reported cases with the number of cases entered into CWS/CMS.
F10:
CPS management provided the Jury with certain CPS policies and procedures and other administrative documents (see Appendix A for a list of documents relevant to this report).
F11:
It was reported to the Jury by CPS management that during the time period under investigation, there was no CPS procedure to verify that telephone calls, or voice mails, had been responded to per CPS policy. Findings 1. The Jury concludes that the visit to CPS took place and the complainant reported suspected child abuse to a CPS social worker.
Additional Recommendations
2
Not linked to specific findings.
R1:
Implement a process to confirm that, if an individual visits the CPS facility and reports suspected abuse or neglect, the report is recorded in CWS/CMS.
R2:
Review with social workers their responsibilities as users of CWS/CMS. The review should be conducted at least annually. Responses Nevada County Board of Supervisors – September 6, 2011
Findings & Recommendations
7 findings
F1:
A valid will may expedite the closing of an estate and assure that a decedent’s wishes are fulfilled.
F2:
Given the limited staffing of the office of the Public Administrator and the complexities of administering some estates, the Public Administrator may take a long time to complete the administration of an estate.
F4:
There is one full time Legal Office Assistant who works for the Public Administrator.
F5:
Of the closed cases, an average case took 4.2 years to process and close based on information provided by staff.
F6:
Of the 39 open cases as of December 31, 2010, the average cases have been open for 8.5 years and the oldest case is 24 years old, based on information provided by staff.
F7:
If a decedent does not have a will the estate passes to the decedent’s heirs as prescribed by Sections 6400-6414 of the California Probate Code.
F8:
If a decedent has no heirs and no will, Section 6800 (a) of the California Probate Code provides that the estate escheats (reverts) to the State of California effective on the date of death. Findings 1. A valid will may expedite the closing of an estate and assure that a decedent’s wishes are fulfilled.
Additional Recommendations
1
Not linked to specific findings.
R1:
The Jury encourages county residents to understand the consequences of not having a valid will. Responses None required.
Findings & Recommendations
5 findings
F1:
Instructions accompanying Vote-by-Mail ballots created confusion for some voters.
F2:
Absence of the phone number of the Elections Office on the Vote-by-Mail envelope inhibits voters from resolving last minute questions concerning spoiled or lost ballots.
F4:
Vote-by-Mail signatures are verified by computer.
F5:
Instructions for Vote-by-Mail voters: Do not address all circumstances for return of spoiled or lost ballots. Lack instructions for replacement of spoiled Vote-by-Mail or lost ballots when it is too late to use the U.S. Postal Service. Are not clear if the Vote-by-Mail voter chooses to vote in person. Do not identify the address of the polling place, if applicable. Do not include the phone number for the Elections Office on the Vote-by-Mail envelope.
F6:
In following up on the 2008-2009 Nevada County Grand Jury Report the current Jury found the following: Compensation is provided for all poll workers attending training. There were no polling places in locations serving alcohol. Eight precincts were staffed by organized community groups. Findings 1. Instructions accompanying Vote-by-Mail ballots created confusion for some voters.
Additional Recommendations
1
Not linked to specific findings.
R1:
The Nevada County Clerk Recorder should direct staff to include the following with the Vote-by-Mail ballots: Instructions for replacement of spoiled or lost Vote-by-Mail ballots for those instances when it is too late to use the U.S. Postal Service. Instructions for Vote-by-Mail voters on how and where to vote in person. The phone number of the Elections Office on the Vote-by-Mail envelope. Responses Nevada County Clerk Recorder, July 13, 2011 November 2010 General Election in Nevada County pages
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Findings & Recommendations
6 findings
F1:
Training deficiencies may result in evidence being improperly processed.
F2:
The absence of designated trained alternates may impact the handling of evidence as to timeliness and security.
F3:
Failure to adhere to policies and procedures may lead to improper processing of evidence.
F4:
Evidence may be compromised due to co-mingling with non-evidentiary items.
F5:
Employees and visitors at City Hall could be placed at risk due to improper handling, control and storage of hazardous materials.
F6:
Regular external audits would identify deficiencies in evidence management practices.
Additional Recommendations
11
Not linked to specific findings.
R1:
Contract for a performance audit of evidence handling and control.
R2:
As a temporary measure, immediately assign an officer to back up the current evidence custodian.
R3:
Designate a trained employee as the primary evidence custodian.
R4:
Designate two additional employees as alternates to the primary evidence custodian.
R5:
Ensure the primary evidence custodian and alternates complete the POST certified training. Nevada City Property Evidence Operation
R6:
Until evidence custodians are fully trained in proper procedures, request temporary assistance in evidence management from an outside law enforcement agency.
R7:
Immediately verify, log and store all evidence items.
R8:
Ensure that adjudicated evidence items are verified, logged, removed from the evidence area and disposed of in accordance with proper evidence-handling procedures.
R9:
Immediately remove all non-evidentiary items from the secured evidence area.
R10:
Immediately cease using the NCPD armory for evidence storage.
R11:
Immediately establish a hazardous material storage area. Once established, identify and store any hazardous material per state standards. Responses The City Council of Nevada City – August 30, 2011 Nevada City Property Evidence Operation
Findings & Recommendations
7 findings
F1:
Standard factory-installed locks on inmate transportation vans do not provide sufficient safety and security for inmates and Sheriff’s personnel.
F2:
The length of time the parking garage gates are open could allow unauthorized individuals to enter or exit the garage.
F3:
Inconsistent use of the sally port increases the possibility of security issues.
F4:
The inability to monitor all sections of the parking garage endangers those using the garage.
F5:
The absence of a surveillance camera in the inmate transport elevator may jeopardize the safety of Sheriff’s personnel and inmates.
F6:
The surveillance camera blind spot in the Courthouse may jeopardize the safety of individuals in that area.
F7:
Employees, inmates and the public may be at risk when hallways are not cleared before moving inmates to courtrooms.
Additional Recommendations
13
Not linked to specific findings.
R1:
There is a holding facility in the Courthouse for inmates transported from WBCF for court appearances and meetings with attorneys.
R2:
The external doors of vans transporting inmates from WBCF are equipped with standard factory-installed locks.
R3:
Transport vans are driven into the enclosed parking garage located below the Courthouse holding facility.
R4:
The parking garage entrance and exit have remote-access, roll-up security gates.
R5:
The Jury observed that the timing cycle allows roll-up gates in the parking garage to remain open longer than necessary for a vehicle to enter or exit.
R6:
The fenced and gated enclosure, commonly known as a sally port, allows inmates to be loaded and unloaded in a secure area before being taken by elevator to the holding cells.
R7:
At the time of inspection, the Jury was told the roll-up security gate on the sally port is not always lowered and secured during movement of the inmates.
R8:
If there is a transport van parked in the sally port, additional transports load and unload inmates in the non-secured area of the parking garage.
R9:
Several surveillance cameras, recommended in previous Jury reports, have been installed in the Courthouse and are monitored by Sheriff’s personnel.
R10:
The surveillance cameras installed in the parking garage do not provide viewing of all sections of the garage.
R11:
The inmate transport elevator does not have a surveillance camera installed. Nevada County Superior Courthouse Holding Facility
R12:
There is a surveillance camera blind spot in an area of the Courthouse used by both the public and inmates.
R13:
In-custody inmate movement between the holding facility and courtrooms takes place in unsecured public corridors.
Findings & Recommendations
7 findings
F1:
The number of control board malfunctions is considerable. As a result, the WBCF has an immediate need to upgrade its security control system. This same finding has been made in the past, but the need has grown much more serious as the equipment ages.)
F2:
Failure to use the recording function of the current surveillance system could preclude the capture of vital evidence in any incident at the facility.
F3:
Contraband could be hidden above the ceiling tiles in the minimum-security dormitories.
F4:
Staff and inmates could be at risk due to faulty locks on visiting-room doors.
F5:
All of the doors to the multi-purpose and visitors’ rooms need to be controlled centrally to prevent potential confrontations between inmates or between inmates and members of the staff and public.
F6:
Many critical areas of the facility need to be monitored by video cameras to ensure the safety of the staff, inmates and public. Wayne Brown Correctional Facility
F7:
moving inmates to courtrooms.
Additional Recommendations
13
Not linked to specific findings.
R1:
The Nevada County Board of Supervisors and the Nevada County Sheriff’s Office should immediately approve the funds needed to upgrade the security system at the WBCF.
R2:
A comprehensive security system upgrade should be given a high priority and be completed as soon as possible.
R3:
The upgrade of the security system should include video recording and playback capabilities.
R4:
The Nevada County Sheriff’s Office should re-configure the ceilings in the minimum- security dormitory areas so that they cannot be used to hide contraband.
R5:
The visiting room and multi-purpose room doors should be brought under central control as part of the upgrade to the security system. Responses Nevada County Board of Supervisors: Recommendations 1, 2 & 3 – September 8, 2011 Nevada County Sheriff’s Office: Findings, and Recommendations 4 & 5 – August 8, 2011 Wayne Brown Correctional Facility
R6:
The fenced and gated enclosure, commonly known as a sally port, allows inmates to be loaded and unloaded in a secure area before being taken by elevator to the holding cells.
R7:
At the time of inspection, the Jury was told the roll-up security gate on the sally port is not always lowered and secured during movement of the inmates.
R8:
If there is a transport van parked in the sally port, additional transports load and unload inmates in the non-secured area of the parking garage. Several surveillance cameras, recommended in previous Jury reports, have been
R9:
installed in the Courthouse and are monitored by Sheriff's personnel.
R10:
The surveillance cameras installed in the parking garage do not provide viewing of all sections of the garage.
R11:
The inmate transport elevator does not have a surveillance camera installed. Nevada County Superior Courthouse Holding Facility
R12:
public and inmates. In-custody inmate movement between the holding facility and courtrooms takes place
R13:
in unsecured public corridors. Findings Standard factory-installed locks on inmate transportation vans do not provide sufficient
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Findings & Recommendations
13 findings
F1:
Employees and inmates at the Sub-Station may be exposed to potentially dangerous situations as surveillance cameras do not monitor all inmate areas.
F2:
The lack of secure handling, storage and control may lead to loss, contamination, degradation and/or destruction of evidence/property.
F3:
The deficiency documented in the State Fire Marshal’s inspection of the Sub-Station may expose employees, inmates and the public to potentially dangerous situations.
F4:
Employees, inmates and the public may be exposed to potentially dangerous situations because inmate workers are unsupervised when outside of the Sub-Station.
F5:
Employees and inmates may be exposed to potentially dangerous situations when inmate workers are not searched on return to the Sub-Station.
F6:
The guideline for dorms and individual housing units and the statement on hygiene in the Wayne Brown Correctional Facility County of Nevada Inmate Informational Handbook are not being enforced at the Sub-station. Nevada County Superior Court, Truckee Branch
F7:
There is concern regarding officer and public safety, as well as potential prisoner escape, when transferring inmates between vehicles and the Truckee Court.
F8:
There is concern regarding employee and public safety when moving inmates within the building housing the Truckee Court.
F10:
Inmates are transported in a secure vehicle by an armed correctional officer between the Wayne Brown Correctional Center, the Sub-Station and the Truckee Court.
F11:
At the Truckee Court inmates are moved from the secure vehicle in an outdoor, unsecured, open area located in close proximity to a public library and county offices.
F12:
Inmates are moved from the secure vehicle to the Truckee Court through an outdoor, unsecured, open walkway utilized by court and county employees and the public.
F13:
There are no surveillance cameras in the inmate loading/unloading area or in the outdoor, unsecured, open walkway through which inmates are moved in and out of the Truckee Court.
F14:
Inmates at the Truckee Court are moved through an unsecured, open area located in close proximity to the courtroom, the judge’s chamber, the jury deliberation room and offices housing court employees. Nevada County Sheriff’s Office Truckee Sub-Station and the Superior Court Holding Facility Findings Nevada County Sheriff’s Office Truckee Sub-Station 1. Employees and inmates at the Sub-Station may be exposed to potentially dangerous situations as surveillance cameras do not monitor all inmate areas.
Additional Recommendations
9
Not linked to specific findings.
R1:
Ensure monitoring of all inmate areas at the Sub-Station.
R2:
Ensure the safety and secure storage of evidence and property. The NCSO should replace the existing wooden, non-keyed lockers with metal lockers equipped with a keyed locking system.
R3:
Ensure full compliance with the State Office of the Fire Marshal.
R4:
Supervise the inmate worker’s activities when the inmate worker is outside of the Sub- Station. Nevada County Sheriff’s Office Truckee Sub-Station and the Superior Court Holding Facility
R5:
Search inmate workers for contraband upon return from outside of the Sub-Station.
R6:
Ensure inmate workers are clean and properly groomed and their quarters are kept clean and orderly. The Nevada County Sheriff should open dialogue with the Nevada County Superior Court to:
R7:
Secure the open inmate loading/unloading area at the Truckee Court with a sally port.
R8:
Secure the open walkway area used to transport inmates into the Truckee Court with a secure enclosure.
R9:
Review the process for the movement of inmates through unsecured areas of the building housing the Truckee Court. Responses Nevada County Sheriff, August 29, 2011 Nevada County Sheriff’s Office Truckee Sub-Station and the Superior Court Holding Facility
Findings & Recommendations
3 findings
F1:
District governance: a Master Plan has been approved; facility improvement permits are approved and an updated Sphere of Influence is in place. Personnel management: policies and procedures have been put into effect and communication between staff and volunteers has improved. Financial management: a new financial system is being used; an independent outside bookkeeper has been hired; the 2007 audit is complete and the audits for 2008-2010 are in process. LAFCo (Local Agency Formation Commission) develops and updates Spheres of Influence for districts. The Commission reviews and updates a district's sphere every five years. A Sphere of Influence considers four factors: present/planned land use, present/probable need for services and facilities, service/facility capacity and relevant social/economic communities of interest. Western Gateway Recreation and Park District
F2:
pumps have been repaired and the turf at the ball fields is green.
F3:
Park utilization: has increased significantly, including a projected 17% increase in rental contracts.
Findings & Recommendations
10 findings
F1:
The members of the Board lacked the education and training to perform their roles and responsibilities as Board members.
F2:
There is education and training available to Board members, regarding the roles and responsibilities of a board member in a special district.
F3:
The members of the Board knew of education and training opportunities and had budgeted funds for training available to them yet failed to take advantage of many opportunities.
F4:
The lack of education and training of the Board members in their roles and responsibilities contributed to insufficient oversight and lack of control of the actions and activities of the District.
F5:
The Financial policy in the Truckee Fire Protection District Board of Directors Policies and Procedures does not provide adequate guidance to the Finance Committee in the exercise of due diligence.
F6:
The Board failed to seek advice and review from its legal counsel regarding the Fire Chief’s employment contract.
F7:
The Board members’ lack of education and training allowed ongoing improper actions by the Fire Chief including multiple violations of his employment contract.
F8:
The Board’s failure to follow the policy regarding Relationship with Staff resulted in insufficient oversight, control and engagement with the TFPD staff. This permitted an atmosphere of fear and intimidation to exist among the personnel of the TFPD.
F9:
The lack of communication between the Board and TFPD personnel prevented the Board from recognizing eroding staff morale.
F10:
The Board members failed to communicate actively with their constituents; as a result, the Board members were unaware of growing negative public opinion.
Additional Recommendations
4
Not linked to specific findings.
R1:
All members of the Board should actively seek out and attend training regarding the roles and responsibilities of board members in special districts.
R2:
The Board should improve their finance policy to require both the thorough review of checks to be signed and the detailed supporting documentation for all District expenditures.
R3:
The Board should improve existing policy to facilitate open and ongoing communication with TFPD personnel.
R4:
The Board, management and staff should forge an active partnership in the rebuilding of the District’s public image and should actively communicate with their constituents to restore and maintain the public’s trust. Responses Truckee Fire Protection District Board of Directors: Date – September 19, 2011