Mendocino County 2011-2012 - California Grand Jury Reports

May 09, 2012 — A Report on the City of Ukiah Garbage Contract

6 pages 46 findings 6 recommendations

Findings & Recommendations 46 findings

F1: On December 7, 2011, the Ukiah City Council approved by a 3 to 1 vote, a new 15- year contract for garbage collection and hauling.

F2: The new contract included a 7.2% increase in collection rates and a 6% increase in transfer station processing.

Related Recommendations (1)

R6: The City Council determine whether the City's contract with C&SWS can be voided, or any other any legal action taken, after the City's investigations noted above are completed and fully evaluated. (Findings 2-4, 15-17, 20-21, 23-32, 35-42, 44)

F3: These rate increases in the new contract followed a rate increase in August 2010, of 6% for collection, 27% to the transfer station by the ton, and 48% by the cubic yard.

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F4: In August 2010, C&SWS cited increased costs for justifying the rate increases.

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F5: The advisor to the City Council during the discussion and negotiation stage of the December 2011, contract, was a CPA. There were two invited members of the public and official members of the Council present for the meeting.

F6: The contracted CPA reviewed, but did not audit the rate requests and stated the increases were justified. 2

F7: The CPA disclosed a conflict of interest, before advising the City of Ukiah on its new contract. The CPA was also under contract with another waste hauler. The other waste hauler is an affiliate of the Ukiah hauler, a wholly owned subsidiary of C&SWS.

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R2: The City Council initiate an investigation into the related business transactions among the companies related to C&SWS as these transactions relate to costs passed on to the City. (Findings 7, 21, 35, 37-38) 5

F8: The disclosure of this conflict of interest was made known and discussed at a City Council meeting in February 2012.

F9: At that February meeting, the Council acknowledged the conflict and stated that the matter had been previously discussed between the City and the CPA. At the February meeting, the CPA explained that the CPA would be advising both the City and the other hauler. The CPA stated that the two contracts would be kept separate. That statement seemed to satisfy the City Council. The City decided to continue their consulting contract arrangement with the CPA.

F10: The City’s Ad Hoc Committee Staff held non-public negotiations with C&SWS for over a year and a half. Two individual members of the public were present at the request of the City. However, this was not an announced meeting and the Staff did not treat this as a Brown Act Meeting.

F11: In a following meeting, the City Council decided that the negotiations with C&SWS were to be exclusive of any other negotiations with any other hauler. The City decided that no other provider of collecting, hauling, or recycling services would be allowed to participate.

Related Recommendations (2)

R4: If it fits in the budget, the City Council engage an economics advisory firm to investigate the potential impact of C&SWS monopoly in the trash collection and hauling business in Ukiah. (Findings 11, 18-19)

R5: The City Council determine if other companies would have responded to a Request for Proposals (RFP) had the City issued an RFP for its trash collection and hauling contracts. (Findings 11, 18-19)

F12: The new 15-year contract signed in December 2011, replaced a contract that was not yet due to expire until 2016.

F13: The renegotiation of the contract was a public process. The contract was an agenized item in four separate City Council meetings before it was adopted in December 2011.

F14: Before 2011, the City’s garbage contract had historically been subject to a three- year review process.

F15: C&SWS submitted facts and information to the City supporting its request for a new contract. These included no new financial statements.

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F16: The financial statements submitted by C&SWS were unaudited.

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F17: The industry norm and best business practices suggest that only audited financials be accepted by a municipality for the purpose of negotiating contracts.

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F18: The City did not issue a Request for Proposals (RFP) for the new garbage contract.

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R5: The City Council determine if other companies would have responded to a Request for Proposals (RFP) had the City issued an RFP for its trash collection and hauling contracts. (Findings 11, 18-19)

F19: In awarding the contract to C&SWS, the City conceded it gave C&SWS a “monopoly”, arguing that there were “…more efficiencies and cost-effectiveness with one provider.”

Related Recommendations (2)

R5: The City Council determine if other companies would have responded to a Request for Proposals (RFP) had the City issued an RFP for its trash collection and hauling contracts. (Findings 11, 18-19)

F20: The C&SWS majority owner has a family relationship with the prior contractor.

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F21: Related parties under common ownership should be identified and their mutual dealings regulated by the contract.

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F22: Although the rate adjustments depend on cost and revenue, C&SWS does not provide financial reports to the City, and the City has no right to audit per the contract, unless C&SWS requests an “extraordinary increase”.

Related Recommendations (2)

R1: The City Council initiate an inquiry at the California League of Cities to determine whether audited financials are required or recommended before a municipality signs a garbage contract and determine the actual costs. (Findings 22, 36, 38)

R3: The City Council conduct an investigation into any possible violations of the contract by C&SWS. (Findings 22, 26-27, 29-30, 42)

F23: Under the new contract, the City lacks unrestricted flow control over the destination of wood waste, green waste and food waste.

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F24: The City gave up, without compensation, its contractual protection from the 2007 contract from landfill disposal cost increases. 3

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F25: The construction cost component of the transfer station gate fee is kept by C&SWS and the City. When the financing is amortized and paid off in 2016, instead of being rescinded, this fee will remain.

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F26: The transfer station gate fee calculation underestimates savings from the redirection of garbage from Potrero Hills landfill to Eastlake landfill.

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R3: The City Council conduct an investigation into any possible violations of the contract by C&SWS. (Findings 22, 26-27, 29-30, 42)

F27: Additional reductions in the transfer station fee are appropriate due to the fact the transfer station realizes substantial income from the sale of scrap metal, buy-back containers, and other recyclables. This income apparently is not separately disclosed per the contract.

Related Recommendations (2)

R3: The City Council conduct an investigation into any possible violations of the contract by C&SWS. (Findings 22, 26-27, 29-30, 42)

F28: The collection contract overlooks the 2.56% rate increase that was supposed to be reversed in 2013.

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F29: The recycling commodity credit applied against the collection contract operating costs appears to be underestimated according to testimony. The contractual price of $5 per ton for single stream (mixed recyclables) appears to be less than the amount C&SWS is paying others.

Related Recommendations (2)

R3: The City Council conduct an investigation into any possible violations of the contract by C&SWS. (Findings 22, 26-27, 29-30, 42)

F30: Granting an exclusive right to collect recyclables violates the City Code. The City Code also provides that contracts can be granted for only 15 years. However, the current contract provides that an additional 5-year option may be added to the contract term by the contractor only. This effectively grants a 20-year contract.

Related Recommendations (2)

R3: The City Council conduct an investigation into any possible violations of the contract by C&SWS. (Findings 22, 26-27, 29-30, 42)

F31: In the terms of the contract is a provision that allows the City to waive arbitration. This may limit the City’s remedies if the contract goes into default.

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F32: The strategic plan section of the contract is vague and ambiguous, and does not commit C&SWS to any aspect of the strategic plan including the open-air composting of organics at an outdoor composting facility.

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F33: Resolution 95-6 was unanimously passed and adopted by the Ukiah City Council on 7/20/94. The resolution urges all regulatory agencies and lending institutions to proceed with all possible speed to get a compost facility up and running.

F34: The composting facility became fully permitted and operational in February of 1995.

F35: Since the transfer station was created, the same corporate entity, has provided both the collection and transfer station operation for the City, although different corporate names were used.

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F36: In negotiating these contracts, the City did no audit.

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F37: These entities are two of at least thirteen related companies underneath an umbrella organization that includes C&SWS.

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F38: In negotiating and signing the contracts, the City understood the fact that the two entities are related companies and that the pass through costs involved made the contracts essentially meaningless.

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F39: The public was allowed less than 5 days to review and comment on the contracts developed by the City and the hauler over that one and a half year period. The contract was published as part of an agenda.

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F40: The hauler’s compost facility is out of compliance, having: 1) more material than allowed on site; 2) exceeding the maximum daily intake; and, 3) because it expanded the facility from 2.76 acres to 4.5 acres without permits. The compost 4 facility has no pad or pond and is sited on a gravel bar adjacent to a year round creek, thus polluting the water.

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F41: The City's food waste is not being composted at all. It is being dumped in a landfill at full expense. Much of the green waste is being trucked to Humboldt County and burned. While the State of California allows both composting and burning at a cogeneration plant to count toward the diversion mandate, it considers composting to be preferable. The State considers burning, in order to capture heat, as conversion. Burning is not recycling.

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F42: The City makes differing statements about organic waste for compost. The City implies that all the material is going to a compost facility. While it may be true that the compost facility receives most of the city's curbside green waste, that material makes up but a fraction of the City's total green and wood waste stream. The City also insists that the hauler has to deliver to the compost facility an additional 200 tons/month at their own expense, implying that there is an expense involved, when in fact the contract obligates the compost facility to take those 200 tons and any additional material free. What remains unclear is by what authority a contract between the City and the hauler can dictate the tip fee or absence of one at the compost facility.

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F43: AB 341 does not mandate 75% recycling; it only sets that figure as a goal. AB 341 mandates recycling by certain businesses and public entities, but the level of recycling mandated appears unclear. The new 75% goal and the 25% increase in diversion that is proposed, is based on mandatory "commercial recycling", because the commercial sector generates 75% of the waste going to landfills.

F44: Food waste materials are not considered “acceptable” for the hauler’s proposed facility. The hauler possesses neither the expertise required, nor has it proposed the necessary permitting, to recycle the range of materials that the current composting facility has been successfully dealing with for years.

F45: The City stated that there is more than one local company capable of recycling all of Ukiah's organic waste. The City also stated that they would welcome competition.

F46: Commercial food waste recycling requires more effort than residential food waste recycling. Some could be co-collected together with the green waste, but the sloppy nature of the material necessitates dedicated bins and special collection routes - something that the hauler has avoided for the past 17 years. RECOMENDATIONS

May 02, 2012 — Rda Successor Agencies from A-z, Starting with the Letter "u" (ukiah) May 2, 2012

11 pages 54 findings 12 recommendations

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Findings & Recommendations 54 findings

F1: On December 29, 2011, the California Supreme Court released its decision in the California Redevelopment Association vs. Matosantos. The Court found that AB 1X26 (the "Dissolution Act") to be constitutional. The Court's decision meant that each redevelopment agency within California must be dissolved and no longer exist as of February 1, 2012. This included all city and county redevelopment agencies.

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R1: City staff assigned to the Ukiah's Successor Agency continues to develop the "blueprint" for the dissolution of the Redevelopment Agency as direction continues to come from the State Controller's Office and the State Department of Finance. (Findings 1-20, 28, 30, 34, 38, 42, 49-50, 54)

F2: In accordance with Health and Safety Code Section 34173, the City of Ukiah - along with the City of Willits, the City of Fort Bragg, and the County of 3 Mendocino – each designated a Successor Agency to supersede their respective Redevelopment Agencies.

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F3: The intent of the Successor Agency is to wind down the business of the Redevelopment Agency.

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F4: Under the Dissolution Act, authority, rights, powers, duties, and obligations of the Redevelopment Agency vest in the Successor Agency subject to approval of the State Department of Finance (DOF).

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F5: The Successor Agency has the responsibility of paying off the former Redevelopment Agency's existing debts. The Successor Agency also has the responsibility for disposing of the Redevelopment Agency's properties and assets in a manner prescribed by law. Lastly, the Successor Agency has the responsibility with winding down all remaining business of the former Redevelopment Agency.

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F6: The Successor Agency's activities are subject to review by the Oversight Board. This newly formed board is composed of seven representatives, as prescribed by Health and Safety Code Section 34179.

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F7: Per Health and Safety Code Section 34180, the Oversight Board must first approve important actions proposed by the Successor Agency. The Oversight Board may choose to approve, reject, or amend those actions.

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F8: The Oversight Board must approve any proposed new repayment terms for outstanding loans where the terms have not been specified prior to the date of the formation of the Successor Agency.

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F9: The Oversight Board must approve any proposed refunding by the Successor Agency of outstanding bonds or other debt of the former RDA. This is to provide cost savings or to finance debt service spikes. However, no additional debt can be created and debt service cannot be accelerated.

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F10: The Oversight Board must approve any proposed setting aside amounts in reserves as required by indentures, trust indentures, or similar documents governing the issuance of outstanding RDA bonds.

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F11: The Oversight Board must approve any proposed merging of project area.

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F12: The Oversight Board must approve any proposed continuing the acceptance of federal or state grants, or other forms of financial assistance from either public or private sources, where assistance is conditioned upon the provision of matching funds by the Successor Agency in amounts greater than 5 per cent of the total liabilities of the Successor Agency.

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F13: If the City of Ukiah wishes to retain any properties or other assets of its former RDA for future development activities, funded from the City's own funds and under the City's own auspices, the City must reach a compensation agreement with the other taxing entities. These payments must be in proportion to their respective shares of the base property tax, as pursuant to Section 34188, for the value of the property retained by the City. The Oversight Board must also approve this action.

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R10: A meeting of all Tax Entities affected by the elimination of the RDA be convened by the Oversight Board to ensure outreach, inclusiveness, transparency, and accountability by the Board. (Findings 13-14, 19)

F14: If no agreement is reached on the valuation of the retained assets, the value will be the fair market value as of the 2011 property tax lien date as determined by the County Assessor. The Oversight Board must also approve this action. 4

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F15: The Oversight Board must approve any proposed establishment of the Recognized Obligation Payment Schedule (ROPS).

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F16: The Oversight Board must approve any request by the Successor Agency to enter into an agreement with the City of Ukiah.

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F17: The Oversight Board must approve any request by the Successor Agency to pledge, or to enter into any agreement for the pledge of, property tax revenues pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 34178.

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F18: The Oversight Board may direct the staff of the Successor Agency to perform work in the furtherance of the Oversight Board's duties and responsibilities.

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F19: The Oversight Board shall have fiduciary responsibilities to the holders of enforceable obligations and the taxing entities that benefit from distributions of property tax and other revenues. The Enforceable Obligation Schedule adopted by the Successor Agency and approved by the Oversight Board must be published on the City's website or Successor Agency website.

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F20: On February 29, 2012, at a regular meeting of the City Council of the City of Ukiah, the Council passed, approved, and adopted a resolution that dissolved the City's RDA, and submitted an initial draft of the ROPS to the Successor Agency. The transmittal of the initial draft of the ROPS also copied the Mendocino County Auditor, the California State Controller, and the California State Department of Finance. The resolution was effective immediately.

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F21: The former RDA for the City of Ukiah was involved in significant projects, including the Redwood Business Park infrastructure on Airport Blvd (the "Costco Project"), the County Courthouse Relocation Project on Perkins Street, the Downtown Beautification Project, the Alex Rorabaugh Gymnasium and Activity Center, the Orchard Street Bridge, and 322 units of affordable housing created during the period of 1990-2007.

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R6: City staff assigned to the Successor Agency should present the Oversight Board with a work plan for economic development projects they intend to continue, i.e., the Costco Project and the Courthouse Relocation Project. (Findings 21-23, 38-39, 51-54)

F22: The City's former RDA issued bonds. Millions of dollars are still outstanding. They are included in the ROPS.

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F23: The former RDA has outstanding loans and other liabilities. They are included in the ROPS.

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F24: The ROPS for Ukiah's Successor Agency totals approximately $118 million for the period of January 1, 2012 through June 30, 2012 and approximately $59 million for the period of July 1, 2012 through December 31, 2012.

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R7: City staff assigned to the Successor Agency should carefully keep track of hours in a code system that tracks City business, Successor Agency business, Oversight Board business, and project management business, so as to avoid the perception of "double dipping”. (Findings 24-25, 54)

F25: The former RDA used its funds to pay significant portions of the salaries of 18 City employees, totaling $808,288 in 2010-2011.

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F26: The first meeting of the Successor Agency's Oversight Board took place on April 3, 2012. The Oversight Board met with a quorum of six members present of its required seven-member Board. The Oversight Board convened its first meeting before the Mendocino County Board of Supervisors appointed a representative from the public.

Related Recommendations (3)

R3: City staff assigned to the Successor Agency should comply and present to the Oversight Board a written timeline of milestones and deadlines. (Findings 26-27, 33-34, 48, 51)

R4: City staff assigned to the Successor Agency should immediately invite the County Auditor to participate in all future meetings of the Oversight Board. (Findings 26-29, 46-47, 52)

R11: The Oversight Board ensure that all important board business be posted on the City website so all stakeholders and media are notified in a timely manner to ensure transparency. (Findings 26-27, 47, 51, 54)

F27: The six members of the Oversight Board that were present at the April 3 meeting included; Deputy CEO, Mendocino County; Vice Mayor, City of Ukiah, Board Member, Russian River Cemetery District; Associate Superintendent Mendocino County Office of Education; Vice President of 5 Administrative Services, Mendo-Lake Community College District, and Assistant Finance Director, City of Ukiah.

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R3: City staff assigned to the Successor Agency should comply and present to the Oversight Board a written timeline of milestones and deadlines. (Findings 26-27, 33-34, 48, 51)

R4: City staff assigned to the Successor Agency should immediately invite the County Auditor to participate in all future meetings of the Oversight Board. (Findings 26-29, 46-47, 52)

F28: The principal staff to the Oversight Board is the City Manager, the Assistant City Manager, and the City Finance Director.

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R4: City staff assigned to the Successor Agency should immediately invite the County Auditor to participate in all future meetings of the Oversight Board. (Findings 26-29, 46-47, 52)

R5: City staff assigned to the Successor Agency should adequately explain their presentations to the Oversight Board, so that all members of the Board can fully understand aspects of the dissolution process about which they are uncertain. (Findings28-29, 32-34, 36-43, 48-51, 54)

F29: Legal counsel represented the City and its Successor Agency. The Oversight Board was not represented by counsel, despite the fact that they were acting in the capacity as sworn fiduciaries.

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R4: City staff assigned to the Successor Agency should immediately invite the County Auditor to participate in all future meetings of the Oversight Board. (Findings 26-29, 46-47, 52)

R8: The Oversight Board should immediately retain legal counsel. (Findings 29, 40-43, 49)

F30: At the April 3 meeting, the Oversight Board adopted a conflict of interest code. In addition, the Oversight Board elected its Chairperson and other officers. The Board also approved the City Clerk to act on its behalf as Secretary to the Oversight Board.

F31: The date, time, and location of future regular meetings of the Oversight Board were resolved as follows: the 2nd Wednesday of every month, at 4 PM, at the Ukiah Conference Center. In addition, it was resolved that Special Meetings could be called with 24 hours notice whenever necessary.

F32: The Oversight Board approved an administrative budget for the Successor Agency. Pursuant to Health and Safety Code 34177(j), the Successor Agency could be allocated up to 5 per cent of the property tax for 2011-12, and up to 3 per cent of the property tax allocated to the Redevelopment Obligation Trust Fund for 2012-2013 and each year thereafter. The Administrative Cost Allowance cannot be less than $250,000 or 5% of the property tax whichever is greater.

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F33: The Oversight Board reviewed and considered, but did not approve the ROPS at the first meeting. Several members of the Board voiced their concern that the ROPS was not sufficiently documented, nor did the County Auditor certify the ROPS. The ROPS was certified at the second meeting.

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R3: City staff assigned to the Successor Agency should comply and present to the Oversight Board a written timeline of milestones and deadlines. (Findings 26-27, 33-34, 48, 51)

F34: The City Manager and Assistant City Manager stressed at the April 3 meeting that there was an April 15 deadline for the Oversight Board to approve the ROPS and to provide a copy of the approved ROPS to the State Controller and the State Department of Finance.

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R3: City staff assigned to the Successor Agency should comply and present to the Oversight Board a written timeline of milestones and deadlines. (Findings 26-27, 33-34, 48, 51)

F35: On April 10, the Mendocino County Board of Supervisors appointed a member of the public to the Successor Agency of the Ukiah's Redevelopment Agency.

F36: On April 11, a Special Meeting was held by the Oversight Board. The only key item on the agenda was the Board's approval of the ROPS list.

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F37: At the April 11 meeting, the Board approved the ROPS following a heated discussion. Only five of the seven members of the Board voted yes. The dissenting members again expressed their concern that the ROPS was not fully documented nor certified by the County Auditor.

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F38: The City Manager expressed her impatience with the Board's process, noting, "This whole process has been extremely difficult and has disrupted two major projects." The City Manager was referring to the Redwood Business Park (the "Costco Project") and the $1 million environmental cleanup at the old Ukiah Railroad Depot for the relocation of the proposed Mendocino County courthouse. 6

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F39: Even some of the Board members who voted yes to approve the ROPS list said they preferred to vote for a "conditional approval" of the ROPS. Some Board members expressed concern if the State Controller or State Department of Finance disallowed the ROPS list from Ukiah Successor Agency. The Assistant City Manager assured the Board that they were not taking an "undue risk".

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F40: The Oversight Board had no way to assess the personal legal liability associated with risk. There was no legal counsel to advise them. Yet, the Board was acting as sworn fiduciaries at the April 3 and April 11 meetings. It was later determined that no liability was attached.

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R8: The Oversight Board should immediately retain legal counsel. (Findings 29, 40-43, 49)

F41: At the April 3 and April 11 meetings, legal counsel advised the City. In fact, counsel for the City was present at the Ukiah Conference Center during the April 11 meeting.

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R8: The Oversight Board should immediately retain legal counsel. (Findings 29, 40-43, 49)

F42: The dissolution of RDAs is a complicated business involving billions of dollars, and hundreds of agencies and tax entities, all across California. The process is fraught with almost unlimited possibilities for error. In fact, it is often remarked, that there is no "playbook" for the dissolution of RDAs. There is no body of case law that can easily resolve disputes.

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R8: The Oversight Board should immediately retain legal counsel. (Findings 29, 40-43, 49)

F43: The dissolution of RDAs represents potentially expensive legal liabilities for all parties involved in the process of dissolution.

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R8: The Oversight Board should immediately retain legal counsel. (Findings 29, 40-43, 49)

F44: On its website, the California League of Cities has identified key areas of what it calls Post Redevelopment Legal Issues: • ROPS, • Cash Flow, • Pass-through Agreements, • Asset Transfer Assessments, • "Clawbacks" by the State Controller, • Agency-City Asset Transfers, • Third-Party Assessments, • Property Acquisition and Eminent Domain.

Related Recommendations (2)

R2: City staff assigned to the Successor Agency should continue to solicit interpretation of this direction from the City Attorney, the California 3 The letter defined EO as enforceable obligation. Redevelopment Association and the California League of Cities. (Findings 44-45)

R9: Regarding any legal questions about housing programs, ongoing economic development projects, environmental issues, and bond financings and other debt, the Oversight Board and their legal counsel should (when retained) consult with the California League of Cities. (Findings 44-46)

F45: Complicating the picture even further, there is the SB 659 Coalition. The Coalition (compromised of a growing list of labor, business, housing, public safety, community, and local government agencies) is seeking to postpone the scheduled dissolution of RDAs with the intent to allow time for new job creation and community renewal programs.

Related Recommendations (3)

R12: The Oversight Board stay apprised of all developments at the SB 659 Coalition. (Finding 45) 9

F46: The January 5, 2012 edition of the California Cities Advocate also called for a "legislative fix" for the dissolution of Redevelopment Agencies. A potential "fix" begs an important question: as Successor Agencies "wind down" the activities of the former RDAs, will this “fix” imply that Successor Agencies must also "rewind"?

Related Recommendations (2)

R4: City staff assigned to the Successor Agency should immediately invite the County Auditor to participate in all future meetings of the Oversight Board. (Findings 26-29, 46-47, 52)

F47: Two members of the Oversight Board noted that the City appears to be minimizing the role of the County Auditor during the first few weeks of the dissolution process. The proposed County Auditor Implementation Guidelines call for the County Auditor to certify all financial actions taken by the Successor Agency. 7

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R4: City staff assigned to the Successor Agency should immediately invite the County Auditor to participate in all future meetings of the Oversight Board. (Findings 26-29, 46-47, 52)

F48: County Auditor Implementation Guidelines for the dissolution of Redevelopment Agencies exist only in draft form at the time of this report.

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F49: The interests of the Successor Agency and its Tax Entities are not the same as the interests of the City. Furthermore, the members of the Oversight Board are acting in the capacity of sworn fiduciaries. As such, there are both legal liabilities and financial consequences for errors made by the Oversight Board.

Related Recommendations (2)

F50: Some elements of the "wind down" of the RDAs are open to legal interpretation, including elements of affordable housing, employment, environmental regulation, and bond financing.

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F51: Ukiah's Successor Agency is experiencing dissent on its Oversight Board. Part of the problem is that some Board members feel "rushed" by City staff. They commented that City staff needs to "slow down" the process of dissolution and to more fully explain all their actions. They also stated that City staff needs to document actions, whenever possible.

Related Recommendations (2)

F52: Some Oversight Board members stated the County Auditor must certify the ROPS list and other actions of the Successor Agency.

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F53: It is not clear at this point in time, what projects started by Ukiah's RDA will be continued by the Successor Agency. Although it appears that the Redwood Business Park Revitalization Project (the "Costco Project") and the Courthouse Relocation Project will both proceed, the future of other projects has not been sufficiently addressed. The future of housing projects, especially student housing projects for the college, is in doubt to the consternation of many community leaders.

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F54: In a letter dated April 27, 2012, the State Department of Finance informed the City that $12,529,535 of the $118 million ROPS submitted to the State Department of Finance do not meet the requirements of Health and Safety Code sections 34171 et seq. and were not approved. The letter went on to state that, "Furthermore, items listed on future ROPS will be subject to review and may be denied as EOs." 3 The letter was not clear whether the State was approving the balance of the ROPS list or if the list was still under review.

Related Recommendations (1)

April 18, 2012 — Mcera Evaluation Time to take the next step

6 pages 25 findings 8 recommendations

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Findings & Recommendations 25 findings

F1: MCERA is responsible for the investment of retirement funds.

Related Recommendations (3)

R1: MCERA have a thorough understanding and a documented account of all fixed monthly pension costs. (Findings 1, 22-24)

R2: MCERA encourage the BOS to revisit pension benefits to renegotiate and reduce benefits for new hires. (Findings 1-2, 20)

R7: MCERA produce reports that facilitate better financial management to sustain principle assets and eliminate the need to sell off investment assets to pay for obligations. (Findings 1, 22, 23-24)

F2: The County, under the direction of the BOS, is responsible for negotiating public employee benefits. 2

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R2: MCERA encourage the BOS to revisit pension benefits to renegotiate and reduce benefits for new hires. (Findings 1-2, 20)

R3: BOS have a working knowledge of the county’s pension obligations and current investment return trends. (Findings 2, 20-21, 24-25)

R4: BOS examine alternative pension strategies and proposals to reduce liabilities and increase funding. (Findings 2-7, 17, 20)

R5: BOS examine pension benefits for new hires and renegotiate to reduce benefits, which are not sustainable. (Findings 2, 20, 25)

R6: BOS authorize and support the creation of an initial plan to manage pension sustainability. (Findings 2, 4-6, 9, 12-13, 20, 25)

F3: In 1998, retiree health benefits were discontinued for new employees after the date of the resolution.

Related Recommendations (1)

R4: BOS examine alternative pension strategies and proposals to reduce liabilities and increase funding. (Findings 2-7, 17, 20)

F4: The county continues to partially fund non-Medicare eligible retirees.

Related Recommendations (2)

R4: BOS examine alternative pension strategies and proposals to reduce liabilities and increase funding. (Findings 2-7, 17, 20)

R6: BOS authorize and support the creation of an initial plan to manage pension sustainability. (Findings 2, 4-6, 9, 12-13, 20, 25)

F5: The county has 1044 active employees.

Related Recommendations (2)

R4: BOS examine alternative pension strategies and proposals to reduce liabilities and increase funding. (Findings 2-7, 17, 20)

R6: BOS authorize and support the creation of an initial plan to manage pension sustainability. (Findings 2, 4-6, 9, 12-13, 20, 25)

F6: The county has 1174 retired employees.

Related Recommendations (2)

R4: BOS examine alternative pension strategies and proposals to reduce liabilities and increase funding. (Findings 2-7, 17, 20)

R6: BOS authorize and support the creation of an initial plan to manage pension sustainability. (Findings 2, 4-6, 9, 12-13, 20, 25)

F7: COLA increases are allowed up to 3% per year.

Related Recommendations (1)

R4: BOS examine alternative pension strategies and proposals to reduce liabilities and increase funding. (Findings 2-7, 17, 20)

F8: Declines in the funded ratio due to market conditions, growing pension liabilities, and the opportunity to reduce interest costs on pension liabilities resulted in the issuance of POBs in 1996 and 2002.

F9: This year’s POB deficit is $82.98 million.

F10: The Buck Consulting firm and MCERA collaborated in 2005 on questionable actuarial practices to justify “excess earnings” of $9.6 million.

F11: Some of the 2005 “excess earnings” were diverted to fund health care.

F12: Ultimately, this $9.6 million was written off as a loss in FY 2010-2011.

Related Recommendations (1)

R6: BOS authorize and support the creation of an initial plan to manage pension sustainability. (Findings 2, 4-6, 9, 12-13, 20, 25)

F13: The IRS is currently reviewing the county’s diversion of “excess earnings” as part of the Volunteer Correction Program (VCP). The VCP is associated with the maintenance of tax-exempt status.

Related Recommendations (2)

R6: BOS authorize and support the creation of an initial plan to manage pension sustainability. (Findings 2, 4-6, 9, 12-13, 20, 25)

R8: MCERA participate in the early trial implementation of the revised GASB 25 offered by the IRS. (Findings 13, 21)

F14: In February 2007, the BOS and the Board of Retirement Ad Hoc Committee recommended hiring an independent MCERA Administrator.

F15: The MCERA Administrator was hired in October 2008.

F16: The new administrator position was created to establish an organization with supporting policies and procedures that increase the effectiveness and transparency of MCERA.

F17: The hiring of a full time director and staff increased MCERA salary costs from $167,000 a year in 2007 to $322,000 a year in 2010.

F18: The creation of an independent MCERA has increased the effectiveness and the cost of its operation with the creation of Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (CAFR), a web presence, and televised meetings.

F19: Since 2008, the following changes have been made through a formal Request For Proposal (RFP) process: • In October 2009 the financial consultant Peter Chan was replaced by Callan Associates • In March 2011 the actuarial consultants Buck Consulting was replaced by Segal Company • In July 2011 the audit consultant Jim Sligh was replaced by Gallina LLP.

F20: MCERA’s unfunded actuarial accrued liability (UAAL) as of June 30, 2010 was $91,784,613. In this year’s actuarial valuation, the UAAL has increased to $124,912,676.

Related Recommendations (1)

R3: BOS have a working knowledge of the county’s pension obligations and current investment return trends. (Findings 2, 20-21, 24-25)

F21: The revised GASB reporting standards, to be implemented in 2013, will reflect a current financial market value of pension assets and liabilities.

Related Recommendations (1)

R3: BOS have a working knowledge of the county’s pension obligations and current investment return trends. (Findings 2, 20-21, 24-25)

F22: MCERA liquidates investment assets on an “as needed” basis to meet pension requirements.

Related Recommendations (1)

R1: MCERA have a thorough understanding and a documented account of all fixed monthly pension costs. (Findings 1, 22-24)

F23: Decision making information has not been readily available to MCERA due to failure to produce cash flow reports.

Related Recommendations (2)

R1: MCERA have a thorough understanding and a documented account of all fixed monthly pension costs. (Findings 1, 22-24)

R7: MCERA produce reports that facilitate better financial management to sustain principle assets and eliminate the need to sell off investment assets to pay for obligations. (Findings 1, 22, 23-24)

F24: The CAFR is produced a full year after the financial reporting period, too late for planning purposes.

Related Recommendations (3)

R1: MCERA have a thorough understanding and a documented account of all fixed monthly pension costs. (Findings 1, 22-24)

R3: BOS have a working knowledge of the county’s pension obligations and current investment return trends. (Findings 2, 20-21, 24-25)

R7: MCERA produce reports that facilitate better financial management to sustain principle assets and eliminate the need to sell off investment assets to pay for obligations. (Findings 1, 22, 23-24)

F25: MCERA has lowered its 8% projected investment return rate to 7.75%, which has a 54% probability of fulfillment over the next 28 years. 3

Related Recommendations (1)

R3: BOS have a working knowledge of the county’s pension obligations and current investment return trends. (Findings 2, 20-21, 24-25)

April 02, 2012 — Rubberized Asphalt Concrete in Mendocino County Dated April 2, 2012

7 pages 15 findings 7 recommendations

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Findings & Recommendations 15 findings

F1: The County Board of Supervisors is the District Board of Directors.

F2: RAC projects divert waste tires from the landfill.

Related Recommendations (3)

R1: Mendocino County Public Works agencies (Cities of Willits, Fort Bragg, and Ukiah and the DOT) use RAC for their projects for pavement top lift and overlays. (Findings 2-6)

R2: Mendocino County Public Works agencies take advantage of the State Tire Recycling Grant funds. (Findings 2-6)

R4: The District work cooperatively with the owner-operators of all asphalt plants to help each other achieve their desired goals. (Findings 2-9)

F3: RAC street and highway surfaces provide a quiet ride for the traveling public.

Related Recommendations (3)

R1: Mendocino County Public Works agencies (Cities of Willits, Fort Bragg, and Ukiah and the DOT) use RAC for their projects for pavement top lift and overlays. (Findings 2-6)

R2: Mendocino County Public Works agencies take advantage of the State Tire Recycling Grant funds. (Findings 2-6)

R4: The District work cooperatively with the owner-operators of all asphalt plants to help each other achieve their desired goals. (Findings 2-9)

F4: The design thickness of RAC is less than AC.

Related Recommendations (3)

R1: Mendocino County Public Works agencies (Cities of Willits, Fort Bragg, and Ukiah and the DOT) use RAC for their projects for pavement top lift and overlays. (Findings 2-6)

R2: Mendocino County Public Works agencies take advantage of the State Tire Recycling Grant funds. (Findings 2-6)

R4: The District work cooperatively with the owner-operators of all asphalt plants to help each other achieve their desired goals. (Findings 2-9)

F5: RAC is not a new, untested product.

Related Recommendations (6)

R1: Mendocino County Public Works agencies (Cities of Willits, Fort Bragg, and Ukiah and the DOT) use RAC for their projects for pavement top lift and overlays. (Findings 2-6)

R2: Mendocino County Public Works agencies take advantage of the State Tire Recycling Grant funds. (Findings 2-6)

R4: The District work cooperatively with the owner-operators of all asphalt plants to help each other achieve their desired goals. (Findings 2-9)

R5: The District conduct self-funded odor monitoring. (Findings 5, 7-14)

R6: The District reconsiders the need and value to the taxpayers for RAC odor plans and neighborhood patrols. (Findings 5, 7-15)

R7: The District be aware of what other Air Management Districts in the State are doing. (Findings 5, 7, 12, 15)

F6: There are State Tire Recycling Grant Funds available to Public Works agencies that use RAC on their projects.

Related Recommendations (3)

R1: Mendocino County Public Works agencies (Cities of Willits, Fort Bragg, and Ukiah and the DOT) use RAC for their projects for pavement top lift and overlays. (Findings 2-6)

R2: Mendocino County Public Works agencies take advantage of the State Tire Recycling Grant funds. (Findings 2-6)

R4: The District work cooperatively with the owner-operators of all asphalt plants to help each other achieve their desired goals. (Findings 2-9)

F7: Extensive studies and testing of RAC by numerous government agencies and industry associations indicate that there are no significant differences between AC and RAC air emissions.

Related Recommendations (3)

R4: The District work cooperatively with the owner-operators of all asphalt plants to help each other achieve their desired goals. (Findings 2-9)

R5: The District conduct self-funded odor monitoring. (Findings 5, 7-14)

R6: The District reconsiders the need and value to the taxpayers for RAC odor plans and neighborhood patrols. (Findings 5, 7-15)

F8: Extensive studies and testing of RAC by numerous government agencies and industry associations indicate that there is not an issue with RAC regarding odor.

Related Recommendations (3)

R4: The District work cooperatively with the owner-operators of all asphalt plants to help each other achieve their desired goals. (Findings 2-9)

R5: The District conduct self-funded odor monitoring. (Findings 5, 7-14)

R6: The District reconsiders the need and value to the taxpayers for RAC odor plans and neighborhood patrols. (Findings 5, 7-15)

F9: Methods to mitigate any possible RAC odor at the manufacturing plant are to use “warm-mix” RAC, maintaining low temperatures, or inclusion of an “asphalt additive” to the RAC mix.

Related Recommendations (3)

R4: The District work cooperatively with the owner-operators of all asphalt plants to help each other achieve their desired goals. (Findings 2-9)

R5: The District conduct self-funded odor monitoring. (Findings 5, 7-14)

R6: The District reconsiders the need and value to the taxpayers for RAC odor plans and neighborhood patrols. (Findings 5, 7-15)

F10: The District uses California Health and Safety Code, which defines odor as a public nuisance.

Related Recommendations (2)

R5: The District conduct self-funded odor monitoring. (Findings 5, 7-14)

R6: The District reconsiders the need and value to the taxpayers for RAC odor plans and neighborhood patrols. (Findings 5, 7-15)

F11: The District has determined that odor is considered a “public nuisance violation” when there are three or more complaints to the District in a 24 hour period. 4

Related Recommendations (2)

R5: The District conduct self-funded odor monitoring. (Findings 5, 7-14)

R6: The District reconsiders the need and value to the taxpayers for RAC odor plans and neighborhood patrols. (Findings 5, 7-15)

F12: There have never been three RAC odor complaints to the District in any 24- hour period.

Related Recommendations (2)

R5: The District conduct self-funded odor monitoring. (Findings 5, 7-14)

R6: The District reconsiders the need and value to the taxpayers for RAC odor plans and neighborhood patrols. (Findings 5, 7-15)

F13: The District requires construction contractors to prepare an “odor control plan” and to conduct “neighborhood odor patrols” as conditions on their RAC permits.

Related Recommendations (3)

R3: To increase transparency, Mendocino County Public Works agencies clearly state in their bid documents for RAC projects those District permit requirements that could increase the bid prices. (Findings 13–15)

R5: The District conduct self-funded odor monitoring. (Findings 5, 7-14)

R6: The District reconsiders the need and value to the taxpayers for RAC odor plans and neighborhood patrols. (Findings 5, 7-15)

F14: The District is the only Air Quality Management District in Northern California to require contractors to provide RAC odor mitigation plans and conduct RAC odor patrols.

Related Recommendations (3)

R5: The District conduct self-funded odor monitoring. (Findings 5, 7-14)

R6: The District reconsiders the need and value to the taxpayers for RAC odor plans and neighborhood patrols. (Findings 5, 7-15)

F15: Mendocino County taxpayers continue to pay the additional costs associated with manufacture and hauling of RAC from outside Mendocino County.

Related Recommendations (2)

R6: The District reconsiders the need and value to the taxpayers for RAC odor plans and neighborhood patrols. (Findings 5, 7-15)

March 30, 2012 — Providing Effective Law Enforcement in Mendocino County March 30, 2012

5 pages 25 findings 9 recommendations

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Findings & Recommendations 25 findings

F1: The Mendocino Major Crimes Task Force (MMCTF) is a principle enforcement agency for narcotics and major crimes.

Related Recommendations (1)

R1: The Task Force Executive Board continue to provide funding for the Major Crimes Task Force. (Findings 1-4)

F2: Between January 2010 and December 2010, the MMCTF seized drugs that have a street value of $160,162,609.00

Related Recommendations (1)

R1: The Task Force Executive Board continue to provide funding for the Major Crimes Task Force. (Findings 1-4)

F3: From January 2010 to December 2010, MMCTF seized cash, vehicles, and property with a value of $1,184,718.00

Related Recommendations (1)

R1: The Task Force Executive Board continue to provide funding for the Major Crimes Task Force. (Findings 1-4)

F4: State funding for the MMCTF has been eliminated, however the Task Force Executive Board agreed to continue funding for 6 months from asset forfeiture funds.

Related Recommendations (1)

R1: The Task Force Executive Board continue to provide funding for the Major Crimes Task Force. (Findings 1-4)

F5: AB 109, the realignment legislation, allows for the sentencing of non-violent, non- serious, and non-sex offenders to the County Jail.

F6: The District Attorney and Sheriff are Constitutional Officers who possess the inherent authority to manage their office.

F7: Proposition 172 funding is placed in the General Fund rather than in a dedicated fund, unlike the majority of counties.

Related Recommendations (2)

R8: Proposition 172 funds should be separate and independent of the General Fund. (Findings 7-8)

R9: The Auditor – Controller provide the MCSO and DA a yearly accounting of the Proposition 172 funding. (Findings 7-8)

F8: Fiscal year 2003-2004 was the last year that the Mendocino County Auditor provided the DA and the Sheriff’s office an accounting of the Proposition 172 funds.

Related Recommendations (2)

R8: Proposition 172 funds should be separate and independent of the General Fund. (Findings 7-8)

R9: The Auditor – Controller provide the MCSO and DA a yearly accounting of the Proposition 172 funding. (Findings 7-8)

F9: Staffing levels for the classification of Deputies and Sergeants in 1985 were 66 and in 2012, they are at 56. The County population increased during that period by approximately twenty thousand.

Related Recommendations (1)

R3: The BOS provide adequate funding for the MCSO. (Findings 9-10, 13, 25)

F10: At the time of the GJ report, the Lieutenant in charge of the Fort Bragg sub-station has retired. Currently one of the two south coast officers provides coverage. 2

Related Recommendations (2)

R3: The BOS provide adequate funding for the MCSO. (Findings 9-10, 13, 25)

R5: The vacant Lieutenant position at the Fort Bragg Sub-station be filled immediately. (Finding 10) 3

F11: Funding for methamphetamine lab cleanup is now the responsibility of the Drug Enforcement Administration.

F12: Full Court Press succeeded in removing 632,000 marijuana plants from the Mendocino National Forest.

F13: Budgetary constraints curtailed patrol operations in all remote areas of the County.

F14: At the time of this report, 23.4% of inmates, booked into the jail, have a history of mental health issues. Psychiatric care for all of the inmates was reduced from 20 hours to 8 hours each week.

Related Recommendations (2)

R6: The BOS restore funding for the original hours for psychiatric care for inmates at the Jail. (Finding 14)

R7: Inmates with a history of abnormal behavior, who are placed in an isolation cell, be seen by a mental health worker or Psychiatrist, which is consistent with MCSO policy and procedure. (Findings 14, 22-25)

F15: A recent manhunt revealed the benefits of mutual aid by state, county and federal law enforcement agencies including the U.S. Marshalls Service and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

F16: The MCSO is responsible for animal control in the County.

Related Recommendations (1)

R2: The MCSO implement the recommendation in the Harris Report regarding returning animal control to Health and Human Services. (Finding 16)

F17: The Jail has under contract a registered dietician ensuring each inmate receives a balanced nutritional diet.

F18: There are multiple programs available to inmates at the Jail, currently serving 58% of the Jail population.

F19: MCSO collaborates with numerous community organizations as Jail program providers.

F20: Inmate services provided by the MCSO receive no General Fund money.

F21: The Inmate Services Fund pays 100% for program staff salaries.

F22: Cameras in certain cells within the county jail are motion detection cameras.

Related Recommendations (1)

F23: Full viewing of certain cells is not available because the cameras lack the capability to pan, zoom or tilt.

Related Recommendations (1)

F24: One Correctional Officer is responsible for monitoring 32 screens in the monitor control room.

Related Recommendations (1)

F25: Poor lighting, in certain cells, makes video viewing difficult and existing cameras are obsolete requiring replacement.

Related Recommendations (2)

R4: The BOS appropriate sufficient funds to replace inadequate and obsolete cameras in the Jail. (Finding 25)

March 28, 2012 — Mendocino County Emergency Services An Update March 28, 2012

6 pages 22 findings 5 recommendations

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Findings & Recommendations 22 findings

F1: At the time of this report, the OES Coordinator primarily works alone. Currently, an intern provides occasional assistance.

Related Recommendations (1)

R1: The BOS approve a full time assistant position to the Office of Emergency Service Coordinator. (Findings 1-2)

F2: The OES Coordinator has other assigned duties, including being a member of the MCSO Search and Rescue Team, Mutual Aid Coordinator and as Communications Leader.

Related Recommendations (1)

R1: The BOS approve a full time assistant position to the Office of Emergency Service Coordinator. (Findings 1-2)

F3: The OES Coordinator is pro-active in providing information concerning OES. He has arranged with all five county radio stations to broadcast public service messages in regards to emergency services. On March 12, 2012, the OES 3 Coordinator spoke before the BOS to promote tsunami awareness. The BOS named the week of March 25-31, 2012 as “Tsunami Preparedness Week”.

F4: The OES Coordinator has proven proficient in grant writing. Currently, the County has secured four grants totaling approximately $400,000 a year.

F5: The EOC was not used during the March 2011 tsunami surge in which Noyo Harbor suffered substantial pier damage.

Related Recommendations (1)

R3: Utilize the Emergency Operations Center during any emergency. (Finding 5- 6)

F6: California National Guard personnel effectively utilized the EOC as a Command-and-Control Center during “Operation Full Court Press”, a three- week long multi-agency marijuana operation during the months of July and August 2011.

Related Recommendations (1)

R3: Utilize the Emergency Operations Center during any emergency. (Finding 5- 6)

F7: The GJ learned that the telephone emergency warning system, “Reverse 911”, has proven to be effective in emergencies. In 2011, the County paid $35,000 to contract for this service. There are plans to submit a formal Request for Proposal for this service beginning 2013-2014.

F8: The “Gang of Five” authorized individual agency funding for a year to purchase the HAZMAT vehicle. The HAZMAT team is comprised of personnel from County fire agencies and various state agencies (CalFire/Cal Trans/CHP). REHIT operates on an annual grant funding of $278,000.

F9: REHIT responded to 22 incidents in 2011 and 6 incidents during the first quarter of 2012.

F10: Meth lab cleanup transportation costs will no longer be financed by the state.

F11: The County paid $228,000 in overtime pay to MCSO personnel during the Fort Bragg manhunt.

F12: In early 2012, a proposed Assembly Bill, AB1863, requested the State reimburse Mendocino County for costs involved in the Fort Bragg manhunt. The bill would also ensure that emergency funds be made available to rural areas for such incidents in the future.

F13: An audit, paid through MCSO, questioned whether there was a need for a sergeant's position to staff the OES.

Related Recommendations (1)

R2: Retain the position of Office of Emergency Service Coordinator under the direction of the MCSO. (Finding 13-14)

F14: The audit recommended that OES revert to staffing by the CEO’s office.

Related Recommendations (1)

R2: Retain the position of Office of Emergency Service Coordinator under the direction of the MCSO. (Finding 13-14)

F15: Countywide communications have vastly improved over the past few years. Seven microwave towers, located within Mendocino County, have replaced the older and ineffective “repeater system” that made communications with the south coast difficult and problematic.

F16: By January 2013, all emergency agencies will have to adhere to the federally mandated “narrow banding” of all frequencies within Mendocino County. The narrowing of the band could cut down effectiveness 10% to 25%.

F17: In 2012, the County purchased four tsunami-warning sirens from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Office. These sirens will be placed in low-lying areas susceptible to tsunamis. Two sirens are to be installed at Noyo Harbor and one at Point Arena by May 2012.The fourth siren, partially funded by the City of Fort Bragg, will be installed later in the Pudding Creek Area of Fort Bragg.

F18: Each spring, the counties of Mendocino, Humboldt and Del Norte participate in a coordinated “Live Code” exercise, which simulates an impending tsunami. Other agencies involved include the California Emergency 4 Management Agency and the West Coast Tsunami Warning Center. The scheduled date in 2012 was March 28.

F19: An after-action report of the March 2011 tsunami reported there were several minor glitches involving inter-agency communication regarding road closures along Highway 1.

F20: The local EMS Agency is mandated by the State to implement and enforce the provisions of the safety code in order to promote effective and efficient pre-hospital care. This is accomplished by providing certification and accreditation in monitoring training programs and investigating complaints. Funding has been a long-standing problem.

Related Recommendations (1)

R4: The BOS provide sufficient funding to the Emergency Medical Service to perform mandated training, certification, public education, and preparedness of emergency personnel. (Finding 20)

F21: The Emergency Operations Plan (EOP), completed in 2006, is outdated.

Related Recommendations (1)

R5: The Emergency Operations Plan, approved by the BOS in 2006, be updated. (Finding 21)

F22: Debris from last year's Japanese earthquake/tsunami is expected to wash ashore along the Mendocino coastline in 2013. There is no state or federal funding for cleanup costs.

March 08, 2012 — Ukiah Unified School District: a House Divided March 8, 2012

6 pages 24 findings 13 recommendations

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Findings & Recommendations 24 findings

F1: Mendocino County Office of Education reported that financial decisions and expenditures conformed to State regulations.

F2: With a threat of 2010-2011 mid-year cuts, reduction of costs was a prudent decision. However, there was inadequate information or explanation of changes in financial practice given to employees.

Related Recommendations (1)

R4: Reasons for major changes be adequately communicated to personnel affected by those changes. (Findings 2, 6, 8,10, 14-16, 23)

F3: The reserves for 2010-2011 were $6,585,532.80, which is higher than the 3% required by the State. Considering the District’s monthly payroll is over $3.6 million, the State required 3% reserve would cover less than two months of payroll.

F4: Late budgets and some fiscal errors were a result of inconsistent handling by fiscal staff.

F5: In 2010, a Chief Business Officer (CBO) was hired, who produced timely, understandable budgets, and assigned charges to appropriate categories.

F6: The CBO instituted a policy of prior approval of purchase orders by the Fiscal Office, a practice that had not been routinely followed in the past. This was done without adequate explanation.

F7: Staff and community members reported that the current Superintendent had a “top-down” style of management, appeared to be threatened by challenges to her decisions, and used extensive legal consultation before replying to requests for information.

Related Recommendations (1)

R5: Administrators and unions be encouraged to develop a mutually respectful working relationship. (Findings 7-9, 11-13, 15, 16)

F8: The Superintendent did not sufficiently involve principals, teachers, and other staff in decision-making processes.

Related Recommendations (2)

R3: Teachers and other staff members be included in planning major changes to educational programs, processes or procedures. (Finding 8)

R5: Administrators and unions be encouraged to develop a mutually respectful working relationship. (Findings 7-9, 11-13, 15, 16)

F9: In the face of community and staff opposition, Administration and The Board of Trustees proceeded with planning for the building of a new District Office.

Related Recommendations (3)

R5: Administrators and unions be encouraged to develop a mutually respectful working relationship. (Findings 7-9, 11-13, 15, 16)

R12: Children’s needs and safety (e.g. the asphalt at Pomolita school) be paramount in all administrative and Trustee decisions. (Findings 9, 10)

R13: Completing all school repairs take priority over the planning and construction of a new District Office. (Findings 9,10)

F10: Community members and District staff voiced concerns that serious school repairs needed to be made before a new District Office was considered. The official school repair list includes the following: • Eagle Peak: $136,500 • Calpella: $490,200 • Ukiah High School: $7,770,000 • Pomolita: $1,175,000 • Frank Zeek: $729,000 • Yokayo: $358.000 • Oak Manor: $759,400 • Nokomis: $322,000 • Grace Hudson: $127,000

F11: There was confusion over mandated leave days: • Administration took 5 days in 2009-2010 • UTA took 5 leave days in the following year. • CSEA did not agree to take any leave days.

Related Recommendations (1)

R5: Administrators and unions be encouraged to develop a mutually respectful working relationship. (Findings 7-9, 11-13, 15, 16)

F12: Prior to the 2007 school year, grievances were resolved at the school level, with only one grievance reaching the District level.

Related Recommendations (1)

R5: Administrators and unions be encouraged to develop a mutually respectful working relationship. (Findings 7-9, 11-13, 15, 16)

F13: During the period 2007-2009, there were four grievances, all resolved with the UTA. However, during the period 2009-2011, there were 28 grievances, some of 3 which ended up in arbitration. Both grievance and arbitration procedures are very expensive.

Related Recommendations (1)

R5: Administrators and unions be encouraged to develop a mutually respectful working relationship. (Findings 7-9, 11-13, 15, 16)

F14: Prior to the 2010 budget, legal fees and the cost of an administrative assistant’s time had never been charged to the health plan.

Related Recommendations (1)

R4: Reasons for major changes be adequately communicated to personnel affected by those changes. (Findings 2, 6, 8,10, 14-16, 23)

F15: Administration conformed to Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) regulations. However, this did not excuse the District Administration from providing more information to the District Health Committee regarding legal fees charged to the health plan.

Related Recommendations (1)

R4: Reasons for major changes be adequately communicated to personnel affected by those changes. (Findings 2, 6, 8,10, 14-16, 23)

F16: Differences over selecting a health plan administrator and charges to health plan participants resulted in multiple grievances, some of which were resolved by mediation. One is currently in arbitration.

Related Recommendations (1)

R4: Reasons for major changes be adequately communicated to personnel affected by those changes. (Findings 2, 6, 8,10, 14-16, 23)

F17: Language in the UTA and CSEA contracts states that the Health Committee was authorized to “…negotiate a contract with consultant and adjudicate problem claims.” However, employee contracts did not clearly state that the Board of Trustees had the final fiduciary responsibility for contracts.

Related Recommendations (1)

R6: The health committee portion of the contracts for UTA/CSEA be amended to give clarity to designation of responsibility and authority. (Finding 17)

F18: Administrative legal fees were $899,000 in the past four years.

Related Recommendations (2)

R7: The contracts for UTA/CSEA be amended to allow mediation before arbitration if grievances cannot be resolved at the local level. (Finding 18)

R8: Trustees monitor, analyze, and approve legal expenditures of the District administration. (Finding 18)

F19: The District instituted an expensive energy saving program without seeking available free local programs or researching other, less-expensive programs.

Related Recommendations (1)

R9: In the future, the Trustees should first seek out local, free programs, prior to committing to under-researched and expensive contracts that ignore or leave out a bidding process. (Findings 19, 20)

F20: The basic energy saving contract costs to date have been $379,900 and the District is still liable for two additional payments of $157,000 each. The Superintendent reported to the Board considerable savings from the program. However, the GJ reviewed documents showing no such savings from the first three years.

F21: District Trustees who have an immediate family member employed by the District are not allowed to participate in discussions or to vote on fiscal matters affecting employees. However, Education Code section 35107 clearly allows Trustees to discuss and vote on matters affecting a class of employees rather than a unique individual.

Related Recommendations (1)

R10: District legal staff consult with other districts to discover how board members, who have a spouse employed by a district, handle discussion and voting on fiscal matters. (Finding 21)

F22: Several Trustees have served many years on the Board and exhibit limited understanding of the fiscal operations of the District.

Related Recommendations (1)

R1: Trustees be trained in fiscal oversight and financial management. (Finding 22)

F23: Public expression at meetings has been limited to the beginning of the agenda, without the Trustees responding.

Related Recommendations (1)

R2: Public expression at Board meetings should be held at the end of each item on the agenda, and the Board should be encouraged to respond. (Finding 23) 4

F24: The GJ heard testimony from many community members that the Superintendent, by maintaining a primary residence in Southern California, was not committed to the community.

Related Recommendations (1)

R11: In the selection of a future Superintendent of Schools, the Board select a candidate who is willing to make their home in the community. (Finding 24)

March 07, 2012 — A Report on the Mendocino County Mental Health Branch GOING…Going….gone?

6 pages 26 findings 11 recommendations

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Findings & Recommendations 26 findings

F1: Administrators often communicate using top-down directives without adequate explanation or input from employees, stakeholders, or Board members.

Related Recommendations (1)

R1: MH Administrators be trained in MH issues, develop consistent goals, and provide transparent communication to clients, staff, and the public. (Findings 1, 2, 3, 5)

F2: Anyone needing information has reported slow, minimal or no response. However, MH was responsive to requests by the GJ.

F3: Staff members report that MH administrators: • are unlicensed or often not trained in mental health issues • operate with administrative indecision • provide uneven direction and supervision of employees

F4: Medical records personnel and case managers have reports of unresolved conflicts regarding their interactions.

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R2: MH establish and monitor clear interactive roles and responsibilities between medical records and staff. (Finding 4)

F5: The GJ received complaints that two MH staff members reversed police and hospital staff recommendations to hospitalize clients under Health and Safety Code section 5150 (regarding individuals who are a danger to themselves and others). MH PROGRAMS / FINANCE

F6: MH balanced the operating budget this year.

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R3: MH use some general funds to help support client services. (Findings 6-9)

F7: The opinions expressed about management direction (by those interviewed) are that if a program is not self-supporting, then it should be eliminated. MH uses general funds only for matching other grant funds to support MH.

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R3: MH use some general funds to help support client services. (Findings 6-9)

F8: The State conducts annual Medi-Cal audits with a four-year period delay and mistakes accrue penalties during that period. Penalties from Medi-Cal audits have been a huge financial drain to MH.

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R3: MH use some general funds to help support client services. (Findings 6-9)

F9: MH has lacked internal audits and training to discover Medi-Cal billing errors. However, they have now hired a worker to minimize audit exceptions and maximize reimbursements. MH expects caseworkers to spend 70% of their time working on billable Medi-Cal issues. However, the achievable goal appears to be around 40% because most of their time is used for other non-billable tasks. TECHNOLOGY

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R3: MH use some general funds to help support client services. (Findings 6-9)

F10: The current Avitar patient computer system meets Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) regulations, and client notes are computerized. However, other important client information, such as medications prescribed or details of the last patient appointment, is not computerized and Avitar does not interface well with other external service providers’ systems.

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R4: Do a preliminary assessment for a new computer system or upgrades to the current system. The goal is significant savings in personnel time and costs. (Findings 10 and 11)

F11: Retrieval and editing of client notes is extremely slow and requires a lot of personnel time.

F12: Obtaining specific fiscal and program information is a problem, and financial reports are hard to read and understand by employees, clients, and the public. CLIENT SERVICES 3

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R5: MH administration print financial reports that contain specifically requested information. This information needs to be clear, concise and easily readable by the community. (Finding 12)

F13: MH has reduced client services to a minimal operating level. Services have been limited to those that are mandated, and the focus of the program has been for Medi-Cal and SMI clients. MH has increasingly re-directed clients to other contracted and non-contracted service providers.

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R6: MH hire additional qualified personnel to serve current and future MH clients in Mendocino County. (Findings 13 , 15 and 18)

F14: There is a common check-in window and waiting room for children waiting for immunizations, adults arriving for drug testing, and MH clients waiting for appointments.

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R7: MH administration create separate check-in and waiting areas for the diverse client population. (Findings 14 and 26)

F15: MH re-negotiated a cost-saving contract with prior vendor for transportation of clients. Now services are “on-call” from Napa, resulting in a long waiting period (a minimum of four hours for clients on the Mendocino County coast).

F16: MH hospitalizations were greatly reduced from the previous year (by 96 patients, 272 to 176), and admissions must now be approved by a supervisor, who may or may not be licensed.

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R8: The County establish suitable local housing for clients returning from MH out of county placements. (Finding 16 and 17)

F17: MH administration has stated that they want to “bring people home” from MH hospitalizations. However, there is a severe lack of local appropriate housing available to achieve this.

F18: MH services for Juvenile Hall and the Mendocino County jail were greatly reduced, and the psychiatrist in charge left County service. The County is currently contracting with a medical group for services. Prison/jail personnel expect arrival of realignment prisoners will increase the number of MH clients.

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R9: MH restore to last year’s levels the psychiatric services for jailed youth and adults. (Finding 18)

F19: MH has cut services on the Mendocino coast to a minimum operating level.

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R10: Mendocino County health clinics that are already serving large numbers of MH clients respond to the HHSA RFP to privatize County MH services when issued. (Findings 19 and 20)

F20: Public health clinics are reporting a large increase in their MH client load.

F21: Two years ago, MH had 125 employees; now there are fewer than 45 active employees. Some large caseloads are not realistic. There are almost no remaining licensed clinicians.

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R11: Human Resources use language that is more specific in employment advertisements for qualified MH personnel, particularly licensed clinicians, listing the experience and education requirements for job openings. These explanations need to be in addition to the mandated civil service requirements. (Findings 21- 25) 5

F22: Remaining caseworkers and some supervisory staff are still dedicated to providing what services they can.

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F23: MH administration and staff have suffered from an enormous turnover of employees, which has resulted in the loss of some highly effective key personnel.

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F24: The GJ has reports that some MH crisis workers have limited experience and others have not received the proper credentials or licensing to assess and diagnose clients.

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F25: It is difficult to recruit and hire high-quality MH employees to Mendocino County. The HHSA Human Resource Department takes months to hire personnel; this is a result of civil service regulations, collective bargaining agreements, and cumbersome hiring systems (e.g. maintaining lists of qualified applicants). FACILITY RELOCATION

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F26: MH moved to a Dora Street facility shared with the Public Health immunization clinic and AODP. The move cost around $100,000 total, of which they spent $20,000 to resize medical record retrieval equipment to fit the new space. As a cost-cutting measure, there is now only one check-in window in a small, inadequate waiting room. Mental health clients, clients coming for drug testing, 4 and children arriving for immunization are required to share a common space. Client confidentiality is difficult to maintain.

Responses to Grand Jury Reports Summary of PC 933.05 Penal Code § 933.05 provides for only two (2) acceptable responses

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