Santa Cruz County Grand Jury
2014-2015
From the annual report
The consolidated year-end volume. The individual investigations it contains are listed separately below.
📑 Year-End Report
The full consolidated volume; individual reports are listed below.
Individual reports (17)
Findings & Recommendations
11 findings
F1:
There is no publicly available comprehensive report identifying the cause of Krista DeLuca’s death, the activities of the SheriffCoroner’s Office, and the activities of the medical services provider related to her death.
Related Recommendations (2)
R1:
The SheriffCoroner should designate qualified personnel to oversee the medical services contract provisions and compliance with standards. Response: Will not be implemented [with explanation].
R3:
Prior to approving a new medical services contract, the SheriffCoroner and Board of Supervisors should thoroughly review the existing contract and evaluate the performance of the 2012–2016 medical services provider with the assistance of qualified medical personnel. (F1–10)
F2:
There is no independent county oversight, by a qualified medical professional, of both the medical services provider (CFMG) and the contract.
Related Recommendations (2)
R2:
The SheriffCoroner should obtain independent oversight of its jail medical services by medically qualified personnel. Response: Will not be implemented [with explanation].
R3:
Prior to approving a new medical services contract, the SheriffCoroner and Board of Supervisors should thoroughly review the existing contract and evaluate the performance of the 2012–2016 medical services provider with the assistance of qualified medical personnel. (F1–10)
F3:
The 2012–2016 contract does not allow the Sheriff’s Office to retain additional independent medical providers but the Watch Commander can override the medical service provider’s decision and escalate to a higher level of medical care in lifethreatening emergency circumstances.
Related Recommendations (2)
R3:
Prior to approving a new medical services contract, the SheriffCoroner and Board of Supervisors should thoroughly review the existing contract and evaluate the performance of the 2012–2016 medical services provider with the assistance of qualified medical personnel. (F1–10)
R4:
The SheriffCoroner should revise the medical services contract to allow an independently retained medical provider to escalate medical care under lifethreatening emergency circumstances. (F3)
F4:
The 2012–2016 contract requirement that the jail medical services provider pay up to $15,000 per inmate admitted to a hospital may be a deterrent to admitting inmates in need of hospital medical care.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
Prior to approving a new medical services contract, the SheriffCoroner and Board of Supervisors should thoroughly review the existing contract and evaluate the performance of the 2012–2016 medical services provider with the assistance of qualified medical personnel. (F1–10)
F5:
The Health Services Agency completed the required 2015 annual Title 15 inspection of the Main Jail but did not identify if the facility was in compliance with the Detoxification Treatment requirements (Title 15, Section 1213).
Related Recommendations (3)
R3:
Prior to approving a new medical services contract, the SheriffCoroner and Board of Supervisors should thoroughly review the existing contract and evaluate the performance of the 2012–2016 medical services provider with the assistance of qualified medical personnel. (F1–10)
R5:
The SheriffCoroner should require, at the time of contract renewal, that the jail medical services provider obtain and maintain California Medical AssociationInstitute for Medical Quality accreditation for the Main Jail, Blaine Street and Rountree detention facilities. Response: Requires further analysis [with explanation]. We find the Sheriff’s responses unsatisfying. There have been six deaths in the Main Jail since October 2012. The sixth and most recent death occurred on September 29, 2015. It is important to note that not all of the six inmates died while under the direct medical care of CFMG. Santa Cruz Main Jail InCustody Deaths from October 2012 through March 2016 Name Age Date of Death Reported Cause of Death Richard Prichard 59 10/06/12 Heart attack Brant Monnett 47 11/20/12 Narcotic overdose Bradley Dreher 47 1/13/13 Asphyxiation by hanging Amanda Sloan 30 7/17/13 Asphyxiation by hanging Sharyon Gibbs 65 11/5/14 Natural causes Aspiration pneumonia, dehydration from Krista DeLuca 23 9/29/15 opiate withdrawal Sources: Five Deaths in Santa Cruz[3] in 2014, Medical Services at the Jails[4] in 2015, and the autopsy report for Krista DeLuca.[6] Two of those deaths have been related to the withdrawal or detoxification from controlled substances (opiates) while under the medical care of CFMG. The Grand Jury has the authority to evaluate the Sheriff’s Office, the detention facilities, the policies and procedures reviewed and approved by the Sheriff’s Office, and the contract between the Sheriff'’s Office and CFMG. The Grand Jury does not have the authority to investigate the California Forensic Medical Group, Inc., a forprofit company. Death rates for jails are collected by the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics. For the years 2000–2013 death rates at local jails have ranged from 123 to 151 per 100,000 inmates per year.[7] During this 13 year period, 82% of local jails had zero deaths recorded.[7] The Santa Cruz County jail population is roughly 500.[8] Therefore, we could expect at most three deaths in our jails in four years; there have been more than twice that number of deaths in the four years under the 2012–2016 contract. Jail inmates are a medically vulnerable population, whether due to poor health habits, poverty, old age, lack of medical care or, as in the case of Krista DeLuca, drug or alcohol addiction. The Sheriff’s Office is responsible for the health care of inmates and our investigation made note of the efforts taken by Corrections Officers in providing humane assistance and care to these fragile inmates. What the Grand Jury found to be so disturbing in Ms. DeLuca's case was that she was under medical care during the fourday period in which she slowly died. Ms. DeLuca did not die from a drug overdose; this 23yearold woman died from complications from an ostensibly medically supervised drug withdrawal. Six inmate deaths have occurred at the Main Jail since October 2012, two of which were related to opiate withdrawals or detoxification while under the medical care of CFMG. Scope The focus of this report is to review three issues: the most recent death in the jail, the medical policies and procedures reviewed and approved by the Sheriff’s Office related to that death, and the existing medical services contract between Santa Cruz County and California Forensic Medical Group, Inc. The following documents were examined: ● The contract between the SheriffCoroner and CFMG[2] ● Four medical policies approved by the Sheriff’s Office related to the death: ○ PreDetention Medical Evaluation/Intake Health Screening ○ Chronic Care ○ Chemically Dependent Inmates ○ Reporting InCustody Deaths ● The 2013–2014[3] and 2014–2015[4] Grand Jury reports ● The autopsy report[6] for Krista DeLuca ● Title 15 Inspection of the Main Jail by the Health Services Agency, April and May 2015[9] ● The Federal Bureau of Prisons, Clinical Practice Guidelines, Detoxification of Chemically Dependent Inmates, February 2014[10] Interviews were conducted and the Grand Jury toured and inspected the Main Jail. The Grand Jury does not have the authority to investigate the California Forensic Medical Group, Inc., a forprofit company. Investigation Death Krista DeLuca was taken into custody on September 25, 2015, and died four days later in the County Main Jail on September 29, 2015. The autopsy stated the cause of death was: Acute aspiration pneumonia, dehydration and probable electrolyte imbalance due to protracted vomiting associated with opiate withdrawal and opiate dependence from chronic heroin abuse.[6] In common terms, this says in part that Ms. DeLuca died after four days of vomiting, depleting her body of essential minerals and hydration, ultimately inhaling her own vomit and developing pneumonia. As an inmate of the County Main Jail, Ms. DeLuca was under the medical care of CFMG. For a chronology of the four days of events leading to her death see Appendix A. After reviewing the records from the jail and conducting interviews, the Grand Jury found that the Corrections Officers at the facility followed their policies and procedures and provided both professional and compassionate care to Krista DeLuca. The Grand Jury has jurisdiction to investigate the SheriffCoroner’s oversight of the CFMG contract, but the Grand Jury does not have authority to investigate CFMG directly. The Sheriff's Office has not issued a public report on Ms. DeLuca's death and the actions or inactions of CFMG. Medical Policies and Procedures Approved by the SheriffCoroner As part of the contract between CFMG and the SheriffCoroner, the Medical and Mental Health Care Procedure Manual is reviewed and approved by the Sheriff’s Office prior to its implementation. Four policies were reviewed by the Grand Jury for compliance to California Title 15 requirements for adult detention facilities: 1. PreDetention Medical Evaluation/Intake Health Screening This policy meets the requirements of Title 15.[11] 2. Chronic Care This policy meets the requirements of Title 15. 3. Chemically Dependent Inmate Policy This policy does not meet the requirements of the Title 15, Section 1213, which states in part: The responsible physician shall develop written medical policies on detoxification which shall include a statement as to whether detoxification will be provided within the facility or require transfer to a licensed medical facility. The facility detoxification protocol shall include procedures and symptoms necessitating immediate transfer to a hospital or other medical facility. The Grand Jury found that the Chemically Dependent Inmates Policy does not specify what symptoms necessitate immediate transfer to a hospital or other medical facility. The policy does not address how chemically dependent inmates are identified other than self report or staff report. Also missing from this policy is the use of an objective opiate withdrawal screening tool such as the Clinical Opiate Withdrawal Scale (COWS).[12] This simple 11 item questionnaire provides an objective measurement of the stage and severity of an inmate’s opiate withdrawal and helps staff with treatment decision making. 4. Reporting InCustody Deaths This policy meets the requirements of Title 15. The Grand Jury reviewed the Detoxification of Chemically Dependent Inmates, Federal Bureau of Prisons Clinical Practice Guidelines, February 2014.[10] The document provides guidelines for the medical management of withdrawal from addictive substances for federal inmates. The Grand Jury recommends this document be reviewed and evaluated by the SheriffCoroner and the applicable guidelines be incorporated into the Sheriff's Office policies and procedures. Why did CFMG medical staff not transfer Krista DeLuca to a hospital? The Grand Jury can not investigate this because actions by a forprofit contractor are not within our jurisdiction. Contract between the SheriffCoroner and CFMG The Grand Jury reviewed the existing contract between the SheriffCoroner and CFMG, which expires on September 16, 2016. Five areas of concern were noted: 1. Responsibility for Health Care Services The contract states ( ) the following regarding responsibility: Final medical judgements rest with the Medical Director of CFMG, or designee. The SheriffCoroner, who is ultimately responsible for emergency and basic health care services to all inmates, should have the ability to retain additional independent medical assessment for lifethreatening or emergency circumstances. 2. Compliance with CMAIMQ Accreditation Standards[13] The contract states ( ) the following regarding compliance with standards: All health care services will comply with Title 15, the CMAIMQ Accreditation Standards for Adult Correction Facilities and all other applicable laws, regulations, codes and guidelines relating to health care services and programs in adult correction facilities in the State of California. The contract does not specifically state CFMG must seek and obtain CMAIMQ accreditation, only that they must comply with the accreditation standards. The Grand Jury found no documentation that the medical services at detention facilities under CFMG’s management were compliant with CMAIMQ accreditation standards. 3. Detoxification Treatment The contract states ( 0186) the following relating to detoxification treatment: Inmates who are unresponsive and/or whose condition is deemed by CFMG health services staff as unsuitable for housing in the jail will be transported to either Dominican Hospital or Watsonville Community Hospital for treatment. CFMG medical staff did not transfer Krista DeLuca to a hospital. The Grand Jury can not investigate this because actions by a forprofit contractor are not within our jurisdiction. 4. Emergency and Catastrophic Costs The contract states ( ) the following relating to emergency and catastrophic costs: CFMG will pay all hospital emergency/catastrophic medical care costs up to $15,000 per inmate for each medical/surgical inpatient episode. The Grand Jury believes this is a disincentive to admit inmates to a hospital for necessary medical treatment, and recommends removing this clause from the contract, an action currently being considered by the Sheriff's Office. The Board of Supervisors and the SheriffCoroner should thoroughly review and revise the existing medical services contract and critically evaluate the performance of the 2012–2016 medical services provider. 5. Outside Review of Contract and the Medical Services Contractor There is no ongoing independent county medical oversight of the detention facility medical services provider or contract compliance related to medical issues. The Grand Jury believes retaining medically qualified personnel familiar with medical services within institutions and contract compliance is necessary to ensure basic health care for all inmates. Investigative Facts Summary 1. The SheriffCoroner has the responsibility to ensure provision of emergency and basic health care services to all inmates in Santa Cruz County detention facilities, even when contracting with a medical services provider for jail health care services. 2. The 2012–2016 contract with CFMG for medical services at the county detention facilities began on September 17, 2012, and ends on September 16, 2016. 3. There have been six inmate deaths in the Main Jail since October 2012. 4. The Santa Cruz County detention facilities are not accredited by the California Medical AssociationInstitute for Medical Quality. The contract states that all health care services will comply with the California Medical AssociationInstitute for Medical Quality standards, but there is no specific requirement for accreditation. 5. The Sheriff’s Office and Board of Supervisors have the option of continuing with a private contractor for jail medical services or returning to the Santa Cruz County Health Services Agency. 6. The Sheriff’s Office at times refers to placing atrisk inmates in the infirmary, when in fact they are placed in the Observation Unit. The Observation Unit is not an infirmary. 7. The most recent Title 15 annual inspection for detention facilities conducted by the Santa Cruz County Health Services Agency in April and May 2015 shows that compliance with the detoxification treatment requirements (Title 15, Section 1213) was marked as “not applicable.” 8. The SheriffCoroner declined to implement most recommendations in the 2013–2014 and 2014–2015 Grand Jury Reports. 9. SheriffCoroner Watch Commanders have the authority to override the medical service provider’s decision and escalate to a higher level of medical care in lifethreatening emergency circumstances.
R6:
The Health Services Agency should complete the annual 2016 Title 15 inspection and identify if the facility is in compliance with the Detoxification Treatment requirements (Title 15, Section 1213), as required by state law. (F5)
F6:
There is no documentation that the Santa Cruz County facilities have been evaluated for compliance with the CMAIMQ medical accreditation standards for detention facilities.
Related Recommendations (2)
R3:
Prior to approving a new medical services contract, the SheriffCoroner and Board of Supervisors should thoroughly review the existing contract and evaluate the performance of the 2012–2016 medical services provider with the assistance of qualified medical personnel. (F1–10)
R7:
The SheriffCoroner and Board of Supervisors should require in the contract that the medical services provider for detention facilities obtain and maintain accreditation from the California Medical AssociationInstitute for Medical Quality for adult detention facilities. (F6)
F7:
The Chemically Dependent Inmate Policy lacks objective measurement tools for assisting the medical staff with their clinical decision making and determination of when a patient requires a higher level of medical care.
Related Recommendations (2)
R3:
Prior to approving a new medical services contract, the SheriffCoroner and Board of Supervisors should thoroughly review the existing contract and evaluate the performance of the 2012–2016 medical services provider with the assistance of qualified medical personnel. (F1–10)
R8:
The SheriffCoroner should require that the Chemically Dependent Inmate Policy include the use of objective measurements of opiate detoxification stages, such as the Clinical Opiate Withdrawal Scale (COWS), to assist the medical staff in making more objective decisions regarding treatment. (F7)
F8:
The Chemically Dependent Inmate Policy does not include procedures and symptoms necessitating immediate transfer to a hospital or other medical facility.
Related Recommendations (2)
R3:
Prior to approving a new medical services contract, the SheriffCoroner and Board of Supervisors should thoroughly review the existing contract and evaluate the performance of the 2012–2016 medical services provider with the assistance of qualified medical personnel. (F1–10)
R9:
The SheriffCoroner should work with the medical services provider to revise the Chemically Dependent Inmate Policy to comply with California Code of Regulations, Title 15, Section 1213, regarding procedures and symptoms necessitating immediate transfer to a hospital or other medical facility. (F8)
F9:
The Chemically Dependent Inmate Policy and the Sheriff’s Medical and Mental Health Care Procedure Manual lack guidance for when an inmate should be transferred to a hospital for a higher level of care or when an inmate should be placed on IV hydration.
Related Recommendations (2)
R3:
Prior to approving a new medical services contract, the SheriffCoroner and Board of Supervisors should thoroughly review the existing contract and evaluate the performance of the 2012–2016 medical services provider with the assistance of qualified medical personnel. (F1–10)
R10:
Clear guidelines need to be established in the Sheriff’s Medical and Mental Health Care Procedure Manual for when an inmate should be given a higher level care such as IV hydration or transfer to a hospital. (F9)
F10:
The Detoxification of Chemically Dependent Inmates, Federal Bureau of Prisons Clinical Practice Guidelines, February 2014, contains useful information related to recommended standards for the medical management of withdrawal from addictive substances.
Related Recommendations (2)
R3:
Prior to approving a new medical services contract, the SheriffCoroner and Board of Supervisors should thoroughly review the existing contract and evaluate the performance of the 2012–2016 medical services provider with the assistance of qualified medical personnel. (F1–10)
R11:
The SheriffCoroner should review Detoxification of Chemically Dependent Inmates, Federal Bureau of Prisons Clinical Practice Guidelines, February 2014, and revise applicable Sheriff's policies and procedures to meet or exceed federal guidelines. (F10)
F11:
The Sheriff’s Office at times refers to placing atrisk inmates in the infirmary, when in fact they are placed in the Observation Unit. The Observation Unit is not an infirmary. The Grand Jury finds this misnomer to be misleading to the public and endangering of the public trust.
Related Recommendations (1)
R12:
The SheriffCoroner should stop referring to the Observation Unit as an infirmary unless major steps are taken to improve the medical services provided in this unit. Continuing to refer to this group of observation cells as an infirmary is misleading to the public and does a disservice to the public trust. (F11) Commendation C1. In this entire unfortunate situation, there is but one bright spot. The Corrections Officers who watched over Krista DeLuca during her last hours carried out their duties with professionalism and compassion for their charge by making small but meaningful efforts to preserve her dignity during her last hours. The Corrections Officer who was working at the booking desk was concerned for Ms. DeLuca’s safety and kept her in booking so he could keep a closer watch on her. Corrections Officers in the Observation Unit made efforts to provide water and assistance while performing their required duties.
Findings and recommendations not yet extracted.
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Findings & Recommendations
7 findings
F1:
Local jurisdictions have not provided adequate emergency shelter to accommodate the vast majority (80%) of the more than 3,500 total homeless persons in Santa Cruz County (using 2013 PIT data).
F2:
Despite persistent unmet need, local jurisdictions have neither increased nor planned to increase the number of emergency shelter beds and services.
F3:
The effectiveness of the North County Emergency Winter Shelter is limited by its reliance on the National Guard Armory facility.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
Santa Cruz County Board of Supervisors and the cities of Santa Cruz, Capitola and Scotts Valley should seek a more permanent, accessible and expandable site for the North County Emergency Winter Shelter program. (F3, F4)
F4:
The absence of a backup plan to replace the National Guard Armory threatens the continuing existence of the North County Emergency Winter Shelter program.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
Santa Cruz County Board of Supervisors and the cities of Santa Cruz, Capitola and Scotts Valley should seek a more permanent, accessible and expandable site for the North County Emergency Winter Shelter program. (F3, F4)
F5:
Insufficient capacity of emergency shelters limits their potential use as an entry point to the planned coordinated entry system.
F6:
Insufficient numbers of personnel and case managers at the emergency shelters limit the services that can be provided to homeless individuals.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
Santa Cruz County Board of Supervisors and the cities of Santa Cruz, Capitola and Scotts Valley should allocate more funds for additional case managers for the local emergency shelters. (F6)
F7:
Insufficient number of staff dedicated to grant writing results in missed grant funding opportunities.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4:
Santa Cruz County Board of Supervisors and the cities of Santa Cruz, Capitola and Scotts Valley should allocate additional staff to seek more grant funding for emergency shelters. (F7)
Additional Recommendations
1
Not linked to specific findings.
R1:
Santa Cruz County Board of Supervisors and the cities of Santa Cruz, Capitola and Scotts Valley should develop plans to provide increased emergency shelter on a priority basis to the most vulnerable populations first, including families, youth, women, and the elderly. (F1F6)
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Findings & Recommendations
6 findings
F1:
The office of the SheriffCoroner has exercised minimal oversight of its contract with California Forensic Medical Group.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
The SheriffCoroner should designate qualified personnel to oversee the medical services contract provisions and compliance with standards. (F1)
F2:
The office of the SheriffCoroner lacks independent medical expertise to oversee California Forensic Medical Group’s delivery of medical services to county detention facilities.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
The SheriffCoroner should obtain independent oversight of its jail medical services by medically qualified personnel. (F2)
F3:
The absence of quality assurance findings and corrective actions in the California Forensic Medical Group Annual Report of Medical Services compromises the ability of the SheriffCoroner to oversee and ensure the quality of care in the county jails.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4:
The SheriffCoroner should direct its medical care services contractor to include in its annual report quality assurance findings and corrective actions taken as required in the current contract for medical services. These annual reports should be available for review by authorized agencies. (F3)
F4:
Current procedures for monitoring inmates younger than age 65 do not identify their potential need for a higher level of care.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6:
The SheriffCoroner should direct the medical care services contractor to develop and implement procedures to identify at intake and then monitor medically fragile inmates younger than 65 years of age. (F4)
F5:
The contract with California Forensic Medical Group lacks provisions for external review by authorized investigative persons or agencies.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
The SheriffCoroner should, upon contract renewal, require its contractor for jail medical services to provide site specific policy and procedure manuals to the County Health Officer and other authorized reviewers. (F5)
F6:
Without accreditation, contractual adherence to California Medical Association Institute for Medical Quality accreditation standards cannot be verified.
Related Recommendations (1)
R5:
The SheriffCoroner should require, at the time of contract renewal, that the jail medical services provider obtain and maintain California Medical AssociationInstitute for Medical Quality accreditation for the Main Jail, Blaine Street, and Rountree detention facilities. (F6)
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Findings & Recommendations
12 findings
F1:
The consolidation of Fire and Emergency Medical System dispatch services at the Santa Cruz Regional 911 center and mutual aid agreements between districts have created an efficient virtual single service district for those services in the entire county.
Related Recommendations (2)
R6:
Branciforte Fire Protection District should negotiate with Scotts Valley Fire Protection District for the provision of managerial oversight of administration and operations by Scotts Valley. (F1, F2, F9, F10)
R7:
The four fire protection districts in the San Lorenzo Valley should further align their policies and procedures in anticipation of future consolidation. (F1, F2, F11)
F2:
Shared services between fire districts have improved response times, training, and services across the county.
Related Recommendations (2)
R6:
Branciforte Fire Protection District should negotiate with Scotts Valley Fire Protection District for the provision of managerial oversight of administration and operations by Scotts Valley. (F1, F2, F9, F10)
R7:
The four fire protection districts in the San Lorenzo Valley should further align their policies and procedures in anticipation of future consolidation. (F1, F2, F11)
F3:
Aptos/La Selva Fire Protection District and Central Fire Protection District did not take advantage of the opportunity to pursue consolidation when the Aptos Fire Chief retired in 2014.
F4:
The differences in pay scales and benefits between Aptos/La Selva Fire Protection District and Central Fire Protection District are issues that must be addressed prior to consolidation.
F5:
Aptos/La Selva Fire Protection District and Central Fire Protection District have a common problem resulting from excessive and unreasonable Public Records Act requests. These requests have negatively impacted the daily administration, budgets and operations of the districts.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
Aptos/La Selva Fire Protection District should create policies for receiving and responding to PRA requests. (F5)
F6:
The lack of enforced policies and procedures regarding conflicts of interest and board member interactions in district operations, has interfered with the ability of the Aptos/La Selva Fire Protection District and Central Fire Protection District to consider further shared services or consolidation.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4:
Central Fire Protection District should adopt and enforce clear and comprehensive conflict of interest regulations for Board Members. (F6)
F7:
The joint Aptos/La Selva Fire Protection District and Central Fire Protection District Cooperative Fire Prevention Program is successful and could benefit the county if made permanent.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
The governing bodies of Aptos/La Selva Fire Protection District and Central Fire Protection District should adopt the three year plan for the Cooperative Fire Prevention Program. (F7)
F8:
Expansion of the Central Fire Protection District’s fleet services department is needed to allow a larger number of districts to contract with this service.
Related Recommendations (1)
R5:
Central Fire Protection District should explore expansion of its fleet maintenance services to support contracts with a greater number of local fire districts. (F8)
F9:
Branciforte Fire Protection District’s lack of a tangible reserve or funds to pay their Fire Chief leaves them vulnerable to insolvency, which would leave Branciforte residents without a fire district.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6:
Branciforte Fire Protection District should negotiate with Scotts Valley Fire Protection District for the provision of managerial oversight of administration and operations by Scotts Valley. (F1, F2, F9, F10)
F10:
Scotts Valley Fire Protection District is the most logical partner for consolidation or shared services with Branciforte Fire Protection District.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6:
Branciforte Fire Protection District should negotiate with Scotts Valley Fire Protection District for the provision of managerial oversight of administration and operations by Scotts Valley. (F1, F2, F9, F10)
F11:
The differences in policies and procedures of the four fire protection districts in the San Lorenzo Valley inhibit future consolidation.
Related Recommendations (1)
R7:
The four fire protection districts in the San Lorenzo Valley should further align their policies and procedures in anticipation of future consolidation. (F1, F2, F11)
F12:
The continued success of Santa Cruz Regional 911 is dependant upon the successful replacement of the Computer Aided Dispatch software.
Related Recommendations (1)
R8:
Santa Cruz Regional 911 should replace the Computer Aided Dispatch software prior to the 2017/18 fiscal year. (F12)
Additional Recommendations
1
Not linked to specific findings.
R1:
Aptos/La Selva Fire Protection District and Central Fire Protection District should work together to merge and form a MidCounty Fire Protection District. (F1F4, F7)
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Findings & Recommendations
7 findings
F1:
Compostable organic waste, which makes up approximately one third of municipal solid waste, must be diverted in order to extend the life of Santa Cruz County landfills and meet state mandates, specifically AB 1826.
Related Recommendations (2)
R1:
In order to comply with AB 1826 mandates, the cities of Capitola, Santa Cruz, Scotts Valley, and Watsonville should join with Santa Cruz County to form a regional agency to develop a largescale organics recycling system located in Santa Cruz County. (F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6)
R2:
The current pilot program for composting food waste from restaurants and other large institutions in Capitola and Santa Cruz County should be expanded to serve other businesses in the AB 1826 first and second tiers throughout Santa Cruz County, including Scotts Valley and Watsonville, until a regional facility can be developed. (F1, F2, F4)
F2:
Unless Santa Cruz County and the cities of Santa Cruz, Capitola, Scotts Valley and Watsonville invest politically and financially in largescale organics recycling systems, they will be out of compliance with AB 1826 by the year 2020 or sooner.
Related Recommendations (2)
R1:
In order to comply with AB 1826 mandates, the cities of Capitola, Santa Cruz, Scotts Valley, and Watsonville should join with Santa Cruz County to form a regional agency to develop a largescale organics recycling system located in Santa Cruz County. (F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6)
R2:
The current pilot program for composting food waste from restaurants and other large institutions in Capitola and Santa Cruz County should be expanded to serve other businesses in the AB 1826 first and second tiers throughout Santa Cruz County, including Scotts Valley and Watsonville, until a regional facility can be developed. (F1, F2, F4)
F3:
Santa Cruz County and the cities of Capitola, Scotts Valley, and Watsonville all passed resolutions in 2005 recommending a regional composting facility, but as of 2015, no facility has been constructed, nor is there a completed plan to do so.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
In order to comply with AB 1826 mandates, the cities of Capitola, Santa Cruz, Scotts Valley, and Watsonville should join with Santa Cruz County to form a regional agency to develop a largescale organics recycling system located in Santa Cruz County. (F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6)
F4:
Rather than building a permanent local infrastructure for organics composting, Santa Cruz County and the city of Capitola opted to continue their commercial composting pilot programs by hauling food waste out of the county to the Monterey Bay Regional Waste Management District’s composting facility, at considerable cost in time and fuel.
Related Recommendations (2)
R1:
In order to comply with AB 1826 mandates, the cities of Capitola, Santa Cruz, Scotts Valley, and Watsonville should join with Santa Cruz County to form a regional agency to develop a largescale organics recycling system located in Santa Cruz County. (F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6)
R2:
The current pilot program for composting food waste from restaurants and other large institutions in Capitola and Santa Cruz County should be expanded to serve other businesses in the AB 1826 first and second tiers throughout Santa Cruz County, including Scotts Valley and Watsonville, until a regional facility can be developed. (F1, F2, F4)
F5:
Unless the Monterey Regional Waste Management District decides to expand its current organic composting facility, Santa Cruz County jurisdictions cannot rely on it as a longterm solution for their organic waste recycling needs.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
In order to comply with AB 1826 mandates, the cities of Capitola, Santa Cruz, Scotts Valley, and Watsonville should join with Santa Cruz County to form a regional agency to develop a largescale organics recycling system located in Santa Cruz County. (F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6)
F6:
Unless the cities of Watsonville and Scotts Valley develop organic waste recycling programs, neither city will be in compliance with AB 1826 by January 1, 2016.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
In order to comply with AB 1826 mandates, the cities of Capitola, Santa Cruz, Scotts Valley, and Watsonville should join with Santa Cruz County to form a regional agency to develop a largescale organics recycling system located in Santa Cruz County. (F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6)
F7:
Rules about what can be put in the “green cart” are inconsistent and not well understood by the general public.
Related Recommendations (2)
R3:
After selection of a composting contractor and technology by the Local Task Force, Santa Cruz County and the cities of Capitola, Santa Cruz, Scotts Valley and Watsonville should create a coordinated outreach program to inform businesses and the public about the benefits and requirements of the new organics recycling program. (F7)
R4:
Curbside “green carts” and bins should be clearly labeled to instruct residential and commercial customers specifying what materials are acceptable. (F7)
Findings & Recommendations
15 findings
F1:
Both SCWD and SqCWD urgently need a supplemental water source.
Related Recommendations (4)
R1:
City of Santa Cruz Water Department should secure a supplemental water supply. (F1, F2)
R2:
Soquel Creek Water District should secure a supplemental water supply. (F1, F2)
R5:
The City of Santa Cruz should strongly consider reviving the scwd2 desalination plan prior to the next available General Election. (F17)
R6:
City of Santa Cruz Water Department and Soquel Creek Water District should continue to pursue a regional solution such as Desalination or Regional Water Transfers 20 with Recycling. (F713)
F2:
The longer SqCWD and SCWD wait to secure a viable alternative to the overdraft problem, the greater the danger of degradation and possible permanent loss of aquifers.
Related Recommendations (4)
R1:
City of Santa Cruz Water Department should secure a supplemental water supply. (F1, F2)
R2:
Soquel Creek Water District should secure a supplemental water supply. (F1, F2)
R5:
The City of Santa Cruz should strongly consider reviving the scwd2 desalination plan prior to the next available General Election. (F17)
R6:
City of Santa Cruz Water Department and Soquel Creek Water District should continue to pursue a regional solution such as Desalination or Regional Water Transfers 20 with Recycling. (F713)
F3:
The decision by the City of Santa Cruz to suspend participation in the scwd2 desalination project forced SqCWD to restart the planning process without a regional partner.
Related Recommendations (1)
R5:
The City of Santa Cruz should strongly consider reviving the scwd2 desalination plan prior to the next available General Election. (F17)
F4:
The City of Santa Cruz did not adequately communicate the urgent need for a 19 supplemental water source to its ratepayers.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4:
The City of Santa Cruz should immediately convey to its citizens the urgency of the long term regional water situation. (F14)
F5:
The scwd2 desalination plant is the only available single alternative that can address in a timely manner all of the supplemental water needs of SCWD and SqCWD, while at the same time being immune to climate change.
Related Recommendations (1)
R5:
The City of Santa Cruz should strongly consider reviving the scwd2 desalination plan prior to the next available General Election. (F17)
F6:
The draft EIR must be finalized before the environmental studies and alternative projects included in it can be implemented.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
The City of Santa Cruz should ensure that the scwd2 draft EIR be finalized by the end of calendar year 2014. (F57)
F7:
DeepWater and Districtonly desalination projects will face many obstacles, including completion of EIRs and securing local approval.
Related Recommendations (1)
R5:
The City of Santa Cruz should strongly consider reviving the scwd2 desalination plan prior to the next available General Election. (F17)
F8:
The private company Central Coast Regional Water Project will have inordinate control over the water rates of the DeepWater Desalination project since it will control the intake pipe.
F9:
Agencies that wait to buy into the DeepWater plant may be excluded because the limited amount of water produced may already be allocated.
F10:
State water rights evaluations will delay the prospective start date of the Regional Water Transfer Project.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6:
City of Santa Cruz Water Department and Soquel Creek Water District should continue to pursue a regional solution such as Desalination or Regional Water Transfers 20 with Recycling. (F713)
F11:
Without modification, the SCWD Tait Street treatment facility is not large enough to accommodate the needs of the Regional Water Transfer Project.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6:
City of Santa Cruz Water Department and Soquel Creek Water District should continue to pursue a regional solution such as Desalination or Regional Water Transfers 20 with Recycling. (F713)
F12:
Officials in SCWD and SqCWD have not given sufficient consideration to a regional recycling plant.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6:
City of Santa Cruz Water Department and Soquel Creek Water District should continue to pursue a regional solution such as Desalination or Regional Water Transfers 20 with Recycling. (F713)
F13:
A water recycling facility would allow for injection wells to either help recharge the aquifer or to build a barrier against seawater intrusion.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6:
City of Santa Cruz Water Department and Soquel Creek Water District should continue to pursue a regional solution such as Desalination or Regional Water Transfers 20 with Recycling. (F713)
F14:
Because there is no detailed groundwater model of the Purisima basin, it is difficult to do the studies and research needed to protect the aquifer.
Related Recommendations (1)
R7:
Members of the Basin Implementation Group should complete work on a groundwater model of the Purisima basin as soon as possible. (F14)
F15:
Private pumpers have unregulated access to water and do not contribute financially to aquifer protection efforts.
Related Recommendations (1)
R8:
The Basin Implementation Group should establish a Replenishment District for the Purisima aquifer. (F15)
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Findings & Recommendations
7 findings
F1:
Lack of Main Jail capacity for 647(f) violators often leads to release without booking, arraignment, adjudication into SIP, or admission into treatment.
Related Recommendations (3)
R2:
The Sheriff should ensure that the Main Jail reserves 3 to 6 beds for the booking and assessment of SIPeligible 647(f) violators. (F1)
R5:
The Sheriff should explore jail space alternatives using Rountree beds or modular buildings either at the Main Jail or Rountree to satisfy the incustody requirements for inclusion in SIP. (F1, F2)
R6:
HSA should fund a fulltime SIP case manager. (F1, F3)
F2:
No Sobering Center is available to provide an alternative to the Main Jail for offenders.
Related Recommendations (1)
R5:
The Sheriff should explore jail space alternatives using Rountree beds or modular buildings either at the Main Jail or Rountree to satisfy the incustody requirements for inclusion in SIP. (F1, F2)
F3:
The current halftime SIP case manager cannot initiate contact with those in custody in a timely manner.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6:
HSA should fund a fulltime SIP case manager. (F1, F3)
F4:
The present low rate that the county pays for treatment beds has caused delays in SIP clients being placed into recovery programs.
Related Recommendations (1)
R7:
HSA should fund treatment beds at a more competitive rate. (F4)
F5:
There is insufficient funding for SLE programs for SIP clients.
Related Recommendations (2)
R4:
The SIP Steering Committee should modify SIP to include mandatory SLE placement after treatment. (F5, F6)
R8:
HSA should fund more SLE space for SIP clients. (F5)
F6:
The current SIP 306090 day treatment schedule is not long enough to adequately treat alcoholism.
Related Recommendations (2)
R3:
The SIP Steering Committee should modify SIP to extend treatment times. (F6)
R4:
The SIP Steering Committee should modify SIP to include mandatory SLE placement after treatment. (F5, F6)
F7:
All parties to the SIP agreement (Board of Supervisors, HSA, Sheriff’s Office, Public Defender’s Office, District Attorney's Office, Corrections Department, Capitola Police Department, Scotts Valley Police Department, Santa Cruz City Police Department) have not implemented any solutions to address the impact of jail overcrowding on SIP. 10
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
All parties to the SIP agreement should create a plan with measurable steps to ensure that SIP can function effectively by the end of 2014. (F7)
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Findings & Recommendations
6 findings
F1:
The family style meal system is a major part of mentoring Juvenile Hall residents and is an important educational function.
Related Recommendations (2)
R1:
The Sheriff’s Office Corrections Bureau should exclude the Juvenile Hall from its kitchen consolidation. (F1, F2, F4, F6)
R3:
Juvenile Hall administration should reinstate the KP duty schedule. (F1, F5) Commendation The Santa Cruz County Grand Jury would like to commend the Juvenile Hall administrators and staff (particularly the cooks) for their dedication to our County’s young people. The three main cooks have over 30 years experience in the kitchen, and the many anecdotes not mentioned in this investigative report make it clear that they do not take their jobs, or the lives of the residents, for granted. The comment by the staff person who said “Good food equals love, concern, and support” echoed the sentiments of all the Juvenile Hall staff with whom we spoke.
F2:
Freshly prepared, nutritious meals have been shown to decrease youth violence in schools, develop healthy bodies, and enhance academic achievement.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
The Sheriff’s Office Corrections Bureau should exclude the Juvenile Hall from its kitchen consolidation. (F1, F2, F4, F6)
F3:
The Juvenile Hall kitchen is currently in need of maintenance as well as a preventative maintenance plan.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
Juvenile Hall administrators should work with General Services to respond to current 6 maintenance needs and develop a preventative maintenance plan. (F3)
F4:
The cost per food tray at Juvenile Hall is comparable to the cost at the three adult jails.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
The Sheriff’s Office Corrections Bureau should exclude the Juvenile Hall from its kitchen consolidation. (F1, F2, F4, F6)
F5:
Juvenile Hall no longer uses residents in the kitchen for KP duty. This has resulted in an increased workload for the cooks and missed mentoring opportunities for the residents.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
Juvenile Hall administration should reinstate the KP duty schedule. (F1, F5) Commendation The Santa Cruz County Grand Jury would like to commend the Juvenile Hall administrators and staff (particularly the cooks) for their dedication to our County’s young people. The three main cooks have over 30 years experience in the kitchen, and the many anecdotes not mentioned in this investigative report make it clear that they do not take their jobs, or the lives of the residents, for granted. The comment by the staff person who said “Good food equals love, concern, and support” echoed the sentiments of all the Juvenile Hall staff with whom we spoke.
F6:
The Sheriff’s Office Kitchen Centralization Study revealed many logistical problems that require further research before implementation.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
The Sheriff’s Office Corrections Bureau should exclude the Juvenile Hall from its kitchen consolidation. (F1, F2, F4, F6)
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Findings & Recommendations
9 findings
F1:
Overcrowded conditions in Main Jail housing units make it difficult for COs to follow their policies and to monitor inmate safety.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
The Sheriff’s Office should expand the Custody Alternatives Program (CAP) to relieve jail overcrowding. (F1)
F2:
Staff furloughs, mandatory overtime, and the impasse in CO labor contract negotiations have lowered CO morale.
Related Recommendations (2)
R2:
The Board of Supervisors should eliminate furloughs and mandatory overtime for Corrections Officers in order to improve their morale. (F2)
R3:
The Board of Supervisors should negotiate a new contract with the Corrections Officers union by the end of 2014. (F2)
F3:
The lack of consistent enforcement of rules and regulations by COs at the Main Jail creates opportunities for inmates to hide prohibited materials.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4:
The Sheriff’s Office should ensure that Main Jail CO supervisors and their management consistently enforce inmate rules. (F3)
F4:
Medical staff members are vulnerable when COs do not remain in the medical clinic with inmates. 7
Related Recommendations (1)
R5:
The Sheriff’s Office should require a CO to remain in the Main Jail medical clinic while inmates are being treated unless the CO is released by the medical staff. (F4)
F5:
An air vent in the Main Jail medical clinic is excessively dirty and in need of immediate maintenance.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6:
The Sheriff’s Office should ensure that the air vent in the Main Jail medical clinic is cleaned and maintained. (F5)
F6:
Record keeping tasks and ongoing clerical work decrease CIT’s counseling time with inmates.
Related Recommendations (1)
R7:
HSA should increase hours for the CIT supervisor at the Main Jail and increase clerical support for CIT staff. (F6)
F7:
Inmate safety has been at risk because CIT has not had a comprehensive protocol manual or individualized inmate treatment plans at the Main Jail.
Related Recommendations (1)
R8:
CIT should complete a protocol manual and develop individualized treatment plans for inmates at the Main Jail. (F7)
F8:
There is no adequate process in place at the Main Jail to communicate jail rules to inmates and verify that they are aware of them.
Related Recommendations (1)
R9:
The Sheriff’s Office should provide inmates with written jail rules at intake and document that inmates have received them. (F8)
F9:
Video surveillance is inadequate for the booking area and the medical clinic in the Main Jail.
Related Recommendations (1)
R10:
The Sheriff’s Office should install video surveillance in the medical clinic and correct the obstructed video surveillance of the open seating booking area. (F9) 8
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Findings & Recommendations
6 findings
F1:
Counselors and psychiatrists are not readily available for existing and potential mental health clients.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
HSA should improve client access to mental health services by increasing available counseling hours for psychologists and psychiatrists at the Emeline facility. (F1)
F2:
The lack of implementation of electronic health records (EHR) hampers mental health service to clients.
Related Recommendations (2)
R2:
HSA should use Electronic Health Records (EHR) for all mental and medical health services. (F2)
R3:
HSA should use EHR to perform quantitative evaluations of program effectiveness. (F2, F3)
F3:
Quantitative evaluation of the success of Prop 63 programs is extremely challenging without the implementation of an EHR.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
HSA should use EHR to perform quantitative evaluations of program effectiveness. (F2, F3)
F4:
The apparent lapses of direct communication between the Advisory Board, HSA, and the Board of Supervisors impedes the Advisory Board’s goals of effective advocacy for clients and advising HSA concerning Prop 63 funded mental health programs.
Related Recommendations (2)
R4:
HSA should regularly attend the Mental Health Advisory Board meetings and should respond directly to the concerns raised. (F4)
R5:
The Mental Health Advisory Board should quickly and clearly communicate to HSA all issues that come before the Board. (F4)
F5:
The mandated stakeholder meetings are not successfully attracting participation by county residents.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6:
HSA should publicize mental health programs and promote them in a way that will educate and engage the larger community. (F5)
F6:
Five vacancies on the 11member Advisory Board left it ineffective for months during our investigation. 8
Related Recommendations (1)
R7:
The Board of Supervisors should fill all Advisory Board vacancies in a timely manner. (F6)
Findings & Recommendations
9 findings
F1:
By assigning responsibility for district investments to the District Manager, the SLVWD Board of Directors improperly relinquished one of its major responsibilities.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
The SLVWD Board should reclaim its financial oversight responsibility by rescinding Resolution 79 (198788). (F1, F2)
F2:
SLVWD took no action to correct its imbalance of investment assets despite multiple years of external audit reports.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
The SLVWD Board should reclaim its financial oversight responsibility by rescinding Resolution 79 (198788). (F1, F2)
F3:
Contrary to accepted practice, SLVWD was operating on a prior year’s budget eight months into its fiscal year.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
The Board should require that the District Manager provide a budget prior to the start of each fiscal year. (F3)
F4:
Despite numerous complaints from ratepayers, SLVWD has failed to prioritize the replacement of leaking redwood tanks.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
SLVWD should provide ratepayers with a specific plan and schedule for replacing its remaining redwood tanks. (F4) 11
F5:
For many years Board committees consisted of a quorum of Board members without being publicly announced as Board meetings.
Related Recommendations (1)
R5:
The Board should publicly notice committee meetings as Board meetings when a quorum is present. (F5)
F6:
The Board has violated its policy to conduct annual reviews of the District Manager.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4:
The Board should create standard criteria and follow its own requirement for annual evaluation of the District Manager. (F6, F7)
F7:
The Board lacks consistent standards to evaluate the performance of the District Manager.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4:
The Board should create standard criteria and follow its own requirement for annual evaluation of the District Manager. (F6, F7)
F8:
SLVWD consistently fails to provide timely meeting minutes or post important information on the District’s website.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6:
SLVWD should post online all ordinances, resolutions, and minutes within a month of approval. It also should post online all current ordinances, resolutions referenced in current ordinances, and minutes for the last five years. (F8, F9)
F9:
SLVWD makes it difficult for ratepayers to obtain public records from the District Office by requiring prior approval from the District Manager.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6:
SLVWD should post online all ordinances, resolutions, and minutes within a month of approval. It also should post online all current ordinances, resolutions referenced in current ordinances, and minutes for the last five years. (F8, F9)
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Findings & Recommendations
5 findings
F1:
The loopholes in Santa Cruz County procurement policies such as the Exceptions to the Competitive Process and Sole Source Requests in the PPM allow some professional service contracts to originate, or to be continually renewed, without competition.
Related Recommendations (3)
R1:
The General Services Department should exclude expert and professional services 9 from the Exceptions to the Competitive Process clause of the PPM. (F1)
R2:
The policies and procedures manuals of the County Administrative Office should require an RFP process for the renewal of all multiyear professional service contracts. (F1)
R3:
In the event of a sole source request for a professional service, the County Administrative Office should ensure that criteria identified in the “Justification for Sole Source, Sole Brand, or Standardization” form are strictly applied. (F1, F2)
F2:
Based on the documentation that we were provided, the Grand Jury could not determine that the sole source provision was correctly applied.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
In the event of a sole source request for a professional service, the County Administrative Office should ensure that criteria identified in the “Justification for Sole Source, Sole Brand, or Standardization” form are strictly applied. (F1, F2)
F3:
As the result of errors in the CAL categorization, numerous contracts did not receive appropriate Board of Supervisors review.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4:
The County Administrative Office should list the dollar amount and the percentage change from the prior year for each contract in the CAL. This list should be ranked based on the percentage change. (F3)
F4:
The CAL Section II allowable percentage increase has not been changed in more than 20 years. It remains at 10%, a much higher rate than the CPI.
Related Recommendations (2)
R5:
The County Administrative Office should modify Section II of the CAL to use an inflationary index set by the BoS instead of the current 10% allowance. (F4)
R6:
The Board of Supervisors should set an inflationary index such as the CPI + 3% as the threshold for annual contract review in Section II of the CAL. (F4)
F5:
It is difficult for the general public to access professional service contracts on the Santa Cruz County website because the website is neither intuitive nor complete.
Related Recommendations (1)
R7:
The County Administrative Office should create a central repository containing all County professional service contracts on the Santa Cruz County website that can be easily located and searched by the general public. (F5)
Findings and recommendations not yet extracted.
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Findings & Recommendations
3 findings
F1:
Continually rising retirement costs and obligations put funding of jurisdictions' services and projects at risk.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
To prevent reductions in public services, each of the six public agencies studied in this report should increase, and make public, their efforts to manage and reduce retirement costs and obligations. (F1)
F2:
A clear and complete statement of the total retirement costs and obligations has not been provided in the budget narrative for either the public or elected officials.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
Each of the six public agencies studied in this report should provide, in language understandable to the public, the totality of retirement obligations in their annual budget narratives beginning with the fiscal year 2015/16 budget. (F2)
F3:
Enrollment in the CalPERS Employers Retiree Benefit Trust Fund reduces employer contributions, prevents retiree health obligations from becoming a significant budget liability, and contributes to a positive credit rating.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
The Board of Supervisors and the City Councils of Santa Cruz, Scotts Valley and Watsonville should enroll in the California Employers Retiree Benefit Trust Fund (CalPERS Trust Fund) to prefund retiree health obligations and unfunded liabilities. (F3)
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Findings & Recommendations
6 findings
F1:
The office of the SheriffCoroner has exercised minimal oversight of its contract with California Forensic Medical Group.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
The SheriffCoroner should designate qualified personnel to oversee the medical services contract provisions and compliance with standards. (F1)
F2:
The office of the SheriffCoroner lacks independent medical expertise to oversee California Forensic Medical Group’s delivery of medical services to county detention facilities.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
The SheriffCoroner should obtain independent oversight of its jail medical services by medically qualified personnel. (F2)
F3:
The absence of quality assurance findings and corrective actions in the California Forensic Medical Group Annual Report of Medical Services compromises the ability of the SheriffCoroner to oversee and ensure the quality of care in the county jails.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4:
The SheriffCoroner should direct its medical care services contractor to include in its annual report quality assurance findings and corrective actions taken as required in the current contract for medical services. These annual reports should be available for review by authorized agencies. (F3)
F4:
Current procedures for monitoring inmates younger than age 65 do not identify their potential need for a higher level of care.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6:
The SheriffCoroner should direct the medical care services contractor to develop and implement procedures to identify at intake and then monitor medically fragile inmates younger than 65 years of age. (F4)
F5:
The contract with California Forensic Medical Group lacks provisions for external review by authorized investigative persons or agencies.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
The SheriffCoroner should, upon contract renewal, require its contractor for jail medical services to provide site specific policy and procedure manuals to the County Health Officer and other authorized reviewers. (F5)
F6:
Without accreditation, contractual adherence to California Medical Association Institute for Medical Quality accreditation standards cannot be verified.
Related Recommendations (1)
R5:
The SheriffCoroner should require, at the time of contract renewal, that the jail medical services provider obtain and maintain California Medical AssociationInstitute for Medical Quality accreditation for the Main Jail, Blaine Street, and Rountree detention facilities. (F6)
Findings & Recommendations
14 findings
F1:
The operations and activities of the Santa Cruz City Schools Parcel Tax Oversight Committee lack the transparency required for public oversight committees, including a website with posted meeting times and locations, agendas, minutes, and membership for the current year and prior historical records.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
Santa Cruz City Schools District should reconstruct and make available on its website an institutional historical record of the Parcel Tax Oversight Committee’s activities. This record should include but not be limited to the official committee charge, membership, and annual reports for the entire span of the committee’s existence, 2003 to the present. Where these records are unavailable, the website should note that absence. (F1, F4, F5, F7, F14)
F2:
The Parcel Tax Oversight Committee has not complied with operating rules defined by the Board of Education with respect to quorum or length of term.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
The Parcel Tax Oversight Committee should ensure that all its members are apprised of the rules and regulations governing their activity, and its officers must require compliance with those rules. Rules should be established for addressing the issue of persistent nonattendance. (F2, F3, F6, F7)
F3:
The Parcel Tax Oversight Committee has not consistently tracked the attendance or responded to continued absences of its appointed members.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
The Parcel Tax Oversight Committee should ensure that all its members are apprised of the rules and regulations governing their activity, and its officers must require compliance with those rules. Rules should be established for addressing the issue of persistent nonattendance. (F2, F3, F6, F7)
F4:
The Parcel Tax Oversight Committee has not provided annual oversight reports in any consistent or predictable format accessible to the general public.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
Santa Cruz City Schools District should reconstruct and make available on its website an institutional historical record of the Parcel Tax Oversight Committee’s activities. This record should include but not be limited to the official committee charge, membership, and annual reports for the entire span of the committee’s existence, 2003 to the present. Where these records are unavailable, the website should note that absence. (F1, F4, F5, F7, F14)
F5:
The lack of publicly available information regarding open positions on the Parcel Tax Oversight Committee leaves taxpayers who are not associated with Santa Cruz City Schools unaware of opportunities to serve on the Parcel Tax Oversight Committee.
Related Recommendations (2)
R1:
Santa Cruz City Schools District should reconstruct and make available on its website an institutional historical record of the Parcel Tax Oversight Committee’s activities. This record should include but not be limited to the official committee charge, membership, and annual reports for the entire span of the committee’s existence, 2003 to the present. Where these records are unavailable, the website should note that absence. (F1, F4, F5, F7, F14)
R7:
The Santa Cruz City Schools Board of Education should solicit applications from the public at large whenever vacancies occur or terms expire among Board appointed seats. (F5)
F6:
For the 201314 school year (the first year of the new Measures I and J) the Parcel Tax Oversight Committee failed to meet, monitor expenditures and report to the community.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
The Parcel Tax Oversight Committee should ensure that all its members are apprised of the rules and regulations governing their activity, and its officers must require compliance with those rules. Rules should be established for addressing the issue of persistent nonattendance. (F2, F3, F6, F7)
F7:
Neither the Parcel Tax Oversight Committee nor Santa Cruz City Schools has been able to verify that the Parcel Tax Oversight Committee has met its responsibility to monitor expenditures and report annually to the community.
Related Recommendations (2)
R1:
Santa Cruz City Schools District should reconstruct and make available on its website an institutional historical record of the Parcel Tax Oversight Committee’s activities. This record should include but not be limited to the official committee charge, membership, and annual reports for the entire span of the committee’s existence, 2003 to the present. Where these records are unavailable, the website should note that absence. (F1, F4, F5, F7, F14)
R3:
The Parcel Tax Oversight Committee should ensure that all its members are apprised of the rules and regulations governing their activity, and its officers must require compliance with those rules. Rules should be established for addressing the issue of persistent nonattendance. (F2, F3, F6, F7)
F8:
Santa Cruz City Schools Board of Education has not defined the form that the annual report should take.
Related Recommendations (2)
R6:
The required Parcel Tax Oversight Committee annual report at the end of the fiscal year should be prepared in advance and included in the Board book, presented orally at a Board meeting, distributed to local media, and published on the Santa Cruz City Schools website. (F8)
R8:
Future parcel tax language should be more precise about the specific responsibilities of the Parcel Tax Oversight Committee, especially regarding the advisory nature of their oversight, required public reporting, and Brown Act compliance. (F8, F12, F13, F14)
F9:
Administrative and clerical duties have been assigned to the counselors, counseling secretaries, and library staff, who are funded by parcel tax money. The use of parcel tax money to pay for administrative and clerical costs is contrary to the intent of the measure language.
Related Recommendations (1)
R9:
Future parcel tax language should more accurately reflect the intent and priorities of the SCCS regarding spending priorities by including funding percentages where appropriate. (F9, F11)
F10:
Santa Cruz City Schools failed in its obligation to provide annual information regarding the allocation of parcel tax funds.
Related Recommendations (1)
R5:
Santa Cruz City Schools business office should reconstruct from its financial records the parcel tax expenditures for all the years since the parcel tax was collected and post these on its website. (F10)
F11:
The Board of Education has failed to follow its own explicit commitments for the proportional allocation of parcel tax funds.
Related Recommendations (2)
R4:
The Santa Cruz City Schools Board of Education should clarify its position on the percentages for funding priorities to which it committed in 2006, and either explicitly revise those percentages or instruct the District business office to comply with those percentages in its budget. (F11)
R9:
Future parcel tax language should more accurately reflect the intent and priorities of the SCCS regarding spending priorities by including funding percentages where appropriate. (F9, F11)
F12:
The Parcel Tax Oversight Committee, Board of Education Trustees, and Santa Cruz City Schools staff disagree concerning the Parcel Tax Oversight Committee’s role in making expenditure recommendations.
Related Recommendations (1)
R8:
Future parcel tax language should be more precise about the specific responsibilities of the Parcel Tax Oversight Committee, especially regarding the advisory nature of their oversight, required public reporting, and Brown Act compliance. (F8, F12, F13, F14)
F13:
The Board of Education has failed to provide a formal charge to the members of the Parcel Tax Oversight Committee.
Related Recommendations (2)
R8:
Future parcel tax language should be more precise about the specific responsibilities of the Parcel Tax Oversight Committee, especially regarding the advisory nature of their oversight, required public reporting, and Brown Act compliance. (F8, F12, F13, F14)
R10:
The Santa Cruz City Schools Board of Education should provide the Parcel Tax Oversight Committee with a formal charge. (F13)
F14:
The Board of Education has failed to require the Parcel Tax Oversight Committee to comply with the Brown Act.
Related Recommendations (3)
R1:
Santa Cruz City Schools District should reconstruct and make available on its website an institutional historical record of the Parcel Tax Oversight Committee’s activities. This record should include but not be limited to the official committee charge, membership, and annual reports for the entire span of the committee’s existence, 2003 to the present. Where these records are unavailable, the website should note that absence. (F1, F4, F5, F7, F14)
R8:
Future parcel tax language should be more precise about the specific responsibilities of the Parcel Tax Oversight Committee, especially regarding the advisory nature of their oversight, required public reporting, and Brown Act compliance. (F8, F12, F13, F14)
R11:
The Santa Cruz City Schools Board of Education should require the Parcel Tax Oversight Committee to comply with the Brown Act. (F14)
Additional Recommendations
1
Not linked to specific findings.
R2:
The Santa Cruz City Schools website for the Parcel Tax Oversight Committee should include the Brown Act requirement, posted meeting times and locations, agendas, minutes, and membership, both for past and upcoming meetings. (F1,
* This report's PDF did not contain easily extractable text and required Optical Character Recognition (OCR) for analysis. There may be minor errors in the extracted findings and recommendations due to OCR limitations with scanned documents.
Additional documents
Documents found alongside this year's reports, not grand jury reports or responses.