Santa Clara County Grand Jury
2001-2002
From the annual report
The consolidated year-end volume. The individual investigations it contains are listed separately below.
📑 Year-End Report
The full consolidated volume; individual reports are listed below.
Individual reports (12)
Findings & Recommendations
4 findings
F1:
Management audits are not a routine function of the entities contacted by the Grand Jury.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
Implement a program of continuing management audits. (Ref. Finding #1)
F2:
GASB No. 34 requires revised financial reporting standards. These revised standards identify the changes necessary for governmental agencies to comply with the new requirements. When implemented, annual reports will be more comprehensive and easier to understand. The activities necessary to meet those requirements and the current status of progress are not routinely addressed in public documents. This results in restricted information available to the public.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
Modify and expand accounting procedures to encompass the requirements of GASB No.34. (Ref. Finding #2) The Santa Clara County Civil Grand Jury recommends that the Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors:
F3:
Accounting procedures in the county probation department require improvement.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
Direct the Santa Clara County Internal Auditor to review all probation department 3 ATTACHMENT A FY 2000-2001 AUDITS, FINANCIAL REPORTS AND LETTERS RECEIVED Agency or Fund Agency Dept. Report Letter Recommend Type Cities or Town Campbell, City CAFR X 1 Cupertino, City CAFR Gilroy, City CAFR 3 Los Altos, City CAFR Los Altos Hills, City CAFR Los Gatos, City CAFR Milpitas, City CAFR Monte Sereno, City AUDIT X Morgan Hill, City CAFR X 3 Mountain View, City CAFR Palo Alto, City CAFR X 6 San Jose, City CAFR Santa Clara, City CAFR Saratoga, City CAFR X 3 Sunnyvale, City CAFR County Santa Clara, County of County CAFR SC County Valley Hospital County SCVHHS CAFR 6 Joint Powers Agencies Santa Clara Valley Water District. Joint XCAFR Valley Transportation Authority Joint XCAFR Special Districts Burbank Sanitary District Special AUDIT X 3 Guadalupe-Coyote Resource Conservation Special AUDIT X District Purissima Hills Water District Special AUDIT X 2 Silver Creek CC Geo. Hazard Special AUDIT Grants CDI Auto Fraud Grant District Attorney IA CDI Workers Comp Fraud Grant District Attorney IA County Social Services Grant Social Services IA Juvenile Crime Grant Probation IA 5 SCC Abandoned Vehicle Abatement County SCCAVA AUDIT Funds SC County Property Tax Admin. County IA SC County Employee Benefits County H. R. IA 10 DOC Inmate Welfare Fund County Probation IA 1 Management Audits San Jose Rental Dispute Program City MA 12 San Jose Arena Mgmt. Agreement City MA 8 Table Legend Dept. Department within the city, county, or other entity responsible for the fund or grant. CAFR Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAFR). AUDIT Copy of independent auditor’s report IA Internal auditor’s report MA Management audit report Letter X indicates auditor’s management letter received. Recommend Number of auditor’s recommendations made in the report. ATTACHMENT B Preface and Summary of Statement No. Basic Financial Statements—and Management's
F4:
Recording procedures and the processing of county employee benefits changes by county human resources require improvement.
Findings & Recommendations
14 findings
F1:
The VTA has done a good job of 33 12 listening to radio or using cell phone 20 7 not properly collecting fares collecting information on vehicle 7 3 intentionally delaying the schedule accidents, however other than compiling 7 3 rude to passengers or other motorists statistics for the annual report, there has 5 2 off route or skipping stops been little management analysis and utilization of the data. (Ref. Facts #1, 2
F2:
Passengers on light rail are at ahead of schedule and seven were significantly higher risk for assault than intentionally delaying the schedule. passengers on buses. This disparity reveals an unacceptable risk for light rail
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
Develop and implement strategies to improve passenger security on light rail vehicles. This might include the use of Route Stabilization Teams, as appropriate. (Ref. Finding #2)
F3:
The VTA has not devoted sufficient process to expand the observation efforts attention to heightened security concerns to include an outside consulting group underscored by the events of September that will provide independent observers 11, 2001. (Ref. Fact #7) to travel on VTA vehicles.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
Request the sheriff’s Risk Analysis Division provide a system-wide security analysis. Using the results of this analysis, develop and implement additional strategies for assuring the security of VTA passengers and operators. (Ref. Finding #3)
F4:
The planned upgrade of VTA’s entire
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
Ensure that each vehicle has a fully operating onboard communications unit before it is allowed to leave the dispatch center. (Ref. Finding #4)
F5:
The VTA does not sufficiently track and customer satisfaction, such as numbers evaluate on-time performance of its or types of customer complaints. buses and light rail vehicles. Confidence levels for customer destination arrival at
Related Recommendations (1)
R4:
Develop and implement an on-time schedule performance measurement for the overall bus and light rail systems or for key high-volume transfer points. Include this measurement in VTA’s annual performance report. (Ref. Finding #5)
F6:
The VTA has identified a number of scheduled. Management objectives are customer service problems that need centered on meeting service objectives and correction by way of its Back-to-Basics the system-wide factors that inhibit Program. (Ref. Facts # 14 & 16) completing the schedule. However, factors that are just as important to the rider, but
Related Recommendations (1)
R5:
Initiate and maintain a process by which customer complaint statistics and data are consistently utilized to improve VTA performance. (Ref. Findings #6 & 7)
F7:
The VTA has done a good job of under the immediate control of the operators collecting information and statistics on themselves, such as timing of stops, are not customer complaints in the CARE tracked to the same level. database; however, the system does not provide comprehensive reports that The Grand Jury agrees that VTA vehicles could be useful in determining ways to were generally clean and well kept. improve service and performance. (Ref. Problems with the bus stops were noted, but Facts # 17 & 18) the facilities in general were considered good. Driver discourtesy was not seen as a
F8:
Station identification signage and sign significant problem, and the Back-to Basics visibility on the light rail system is Program is spotlighting any concerns in this inadequate to effectively serve area. passengers. (Ref. Fact # 20) Information on VTA schedules and standard CONCLUSIONS services was readily available, as was information on programs, such as airport or The Grand Jury believes the overall efforts arena shuttles. Line-specific schedules of the employees at the VTA are providing were available on vehicles ridden by the the residents of Santa Clara County with a Grand Jury. However, information on quality transit system. However, the Grand where to make a complaint, complaint forms Jury is concerned that transportation or information on obtaining special services operations management is more often was more difficult to obtain. focused on improving image than on analyzing data and implementing proactive The VTA staff responsible for processing strategies for improving service. customer complaints was observed by the Grand Jury to be committed to the The Grand Jury also believes that the responsibility. Service complaints are sheriff’s recent implementation of a near- resolved and responses are returned to the zero tolerance policy and the issuance of complainants in a cordial and expedient more citations for minor infractions is manner. It appears to the Grand Jury that engendering an improvement in security. the CARE database is an excellent tool for This approach seems to have resulted in a tracking complaint assignment and decrease in the need for arrests for more resolution, and has the potential of being an serious infractions. The current numbers are outstanding management source of reports in contrast to prior years, when arrests for improving quality of service. increased in proportion to rider volume. 6
Related Recommendations (1)
R6:
Improve light rail station signs and other indicators so that passengers can easily identify stations from within the vehicle, both in advance of and while stopped at the stations. (Ref. Finding #8) 7 ATTACHMENT CHART 8 BIBLIOGRAPHY Except as noted, publications were prepared by the Santa Clara Valley Transit Authority as public documents or reports.
F11:
routinely compile and publish reports of indicators for quality of service or 5. The VTA does not sufficiently track and customer satisfaction, such as numbers evaluate on-time performance of its or types of customer complaints. buses and light rail vehicles. Confidence levels for customer destination arrival at 19. Station announcements on both the bus the scheduled time, especially for trips and light rail vehicles are frequently that involved multiple transfers, is not skipped, garbled or unintelligible. known. There is a serious need for VTA to improve on-time performance. This 5 one issue holds great significance for the The Grand Jury observed that the VTA quality of service being provided to places a high level of importance on transit customers. (Ref. Facts # 12, 14 & providing the quantity of service promised
F15:
The August 2001 Back-to-Basics Survey & 3) (noted in table above) concluded that of 282 bus operators observed, 76 operated
F16:
Supervisors and administrative staff are passengers. (Ref. Fact #5) serving as rider-observers for the Back- to-Basics Program. Negotiations are in
F17:
The VTA has procedures in place for communications systems should alleviate complaint tracking and resolution. The current communications deficiencies. CARE database system provides the Implementation is expected to be complete ability to maintain extensive complaint in 2004. In the meantime, the practice of records, but it has limited report relying on cellular telephones to fill in for generation capabilities. inoperable onboard communications units is inadequate to assure passenger and
F18:
Based upon evidence provided to the operator security. (Ref. Facts #8, 9, 10 & Grand Jury, VTA management does not 11) routinely compile and publish reports of indicators for quality of service or
F19:
Station announcements on both the bus the scheduled time, especially for trips and light rail vehicles are frequently that involved multiple transfers, is not skipped, garbled or unintelligible. known. There is a serious need for VTA to improve on-time performance. This 5 one issue holds great significance for the The Grand Jury observed that the VTA quality of service being provided to places a high level of importance on transit customers. (Ref. Facts # 12, 14 & providing the quantity of service promised 15) in their published schedule, as measured by the ratio of trips completed to trips
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Findings & Recommendations
1 findings
F2002:
3 Bruce E. Capron Foreperson Norman N. Abrahams, DDS Foreperson Pro Tem Joyce S. Byrne Secretary
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Findings & Recommendations
2 findings
F1:
City Manager, City of Mountain View
F2:
City Clerk, City of Mountain View
Findings & Recommendations
3 findings
F2:
After reviewing release Due to the shortage of inpatient procedures and interviewing facilities, EPS had recently implemented staff members, the Grand Jury an aggressive strategy to begin found evidence that reasonable placement efforts for the most severely care is taken to alleviate patient ill patients as soon as they have been safety concerns around late-night evaluated by the EPS physician releases. (psychiatrist). One EPS staff member has been assigned full-time to this task. 3. The shortage of adequate acute psychiatric care facilities is a The bed shortage is not unique to Santa serious impediment to the ability Clara County. According to the county of any public organization to mental health director in a report dated provide proper care to this needy December 5, 2001, “The problems of segment of the population. The insufficient public mental health funding Grand Jury acknowledges the and services in general, and the lack of efforts of EPS staff and deep end and residential resources in management to fulfill its mission particular, are statewide concerns that under these difficult conditions. have been documented in a 2000 publication of the Little Hoover 4. The incidence of overstays is Commission, and in a report published lessening month by month, from by the California Institute for Mental 67 in May 2001 to 10 in October Health in August 2001.” 2001. This is partly due to more (See Attachment 2) aggressive efforts to secure placement. The operation of 24-hour public use mental health care facilities in Santa 5. Santa Clara County does not Clara County requires a large subsidy provide an adequate number of from the county coffers. During fiscal acute psychiatric care beds to year 2001, the board of supervisors properly serve its populace. The augmented the department’s operating Santa Clara County Board of 3 Supervisors Health and Hospital and visible. The very existence Committee is clearly aware of of a fire extinguisher cabinet on this shortage, since two reports the patient floor for which no one reviewed by the Grand Jury were has a key creates the potential for written for the specific purpose dangerous confusion and wasted of informing the board. time in the event of an emergency.
F6:
The need to place acutely ill patients in out-of-county 10. The posted evacuation plan in facilities is onerous to families of EPS is confusing to anyone who the patients. Since the county is not intimately familiar with the system serves mostly public building. None of the Grand patients, families are even less Jurors who viewed the plan could likely to have the financial and/or easily decipher the location of physical resources to travel the emergency exit. This poses significant distance to be near or an unacceptable safety problem visit loved ones. for patients and anyone who might be visiting the facility.
F5150:
Section 5150 is applicable to of a specially designed security entrance persons who are perceived to be a and holding room. A uniformed security danger to themselves or others. guard is present at all times. Involuntary holds under Section 5150 are limited to 72 hours. Detailed emergency procedures are available on the staff floor. A red phone EPS is a locked facility designed to in the office area provides a direct link to allow evaluation and processing of the sheriff’s dispatch center and other acutely troubled or ill patients. Because emergency personnel. Staff receives EPS is licensed as an ambulatory clinic regular training on procedures covering of Valley Medical Center, stays at the emergencies, such as fire or earthquake. Two problems of note were the lack of Each of these overstays carries the available keys for one locked fire potential for a substantial legal penalty extinguisher cabinet in the patient area, from the state, including a fine of and the lack of understandable detail on $50,000 per incident. EPS has been the posted evacuation plan. Alternative cited twice for this problem, but to date fire extinguishers were available in the the state has not opted to levy any fines. locked kitchen and office areas on the EPS staff stated that all of these staff side of the facility. On both its overstays were attributable to patients visits, Grand Jurors notified the staff of who needed transfer to acute care these insufficiencies. inpatient facilities (psychiatric hospitals). Staff also reported that it is Emergency Psychiatric Services Patients very difficult to place these patients The EPS patient load averages 750-800 within the 24-hour limit because there is per month. Of these, approximately five a shortage of available beds, particularly percent require discharge to an acute for Medi-Cal or uninsured (public) care inpatient facility (psychiatric patients. These types of patients hospital). EPS admits patients of varying comprise the large majority of ages, from children to seniors. Special individuals who pass through EPS. attention is given to juvenile patients, who are kept apart from the general Hospital Bed Shortage patient population under one-on-one A July 2001 survey of psychiatric surveillance. hospitals in the Bay Area showed that Santa Clara County maintains one bed New patients, in particular those brought for each 14,505 county residents, as to the facility by police or ambulance, compared to the Bay Area/Sacramento may arrive at all hours of the day and average of one bed per 6,716 night. Consequently, patients are also individuals. Of the capacity available in released at all hours of the day and night, Santa Clara County, 100 percent of in order to meet the mandated 24-hour public inpatients were in Valley Medical time limit. In the case of late-night Center’s Barbara Arons Pavilion, the releases, staff arranges a taxi or other county’s acute care facility. The other transportation when necessary. In some three Santa Clara County hospitals cases patients are allowed to remain in offering psychiatric beds housed no the secure lobby until daylight. public patients. (See Attachment 2) Although the law states that patients will There are no beds identified for the not remain at EPS longer than 24 hours, treatment of children or adolescent “overstays” are a common occurrence. patients (public or private) within the In the months of May through October county. All juvenile patients are treated 2001, for example, EPS had a total and housed at out-of-county facilities, patient population of 3864. Of this often in Vallejo or Sacramento. Many number, 150 persons (about four adult patients are placed in out-of-county percent) remained beyond the mandated facilities as well, mostly at a contracting 24-hour cutoff. hospital in Fremont or at a state hospital facility. For instance, a survey taken July and September 2001 on behalf of 2 the Greater Bay Area Mental Health budget in the amount of $3.6 million. Directors shows that the county was first During budgeting for fiscal year 2002, among 12 counties in use of out-of- the board approved another $7.6 million county hospital beds. At that time, the infusion. (See Attachment 2) county had placed 18 patients (26 percent) in out-of-county hospitals. FINDINGS EPS staff reported to the Grand Jury that the bed shortage problem is exacerbated 1. The EPS facility is equipped to by an apparent lack of access to three of handle the approximately 800 the four hospitals in the county that patients that pass through its provide psychiatric inpatient service. doors each month. The difficulty They report that the problem relates to comes in finding the appropriate the rates paid by Medi-Cal and the longer-term care for the most degree of acuity of many of these acutely ill patients. severely ill patients.
Additional Recommendations
1
Not linked to specific findings.
R8:
The Grand Jury finds that care bed space. Questions to be providing adequate mental health answered include: care to the citizens of Santa Clara County should remain a priority a. Could an advantage be derived from in the budgeting process. The partnering with private enterprises, such cost of providing mental health as large health maintenance organizations? care to county residents is a source of concern, particularly in b. How much of a cost/benefit could be current economic climate where gained from reducing or eliminating the government budgets are being need to contract for treatment at out-of- squeezed. county facilities?
Findings & Recommendations
5 findings
F1:
Request that California State 4. Encourage companies to provide Legislative and U.S. community-service programs so Congressional members develop employees can serve at the polls legislation that will require new and be paid for time away from voter applicants to provide proof work. (Refer to Finding 3) 9 BIBLIOGRAPHY Bipartisan Election Reform Taking Shape with $2.6 Billion for State, Local Changes, San Jose Mercury News, 11/9/01. California Elections Code, Chapter 2 ,Voters Registration, current edition. Election Officer Handbook, by Registrar of Voters Office for November 6, 2001 Consolidated Elections. Elections Chief: 9 Counties Must Phase Out Punch Cards, San Jose Mercury News, 9/18/01. Legislature Weighs Plans to Modernize Ballot Box, San Jose Mercury News, 9/11/01. Management Audit of the General Services Agency, Registrar of Voters, August 1999, Harvey M Rose Accountancy Corp. for the Santa Clara County Board of Supervisors. Registrar of Voters Procedures Manual, current revisions. Santa Clara County Registrar of Voters Website, http://www.sccvote.org/ Study of Florida 2000 Election, San Jose Mercury News, 11/10/01. PASSED and ADOPTED by the Santa 11 Clara County Civil Grand Jury this 24th day of January, 2002. _________________________________ Bruce E. Capron Foreperson _________________________________ Norman N. Abrahams, DDS Foreperson Pro Tem _________________________________ Joyce S. Byrne Secretary 11
F2:
Election Officer Training 6 of encouraging younger individuals to participate.
F3:
Include evening visits to check Jury recommends that the Santa Clara lighting at polling locations. County Board of Supervisors: (Refer to Finding 3)
F4:
Ballot Processing The ballot processing and counting observed by the Grand Jury appeared to be well supervised. Permanent and extra-help staff went about their duties in a coordinated and professional manner. In several precincts, clerks were serving in their first election. In a few isolated cases new clerks had not attended a training session prior to serving. The experienced workers were very helpful in assisting the new clerks in performing their assigned duties. One precinct had a high school student working as a clerk alongside one of her parents.
F5:
Registrar’s Extra Effort The registrar’s staff exceeds the state law’s minimum requirements. The Santa Clara County Registrar of Voters Office: • A high percentage of the poll workers are older or retired citizens who can devote the time to this task. The current use of part-day, high school and college students to work the polls is one method
Findings & Recommendations
4 findings
F1:
The county to the KEYBOARD system requirements before issuing a request for proposals to software aggressively pursuing
F2:
The KEYBOARD project, involving the concurrent processes of re-engineering and CONCLUSION software development, created the difficult requirement to manage evolving user The KEYBOARD project was viewed by the county as a visionary improvement needed for requirements while working within the the 21st century by both the government and restrictions of a software contractor on a the public realities of the information age. fixed price contract. This situation created project complexity and high risk and While the measurable savings from the project were few, the Grand Jury agrees with the contributed to schedule and cost problems. county that the agenda process improvements in quality, information availability and The board did not request a management
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
Write the project system requirements document based on the re-engineering effort
F6:
Based on documents reviewed, the Grand Jury finds that the board was presented the failed define project status at regular intervals.
F7:
The county is integration contractors. reimbursement of KEYBOARD development expenses from the state.
Additional Recommendations
1
Not linked to specific findings.
R3:
Issue a contract that reflects the system requirements document With this approach, the county can develop detailed system requirements documents and establish a realistic, firm, fixed-price contract. Due to the risks of schedule delay and cost escalation, the Grand Jury also concludes that the county would be better served to utilize software engineering contractors as opposed to hiring software engineers. KEYBOARD FUNDING AUTHORIZATION SUMMARY (TOTAL DEVELOPMENT EFFORT WITH PRINTERS AND SCANNERS) CALENDAR AUTHORIZATION DATE AMOUNT CUMULATIV TYPE COMMENTS 1998 $1,233,000 $1,233,000 Fiscal Year Budget FY 1999 Technology June 1999 $1,568,893 $2,801,893 Fiscal Year Budget FY 2000 Technology * Feb 2000 $1,197,245 $3,999,138 Special Request Printers and Scanners June 2000 $1,094,000 $5,093,138 Fiscal Year Budget FY 2001 Technology Feb 2001 $187,423 $5,280,561 Special Request Delays: staffing/tech problems June 2001 $129,487 $5,410,048 Fiscal Year Budget Phase 3 Records Management Sept 2001 $195,000 $5,605,048 Special Request Delays: staffing/tech problems * NOTE: The KEYBOARD total three-year development cost estimate prepared as part of the FY 2000 Budget was $3,547,493. BIBLIOGRAPHY Budget Modification Request for the KEYBOARD Project Report, provides the rationale for the KEYBOARD Project’s FY 2002 $195,000 budget modification, dated September 25, 2001, 4 pages. FY 2001 Mid-Year Budget Review, Attachment P section provides the rationale for the KEYBOARD Project’s $187,423 FY 2001 budget modification, dated February 1, 2001, 5 pages. General Requirements for KEYBOARD Phase 1 (Version 1.0), includes project’s external design specifications, dated November 7, 2000, 92 pages. General Requirements for KEYBOARD Release 2 (Version 2.04), includes project’s external design specifications, dated January 7, 2002, 130 pages. http://www.santaclaracounty.org, Website for Santa Clara County where the Board of supervisors’ agenda can be found. KEYBOARD PROJECT: Funding Summary, presentation handout on November 27, 2001, dated October 30, 2001, 1 page. KEYBOARD PROJECT: Funding Summary, same as October 30, 2001 summary except the inclusion of actual expenditures, dated December 3, 2001, 1 page. Non-Stores Requisition – Documentum Product Software Procurement, includes project’s software product requirements document, project’s software product RFP document, and vendor responses that resulted in the software product selection, dated April 29, 1999, 36 pages. Request for Proposals (RFP) Systems Integration Services for Product Customization, issued April 5, 1999, 86 pages. Request for Technology Funding – KEYBOARD, identifies the KEYBOARD Project’s original goals including a development cost estimate, cost savings, and project payback analysis, dated April, 1999, 16 pages. Santa Clara County Code of Ordinance Section A34-80, outlines county requirements for software technology purchases, dated December 14, 2001, 1 page. Transmittal Memorandum, background section and Attachment 1 provide a discussion of the KEYBOARD project’s original technical approach, dated January 20, 1999, 8 pages. Transmittal Memorandum, provides the rationale for the KEYBOARD Project’s FY2000 $1,197,245 budget modification for the purchase of printers and scanners, dated February 1, 2000, 17 pages. PASSED and ADOPTED by the Santa Clara County Civil Grand Jury this 14th day of March, 2002. ______________________________ Bruce E. Capron Foreperson ______________________________ Norman N. Abrahams, DDS Foreperson Pro Tem ______________________________ Joyce S. Byrne Secretary 10
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Findings & Recommendations
8 findings
F1:
The Martin Avenue entrance to longterm parking is difficult to find. Directional signs to this entrance are inadequate.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
The Santa Clara County Civil Grand Jury recommends that the San Jose City Manager:
Improve the effectiveness of signage on the perimeter of the airport, in the parking and roadway areas, and within the garage. Suggestions include: a. Increase the quantity of directional signs b. Increase the size of signs to make them more readable c. Improve placement of signs so that they can be read from all expected approaches d. Trim foliage and remove other obstructions that may obscure signs 7 PASSED and ADOPTED by the Santa Clara County Civil Grand Jury this 28th day of May
F2:
It is difficult to determine from directional signs that handicapped parking exists in the Terminal A parking garage. 3. 4.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
The Santa Clara County Civil Grand Jury recommends that the San Jose City Manager:
Improve the effectiveness of signage on the perimeter of the airport, in the parking and roadway areas, and within the garage. Suggestions include: a. Increase the quantity of directional signs b. Increase the size of signs to make them more readable c. Improve placement of signs so that they can be read from all expected approaches d. Trim foliage and remove other obstructions that may obscure signs 7 PASSED and ADOPTED by the Santa Clara County Civil Grand Jury this 28th day of May
F5:
In Terminal A, long lines can lead to customer frustration and dissatisfaction. This situation is exacerbated by the juxtaposition of two high volume airlines.
F6:
The Ambassador Program as currently implemented is mostly ineffective. The program could be improved by increasing the number of Ambassadors on duty during busy travel times.
F7:
Courtesy phones, while widely dispersed throughout both terminals, are sometimes difficult to locate. People walking or standing in front of the devices can easily block the phones from view.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
The Santa Clara County Civil Grand Jury recommends that the San Jose City Manager:
Improve the effectiveness of signage on the perimeter of the airport, in the parking and roadway areas, and within the garage. Suggestions include: a. Increase the quantity of directional signs b. Increase the size of signs to make them more readable c. Improve placement of signs so that they can be read from all expected approaches d. Trim foliage and remove other obstructions that may obscure signs 7 PASSED and ADOPTED by the Santa Clara County Civil Grand Jury this 28th day of May
F8:
Disabled travelers are inconvenienced when wheelchairs are not available or are not working properly.
F9:
Reports from the complaint logging and tracking system are being used to identify and improve customer service issues.
F10:
The computer-based spreadsheet system of storing complaint data does not allow for sophisticated reports to be easily generated. The time consuming process of manually extracting data for monthly reports could be improved upon by implementing a different tracking system. CONCLUSIONS Many elements of customer service at San Jose’s airport have been affected by September 11. City officials and airport management are working hard to effectively deal with those issues and still maintain progress toward the goals detailed in the city’s master plan, including the renovation of the airport with the construction of Terminal B. Due to a lack of signs, it is difficult to find the elevators and entrance to Terminal A from the parking garage. The lack of road signs along the busy airport roadways between terminals causes a confusing and unsafe situation. 6 e. Add or improve lighting where appropriate Near the end of its review, the Grand Jury became aware of a presentation by airport management to the 2002 Silicon Valley Blue Ribbon Task Force On Aviation Security And Technology entitled Impacts Of The Transportation Security Act (ATSA), dated April 17, 2002. This report dealt with the proposed terminal building and the construction changes and increased costs that will result from the new federal safety regulations. The director of aviation for the city has also voiced his concerns to the Grand Jury regarding the number of passenger gates proposed for the renovated airport. (Ref. Findings #1, 2, 3 & 4)
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Findings & Recommendations
1 findings
F2001:
Two visitor conspirators and a construction design flaw at Elmwood enabled the July escape. The construction defect has been corrected and visitor procedures have been modified to prevent a similar incident. At the main jail, a problem with the guards’ doorway access from the cell common area to the prisoners’ sundeck recreational area contributed to a delay in the guards gaining access to control the situation. This delay escalated the seriousness of the riot incident. Defeated or inoperable cell door locking mechanisms may have contributed to the mixing of the prisoners and the fight in the common area in front of the cells. This event probably would not have gotten out of control had the guards been able to gain quick access to the sun deck recreational area. Bruce E. Capron Foreperson Norman N. Abrahams, DDS Foreperson Pro Tem Joyce S. Byrne Secretary
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Findings & Recommendations
16 findings
F1:
Despite having had training and despite the availability of outside support resources, the OSD Board of Trustees erred in at least three major areas: business and organizational management; compliance with state education codes; and compliance with the Brown Act. (Ref. Facts #1-29)
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
Review major sections of the applicable California codes as they relate to the duties of the board and then define, document and _________________________________ implement a plan to make effective Norman N. Abrahams, DDS use of advice from legal counsel in Foreperson Pro Tem these areas. (Ref. Findings # 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11)
F2:
The board exhibited gross negligence in financial planning and control, including: failure to monitor expenditures versus budgets; failure to assess the risks associated with budget planning assumptions; and failure to ensure adequate funding for all district policy decisions. Various education codes limit or require special authorizations to move district monies between general operational funds and “capital” funds (including interest). The evidence collected by the Grand Jury indicates that the board and superintendent either did not understand these requirements or chose to ignore them. (Ref. Facts # 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21)
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
Perform a thorough assessment of particularly in the areas of financial board needs and responsibilities and management, budget preparation and then define, document and education code requirements. (Ref implement an annual plan to train
F3:
The board failed to understand the balanced management focus necessary to accomplish concurrent district goals. The board and the superintendent focused almost entirely on test scores to the exclusion of other critical areas. (Ref. Facts # 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29)
F4:
The board did not recognize or act upon the seriously deteriorating relationship 7 Act Section 54954.2) (Ref. Facts # 11 & 14)
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
Distribute information once a year to parents and other community _________________________________ members regarding provisions of the Joyce S. Byrne Brown Act and district procedures Secretary for handling complaints and questions. (Ref. Findings # 4, 10, 11) 9
F5:
Personnel decisions were made without projections for determining needs. The resulting imbalance of teaching staff contributed to the serious shortfall in the 2000-2001 budget. (Ref. Facts # 18, 19, 20)
F6:
The board did not follow state guidelines to ensure fair personnel practices for all employees. (Ref. Facts #19 & 23)
F7:
The board and its administration failed to consistently create and maintain the documents necessary to maintain orderly records of its meetings and official actions as required by California Education Code Section 35163. (Ref. Facts # 12, 13, 15) The story of OSD is a cautionary tale for school boards statewide. The public trust was breeched at almost every level of OSD administration. As the district teetered between difficulties and chaos, the consequences of the board’s weak governance grew increasingly serious.
F8:
The board failed to make timely reports of budgets and expenditures to the county office of education as required by California Education Code Section 42100. (Ref. Fact # 21) In the opinion of the Grand Jury, the most troublesome blunder at OSD was an apparent lack of respect for the public’s right to oversee the business of the district. This disregard for the principle of open government by the OSD board and superintendent was evidenced by outright neglect of the Brown Act and relevant sections of the appropriate California codes.
F9:
The district failed to monitor the status of compliance to legal mandates. The board was oblivious to these issues, thereby incurring risk to the district’s legal status and, in some cases, to the quality of education being provided OSD students. (Ref. Fact # 22) The public has both a right and a duty to ask reasonable questions and to expect that those questions be answered. This process provides a safeguard that is critical to the successful operation of democratic government. At OSD, a careless board and autocratic administration created an environment ripe for disaster. Had the public been given proper access to the workings of the district, the problems at OSD might have been recognized and averted before the current crisis.
F10:
The board failed to consistently post required agendas sufficiently ahead of meetings and then failed to consistently follow the agendas during meetings as required by the Brown Act. This omission hindered the public’s ability to understand when and how decisions were to be made. Consequently, the public’s ability to make fair comment before the board was abridged. (Brown
F11:
The board failed to conduct closed sessions in the approved manner, including properly reporting actions taken, as required by the Brown Act. This omission thwarted the public’s ability to understand what was happening in the district. (Brown Act Sections 54954.2 and 54957). (Ref. Fact # 12)
F25:
Prior to March 2001 there had not been a continuously functioning School Site Council, a violation of Education Code Sections 52011 and 52012. During this time, parents and staff were asked to sign documents, implying that the council existed when it did not.
F26:
A school-wide plan, including a needs assessment, developed with broad involvement of school personnel and parents was not in place, as required by Education Code Section 52011.
F27:
There was no Gifted and Talented Education Program (GATE) during the 2000-2001 school year. It is unclear just how long this situation had existed prior to 2000-2001. Until parents openly complained, the district had improperly accepted the GATE money issued by the state. The 2000-2001 money has since been returned.
F28:
No process was in place for disseminating information about the complaint procedures to students, employees, parents, guardians, school advisory committees and interested parties, as required by district policies 1313 and 1314.
F29:
Because the OSD English Language Learners Program has been frequently out of compliance, the district has been targeted by the state department of education to participate in a specialized process of strict monitoring and intensive assistance. This program targets chronically non-compliant English Language Learners Programs
Additional Recommendations
1
Not linked to specific findings.
R6:
Define, document and implement a Orchard School District Board of Trustees: plan to increase its efforts at offering support services to school districts,
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Findings and recommendations not yet extracted.
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Additional Recommendations
5
Not linked to specific findings.
R2:
Prepare a second employee’s to promptly report when an guide, or include in the current employee is injured, some guide, information for individuals supervisors may not be aware of that have long-term requirements, their responsibility to the permanent disability settlements, employee. or injuries having a high probability of recurrence. (Ref.
R3:
Informational and instructional Compensation Division: documents about Workers’ Compensation were supplied to 1. Include information related to the claimants without a review or importance of obtaining authorization explanation of the materials. before seeing a specialist/therapist as the “Employee’s Guide to Workers’
R4:
Although the “Supervisor’s Compensation” is updated. (Ref.
R5:
Some supervisors are not
R6:
Although most individuals occupational injuries or illnesses. expressed satisfaction with the (Ref. Finding #’s 3, 4, & 5) Workers’ Compensation Division, they reported
Additional documents
Documents found alongside this year's reports, not grand jury reports or responses.