San Joaquin County 2022-2023 - California Grand Jury Reports

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The consolidated year-end volume. The individual investigations it contains are listed separately below.

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Individual reports (12)

∼ June 30, 2023 — 2022-2023 Final Report

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June 26, 2023 — Working Title 1: Working Title 2 (Case No. xx20) The Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Authority: a Rubik’s Cube of Water

37 pages 25 findings 4 recommendations

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Findings & Recommendations 25 findings

F1: 2.1 The Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Authority has provided no public information events on the status of the adoption and implementation of the Groundwater Sustainability Plan since July 2021, leaving the public largely unaware of what the Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Authority is doing regarding groundwater sustainability and the associated effects and costs of Groundwater Sustainability Plan implementation.

Related Recommendations (1)

R1: 2.1 By November 1, 2023, the Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Authority Board of Directors, in consultation with member Groundwater Sustainability Agencies, develop, adopt, and implement a schedule for regular public events to provide information on Groundwater Sustainability Plan adoption and implementation and the associated effects and costs.

F2: 1.1 The Memorandum of Agreement with Cal Water benefits the County and its taxpayers by reducing the cost allocation paid by the County and incorporates Cal Water’s expertise and support into the Groundwater Sustainability Plan development and implementation.

Related Recommendations (1)

R2: 2.1 By November 1, 2023, the Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Authority Board modify the Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Authority website to provide the public clear and convenient access to a more detailed Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Authority budget with prior‐year actuals.

F3: 3.1 The minutes of Board and Steering Committee meetings are difficult to locate on the Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Authority website and sometimes are not posted for months or at all, resulting in frustration for interested parties and a lack of transparency.

Related Recommendations (1)

R3: 1.1 By November 1, 2023, the Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Authority Board of Directors update their website to include the current Financial Transaction Report (or link to the State Controller’s website) to ensure compliance with SB 929.

F4: 1 San Joaquin County and Cal Water allowed their Memorandum of Agreement to automatically terminate in December 2021 and failed to renew it until November 2022, which undermines public confidence in the County’s governance and due diligence in tracking all legal agreements.

Related Recommendations (1)

R4: 1 By November 1, 2023, the San Joaquin Board of Supervisors develop, adopt, and implement a methodology for reviewing Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Authority governance and contractual documents regularly to ensure that any that are approaching expiration can be acted upon promptly.

F4.1: San Joaquin County and Cal Water allowed their Memorandum of Agreement to automatically terminate in December 2021 and failed to renew it until November 2022, which undermines public confidence in the County’s governance and due diligence in tracking all legal agreements.

F4.2: The Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Authority has insufficient staff support, which negatively impacts its ability to operate efficiently and can result in staff burnout and possible administrative delays and errors.

F1.2.1: The Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Authority has provided no public information events on the status of the adoption and implementation of the Groundwater Sustainability Plan since July 2021, leaving the public largely unaware of what the Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Authority is doing regarding groundwater sustainability and the associated effects and costs of Groundwater Sustainability Plan implementation.

F1.2.2: The Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Authority developed but never formally approved or adopted an engagement and public outreach plan, and although the Department of Water Resources is now funding a consultant firm to work with the Board of Directors to develop one, public communications and engagement efforts so far have been limited and ineffective.

F1.3.1: The Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Authority’s efforts to identify and engage with people who are members of disadvantaged communities have been limited, potentially excluding members of these communities from learning about and having a voice in groundwater sustainability plans.

F1.3.2: Informational materials used to communicate with and inform residents of the subbasin have been in English and Spanish only, thus leaving subbasin residents who speak and read other languages potentially uninformed about the Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Authority and its activities.

F2.1.1: The Memorandum of Agreement with Cal Water benefits the County and its taxpayers by reducing the cost allocation paid by the County and incorporates Cal Water’s expertise and support into the Groundwater Sustainability Plan development and implementation.

F2.1.2: Zone 2 property fees are collected by the County within the Cal Water‐County GSA boundaries. Therefore, it is reasonable and equitable that Cal Water‐County GSA receives the same reduction to its member cost allocation as all other County Groundwater Sustainability Agencies to reflect the property fees paid into the Zone 2 fund. 2.2 Transparency and Ease of Access to Financial Information During its investigation, the Grand Jury requested, received, and reviewed the following financial data: Zone 2 Fund Reports (2016‐2022), ESJGWA Fund Reports (2018‐2022), Countywide annual audits (2014‐2021), Chart of Accounts, Vendor Payments (2015‐2022), ESJGWA and Zone 2 projected and actual budgets, and annual County proposed budget reports prepared for the Board of Supervisors. In addition, Grand Jury members reviewed the County’s OpenGov Financial Data Transparency Portal. The Grand Jury also heard testimony from County officials familiar with ESJGWA financial processes. The San Joaquin County Public Works Department provides accounting services for the ESJGWA and develops budgets for approval by the ESJGWA Board and the County Board of Supervisors (JPA, Article 4.10). The Grand Jury found the annual proposed budgets on the County Administrator’s Office (CAO) Budget public website to be an excellent overview of both Zone 2 and ESJGWA origination, purpose, and fiscal year planning. Revenues collected for Zone 2 and the ESJGWA are held separately in the County Treasury (JPA, Article 5.7). The Zone 2 fund is not audited separately from the District, and the County Auditor‐Controller’s Office does not prepare a separate financial statement. The Flood Control & Water Conservation District posts on its website the annual Engineer’s reports for the beneficial use Zones 9 and 10. These reports include services provided, the budget to provide the services, and the criteria. However, according to witness testimony, the District does not post an annual report for Zone 2 accountability. ESJGWA is audited annually in accordance with JPA Article 5.8 and is included in the “County of San Joaquin, California” annual audit, which is conducted by an independent auditor. Within this audit, the ESJGWA is labeled a “Nonmajor Special District Governed by the Board of Supervisors.” Audits reviewed by the Grand Jury from 2014 to 2021 include ESJGWA from 2017 on, with a brief description of “Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Authority… established in 2017.” However, from 2018 to 2021, the balance sheet column heading lists the ESJGWA as the “Eastern San Joaquin Ground Water Banking Authority,” which is a different agency established prior to the ESJGWA, and which terminated in 2022. A review of preceding audits does not include any Eastern San Joaquin authorities. The Grand Jury also received ESJGWA fund reports (labeled “21451”) from the Auditor‐Controller’s Office and compared fund balances. The Grand Jury noted that year‐end balances between the audits and the fund reports differ, as summarized in Table 1. Table 1. Differences Between County Audited Year‐End Balances and the 21451 Fund Report Audit Combining Balance Sheet 2022 2021 2020 2019 2018 – 386,618 (641,657) (483,152) 474,139 Audit Combining Statement of Revenues, Expenditures – 369,813 (641,657) (483,152) 275,982 ESJGWA 21451 Fund Report 2022 2021 2020 2019 2018 370,409 380,025 (553,577) (328,783) 442,117 Neither the County nor ESJGWA provides easy access to ESJGWA financial information. The County’s OpenGov Financial Data Transparency Portal can be utilized to examine how Zone 2 funds are used, but the Grand Jury found it very difficult to locate and access this information. The Zone 2 budget link leads to a page with only minimal information. More information regarding Zone 2 and projects is available elsewhere on the District’s website, but it is difficult to find that information. Similarly, the ESJGWA’s website does not provide a convenient link to ESJGWA budgets or financial information. That information can only be found by searching through agenda meeting packets of the Board and the Steering Committee. Even so, budget information presented at a meeting might not be included in the packets. For example, on February 8, 2023, the Steering Committee considered a draft budget proposal, but the proposal was not included in the meeting packet available to the public. The Grand Jury requested and received a copy of the proposed budget presentation, but it was not clear how the public would know to request that information. Findings

F2.2.1: Important Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Authority financial information is not readily available on the Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Authority website, effectively depriving the public access to this information.

F2.2.2: Important Zone 2 financial information is not readily available on the San Joaquin County Flood Control & Water Conservation District’s website, therefore does not meet the public’s need for transparency.

F2.2.3: The Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Authority is included in the annual San Joaquin County independent audit, but the audited fund balance differs from the fund balance report, calling into question the data included in the reported financials.

F2.2.4: The independent auditor lists and discusses the Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Authority in the “Summary of Significant Accounting Policies.” The balance sheet column heading listing the previous Ground Water Banking Authority (GBA) is incorrect, lessening public confidence in the audit. 24

F3.1.1: The Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Authority website does not provide the State‐ required Financial Transaction Report or a link to the State Controller’s website, which decreases transparency.

F3.1.2: The Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Authority website does not list the Board compensation report or a link to the State Controller’s website, reducing transparency.

F3.1.3: The Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Authority website does not provide an Enterprise System Catalog, which violates public records and transparency reporting requirements.

F3.1.4: The Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Authority website does not meet the accessibility requirements established by Government Code Section 7405, which could make it difficult for 26 some members of the public to access the site and could expose the Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Authority to legal action.

F3.1.5: The Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Authority website is not updated in a timely manner, causing frustration for site visitors and the appearance of a lack of transparency.

F3.2.1: The Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Authority Board routinely holds its meetings at times that differ from those stated in its Bylaws and on its website. Together with cancellations and a reduction in the number of Board meetings, this creates confusion and reduces opportunities for public engagement.

F3.2.2: The Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Authority Technical Advisory Committee is a de facto standing committee but does not follow noticing and transparency requirements for its meetings, violating the Brown Act and giving the public no insight or input into its activities.

F3.2.3: The Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Authority does not identify the individuals who serve on the Board of Directors on either its website or its agendas, making it difficult for the public to ascertain who governs the Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Authority and who from each Groundwater Sustainability Agency sits on their Board.

F3.3.1: The minutes of Board and Steering Committee meetings are difficult to locate on the Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Authority website and sometimes are not posted for months or at all, resulting in frustration for interested parties and a lack of transparency.

June 12, 2023 — 2022‐2023 San Joaquin County Grand Jury School Safety in San Joaquin County: Developing a Culture of Safety

26 pages 33 findings 3 recommendations

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Findings & Recommendations 33 findings

F1: Improving communica(cid:415)on: ICS‐100 training teaches responders how to use a common language and communica(cid:415)on system to ensure that everyone is on the same page during an emergency.

F2: Enhancing coordina(cid:415)on: ICS‐100 training clarifies how responders work together and coordinate their efforts to respond effec(cid:415)vely to an emergency.

Related Recommendations (1)

R2: 1 By March 1, 2024, the annual updates for each school site’s CSSP address safety issues unique to the site. 13

F3: Promo(cid:415)ng safety: ICS‐100 training emphasizes the importance of safety during an emergency and informs responders how to priori(cid:415)ze safety when responding to incidents.

Related Recommendations (1)

R3: 1 By December 1, 2023, the San Joaquin County Office of Educa(cid:415)on and the San Joaquin County Office of Educa(cid:415)on Board of Trustees develop, adopt, and host an annual School Safety Summit.

F4: Reducing confusion: ICS‐100 training provides a clear structure and framework for responding to emergencies, reducing confusion and ensuring that everyone knows their role in an emergency. The Grand Jury discovered that within the County, while some school districts u(cid:415)lize ICS‐100 training, many do not, causing a security gap. When the Grand Jury inquired about ICS training with expert witnesses, the answer was universally in support of such training, tailored to the specifics of school sites. “I think it's useful. I think it's useful to understand how it all works in the big picture,” said an expert. While the Grand Jury recognizes that annual training can be overwhelming to school staff, not all school site personnel require ICS‐100 training as much as those personnel iden(cid:415)fied in the CSSP incident command roles on school campuses (including classified employees). While ICS‐100 training is focused on a school site, ICS‐402 training is directed towards execu(cid:415)ve‐ level leadership (district cabinet‐level employees). ICS‐402 training is designed to provide educa(cid:415)on and training for those who may be responsible for managing large‐scale incidents or emergencies. ICS‐402 training for senior‐level district staff members is important for several reasons:

Related Recommendations (1)

R4: 1 By October 1, 2023, each school site implement an access control program that consistently includes verifying visitors' iden(cid:415)ty and collec(cid:415)on of any issued badge before the visitor leaves the school site.

F2.1: A review of CSSPs demonstrated many districts have failed to create a CSSP that addresses safety issues unique to the individual school sites, and rather use a template and/or boilerplate language, leaving the school site unprepared in an emergency. 12

F2.2: Many districts have not involved teachers, support staff, students, and parents/guardians when upda(cid:415)ng each school site’s CSSP, missing an opportunity to create a culture of school safety.

F2.3: Many districts have not collaborated with local law enforcement and other first responders during the annual process to update the CSSP, which could result in a prolonged and inefficient emergency response.

F2.4: Many district CSSPs show a lack of meaningful collabora(cid:415)on between districts and local law enforcement agencies, causing confusion and chaos during an emergency.

F2.5: Many districts do not offer an opportunity for public input during the dra(cid:332)ing or approval stages of the annual CSSP, which renders the districts out of compliance with State law.

F2.6: Most districts do not include an assessment of the status of crime at the school and school‐ related func(cid:415)ons in their CSSPs, which renders the districts out of compliance with State law and causes poten(cid:415)al harm and liability.

F2.7: Many districts do not adequately address the unique needs of students with disabili(cid:415)es during emergencies. The lack of planning for the most vulnerable students can cause harm during a (cid:415)me of confusion and crisis.

F2.8: A few districts do not make any part of the CSSPs available to the public, withholding important informa(cid:415)on about steps taken by the district to reduce the probability and impact of safety risks. Other districts post the CSSPs in their en(cid:415)rety, failing to keep confiden(cid:415)al informa(cid:415)on about tac(cid:415)cal responses, poten(cid:415)ally revealing sensi(cid:415)ve informa(cid:415)on to the public.

F2.9: Many districts have CSSPs that fail to iden(cid:415)fy incident command roles and the individuals who are to perform those roles in case of an emergency, exposing students and staff to the poten(cid:415)al for confusion and increased risks during an emergency.

F3.1: Feedback forms completed by attendees of the San Joaquin County Office of Education School Safety Summit and reviewed by the Grand Jury demonstrate the value and necessity of a Countywide School Safety Summit.

F3.2: Some of the districts failed to send representatives to the 2022 School Safety Summit, thereby missing an opportunity to work together to make schools safer.

F3.3: The Grand Jury learned through interviews, surveys, and site tours that many districts fail to include safety topics during regular mee(cid:415)ngs with teachers and support staff throughout the school year, minimizing the importance of safety.

F3.4: The Grand Jury learned through interviews, surveys, and site tours that many school sites fail to assure subs(cid:415)tute staff receive the informa(cid:415)on they will need in the case of a school safety emergency, leaving the subs(cid:415)tute staff ill‐prepared for an emergency.

F3.5: Many districts fail to include the u(cid:415)liza(cid:415)on of communica(cid:415)on and incident command protocols (ICS‐100) during safety drills throughout the school year, causing miscommunica(cid:415)on in an emergency.

F3.6: Many district cabinet‐level posi(cid:415)ons (e.g., Superintendent, Chief Business Officer) are not trained in ICS protocols (ICS‐402), causing a lack of unified response to districtwide emergencies.

F3.7: Many school sites do not vary the (cid:415)me of day when rou(cid:415)ne safety drills are conducted or when students are not in classrooms, making drills predictable and leaving students unprepared for emergencies that may occur at any (cid:415)me.

F3.8: Many school sites fail to include support staff (classified personnel) in probable real‐life roles during safety drills, leaving them unprepared to assist students in emergencies.

F3.9: Most school sites fail to conduct a post‐incident report a(cid:332)er drills analyzing what went well, what went wrong, and what needs to be changed in the future to improve plans and drills, undermining the effec(cid:415)veness of drills. Recommenda(cid:415)ons The 2022‐2023 San Joaquin County Civil Grand Jury recommends that the County Office of Educa(cid:415)on and the 14 school districts in the County implement school safety programs that require the following ac(cid:415)ons:

F4.1: Not all school sites have check‐in procedures in place that were followed consistently, posing serious security threats.

F4.2: Perimeter fencing or an “open” campus each pose security challenges and require careful considera(cid:415)on to mi(cid:415)gate security shortcomings.

F4.3: Evacua(cid:415)on maps that are posted inconsistently or do not adequately illustrate evacua(cid:415)on routes cause confusion and prolonged evacua(cid:415)on (cid:415)mes, making staff and students vulnerable to harm in both classrooms and common areas.

F4.4: Inconsistent door‐locking policies and failure to follow policies create opportuni(cid:415)es for perpetrators to enter classrooms and common areas.

F4.5: Most school sites u(cid:415)lized flip charts that iden(cid:415)fy steps to be taken in case of emergencies, however, none of the sites posted them in all rooms used by students, staff, parents/guardians, and the general public.

F4.6: Insufficient window coverings give perpetrators a clear line of sight, crea(cid:415)ng risk for students and staff.

F4.7: Most school sites, regardless of age, were well maintained and showed school pride. One school site demonstrated mul(cid:415)ple maintenance shortcomings, which can nega(cid:415)vely impact safety.

F4.8: Good rela(cid:415)onships among administrators, cer(cid:415)ficated and classified staff, parents, and students are vital to promptly iden(cid:415)fy and address areas of concern, par(cid:415)cularly regarding student behavior. Rela(cid:415)onships varied greatly from campus to campus.

F4.9: The culture of safety is best developed by public transparency and involvement by all par(cid:415)es. Few of the school sites visited by the Grand Jury demonstrated meaningful public engagement in safety planning. 22

F2.10: Many districts have CSSPs that fail to describe the system to reunite parents/guardians with their children in the event of a campus‐wide evacua(cid:415)on, crea(cid:415)ng confusion and addi(cid:415)onal anxiety in the event of a safety emergency.

F2.11: Many school site CSSPs do not account for specific dangers unique to the school site (e.g., train tracks, flooding, freeways). Recommenda(cid:415)ons The 2022‐2023 San Joaquin County Civil Grand Jury recommends that the County Office of Educa(cid:415)on, the 14 school districts, and law enforcement agencies in the County implement school safety programs that require the following ac(cid:415)ons:

📋June 10, 2023 — Section 2: Investigations San Joaquin County Custodial Facili�es:

102 pages 53 findings 5 recommendations

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Findings & Recommendations 53 findings

Page 105

F1.1: The San Joaquin County Sheriff’s Office has failed to ensure that a mandated PREA audit (28 CFR 115.401) by a Department of Justice certified auditor has ever been done where one is required to be completed every three years. Failure to complete audits by a Department of Justice certified auditor diminishes transparency, could put inmates and detainees at risk, and could erode public trust.

Page 21

F1.2: The San Joaquin County Sheriff’s Office is not in compliance with 28 CFR 115.33(f), which requires them to provide adequate written materials and visible posters that explain inmate rights and the Sheriff’s zero-tolerance policy regarding sexual abuse or sexual harassment. This could 20 result in delays in reporting and investigating, thereby exposing the Office to potential lawsuits, financial liability, and reduction in Federal grant funding.

Page 21

F1.3: The San Joaquin County Sheriff’s Office does not provide adequate means to report sexual abuse or harassment confidentially and privately to an independent public or private entity as required under 28 CFR 115.51 which is a violation of PREA standards and could result in a reduction of Federal grant funding.

Page 22

F1.4: There is no video or audio recording equipment in interrogation rooms. There should be no area in the jail, absent issues of mandated privacy, where an inmate could be with officers in secluded settings. A potential claim of sexual or physical abuse without providing visual evidence also means the Sheriff’s department would be unable to effectively defend such a claim.

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F2.1: Every three years PREA Audits by a Department of Justice certified auditor must be completed. The Probation Department for Juvenile Detention has never scheduled nor completed this mandated audit. This failure diminishes transparency, could put juvenile residents at risk, and could erode public trust, exposing the Probation Department and the Juvenile Detention Facility to potential lawsuits and financial liability.

Page 23

F2.2: The Probation Department for Juvenile Detention has failed to conduct an annual review, mandated by 28 CFR 115.401(b), or updates for required procedures since 2019, which is a violation of PREA standards and could result in reduction of funding or other financial liability.

Page 23

F2.3: The Probation Department for Juvenile Detention lacks published material explaining how separation between juveniles and older residents is to be maintained. Failure to maintain separation and ensure steps are taken to protect juvenile residents from unsupervised older residents could result in undesirable interactions leading to potential lawsuits and financial liability. 22

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F2.4: The Probation Department for Juvenile Detention has failed to provide a written policy or procedure to ensure a sexual assault or harassment victim’s report to the Women’s Center Sexual Assault Crisis Line will remain confidential.

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F2.5: The Probation Department for Juvenile Detention’s website and other public media fail to explain or reference how a third party can make a confidential report on behalf of a juvenile resident, which creates a lack of transparency and fails to provide required confidential accessibility options to file a report.

Page 24

F2.6: The Probation Department for Juvenile Detention staff members demonstrated a lack of understanding that all federally mandated PREA standards apply to San Joaquin County’s Juvenile Detention Facility. A lack of comprehensive understanding of all PREA standards that apply could result in a failure to adequately protect juvenile residents, contractors, and employees.

Page 24

F2.7: The Probation Department for Juvenile Detention does not consistently provide training for educators, third party contractors, and volunteers with refresher training every two years, which is a violation of PREA Standards 28 CFR 115.331 and 28 CFR 115.332 and could compromise the safety of staff, volunteers, and juvenile residents.

Page 24

F2.8: A few districts do not make any part of the CSSPs available to the public, withholding important information about steps taken by the district to reduce the probability and impact of safety risks. Other districts post the CSSPs in their entirety, failing to keep confidential information about tactical responses, potentially revealing sensitive information to the public.

Page 40

F2.9: Many districts have CSSPs that fail to identify incident command roles and the individuals who are to perform those roles in case of an emergency, exposing students and staff to the potential for confusion and increased risks during an emergency.

Page 40

F3.1: The Lodi Police Department is not in full compliance with 28 CFR 115.33(f), which requires them to provide written materials and visible posters explaining inmate rights and the Department’s zero-tolerance policy regarding sexual abuse or sexual harassment at the jail. This could result in delays in reporting and investigating, exposing the Office to potential lawsuits, financial liability, and reduction in grant funding.

Page 25

F3.2: Some of the districts failed to send representatives to the 2022 School Safety Summit, thereby missing an opportunity to work together to make schools safer.

Page 44

F3.3: The Grand Jury learned through interviews, surveys, and site tours that many districts fail to include safety topics during regular meetings with teachers and support staff throughout the school year, minimizing the importance of safety.

Page 44

F3.4: The Grand Jury learned through interviews, surveys, and site tours that many school sites fail to assure substitute staff receive the information they will need in the case of a school safety emergency, leaving the substitute staff ill-prepared for an emergency.

Page 44

F3.5: Many districts fail to include the utilization of communication and incident command protocols (ICS-100) during safety drills throughout the school year, causing miscommunication in an emergency. 43

Page 44

F3.6: Many district cabinet-level positions (e.g., Superintendent, Chief Business Officer) are not trained in ICS protocols (ICS-402), causing a lack of unified response to districtwide emergencies.

Page 45

F3.7: Many school sites do not vary the time of day when routine safety drills are conducted or when students are not in classrooms, making drills predictable and leaving students unprepared for emergencies that may occur at any time.

Page 45

F3.8: Many school sites fail to include support staff (classified personnel) in probable real-life roles during safety drills, leaving them unprepared to assist students in emergencies.

Page 45

F3.9: Most school sites fail to conduct a post-incident report after drills analyzing what went well, what went wrong, and what needs to be changed in the future to improve plans and drills, undermining the effectiveness of drills.

Page 45

F4.1: Not all school sites have check-in procedures in place that were followed consistently, posing serious security threats.

Page 48

F4.2: Perimeter fencing or an “open” campus each pose security challenges and require careful consideration to mitigate security shortcomings. 47

Page 48

F4.3: Evacuation maps that are posted inconsistently or do not adequately illustrate evacuation routes cause confusion and prolonged evacuation times, making staff and students vulnerable to harm in both classrooms and common areas.

Page 49

F4.4: Inconsistent door-locking policies and failure to follow policies create opportunities for perpetrators to enter classrooms and common areas.

Page 49

F4.5: Most school sites utilized flip charts that identify steps to be taken in case of emergencies, however, none of the sites posted them in all rooms used by students, staff, parents/guardians, and the general public.

Page 49

F4.6: Insufficient window coverings give perpetrators a clear line of sight, creating risk for students and staff.

Page 49

F4.7: Most school sites, regardless of age, were well maintained and showed school pride. One school site demonstrated multiple maintenance shortcomings, which can negatively impact safety.

Page 49

F4.8: Good relationships among administrators, certificated and classified staff, parents, and students are vital to promptly identify and address areas of concern, particularly regarding student behavior. Relationships varied greatly from campus to campus.

Page 49

F4.9: The culture of safety is best developed by public transparency and involvement by all parties. Few of the school sites visited by the Grand Jury demonstrated meaningful public engagement in safety planning.

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Page 96

F2.10: Many districts have CSSPs that fail to describe the system to reunite parents/guardians with their children in the event of a campus-wide evacuation, creating confusion and additional anxiety in the event of a safety emergency.

Page 40

Page 98

F2.11: Many school site CSSPs do not account for specific dangers unique to the school site (e.g., train tracks, flooding, freeways).

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F2.1.2: Zone 2 property fees are collected by the County within the Cal Water-County GSA boundaries. Therefore, it is reasonable and equitable that Cal Water-County GSA receives the same reduction to its member cost allocation as all other County Groundwater Sustainability Agencies to reflect the property fees paid into the Zone 2 fund. 2.2 Transparency and Ease of Access to Financial Information During its investigation, the Grand Jury requested, received, and reviewed the following financial data: Zone 2 Fund Reports (2016-2022), ESJGWA Fund Reports (2018-2022), Countywide annual audits (2014-2021), Chart of Accounts, Vendor Payments (2015-2022), ESJGWA and Zone 2 projected and actual budgets, and annual County proposed budget reports prepared for the Board of Supervisors. In addition, Grand Jury members reviewed the County’s OpenGov Financial Data Transparency Portal. The Grand Jury also heard testimony from County officials familiar with ESJGWA financial processes. The San Joaquin County Public Works Department provides accounting services for the ESJGWA and develops budgets for approval by the ESJGWA Board and the County Board of Supervisors (JPA, Article 4.10). The Grand Jury found the annual proposed budgets on the County Administrator’s Office (CAO) Budget public website to be an excellent overview of both Zone 2 and ESJGWA origination, purpose, and fiscal year planning. Revenues collected for Zone 2 and the ESJGWA are held separately in the County Treasury (JPA, Article 5.7). The Zone 2 fund is not audited separately from the District, and the County Auditor-Controller’s Office does not prepare a separate financial statement. The Flood Control & Water Conservation District posts on its website the annual Engineer’s reports for the beneficial use Zones 9 and 10. These reports include services provided, the budget to provide the services, and the criteria. However, according to witness testimony, the District does not post an annual report for Zone 2 accountability. ESJGWA is audited annually in accordance with JPA Article 5.8 and is included in the “County of San Joaquin, California” annual audit, which is conducted by an independent auditor. Within this audit, the ESJGWA is labeled a “Nonmajor Special District Governed by the Board of Supervisors.” Audits reviewed by the Grand Jury from 2014 to 2021 include ESJGWA from 2017 on, with a brief description of “Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Authority… established in 2017.” However, from 2018 to 2021, the balance sheet column heading lists the ESJGWA as the “Eastern San Joaquin Ground Water Banking Authority,” which is a different agency established prior to the ESJGWA, and which terminated in 2022. A review of preceding audits does not include any Eastern San Joaquin authorities. The Grand Jury also received ESJGWA fund reports (labeled “21451”) from the 97 Auditor-Controller’s Office and compared fund balances. The Grand Jury noted that year-end balances between the audits and the fund reports differ, as summarized in Table 1. Table 1. Differences Between County Audited Year-End Balances and the 21451 Fund Report Audit Combining Balance Sheet 2022 2021 2020 2019 2018 – 386,618 (641,657) (483,152) 474,139 Audit Combining Statement of Revenues, Expenditures – 369,813 (641,657) (483,152) 275,982 ESJGWA 21451 Fund Report 2022 2021 2020 2019 2018 370,409 380,025 (553,577) (328,783) 442,117 Neither the County nor ESJGWA provides easy access to ESJGWA financial information. The County’s OpenGov Financial Data Transparency Portal can be utilized to examine how Zone 2 funds are used, but the Grand Jury found it very difficult to locate and access this information. The Zone 2 budget link leads to a page with only minimal information. More information regarding Zone 2 and projects is available elsewhere on the District’s website, but it is difficult to find that information. Similarly, the ESJGWA’s website does not provide a convenient link to ESJGWA budgets or financial information. That information can only be found by searching through agenda meeting packets of the Board and the Steering Committee. Even so, budget information presented at a meeting might not be included in the packets. For example, on February 8, 2023, the Steering Committee considered a draft budget proposal, but the proposal was not included in the meeting packet available to the public. The Grand Jury requested and received a copy of the proposed budget presentation, but it was not clear how the public would know to request that information. Findings

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F2.2.4: The independent auditor lists and discusses the Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Authority in the “Summary of Significant Accounting Policies.” The balance sheet column heading listing the 98 previous Ground Water Banking Authority (GBA) is incorrect, lessening public confidence in the audit.

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F3.1.1: The Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Authority website does not provide the State- required Financial Transaction Report or a link to the State Controller’s website, which decreases transparency.

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F3.1.2: The Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Authority website does not list the Board compensation report or a link to the State Controller’s website, reducing transparency. 100

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F3.1.3: The Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Authority website does not provide an Enterprise System Catalog, which violates public records and transparency reporting requirements.

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F3.1.4: The Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Authority website does not meet the accessibility requirements established by Government Code Section 7405, which could make it difficult for some members of the public to access the site and could expose the Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Authority to legal action.

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F3.1.5: The Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Authority website is not updated in a timely manner, causing frustration for site visitors and the appearance of a lack of transparency.

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Additional Recommendations 5

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R1: 1 By July 1, 2023, The San Joaquin County Sheriff schedule an independent audit by a Department of Justice certified Auditor in accordance with 28 CFR 115.401(a) and post the audit report on the agency’s website within 30 days of completion.

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R2: 1 By July 1, 2023, The Probation Department for Juvenile Detention schedule an independent audit by a Department of Justice certified auditor in accordance with 28 CFR 115.401(a) and post the audit report on the agency’s website within 30 days of completion.

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R3: 1 By October 1, 2023, the City of Lodi Jail and Police Department provide visible posters and written materials explaining inmate rights and the Department’s zero-tolerance policy regarding sexual abuse in the booking, processing, and holding areas within the jail.

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R4: 1 By October 1, 2023, each school site implement an access control program that consistently includes verifying visitors' identity and collection of any issued badge before the visitor leaves the school site.

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R12-17: years old. Many are not confined and are immediately released to a parent, guardian, or caregiver, where they can access community-based programs and resources. Youth under 12 cannot be arrested or detained, as no delinquency or criminal court has jurisdiction over them. Youth under 12 cannot be prosecuted except for murder or forcible rape. San Joaquin County has a contact protocol for juvenile offenders, but for alternative placement, as described in SB 439, counties are urged to develop a protocol, which the County has not done. In 1991 a San Joaquin County Juvenile Court Judge said, “[t]here is a need for a place somewhere between Juvenile Hall and foster care to act as a safety valve to hold the most disruptive youths temporarily away from the shelters.” The administrators, managers, supervisors, and employees interviewed echoed the judge’s sentiment. The Welfare & Institutions Code, Sections 1990-1995, established the Juvenile Justice Realignment Block Grant program. To receive Block Grant funds, counties must create a multiagency Juvenile Justice Coordinating Council (JJCC) to develop annual plans describing the facilities, programs, placement services, supervision, and reentry strategies to provide appropriate rehabilitative services for realigned youth. The San Joaquin County JJCC consists of the San Joaquin County Probation Department, Office of the Sheriff, County Office of the District Attorney, County Office of the Public Defender, HSA, BHS, Police Departments of Escalon, Lodi, Manteca, Ripon, Tracy, and Stockton, along with Stockton Unified School District’s Department of Public Safety. The JJCC’s annual plans include legislative changes as they become law. Based on the legislated premise that community-based support services improve an offender’s potential to reintegrate into the community successfully, counties are directed to develop and initiate such services. The evidence-based programs, practices, and alternatives to incarceration are intended to limit future crimes and reduce victimization. The JJCC plan identified and implemented several programs and continually evaluates the success and value of each. The San Joaquin Community Data Co-Op conducted the most recent evaluation report of programs 62

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📋June 10, 2023 — Section 2: Investigations San Joaquin County Custodial Facili�es:

102 pages 53 findings 5 recommendations

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Findings & Recommendations 53 findings

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F3.2: Some of the districts failed to send representatives to the 2022 School Safety Summit, thereby missing an opportunity to work together to make schools safer.

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F3.6: Many district cabinet-level positions (e.g., Superintendent, Chief Business Officer) are not trained in ICS protocols (ICS-402), causing a lack of unified response to districtwide emergencies.

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F3.8: Many school sites fail to include support staff (classified personnel) in probable real-life roles during safety drills, leaving them unprepared to assist students in emergencies.

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F4.1: Not all school sites have check-in procedures in place that were followed consistently, posing serious security threats.

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F4.2: Perimeter fencing or an “open” campus each pose security challenges and require careful consideration to mitigate security shortcomings. 47

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F4.4: Inconsistent door-locking policies and failure to follow policies create opportunities for perpetrators to enter classrooms and common areas.

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F4.6: Insufficient window coverings give perpetrators a clear line of sight, creating risk for students and staff.

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F4.7: Most school sites, regardless of age, were well maintained and showed school pride. One school site demonstrated multiple maintenance shortcomings, which can negatively impact safety.

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F2.11: Many school site CSSPs do not account for specific dangers unique to the school site (e.g., train tracks, flooding, freeways).

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F2.2.4: The independent auditor lists and discusses the Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Authority in the “Summary of Significant Accounting Policies.” The balance sheet column heading listing the 98 previous Ground Water Banking Authority (GBA) is incorrect, lessening public confidence in the audit.

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F3.1.2: The Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Authority website does not list the Board compensation report or a link to the State Controller’s website, reducing transparency. 100

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F3.1.3: The Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Authority website does not provide an Enterprise System Catalog, which violates public records and transparency reporting requirements.

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F3.1.4: The Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Authority website does not meet the accessibility requirements established by Government Code Section 7405, which could make it difficult for some members of the public to access the site and could expose the Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Authority to legal action.

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F3.1.5: The Eastern San Joaquin Groundwater Authority website is not updated in a timely manner, causing frustration for site visitors and the appearance of a lack of transparency.

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April 14, 2023 — San Joaquin County Custodial Facilities: Failing to Comply with the Prison Rape Elimination Act of 2003

13 pages 15 findings 3 recommendations

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Findings & Recommendations 15 findings

F1: 1 The San Joaquin County Sheriff’s Office has failed to ensure that a mandated PREA audit (28 CFR 115.401) by a Department of Justice certified auditor has ever been done where one is required to be completed every three years. Failure to complete audits by a Department of Justice certified auditor diminishes transparency, could put inmates and detainees at risk, and could erode public trust. 8

Related Recommendations (1)

F2: 1 Every three years PREA Audits by a Department of Justice certified auditor must be completed. The Probation Department for Juvenile Detention has never scheduled nor completed this mandated audit. This failure diminishes transparency, could put juvenile residents at risk, and could erode public trust, exposing the Probation Department and the Juvenile Detention Facility to potential lawsuits and financial liability.

Related Recommendations (1)

F3: 1 The Lodi Police Department is not in full compliance with 28 CFR 115.33(f), which requires them to provide written materials and visible posters explaining inmate rights and the Department’s zero-tolerance policy regarding sexual abuse or sexual harassment at the jail. This could result in delays in reporting and investigating, exposing the Office to potential lawsuits, financial liability, and reduction in grant funding.

Related Recommendations (1)

F1.2: The San Joaquin County Sheriff’s Office is not in compliance with 28 CFR 115.33(f), which requires them to provide adequate written materials and visible posters that explain inmate rights and the Sheriff’s zero-tolerance policy regarding sexual abuse or sexual harassment. This could result in delays in reporting and investigating, thereby exposing the Office to potential lawsuits, financial liability, and reduction in Federal grant funding.

F2.3: The Probation Department for Juvenile Detention lacks published material explaining how separation between juveniles and older residents is to be maintained. Failure to maintain 10 separation and ensure steps are taken to protect juvenile residents from unsupervised older residents could result in undesirable interactions leading to potential lawsuits and financial liability.

📋March 05, 2023 — Section 3: LAW and Justice Law and Jus�ce Report with a Special Report

40 pages 1 recommendations

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Additional Recommendations 1

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R16-19: interested in a career in law enforcement. • Mark43: An AWS Partner Network Advanced Technology based in New York City that developed a cloud-based so�ware solu�on for the public safety industry. The Mark43 pla�orm offers records management and computer-aided dispatch (CAD) applica�ons for a growing number of police and public service organiza�ons. • Marshall Plan: A strategic ini�a�ve adopted by the Stockton City Council to reduce crime and increase public safety. The plan was discussed in Council on January 31, 2012, and the Marshall Plan Commitee met through 2012 and held a symposium for community leaders on February 8, 2013. • MHP: Mental Health Plan (San Joaquin County). • NASRO: Na�onal Associa�on of School Resource Officers. • NOBLE: Na�onal Organiza�on of Black Law Enforcement. • OYCR: Office of Youth and Community Restora�on (California). • one.Cruikshank: The San Joaquin County Office of Educa�on program (named for Judge John F. Cruikshank, Jr.) provides a fully accredited year-round educa�on for all individuals enrolled in the Juvenile Court School. Atending school is mandatory Monday through Friday for all youth. • POP: Problem-Oriented Policing diagnoses and solves problems that are increasing crime risks, usually in areas that are seeing compara�vely high levels of crime. POP is challenging in that agencies need to diagnose and solve what could be any of a wide range of crime- causing problems. • POST: Peace Officer Standard and Training sets the standards for all law enforcement training. • POST Academy: Any law enforcement academy approved by POST to provide minimum selec�on and training standards for California law enforcement. • PREA: Prison Rape Elimina�on Act established in 2003 under the Code of Federal Regula�ons 28 (CFR Part 115), the Prison Rape Elimina�on Act sets the standards for the detec�on, preven�on, reduc�on, and prosecu�on of prison sexual assault. It also provides funds to help State and local governments implement the act. • Principled Policing: Focuses on the way police interact with the public and how these interac�ons influence crime rates and the public’s view of police and willingness to obey the law. Prac�cing procedural jus�ce can have a significant impact on compliance, coopera�on, public safety, and officer safety. • Read 180: A reading interven�on program, u�lizing adap�ve technology, to help students who are reading two grades below level or have reading difficul�es. • Resident: Any person confined or detained in a juvenile facility or in a community confinement facility. • Ride-along: An opportunity for a ci�zen to ride with a police officer. • SB 92: California Senate Bill 92 Chapter 18. Commitee on Budget and Fiscal Review, Juvenile Jus�ce. Commencing July 1, 2021, it prohibits further commitment of wards to the Division of Juvenile Jus�ce unless the ward is otherwise eligible to be commited to the division and a mo�on was filed to transfer the ward from the juvenile court to a court of criminal 120

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📋March 05, 2023 — Section 3: LAW and Justice Law and Jus�ce Report with a Special Report

40 pages 1 recommendations

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Additional Recommendations 1

Not linked to specific findings.

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📋December 01, 2022 — Section 4: Follow-up Illegal Dumping: Talking Trash

74 pages 2 findings 8 recommendations

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Findings & Recommendations 2 findings

F1.1: , F1.2, and Recommendations R1.1, R1.2, and R1.3. The San Joaquin County Board of Supervisors is required to respond to: Findings F2.1 and Recommendation R2.1. Mail or hand deliver a hard copy of the response to: Honorable Michael D. Coughlan, Presiding Judge San Joaquin County Superior Court 180 E. Weber Ave., Suite 1306J Stockton, California 95202 Also, please email a copy of the response to Mr. Irving Jimenez, Judicial Secretary to the Grand Jury, at grandjury@sjcourts.org. 173 174 Follow-up Report to the 2021-2022 San Joaquin County Grand Jury Stockton Unified School District Board of Educa�on: A Failing Grade in Public Trust Case #0121 Preface This report contains the responses to the 2021-2022 San Joaquin County Civil Grand Jury report regarding Stockton Unified School District. This follow-up report focuses on the 2021-2022 Grand Jury findings and recommenda�ons and the Stockton Unified School District responses, which are presented verba�m in this report. The 2022-2023 Grand Jury reviewed the agency responses to those recommenda�ons. The Grand Jury’s follow-up conclusions are presented a�er the agency responses. Discussions, findings, and recommendations from the 2022-2023 Grand Jury are in text boxes framed in black. Complete copies of the original report and the agency’s responses may be found on the San Joaquin County Grand Jury website at htps//www.sjcourts.org/grandjury/. Summary Over the past two years, the San Joaquin County Civil Grand Jury has conducted two separate investigations of Stockton Unified School District (SUSD) spanning topics from Superintendent turnover to fiscal mismanagement. While many circumstances have changed over the past two 175 years, one thing has remained the same: the SUSD Board of Trustees. The November 2022 election has changed the current majority of the Board, nonetheless, the 2022-2023 Civil Grand Jury maintained a keen eye on Stockton Unified School District, especially with respect to SUSD’s response to Case #0121 – A Failing Grade in Public Trust. The San Joaquin County Civil Grand Jury is constitutionally established as a branch of the California Superior Court. The rules and regulations for the Grand Jury proceedings and for those who must reply to recommendations are long established by statutory law. These regulations are mainly found in the California Penal Code. In reply to the 2021-2022 Grand Jury report issued in July 2022, the SUSD Trustees either inadvertently or deliberately failed to follow the law in some responses. The supplemental responses are listed after the initial agency response in this follow-up report. Method of Follow-up Inves�ga�on The 2022-2023 Grand Jury: • attended SUSD Board meetings, • conducted follow-up interviews, • requested documents that were germane to Case #0121, • reviewed Board agendas, and • reviewed Board videos. Materials Reviewed • Board meetings. • Board minutes. • Document requests. • Interviews. • Media reports. Findings, Recommenda�ons, Agency Responses, and Grand Jury Conclusions 1.0 Finance 2021-2022 Grand Jury Finding F1.1.1 Stockton Unified School District does not u�lize financial so�ware that aligns with the San Joaquin County Office of Educa�on so�ware, making analysis and review by the San Joaquin County Office of Educa�on difficult. Agency Response: The District recognizes the importance of its financial software and of its compatibility with the software utilized by the San Joaquin County Office of Education. 176 2021-2022 Grand Jury Finding F1.1.2 Stockton Unified School District Business Services staff lacks necessary training and guidance to execute complex District business needs, resul�ng in the need to hire outside consultants at an increased cost to the District. Agency Response: The District disagrees with this finding. There are many excellent administrators and staff in the District’s Business Services Department, and these employees undergo regular and consistent training. Nevertheless, it has been necessary to retain the services of outside consultants to augment these services, particularly in light of recent personnel vacancies and shortages, but the Board disagrees that doing so reflects a lack of staff training. 2021-2022 Grand Jury Finding F1.1.3 The current Chief Business Officer was hired without following Board Policy 4211, crea�ng an appearance of par�ality and crea�ng diminished internal and external confidence. Agency Response: In hiring its prior Chief Business Officer, although the District engaged in an expedited process in order to fill the vacancy as soon as possible, the District complied with the basic principles set forth in Board Policy 4211, including that “there will be no unlawful discrimination in selection.” 2021-2022 Grand Jury Recommenda�on R1.1.1 By January 1, 2023, the Stockton Unified School District Board of Trustees direct the Superintendent to assess the current financial so�ware to be compa�ble with the San Joaquin County Office of Educa�on so�ware. Agency Response: On August 9, 2022, the Board of Trustees complied with this

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F3.5: and Recommendation R3.5 and would like to further clarify that staff confirmed that the city of Lathrop does in fact have cybersecurity insurance coverage, and is currently in discussions with Risk Management to enhance said coverage. The 2022-2023 Grand Jury determined to take no further action. 4.0 City of Lodi 2021-2022 Grand Jury Finding F4.1: The City of Lodi does not have an approved Business Continuity Plan, rendering the City relatively unprepared to restore essential services in a disruptive event. Agency Response: Lodi agrees with this finding. However, Lodi was already on track to complete a BCP before this investigation began and will have one in place by the end of June 2023. 2021-2022 Grand Jury Finding F4.2: The City of Lodi has implemented an excellent cyber awareness training program for all employees minimizing risk to damage from cyberattack. Agency Response: Lodi agrees with this finding. 2021-2022 Grand Jury Recommendation R4.1: By January 1, 2023, the Lodi City Council, in conjunction with the City’s IT division, develop, adopt and implement a Business Continuity Plan. Agency Response: Lodi will adopt a Business Continuity plan by the recommended date. The City of Lodi agrees to comply by July 1, 2023. 5.0 City of Manteca 2021-2022 Grand Jury Finding F5.1: The City of Manteca has an Information Technology Security Policy which has not been updated since 2010, leaving the City relatively unprepared for a cyber event. Agency Response: The City agrees with this finding in part; while the City’s policy has not been updated since 2010, the City has undertaken other security measures and trainings to stave off a cyber-event. 2021-2022 Grand Jury Finding F5.2: The City of Manteca lacks a policy and procedure for ransomware attacks. This absence of policy could cause confusion, delay, and greater loss of security in the event of such an attack. Agency Response: The City agrees with this finding in part; though the City does not have a formal policy, IT staff is trained and capable to deal with a cyber-event. 2021-2022 Grand Jury Finding F5.3: The City of Manteca has a significant number of security devices with single power supplies. This lack of redundant power presents vulnerability in major or prolonged power outages. Agency Response: The City agrees with this finding. 2021-2022 Grand Jury Recommendation R5.1: By January 1, 2023, the Manteca City Council, in conjunction with the City’s ISD, develop, approve, and implement an updated Information Technology Security Policy. Agency Response: This recommendation will be completed by January 1, 2023. 2021-2022 Grand Jury Finding F5.1: The City of Manteca has an information technology security policy that has not been updated since 2010, leaving the City relatively unprepared for a cyber event. The 2022-2023 Grand Jury’s request for confirmation of action taken has not been answered. The 2022-2023 Grand Jury Recommendation 1.0: By October 1, 2023, the Manteca City Council, in conjunction with the City’s ISD, develop, approve, and implement an updated Information Technology Security Policy and forward the approved policy to the 2023-2024 San Joaquin County Civil Grand Jury. 2021-2022 Grand Jury Recommendation R5.2: By January 1, 2023, the Manteca City Council, in conjunction with the City’s ISD, develop, approve, and implement a confidential policy and procedure for response to a ransomware attack. Agency Response: The City will implement this recommendation on or before March 1, 2023. 2021-2022 Grand Jury Finding F5.2: The City of Manteca lacks a policy and procedure for ransomware attacks. This absence of policy could cause confusion, delay, and greater loss of security in the event of such an attack. The 2022-2023 Grand Jury’s request for confirmation of action taken has not been answered. The 2022-2023 Grand Jury Recommendation R1.1: By October 1, 2023, the Manteca City Council, in conjunction with the City’s ISD, develop, approve, and implement a confidential policy and procedure for responding to a ransomware attack and forward the approved policy to the 2023-2024 San Joaquin County Civil Grand Jury. 2021-2022 Grand Jury Recommendation R5.3: By March 1, 2023, the Manteca City Council, in conjunction with the City’s ISD, develop, approve and adopt an updated timeline to replace single- powered units with dual-powered or redundant-powered units in their network architecture. Agency Response: All critical network architecture have been updated with redundant- powered units. 205 2021-2022 Grand Jury Finding F5.3: The City of Manteca has a significant number of security devices with single power supplies. This lack of redundant power presents vulnerability in major or prolonged power outages. The 2022-2023 Grand Jury’s request for confirmation of action taken has not been answered. The 2022-2023 Grand Jury Recommendation R1.2: By October 1, 2023, the Manteca City Council, in conjunction with the City’s ISD, to provide confirmation of the completion of the replacement of single-powered units with dual-powered or redundant-powered units in their network architecture and forward the confirmation to the 2023-2024 San Joaquin County Civil Grand Jury. 6.0 City of Ripon 2021-2022 Grand Jury Finding F6.1: It is unclear in the City of Ripon’s Organization Chart where responsibilities for IT and IT security lie, creating confusion over who is responsible to act in a disruptive event. Agency Response: The City of Ripon respectfully disagrees with this finding for the reasons set forth below. The IT Department is organized into Information Technology Technician level I and II, with the tier II technician reporting directly to the Lieutenant of the Ripon Police Department. The Police Department’s organizational chart (sic) depicts the relationship between the two IT positions and the Lieutenant. In a disruptive event it is clear that the technicians within the IT Department, as well as all identified vendors and contractors, respond to, preserve and reinstate functions as the City of Ripon, under the supervision of the Lieutenant. At this time, both Information Technology Technician positions are filled and both employees have been fully briefed as to the organizational structure. 2021-2022 Grand Jury Finding F6.2 The City of Ripon has a rudimentary network diagram outlining the City’s router and firewall relationship with networks used, but the diagram lacks detail, leaving uncertainty about data security. Agency Response: The City of Ripon respectfully disagrees with the finding. The City of Ripon has contracted with Waypoint Network Solutions for the last 15 years to assist in creating very detailed diagrams of network structure including documentation on router and firewall settings. Both of the City’s Information Technology technicians understand these diagrams and work with Waypoint Network Solutions as updates are periodically needed when improvements are made to increase the security of the City’s network. 2021-2022 Grand Jury Finding F6.3: Although the City of Ripon met expectations in the areas of data confidentiality and security, lack of IT staff and leadership leaves these areas vulnerable to cyberattack. Agency Response: The City of Ripon has addressed this Finding as to staffing following the information-gathering phase of the Report. The City of Ripon has created a second full time 206 position as part of the Fiscal year 2022-2023 budget. The City has filled both full-time positions since the completion of the information-gathering phase. The City of Ripon respectfully disagrees with the finding regarding lack of leadership. The IT team leader reports directly to the Lieutenant of the Ripon Police Department for status updates and administrative decisions. 2021-2022 Grand Jury Finding F6.4: The City of Ripon lacks a Business Continuity Plan, rendering the City relatively unprepared to restore essential services in a disruptive event. Agency Response: The City of Ripon has addressed this finding following the information- gathering phase of this Report. The City of Ripon has drafted a formal plan for business continuity as part of the City’s Network Security Plan (sic) that was approved by the City Council on December 13, 2022. 2021-2022 Grand Jury Finding F6.5: The City of Ripon does not have a Disaster Preparedness Plan, leaving the City at risk for significant delay and cost to restore IT systems in the event of a disaster. Agency Response: The City of Ripon has addressed this finding following the information- gathering phase of this Report. Many of the disaster response measures were already in place prior to the information-gathering phase. To avoid the confusion of utilizing multiple plans in the event of a ransomware attack, the City of Ripon has drafted the elements of the of the disaster preparedness plan as part of the City’s Network Security Plan. 2021-2022 Grand Jury Finding F6.6: The City of Ripon does not have a formal policy or procedure to address ransomware attacks. This absence of policy could cause confusion, delay and greater loss of security in the event of an attack. Agency Response: The City of Ripon has addressed this finding following the information- gathering phase of this Report. Many of the measures to address a ransomware attack were already in place prior to the information-gathering phase. To avoid the confusion of utilizing multiple plans in the event of a ransomware attack, the City of Ripon has incorporated the elements of the ransomware attack response as part of the Network Security Plan. 2021-2022 Grand Jury Recommendation R6.1: By January 1, 2023, the Ripon City Council develop and make public an updated City Organizational chart showing details of the City’s IT functions, including all IT positions. Agency Response: The City of Ripon has updated its organizational chart to show the changes made to our current staff positions (sic). The 2022-2023 Grand Jury determined to take no further action. 2021-2022 Grand Jury Recommendation R6.2: By January 1, 2023, the Ripon City Council develop and adopt a detailed Network Diagram to decrease security vulnerabilities. Agency Response: The City of Ripon already has developed and adopted highly detailed networks diagrams that are kept confidential and secure internally. The City of Ripon 207 recognizes the importance of maintaining network documentation and will continually maintain its network documentation consistent with the Grand Jury’s recommendation. The 2022-2023 Grand Jury determined to take no further action. 2021-2022 Grand Jury Recommendation R6.3: By January 1, 2023, the Ripon City Council obtain a third-party security review of the City’s IT department assets, positions, and policies and an evaluation of data confidentiality, security systems and protocols. Agency Response: The City of Ripon has obtained the third-party firm “Resolute Guard” to perform an independent review of the City’s IT department assets, which has been completed. The City of Ripon’s IT department has incorporated the recommendations of this third-party review into the operations of the IT department, consistent with the Grand Jury’s findings. The 2022-2023 Grand Jury determined to take no further action. 2021-2022 Grand Jury Recommendation R6.4: By January 1, 2023, the Ripon City Council develop, adopt and implement a formal Business Continuity Plan. Agency Response: The City of Ripon has conducted an internal review of its network and developed the elements of the business continuity plan as part of the City’s Network Security Plan that is accessible to the IT department and relevant Response Team Members. This plan was adopted by the City Council on December 13, 2022 and will be continually reviewed and updated to stay current and effective with evolving technologies. The 2022-2023 Grand Jury determined to take no further action. 2021-2022 Grand Jury Recommendation R6.5: By January 1, 2023, the Ripon City Council develop, adopt and implement a formal Disaster Preparedness Plan for IT functions. Agency Response: The City of Ripon has conducted an internal review of its network and incorporated the elements of the Disaster Preparedness Plan as part of the City’s Network Security Plan previously described. The 2022-2023 Grand Jury determined to take no further action. 2021-2022 Grand Jury Recommendation R6.6: By January 1, 2023, the Ripon City Council develop, adopt, and implement a formal internal policy and procedure for response to a ransomware attack. Agency Response: The City of Ripon has conducted an internal review of its network and incorporated the elements of responding to a ransomware attack as part of the City’s Network Security Plan previously described. The 2022-2023 Grand Jury determined to take no further action. 208 7.0 City of Stockton 2021-2022 Grand Jury Finding F7.1: The City of Stockton does not have a formal internal policy concerning payments or procedures in ransomware attacks. This absence of policy could cause confusion, delay, and greater loss of security in the event of an attack. Agency Response: The City agrees with this finding. 2021-2022 Grand Jury Finding F7.2: The City of Stockton has a large IT Department which places cybersecurity and disaster preparedness at a high priority, minimizing risk to the City’s information and service systems. Agency Response: The City agrees with this finding. 2021-2022 Grand Jury Recommendation R7.1: By November 1, 2022, the Stockton City Council, in conjunction with the City’s IT department, develop, adopt, and implement a formal internal policy and procedure for response to a ransomware attack. Agency Response: A formal internal policy and procedure for response to a ransomware attack was approved by the City Manager on September 1, 2022, and presented to the City Council at its September 13, 2022 public meeting (sic). The 2022-2023 Grand Jury determined to take no further action. 8.0 City of Tracy 2021-2022 Grand Jury Finding F8.1: Lacking a requirement for encryption of thumb drives used on City devices exposes the City of Tracy to potential data theft and contamination. 2021-2022 Grand Jury Recommendation R8.1: By November 1, 2022, the Tracy City Council, in conjunction with the IT division, develop, adopt, and implement a policy requiring encryption of thumb drives used on City devices. Agency Response: IT has developed a draft policy to require encrypted thumb drives which will be routed through HR for official adoption. For the implementation of administrative policies such as the one for the encryption of thumb drives, the City of Tracy's procedures require that these draft policies be routed to the various bargaining units for approval. The draft IT policy is currently being circulated to these units and should be ready for adoption shortly. While we strive to remove technological barriers that encourage removable storage use, we recognize special situations exist that require it. Once the new policy is rolled out all thumb drives used for City data or on City-owned devices will be required by the policy to be encrypted. The 2022-2023 Grand Jury determined to take no further action. 2021-2022 Grand Jury Finding F8.2: The City of Tracy lacks a completed Business Continuity Plan, rendering Tracy relatively unprepared to restore essential services in a disruptive event. 209 2021-2022 Grand Jury Recommendation R8.2: By January 1, 2023, the Tracy City Council, in conjunction with the IT division, develop, adopt and implement a formal Business Continuity Plan. Agency Response: Human Resources coordinated with a consultant and management from each department to draft a Business Continuity Plan to be finalized as an Annex to the City of Tracy Emergency Management Plan. The South San Joaquin County Fire Authority has contracted services to prepare the draft Emergency Management Plan which is anticipated to be finalized in the fall of 2022. The IT Manager had several meetings with the consultant to summarize the business continuity plan for the information technology needs of the organization. The IT department is aware of the lack of an IT-specific Disaster Recovery/ Business continuity plan as it relates to a Cyber incident. The IT department will be crafting an RFP to include a disaster preparedness plan and necessary infrastructure additions as well as IT-specific Business Continuity. In addition, we plan to add a dedicated information security position this fiscal year in line with the Grand Jury recommendation. It is generally recognized practice for the Security Officer in an organization to maintain a Disaster Preparedness and Business Continuity Plan. Due to the nature of this policy adoption, as part of the Tracy Emergency Management Plan, City Council approval is required. The City is striving to adopt this Business Continuity Plan by the first quarter of 2023. The 2022-2023 Grand Jury determined to take no further action. 2021-2022 Grand Jury Recommendation R8.3: By January 1, 2023, the Tracy City Council provide the Grand Jury with an updated formal Disaster Preparedness Plan. Agency Response: We view the business continuity, and the disaster preparedness plans as two sides of the same coin that work hand in hand and should be addressed holistically. Any large- scale Cyber business continuity event should be treated in a similar way as a disaster. Most equipment will be unavailable for extended periods of time due to the necessary forensics. We plan on addressing this in conjunction with the IT-specific business continuity plan as outlined in the response to Finding 8.2. Due to the nature of this policy, as an annexation to the City of Tracy Emergency Management Plan, City Council approval is required. The City is striving to adopt the Disaster Preparedness Plan by the first quarter of 2023. The 2022-2023 Grand Jury determined to take no further action. Disclaimer Grand Jury reports are based on documentary evidence and the testimony of sworn or admonished witnesses, not on conjecture or opinion. However, the Grand Jury is precluded by law from disclosing such evidence except upon specific approval of the Presiding Judge of the Superior Court, or another judge appointed by the Presiding Judge (Penal Code Section 911, 924.1(a), and 929). Similarly, the Grand Jury is precluded by law from disclosing the identity of witnesses except upon an order of the court for narrowly defined purposes (Penal Code Sections 924.2 and 929). Response Requirements California Penal Code Sections 933 and 933.05 require that specific responses to all findings and

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Additional Recommendations 8

Not linked to specific findings.

R1: R1 September 30, 2022 No further ac�on Supervisors implemented SJC Board of R2 Will be R2 September 30, 2022 No further ac�on Supervisors implemented SJC Board of R3 Will be R3 September 30, 2022 No further ac�on Supervisors implemented 156 2021-2022 Findings, Recommendations, and Agency Responses Board of Supervisors 2021-2022 Grand Jury Finding F1: Because the County has not created a strong, enforceable ordinance, illegal dumping continues without consequences. Agency Response: Agree. 2021-2022 Grand Jury Recommendation R1: By September 30, 2022, the Board of Supervisors adopts an enforceable ordinance to deter illegal dumping. This ordinance will include a mechanism for collecting fines, an appeals process, and a way to recoup the cost of administration from the illegal dumpers. Agency Response: Will be implemented. A draft ordinance will be agendized for introduction to the Board of Supervisors on August 23, 2022, and for adoption on September 13, 2022. If adopted the ordinance will become effective 30 days after adoption. The purpose of the proposed ordinance is to protect public and private property from illegal dumping, to hold any person that takes actions that substantially contribute to illegal dumping accountable, to deter illegal dumping and to mitigate the harms that the County has found are caused by illegal dumping. Ordinance provisions prohibit all illegal dumping and, among other things, make vehicle or trailer owners liable if their vehicle or trailer is used for illegal dumping with the express or implied permission of the owner. For example, if the County Sheriff’s Office gets video of an identifiable vehicle or trailer, even if they cannot identify the driver, they can take action against the vehicle/trailer owner. This is to address situations in which residents obtained video of vehicles dumping waste, but authorities could not take enforcement action because they could not identify the driver. Further, the proposed ordinance is going to the Board of Supervisors as part of an illegal dumping mitigation plan called the “3 E’s Plan” to address Illegal Dumping. The Plan will be carried out by the County’s Illegal Dumping Task Force, which will report back to the Board of Supervisors on the effectiveness of the Plan, including the ordinance if it is adopted, in one-year. A draft ordinance is complete and will be part of an illegal dumping mitigation package proposed for approval to the Board of Supervisors by early summer of 2022. The 2022-2023 Grand Jury determined to take no further action. 2021-2022 Grand Jury Finding F2: San Joaquin County still lacks the capability to monitor dumping hotspots and to prosecute illegal dumpers. Agency Response: Partially disagree. The County disagrees that it still lacks the capability to monitor dumping hotspots; however, agrees that the County still lacks the capability to prosecute illegal dumpers. 157 2021-2022 Grand Jury Recommendation R2: By September 30, 2022, approves a plan to effectively monitor the surveillance camera. Agency Response: Will be implemented. On August 23, 2022, the County Board of Supervisors will consider the “3 E’s Plan” to address Illegal Dumping, which includes the posting and monitoring of surveillance cameras. The Plan proposed to be carried out by the County’s Illegal Dumping Task Force, includes action items relating to education, enforcement, and eradication. As part of the plan to implement robust enforcement, including the adoption of a new ordinance prohibiting illegal dumping, the County’s Sheriff’s Office, with assistance and funding to the Public Works Department, will be as follows: A. Video surveillance using cellular fed cameras equipped with a notification system, will be used to monitor dumping hot spots, and send notifications when movement is detected. Data will be stored in the system’s cloud database and accessible to download and memorialize for investigational purposes. B. The Sheriff’s Office Community Revitalization Unit (CRU) and the Community Car Unit (CCU) will proactively identify and investigate illegal dumping issues with the County. i. CRU consists of eight specially trained Deputies to address the quality-of-life issues surrounding illegal dumping and homelessness. ii. CCU designates a Deputy to be assigned to a smaller area within the County to establish close relationship and address issues within the community. C. Sheriff’s Office will provide training to all sworn Deputies to educate them on how to effectively enforce the ordinance from a call-for-service model. D. The Strategic Intelligence Unit will collect data on reports of illegal dumping, issued citations, deployment of Sheriff’s Office resources, and other relevant data to evaluate the effectiveness of the illegal dumping ordinance. E. The Sheriff’s Office and other County departments, including but not limited to Public Works, Community Development, Environmental Health, and County Administrator’s Office, will conduct continuous evaluation and review of the effectiveness of the Sheriff’s Office response and deployment strategy to modify enforcement strategies as needed. 2022-2023 Grand Jury determined to take no further action. 2021-2022 Grand Jury Finding F3: Regional limitations prevent each jurisdiction from sharing the specific costs of cleanup outside of its respective boundaries. These limitations make a coordinated response difficult. Agency Response: Agree. 2021-2022 Grand Jury Recommendation R3: By September 30, 2022, the San Joaquin County Board of Supervisors develop and adopt a plan to equitably share costs for illegal dumping removal throughout the County. Agency Response: Will be implemented. Illegal dumping and its negative effects do not stop at City borders, but no single jurisdiction has the funding to tackle it. Further, there are legal limitations on the use of certain funds across jurisdictional boundaries. Accordingly, on August 23, 2022, the County Board of Supervisors will consider the “3 E’s Plan” to address Illegal Dumping, which includes specific direction to staff to work cooperatively with the 7 cities within the County to propose development of consistent regulatory frameworks and joint education, eradication, and enforcement measures. The 2022-2023 Grand Jury determined to take no further action.

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R2: 1 January 1, 2023 City of Lathrop Implemented November 1, 2022 No further ac�on

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R3: 1 June 1, 2022 Disagrees November 1, 2022 No further ac�on

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R4: 1 implemented by July 1, 2023 July 1, 2023 City of Manteca Will be October 1, 2023 The requested implemented by confirma�on of

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R5: 1 January 1, 2023 compliance was not received (see R1.0) Will be October 1, 2023 The requested implemented by confirma�on of

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R6: 1 December 13, 2022 Implemented January 1, 2023 No further ac�on

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R7: 1 November 1, 2022 City of Tracy Implemented 1st April 1, 2023 No further ac�on

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R8: 1 quarter of 2023 Implemented 1st April 1, 2023 No further ac�on

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📋December 01, 2022 — Section 4: Follow-up Illegal Dumping: Talking Trash

74 pages 2 findings 8 recommendations

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Findings & Recommendations 2 findings

Page 174

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Additional Recommendations 8

Not linked to specific findings.

Page 157

R2: 1 January 1, 2023 City of Lathrop Implemented November 1, 2022 No further ac�on

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R3: 1 June 1, 2022 Disagrees November 1, 2022 No further ac�on

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R4: 1 implemented by July 1, 2023 July 1, 2023 City of Manteca Will be October 1, 2023 The requested implemented by confirma�on of

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R5: 1 January 1, 2023 compliance was not received (see R1.0) Will be October 1, 2023 The requested implemented by confirma�on of

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R6: 1 December 13, 2022 Implemented January 1, 2023 No further ac�on

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R7: 1 November 1, 2022 City of Tracy Implemented 1 st April 1, 2023 No further ac�on

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R8: 1 quarter of 2023 Implemented 1 st April 1, 2023 No further ac�on

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Working Title 1: Working Title 2 (Case No. xx20) Good Intentions Are Failing San Joaquin County’s At‐Risk Children

24 pages 13 findings 3 recommendations

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Findings & Recommendations 13 findings

F1: 1 The San Joaquin County Board of Supervisors and San Joaquin County Probation Department failed to promptly take expedient measures to keep up with the ever‐changing regulatory environment regarding the Juvenile Realignment Act, which created significant deficiencies in available placement options.

Related Recommendations (1)

R1: 1 By December 31, 2023, the San Joaquin County Board of Supervisors and San Joaquin County Proba(cid:415)on Department, through collabora(cid:415)on with Human Services Agency, Children’s Protec(cid:415)ve Services, Behavioral Health Services develop, adopt, and implement appropriate alterna(cid:415)ve housing placement op(cid:415)ons (e.g., transi(cid:415)onal housing placement program, small family homes, group homes, and/or short‐term residen(cid:415)al therapeu(cid:415)c programs).

F2: 1 Human Services Agency, Children’s Protective Services, and Mary Graham Children’s Shelter are critically and chronically understaffed and fail to provide the level of supervision required for At‐Risk Youth and sheltered children. 19

Related Recommendations (1)

R2: 1 By December 31, 2023, Human Services Agency implement an ongoing recruitment plan utilizing the services of a third‐party recruiter.

F3: 1 The absence of the Sheriff’s Office from participation in the development of the System of Care Memorandum of Understanding was a significant omission by the San Joaquin County Board of Supervisors and the San Joaquin County Human Services Agency, which failed to capitalize on law enforcement experience when developing the MOU.

Related Recommendations (1)

R3: 1 By December 31, 2023, San Joaquin County Human Services Agency prepare an addendum to the System of Care MOU that includes the participation of the Sheriff’s Office.

F1.1: The San Joaquin County Board of Supervisors and San Joaquin County Probation Department failed to promptly take expedient measures to keep up with the ever‐changing regulatory environment regarding the Juvenile Realignment Act, which created significant deficiencies in available placement options.

F1.2: The San Joaquin County Board of Supervisors and San Joaquin County Human Services Agency failed to take (cid:415)mely steps to keep up with the Juvenile Realignment Act’s ever‐changing regulatory environment, which created significant deficiencies in available services and placement op(cid:415)ons.

F1.3: The San Joaquin County Board of Supervisors and San Joaquin County Human Services Agency and San Joaquin County Probation Department are underutilizing available program options like the San Joaquin County Office of Education’s Discovery ChalleNGe Academy, or the Youth Law Center’s Quality Parenting Initiative. This deprives children of additional available resources. 1 *Figure includes services for individuals provided mul(cid:415)ple occurrences of care throughout the year. **A(cid:332)er January 1, 2017, the length of stay was statutorily limited to 10 days. 13

F1.4: The San Joaquin County Board of Supervisors and San Joaquin County Human Services Agency and San Joaquin County Probation Department, did not plan or account for the increased number of the most difficult‐to‐place youth needing placement in congregate care, creating restricted access to services and potential harm to juveniles and communities throughout San Joaquin County.

F2.1: Human Services Agency, Children’s Protective Services, and Mary Graham Children’s Shelter are critically and chronically understaffed and fail to provide the level of supervision required for At‐Risk Youth and sheltered children. 19

F2.2: Human Services Agency, Children’s Protective Services, and Mary Graham Children’s Shelter training has been inconsistent and inadequate to meet regulatory requirements that are critical for the staff to maintain the welfare of At‐Risk Youth and sheltered children.

F2.3: Mary Graham Children’s Shelter employees lack clear and concise guidance for handling disruptive behaviors, which creates an environment where the safety of children and staff is compromised.

F3.1: The absence of the Sheriff’s Office from participation in the development of the System of Care Memorandum of Understanding was a significant omission by the San Joaquin County Board of Supervisors and the San Joaquin County Human Services Agency, which failed to capitalize on law enforcement experience when developing the MOU.

F3.2: Substantial issues in managing the care for At‐Risk Youth in the County were due to a lack of meaningful interagency cooperation, which missed an opportunity to leverage and gain sustainable support from other agencies.

F3.3: The Sheriff’s Office has failed to meaningfully collaborate with the other agencies charged with the care of At‐Risk Youth, leaving those agencies more vulnerable to threats and challenges.

Stockton Unified School District Swiftly Hired

7 pages 1 findings 1 recommendations

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Findings & Recommendations 1 findings

F1: 1 District HR being left out of the hiring process of the Interim Chief and Captain caused confusion thus the pre-employment requirements for the positions were not met.

Related Recommendations (1)

R1: 1 The District Board is to develop and implement a policy/procedure no later than November 1, 2014 to insure the District HR is involved in the hiring process of police personnel to properly vet the applicant according to the current state law and district board policy.