San Joaquin County Grand Jury • 2022-2023

2022‐2023 San Joaquin County Grand Jury School Safety in San Joaquin County: Developing a Culture of Safety

Published: June 12, 2023 26 pages
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Findings and Recommendations 33 findings

F1
Improving communica(cid:415)on: ICS‐100 training teaches responders how to use a common language and communica(cid:415)on system to ensure that everyone is on the same page during an emergency.
No recommendations for this finding
F2
Enhancing coordina(cid:415)on: ICS‐100 training clarifies how responders work together and coordinate their efforts to respond effec(cid:415)vely to an emergency.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2
1 By March 1, 2024, the annual updates for each school site’s CSSP address safety issues unique to the site. 13
F3
Promo(cid:415)ng safety: ICS‐100 training emphasizes the importance of safety during an emergency and informs responders how to priori(cid:415)ze safety when responding to incidents.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3
1 By December 1, 2023, the San Joaquin County Office of Educa(cid:415)on and the San Joaquin County Office of Educa(cid:415)on Board of Trustees develop, adopt, and host an annual School Safety Summit.
F4
Reducing confusion: ICS‐100 training provides a clear structure and framework for responding to emergencies, reducing confusion and ensuring that everyone knows their role in an emergency. The Grand Jury discovered that within the County, while some school districts u(cid:415)lize ICS‐100 training, many do not, causing a security gap. When the Grand Jury inquired about ICS training with expert witnesses, the answer was universally in support of such training, tailored to the specifics of school sites. “I think it's useful. I think it's useful to understand how it all works in the big picture,” said an expert. While the Grand Jury recognizes that annual training can be overwhelming to school staff, not all school site personnel require ICS‐100 training as much as those personnel iden(cid:415)fied in the CSSP incident command roles on school campuses (including classified employees). While ICS‐100 training is focused on a school site, ICS‐402 training is directed towards execu(cid:415)ve‐ level leadership (district cabinet‐level employees). ICS‐402 training is designed to provide educa(cid:415)on and training for those who may be responsible for managing large‐scale incidents or emergencies. ICS‐402 training for senior‐level district staff members is important for several reasons:
Related Recommendations (1)
R4
1 By October 1, 2023, each school site implement an access control program that consistently includes verifying visitors' iden(cid:415)ty and collec(cid:415)on of any issued badge before the visitor leaves the school site.
F2.1
A review of CSSPs demonstrated many districts have failed to create a CSSP that addresses safety issues unique to the individual school sites, and rather use a template and/or boilerplate language, leaving the school site unprepared in an emergency. 12
No recommendations for this finding
F2.2
Many districts have not involved teachers, support staff, students, and parents/guardians when upda(cid:415)ng each school site’s CSSP, missing an opportunity to create a culture of school safety.
No recommendations for this finding
F2.3
Many districts have not collaborated with local law enforcement and other first responders during the annual process to update the CSSP, which could result in a prolonged and inefficient emergency response.
No recommendations for this finding
F2.4
Many district CSSPs show a lack of meaningful collabora(cid:415)on between districts and local law enforcement agencies, causing confusion and chaos during an emergency.
No recommendations for this finding
F2.5
Many districts do not offer an opportunity for public input during the dra(cid:332)ing or approval stages of the annual CSSP, which renders the districts out of compliance with State law.
No recommendations for this finding
F2.6
Most districts do not include an assessment of the status of crime at the school and school‐ related func(cid:415)ons in their CSSPs, which renders the districts out of compliance with State law and causes poten(cid:415)al harm and liability.
No recommendations for this finding
F2.7
Many districts do not adequately address the unique needs of students with disabili(cid:415)es during emergencies. The lack of planning for the most vulnerable students can cause harm during a (cid:415)me of confusion and crisis.
No recommendations for this finding
F2.8
A few districts do not make any part of the CSSPs available to the public, withholding important informa(cid:415)on about steps taken by the district to reduce the probability and impact of safety risks. Other districts post the CSSPs in their en(cid:415)rety, failing to keep confiden(cid:415)al informa(cid:415)on about tac(cid:415)cal responses, poten(cid:415)ally revealing sensi(cid:415)ve informa(cid:415)on to the public.
No recommendations for this finding
F2.9
Many districts have CSSPs that fail to iden(cid:415)fy incident command roles and the individuals who are to perform those roles in case of an emergency, exposing students and staff to the poten(cid:415)al for confusion and increased risks during an emergency.
No recommendations for this finding
F3.1
Feedback forms completed by attendees of the San Joaquin County Office of Education School Safety Summit and reviewed by the Grand Jury demonstrate the value and necessity of a Countywide School Safety Summit.
No recommendations for this finding
F3.2
Some of the districts failed to send representatives to the 2022 School Safety Summit, thereby missing an opportunity to work together to make schools safer.
No recommendations for this finding
F3.3
The Grand Jury learned through interviews, surveys, and site tours that many districts fail to include safety topics during regular mee(cid:415)ngs with teachers and support staff throughout the school year, minimizing the importance of safety.
No recommendations for this finding
F3.4
The Grand Jury learned through interviews, surveys, and site tours that many school sites fail to assure subs(cid:415)tute staff receive the informa(cid:415)on they will need in the case of a school safety emergency, leaving the subs(cid:415)tute staff ill‐prepared for an emergency.
No recommendations for this finding
F3.5
Many districts fail to include the u(cid:415)liza(cid:415)on of communica(cid:415)on and incident command protocols (ICS‐100) during safety drills throughout the school year, causing miscommunica(cid:415)on in an emergency.
No recommendations for this finding
F3.6
Many district cabinet‐level posi(cid:415)ons (e.g., Superintendent, Chief Business Officer) are not trained in ICS protocols (ICS‐402), causing a lack of unified response to districtwide emergencies.
No recommendations for this finding
F3.7
Many school sites do not vary the (cid:415)me of day when rou(cid:415)ne safety drills are conducted or when students are not in classrooms, making drills predictable and leaving students unprepared for emergencies that may occur at any (cid:415)me.
No recommendations for this finding
F3.8
Many school sites fail to include support staff (classified personnel) in probable real‐life roles during safety drills, leaving them unprepared to assist students in emergencies.
No recommendations for this finding
F3.9
Most school sites fail to conduct a post‐incident report a(cid:332)er drills analyzing what went well, what went wrong, and what needs to be changed in the future to improve plans and drills, undermining the effec(cid:415)veness of drills. Recommenda(cid:415)ons The 2022‐2023 San Joaquin County Civil Grand Jury recommends that the County Office of Educa(cid:415)on and the 14 school districts in the County implement school safety programs that require the following ac(cid:415)ons:
No recommendations for this finding
F4.1
Not all school sites have check‐in procedures in place that were followed consistently, posing serious security threats.
No recommendations for this finding
F4.2
Perimeter fencing or an “open” campus each pose security challenges and require careful considera(cid:415)on to mi(cid:415)gate security shortcomings.
No recommendations for this finding
F4.3
Evacua(cid:415)on maps that are posted inconsistently or do not adequately illustrate evacua(cid:415)on routes cause confusion and prolonged evacua(cid:415)on (cid:415)mes, making staff and students vulnerable to harm in both classrooms and common areas.
No recommendations for this finding
F4.4
Inconsistent door‐locking policies and failure to follow policies create opportuni(cid:415)es for perpetrators to enter classrooms and common areas.
No recommendations for this finding
F4.5
Most school sites u(cid:415)lized flip charts that iden(cid:415)fy steps to be taken in case of emergencies, however, none of the sites posted them in all rooms used by students, staff, parents/guardians, and the general public.
No recommendations for this finding
F4.6
Insufficient window coverings give perpetrators a clear line of sight, crea(cid:415)ng risk for students and staff.
No recommendations for this finding
F4.7
Most school sites, regardless of age, were well maintained and showed school pride. One school site demonstrated mul(cid:415)ple maintenance shortcomings, which can nega(cid:415)vely impact safety.
No recommendations for this finding
F4.8
Good rela(cid:415)onships among administrators, cer(cid:415)ficated and classified staff, parents, and students are vital to promptly iden(cid:415)fy and address areas of concern, par(cid:415)cularly regarding student behavior. Rela(cid:415)onships varied greatly from campus to campus.
No recommendations for this finding
F4.9
The culture of safety is best developed by public transparency and involvement by all par(cid:415)es. Few of the school sites visited by the Grand Jury demonstrated meaningful public engagement in safety planning. 22
No recommendations for this finding
F2.10
Many districts have CSSPs that fail to describe the system to reunite parents/guardians with their children in the event of a campus‐wide evacua(cid:415)on, crea(cid:415)ng confusion and addi(cid:415)onal anxiety in the event of a safety emergency.
No recommendations for this finding
F2.11
Many school site CSSPs do not account for specific dangers unique to the school site (e.g., train tracks, flooding, freeways). Recommenda(cid:415)ons The 2022‐2023 San Joaquin County Civil Grand Jury recommends that the County Office of Educa(cid:415)on, the 14 school districts, and law enforcement agencies in the County implement school safety programs that require the following ac(cid:415)ons:
No recommendations for this finding

Conclusions 1