Gran Jurado del Condado de San Joaquin

2014-2015

6 informes

From the annual report
The consolidated year-end volume. The individual investigations it contains are listed separately below.
📑 Year-End Report
View the full annual report (PDF)
The full consolidated volume; individual reports are listed below.
Individual reports (6)
Hallazgos & Recomendaciones 5 hallazgos
F1: 1 San Joaquin County and its cities do not have regulations that specifically address the placement, maintenance, and monitoring of unattended donation bins.
Recomendaciones relacionadas (1)
R1: By December 1, 2015, San Joaquin County and its incorporated cities should enact ordinances that regulate unattended donation bins, including:  Shall require written consent from property owners before placement of any donation bin on private property  Shall obligate the bin owner to maintain it  Shall obligate the bin owner to hold property owners and their agents harmless from liability who remove unwanted bins from their property  Shall require donation bins meet or exceed the requirements found in the California Welfare and Institutions Code, §§150 to 153  Shall adopt sanctions for any violations of the ordinance provisions  Shall require owners of donation bins that do not have IRS Code 501(c)(3) status to pay a permit fee to generate income to help off-set ordinance enforcement efforts
F1.1: San Joaquin County and its cities do not have regulations that specifically address the placement, maintenance, and monitoring of unattended donation bins.
F1.2: City and county ordinances can effectively clarify who is responsible for removing unwanted donation bins and protect property owners from liability.
F1.3: Local ordinances can provide cities and the county with stronger control over unattended donation bin placement and assist to enforce them efficiently.
F1.4: Donations to out-of-state for profit operators divert donations from local not-for-profit operators, which diminishes their ability to benefit local communities.
Hallazgos & Recomendaciones 16 hallazgos
F1: 1 While there are pockets of poverty throughout Stockton, much of it is concentrated in South Stockton where incomes and educational attainment are low.
F2: 1 South Stockton has some of the lowest levels of homeownership in the City. This creates a more transient population and one with less “buy-in” to the community.
F3: 1 The activity of street gangs stems from and exacerbates poverty problems for South Stockton residents.
Recomendaciones relacionadas (1)
R3: 1 By December 31, 2015, the City Council shall begin quarterly public reporting of its results from the Operation Ceasefire and Marshall Plan programs, with emphasis on criminal activities that originate or concentrate in South Stockton.
F4: 1 South Stockton has been neglected and underserved by City government for many years.
Recomendaciones relacionadas (2)
R2: 1 By December 31, 2015, the City resources be allocated on an equitable distribution based on the needs of each City Council district, and the City in its present and future budgets provide the necessary resources to increase the CEO and SPD staff necessary to adequately address the longstanding neglect affecting South Stockton. 3.0 Crime No area of Stockton is without crime problems. In 2012, based on data provided by the City and media reports, the City had a violent crime rate of 782.8 per 100,000 residents, compared to a statewide rate of 332.6 and a nationwide rate of 223.2. Including property crimes, Stockton’s overall crime rate is the highest in the county. Compared to Riverside, a city with a similar population and density, Stockton had a violent crime rate that was more than double. Stockton homicides peaked at 71 in 2012, giving the City a homicide rate of 23.7 per 100,000 residents compared to a national rate of about five. The SPD oversees anti-crime efforts throughout the City. After the City’s economic collapse in 2008, SPD lost more than 100 experienced officers. The trend seems to have abated somewhat, however, layoffs, resignations, and retirements, as well as the difficulties of finding qualified personnel, have reduced the police force significantly in recent years. The SPD is rebuilding, but it will take time. Street gangs are among the major problems faced by the SPD. At least 45 gangs are known to be active in Stockton. Although gang activity can be found citywide, much of it is concentrated in South Stockton. Efforts are being made to address crime with programs such as the Marshall Plan, Operation Ceasefire, and the Blitz program. The Blitz program strategically utilizes City resources within secured neighborhoods for a 90-day period, using code enforcement, SPD, and other City departments aimed to reclaim neighborhoods by addressing blight, crime, and drug activity. However, no area of South Stockton presently has been designated as part of the Blitz program. STAND is working in cooperation with SPD to implement community policing, which is becoming the standard for the City. Community policing involves assigning officers to specific neighborhoods for extended periods.
R4: 1 By September 30, 2015, the City should begin holding a series of public workshop/forums devoted to the needs of South Stockton – as guided by its residents – with the purpose of developing short- and long-term goals to correct the long neglected issues affecting South Stockton.
F1.1: While there are pockets of poverty throughout Stockton, much of it is concentrated in South Stockton where incomes and educational attainment are low.
F1.2: Compared to the rest of the City, South Stockton has few major retail outlets, including major grocery outlets, and only in recent months did a financial institution announce plans to locate a branch in South Stockton.
F1.3: People outside and inside South Stockton perceive the area as being an unsafe place to do business, shop, or live. 2.0 Housing and Code Enforcement About 30 percent of South Stockton residents are homeowners, roughly half the rate for the City as a whole, according to Census Bureau data. Citywide, homeownership is highest among whites, roughly 68 percent, and lowest among African Americans and Hispanics, about 42 percent. More than 60 percent of the South Stockton housing units are rentals. The Code Enforcement Office (CEO) is responsible for enforcing the City’s building codes and abating blight and graffiti. There are fewer than 10 CEO staff members to cover the City. Due to the low number of CEO staff, Code Enforcement staff is limited to responding to complaints and are not able to proactively initiate their independent investigations. There are no plans by the City Manager to add code enforcement staff during the next two budget years. CEO efforts are largely reactive, meaning enforcement officers respond to complaints rather than proactively addressing problems. There are efforts to abate blight by several groups, including STAND, a non-profit organization, working with the SPD and CEO to eradicate blight, slumlords, and to reduce crime and drugs, buying homes, and rehabilitating them for occupancy by low income families. Findings
F2.2: Code enforcement is inadequately staffed to deal with the problems of South Stockton. Enforcement and abatement efforts are reactive rather than proactive.
F2.3: In many cases, South Stockton residents do not report blight, graffiti, and building code violations because they do not believe the City will help, and/or they fear reprisals from their landlord.
F2.4: The City is not aggressively taking proactive steps to remove slumlords from South Stockton.
F2.5: STAND is making contributions to address housing, drug activity, crime, and quality-of-life issues in South Stockton.
F3.1: The activity of street gangs stems from and exacerbates poverty problems for South Stockton residents.
F3.2: Crimes of violence, in recent years soared citywide as policing levels plummeted.
F3.3: In recent months the City has begun to address the problems of crime, but it will take months, possibly years, of effort to rebuild the police force decimated by the City’s bankruptcy.
F4.1: South Stockton has been neglected and underserved by City government for many years.
F4.2: City officials, with some notable exceptions, continue to speak about the problems of South Stockton, but take little action.
Hallazgos & Recomendaciones 11 hallazgos
F1: 1 Non-pile supported areas at the IPS are shifting as evidenced by changes in ground elevation, which has caused concern about employee safety and the integrity of equipment and buried electrical systems and conduits in the generator yard and other areas.
Recomendaciones relacionadas (1)
R1: 1 The City Council direct (through the City Manager) the Director of MUD to complete needed repairs at the IPS by September 2015 to ensure work areas are safe for employees and to report back annually to the Council regarding the status of IPS ground settling and associated repairs and costs.
F2: 1 shocking and/or continuous chemical treatment for H2S, yet none was conducted by MUD for more than two years, allowing continued sewer pipe corrosion. The utility vault at the southeast corner of Van Buskirk Park is extensively corroded and at times
Recomendaciones relacionadas (1)
R2: 1 The City Council direct (through the City Manager) the Director of MUD to make a presentation to the Council no later than September 2015 identifying the process and timeline to manage the H S 2 problem in the sewer pipeline system.
F3: 1 difficulties during transitions and the unnecessary loss of valuable institutional knowledge. As of March 10, 2015 MUD had 27 vacancies. Staff shortages contributed to delays in progress
Recomendaciones relacionadas (1)
R3: 1 The City Council direct (through the City Manager) the Director of MUD to develop and implement a succession plan by September 2015.
F1.1: Non-pile supported areas at the IPS are shifting as evidenced by changes in ground elevation, which has caused concern about employee safety and the integrity of equipment and buried electrical systems and conduits in the generator yard and other areas.
F1.2: The DWTP was shut down for approximately four months in calendar year 2014 due to low staffing levels, which caused an increase in the SEWD pumping tax and further depleted declining water supplies.
F2.1: Both the USPeroxide study in 2012 and the AMEC analysis in 2014 recommended biofilm shocking and/or continuous chemical treatment for H S, yet none was conducted by MUD for more than 2 two years, allowing continued sewer pipe corrosion.
F2.2: The utility vault at the southeast corner of Van Buskirk Park is extensively corroded and at times emits a strong H S odor, which raises concerns about public safety. 2
F3.1: MUD failed to develop a succession plan as recommended in its 2009 Business Plan, causing difficulties during transitions and the unnecessary loss of valuable institutional knowledge.
F3.2: As of March 10, 2015 MUD had 27 vacancies. Staff shortages contributed to delays in progress of capital improvement projects, caused more than $1 million in annual overtime costs in 2014, and threaten the operation of critical facilities if qualified technical positions are not filled.
F3.3: The independent, full-time position of Safety Program Manager has been vacant since May 2013 and the decision to fill the position on an interim basis with the Deputy Director of Wastewater caused some employees to perceive it to be a conflict of interest.
F3.4: Complaints regarding safety concerns have often been filed directly to Cal/OSHA by MUD employees intimating a lack of trust in management personnel to solve issues.
Hallazgos & Recomendaciones 11 hallazgos
F1: 1 Non-pile supported areas at the IPS are shifting as evidenced by changes in ground elevation, which has caused concern about employee safety and the integrity of equipment and buried electrical systems and conduits in the generator yard and other areas.
Recomendaciones relacionadas (1)
R1: 1 The City Council direct (through the City Manager) the Director of MUD to complete needed repairs at the IPS by September 2015 to ensure work areas are safe for employees and to report back annually to the Council regarding the status of IPS ground settling and associated repairs and costs.
F2: 1 Both the USPeroxide study in 2012 and the AMEC analysis in 2014 recommended biofilm shocking and/or continuous chemical treatment for H S, yet none was conducted by MUD for more than 2 two years, allowing continued sewer pipe corrosion.
Recomendaciones relacionadas (1)
R2: 1 The City Council direct (through the City Manager) the Director of MUD to make a presentation to the Council no later than September 2015 identifying the process and timeline to manage the H S 2 problem in the sewer pipeline system.
F3: 1 MUD failed to develop a succession plan as recommended in its 2009 Business Plan, causing difficulties during transitions and the unnecessary loss of valuable institutional knowledge.
Recomendaciones relacionadas (1)
R3: 1 The City Council direct (through the City Manager) the Director of MUD to develop and implement a succession plan by September 2015.
F1.1: Non-pile supported areas at the IPS are shifting as evidenced by changes in ground elevation, which has caused concern about employee safety and the integrity of equipment and buried electrical systems and conduits in the generator yard and other areas.
F1.2: The DWTP was shut down for approximately four months in calendar year 2014 due to low staffing levels, which caused an increase in the SEWD pumping tax and further depleted declining water supplies.
F2.1: Both the USPeroxide study in 2012 and the AMEC analysis in 2014 recommended biofilm shocking and/or continuous chemical treatment for H S, yet none was conducted by MUD for more than 2 two years, allowing continued sewer pipe corrosion.
F2.2: The utility vault at the southeast corner of Van Buskirk Park is extensively corroded and at times emits a strong H S odor, which raises concerns about public safety. 2
F3.1: MUD failed to develop a succession plan as recommended in its 2009 Business Plan, causing difficulties during transitions and the unnecessary loss of valuable institutional knowledge.
F3.2: As of March 10, 2015 MUD had 27 vacancies. Staff shortages contributed to delays in progress of capital improvement projects, caused more than $1 million in annual overtime costs in 2014, and threaten the operation of critical facilities if qualified technical positions are not filled.
F3.3: The independent, full-time position of Safety Program Manager has been vacant since May 2013 and the decision to fill the position on an interim basis with the Deputy Director of Wastewater caused some employees to perceive it to be a conflict of interest.
F3.4: Complaints regarding safety concerns have often been filed directly to Cal/OSHA by MUD employees intimating a lack of trust in management personnel to solve issues.

Hallazgos y recomendaciones aún no extraídos.

Hallazgos & Recomendaciones 3 hallazgos
F1: 2 District policies and procedures were not always followed. The Shared Services Agreement helped bring stability to the District.
F2: 1 There were operational improvements with Mokelumne Rural Fire District after the Shared
F3: 1 of the rural fire districts.
Recomendaciones relacionadas (1)
R3: 1 No later than November 1, 2015 LAFCo and the county's rural fire districts are to coordinate a series of meetings to consider the operational benefits of consolidation. The districts should include, but are not limited to, the following: Waterloo-Morada Fire District . Mokelumne Rural Fire District . French Camp-McKinley Rural Fire District 0 Montezuma Fire Protection District . Linden-Peters Fire District . Clements Rural Fire District 0 Woodridge Fire District . Liberty Fire Distict .