San Francisco County Grand Jury
2026-2027
From the annual report
The consolidated year-end volume. The individual investigations it contains are listed separately below.
📑 Year-End Report
The full consolidated volume; individual reports are listed below.
Individual reports (3)
Quick View
Full Details →
Findings & Recommendations
16 findings
F1:
Five content elements — source, hazard, location, guidance, and time — are necessary in a public alert for the public to take timely protective action.
F2:
City-originated emergency messages do not consistently include these five content elements.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
By 1 January 2028, the Department of Emergency Management should adopt a Citywide Emergency Messaging Standard that requires all city-originated emergency messages, across AlertSF, WEA, EAS, and social media channels, to include the five content elements: source, hazard, location, guidance, and time. The standard should include content requirements for both initial alerts and closure messages, requirements for multilingual delivery consistent with the City's Language Access Ordinance, and a pre-send review step.
F3:
No citywide standard requires inclusion of these five content elements across city alerting channels.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
By 1 January 2028, the Department of Emergency Management should adopt a Citywide Emergency Messaging Standard that requires all city-originated emergency messages, across AlertSF, WEA, EAS, and social media channels, to include the five content elements: source, hazard, location, guidance, and time. The standard should include content requirements for both initial alerts and closure messages, requirements for multilingual delivery consistent with the City's Language Access Ordinance, and a pre-send review step.
F4:
The Watch Center's protocols contain no criteria for message content quality.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
By 1 January 2028, the Department of Emergency Management should adopt a Citywide Emergency Messaging Standard that requires all city-originated emergency messages, across AlertSF, WEA, EAS, and social media channels, to include the five content elements: source, hazard, location, guidance, and time. The standard should include content requirements for both initial alerts and closure messages, requirements for multilingual delivery consistent with the City's Language Access Ordinance, and a pre-send review step.
F5:
For most emergency incident types, there exist no written criteria that govern when Wireless Emergency Alerts, the City's most powerful channel, should be used, leaving the decision to the discretion of the Watch Center's on-duty manager.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
By 1 January 2028, the Department of Emergency Management should adopt written criteria defining when Wireless Emergency Alerts are warranted across all 38 incident types the Watch Center handles. The criteria should address hazard severity, geographic scope, time sensitivity, and interaction with all other available channels.
F6:
The absence of written criteria means that decisions about when to use the most intrusive channel available to the city are made case-by-case, without the benefit of consistent thresholds developed in advance.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
By 1 January 2028, the Department of Emergency Management should adopt written criteria defining when Wireless Emergency Alerts are warranted across all 38 incident types the Watch Center handles. The criteria should address hazard severity, geographic scope, time sensitivity, and interaction with all other available channels.
F7:
The city's emergency alerting protocols do not include closure procedures for any of the 38 incident types covered by Watch Center protocols.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
By 1 January 2028, the Department of Emergency Management should require a closure or follow-up message for every incident type for which an initial alert is issued. Closure messages should communicate what changed, what protective actions can stop, and when the resolution occurred.
F8:
Standard closure messages do not communicate what changed, what actions can stop, or when the resolution occurred.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
By 1 January 2028, the Department of Emergency Management should require a closure or follow-up message for every incident type for which an initial alert is issued. Closure messages should communicate what changed, what protective actions can stop, and when the resolution occurred.
F9:
Research has established that effective post-alert communication requires three components: resolution, action guidance, and status.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
By 1 January 2028, the Department of Emergency Management should require a closure or follow-up message for every incident type for which an initial alert is issued. Closure messages should communicate what changed, what protective actions can stop, and when the resolution occurred.
F10:
The absence of formal incident closure procedures means that the decision to issue a follow-up message, and what it says, is left to individual judgment.
F11:
The city's primary opt-in alerting system reaches a small fraction of the people present in San Francisco on any given day.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4:
By 1 January 2028, the Department of Emergency Management should develop a dedicated audience growth strategy for AlertSF, including a standing approach to reaching visitors and commuters beyond event-specific campaigns. The strategy should include measurable enrollment targets and a regular reporting cadence to the Mayor and Board of Supervisors.
F12:
Wireless Emergency Alerts cannot deliver the sustained information an opt-in system like AlertSF provides during extended incidents.
F13:
DEM has demonstrated ability to build effective audience outreach through event-specific campaigns, but these efforts have not become standing infrastructure.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4:
By 1 January 2028, the Department of Emergency Management should develop a dedicated audience growth strategy for AlertSF, including a standing approach to reaching visitors and commuters beyond event-specific campaigns. The strategy should include measurable enrollment targets and a regular reporting cadence to the Mayor and Board of Supervisors.
F14:
The resources dedicated to growing and maintaining AlertSF do not reflect the system's stated operational role as the foundation of the city's opt-in alerting.
Related Recommendations (2)
R5:
By 1 January 2028, the Department of Emergency Management should publish a study setting forth what it would take to fully resource the audience growth strategy developed for AlertSF under Recommendation R4.
R6:
By 1 July 2028, the Mayor and Board of Supervisors should determine whether to resource AlertSF to the extent set forth in DEM's study and, if not, determine what steps would be necessary for an AlertSF growth strategy.
F15:
No standing strategy exists for reaching visitors or commuters beyond event-specific campaigns.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4:
By 1 January 2028, the Department of Emergency Management should develop a dedicated audience growth strategy for AlertSF, including a standing approach to reaching visitors and commuters beyond event-specific campaigns. The strategy should include measurable enrollment targets and a regular reporting cadence to the Mayor and Board of Supervisors.
F16:
No unified, mobile-first, multilingual public destination exists for emergency information.
Related Recommendations (1)
R7:
By 1 January 2028, the Department of Emergency Management should establish a consistent, mobile-first, multilingual public destination for emergency updates that is referenced across all alert channels and serves as the authoritative source for the public during and after an incident. REQUIRED AND INVITED RESPONSES The following responses are required pursuant to California Penal Code Sections 933 and 933.05. Required Respondent Findings Recommendations Mayor of San Francisco F2–F8, F10–F16 R1–R7 Board of Supervisors F14, F15, F16 R6 Invited Respondent Findings Recommendations SF Department of Emergency Management F1–F16 R1–R5, R7 SF Police Department F1, F2, F3 R1 SF Fire Department F1, F2, F3 R1
Quick View
Full Details →
Findings & Recommendations
12 findings
F1:
The OPWS was originally designed for an aerial attack that is not a threat to San Francisco today.
F2:
Each type of emergency facing San Francisco, including earthquakes, tsunamis and extreme weather, requires its own emergency instructions, affects different areas of the city, and has different durations.
F3:
The OPWS was not designed for San Francisco’s current population, which is larger, multilingual, often indoors, and includes a substantial visitor population with little siren training or familiarity.
F4:
A modernized version of the OPWS would still depend on listeners being outdoors, in range, and able to hear and understand the language of the broadcast.
F5:
Sirens cannot deliver the information people need to take protective action during an emergency.
F6:
Any siren-based approach to emergency warnings still requires San Francisco to maintain and use its existing digital messaging systems for emergencies including WEA, AlertSF, and social media.
F7:
Restoring OPWS would add a layer of infrastructure and operational complexity to emergency warnings without providing the specific, actionable instructions that discourage milling behavior.
F8:
The siren system has been inoperable since 2019 due to security vulnerabilities and deteriorating physical infrastructure without a firm commitment of resources for its restoration.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
By 1 January 2028, the Department of Public Works, in coordination with property owners where applicable, should remove or secure remnant siren hardware identified as a physical safety hazard.
F9:
The status quo, in which OPWS is inoperable and no institutional actor has committed to either restoring or retiring the OPWS, produces ongoing cost without progress to restore OPWS or to confirm its retirement.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
By 1 July 2027, the Department of Emergency Management should formally advise the Mayor and the Board of Supervisors whether to restore or permanently retire the OPWS.
F10:
The unresolved question of whether to restore or retire the OPWS consumes DEM capacity, including staff time and leadership attention, that could be spent improving the city’s emergency warning systems.
F11:
The public has not been given a clear explanation of OPWS’s historical importance or its current status, and the public information that does exist is outdated and contradictory.
Related Recommendations (2)
R3:
By 1 January 2028, the DEM should preserve one siren installation, restored and distinctively marked, as a permanent public safety monument with interpretive signage. The signage should explain the history of the siren system, its World War II origins, its role in San Francisco's public safety infrastructure, and the City's evolution toward modern emergency alerting. The monument should be visibly distinct, consistent with San Francisco's tradition of commemorative infrastructure such as the gold fire hydrant at Church and 20th Streets.26
R4:
By 1 April 2027, the DEM should make available to the public a clear explanation of the City's emergency alerting strategy: what channels exist, how the public can access them, and the rationale for the City's approach. DEM should also correct or remove public-facing content that inaccurately describes the siren system. This explanation should be written for a general audience, available in the City's threshold languages, and maintained as a living resource. It should be accessible to anyone searching for "San Francisco emergency sirens" or "San Francisco emergency alerts." REQUIRED AND INVITED RESPONSES The following responses are required pursuant to California Penal Code Sections 933 and 933.05. Required Respondent Findings Recommendations Mayor of San Francisco F6, F7, F9–F12 R1, R2, R4 Board of Supervisors F6, F7, F9–F12 R1, R2 Invited Respondent Findings Recommendations SF Department of Emergency Management F1–F12 R1, R2, R3, R4 SF Department of Public Works F8, F9 R2
F12:
The absence of a clear explanation of OPWS’s status has negative implications, including negative media coverage, and public uncertainty.
Quick View
Full Details →
Findings & Recommendations
7 findings
F1:
Eucalyptus Wildfire Danger.........................................................................................30
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
1.......................................................................................................30
F2:
Division of Vegetation Management Activities.........................................................30
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
1.......................................................................................................30
F3:
DPW Management Zone.............................................................................................31
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
1.......................................................................................................31
F4:
WildFire Mitigation Plans.......................................................................................31
Related Recommendations (1)
R4:
1.......................................................................................................31
F5:
Urban Forestry Council Roles.....................................................................................32
Related Recommendations (1)
R5:
1.......................................................................................................32
F6:
Technology Sharing.....................................................................................................32
Related Recommendations (1)
R6:
1.......................................................................................................32
F7:
SFFD Preparedness..............................................................................................33
Related Recommendations (1)
R7:
1.......................................................................................................33