Santa Cruz County Grand Jury • 2024-2025 • Agency Response
Response to: Human Trafficking in Santa Cruz County Voices Unheard, Signs Unseen

Victims of the Czu Wildfire – Four Years Later.

Published: September 10, 2024 14 pages
Ver PDF original

Findings and Recommendations 6 findings

F1 Page 5
The inability of local fire departments to coordinate (communicate) with CAL FIRE during their initial response to the CZU Fire caused many fire victims to unnecessarily lose their homes and possibly contributed to the loss of a life. __ AGREE __ PARTIALLY DISAGREE _X_ DISAGREE Response explanation (required for a response other than Agree): The ability for local fire departments and CALFIRE to communicate during operations was in place at the time and continued for the duration of the CZU Fire through unified incident command, which included the Santa Cruz County Sheriff’s Office, San Mateo County Sheriff’s Office, Felton Fire Protection District, Santa Cruz County Fire Department, San Mateo County Fire Department, Boulder Creek Fire Department and the Ben Lomond Fire Protection District. These agencies operated using long- established unified command principles including coordination and communication.
No recommendations for this finding
F2 Page 6
The Long-term Recovery Group which assisted CZU fire and other disaster victims with case management and food and housing support serves as a model for the future. _X_ AGREE __ PARTIALLY DISAGREE __ DISAGREE Response explanation (required for a response other than Agree): The County, and Office of Response, Recovery, and Resilience (OR3) see the value in a strong, well organized and resourced VOAD (Volunteer Organizations Assisting in Disaster) and a Long-Term Recovery Group (LTRG) is supporting all phases of disaster from preparedness to response, short term recovery and long-term recovery.
No recommendations for this finding
F3 Page 7
Because many CZU fire victims were unaware of LTRG disaster services, fire victims, to their detriment, did not make use of the services and/or available financial assistance. __ AGREE _X_ PARTIALLY DISAGREE __ DISAGREE Response explanation (required for a response other than Agree): Communications to fire victim families included regular newsletters from the OR3, community meetings and in-person resource sharing events, outreach from the Board of Supervisor offices whose districts were affected, and digital surveys to learn more about victims’ experiences and share resource information. More can and will be done following future disasters to increase communications. A key learning from the CZU recovery has been the recognition that residents impacted by disaster are able to receive information and integrate resources into their recovery journey at different timelines and stages.
No recommendations for this finding
F4 Page 8
The failure of County agencies to have an effective disaster response plan in place prior to the CZU Fire caused many fire victims to incur unnecessary expense in the rebuilding process. __ AGREE __ PARTIALLY DISAGREE _X_ DISAGREE Response explanation (required for a response other than Agree): The rebuild plan and procedures were established well in advance of the completion of the state's debris removal process, which is the essential first step. The county finalized its contract with 4 Leaf in November 2020, ahead of the debris removal effort's conclusion. Within two weeks of signing the contract, the Recovery Permit Center was opened to the public on November 30, 2020, where telephone assistance and walk in appointments are available during business hours Monday through Friday. Further, the Preclearance and Building Permit submittal and review processes were established and fully operational as of November 30, 2020. The fire affected 697 parcels with dwellings. To date, 113 replacement dwellings have been constructed and finaled and another 142 are permitted or under construction, for an overall rebuild percentage of 37%. In addition, 360 Environmental Health Pre-Clearances have been approved (out of the 478 submitted), representing a 75% approval rate.
No recommendations for this finding
F5 Page 9
The failure of CDI and Environmental Health to provide timely guidance with respect to applying for and obtaining required permits after the CZU Fire caused many fire victims to expend unnecessary time and expense in the rebuild permitting process. __ AGREE __ PARTIALLY DISAGREE _X_ DISAGREE Response explanation (required for a response other than Agree): The rebuild plan and procedures were established well in advance of the completion of the state’s debris removal process, the essential first step before any site investigations or permitting activity could take place. The county finalized its contract with 4 Leaf in November 2020, prior to the conclusion of the debris removal efforts. Within two weeks of executing the contract, the Recovery Permit Center (RPC) was opened to the public on November 30, 2020, and the RPC website was launched with information regarding the steps to obtain an expedited building permit. At that time, the Environmental Health Preclearance and Building Permit submittal and review processes became fully operational. The RPC website provides links to informational and guidance documents outlining rebuild parameters related to water and septic requirements for property owners.
No recommendations for this finding
F6 Page 10
The failure of the County Environmental Health department to fully inform CZU fire victims about new state septic system regulations (LAMP) resulted in many fire victims abandoning their plans to rebuild after realizing how high the cost of meeting the new standards would be. __ AGREE __ PARTIALLY DISAGREE _X_ DISAGREE Response explanation (required for a response other than Agree): The expedited re-build permit process was built on the first step of obtaining “pre- clearances” to ensure rebuilders were able to fully understand the scope of work and financial impact of meeting state-approved requirements for septic systems early in the process and could make informed decisions. In some cases, un-permitted additions or unauthorized septic system augmentation prior to the fire resulted in rebuilders being unable to permit their pre-existing home size and bedroom count without incurring significant expenses related to upgraded systems required to support the size of the rebuild. The Recovery Permit Center staff spent considerable time and resources working with applicants to problem-solve; many were able to scale their home size back to what was legally permitted prior to the fire to avoid the increased cost, while others chose to abandon their plans entirely.
No recommendations for this finding