Santa Cruz County Grand Jury • 2007-2008

Electronic Voting: A Strategy for Managing the Voting Process

Published: June 23, 2007 16 pages
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Note: Missing finding numbers detected: F29, F33

Findings 51 findings

F1
Adequacy of Security in the Election Process A. Data Security
F2
Sequoia equipment and software goes through extensive testing by Sequoia Systems. This testing is required by the state.
F3
The Sequoia Systems’ touch screen voting machine uses a voter verified paper trail which is the fundamental protection against software errors in recording the vote, provided there is a good audit procedure following the election.
F4
Procedures are in place to protect the integrity of the data on the voting machines’ memory packs and results cartridges. These items are external and - 4 Electronic Voting removable and protected with traceable seals. Any sign of tampering with the seals is reported to the Election Department and investigated. There is a standard reporting form, and written procedures are provided to the poll workers.
F5
The ballot information file for each precinct was created by the Santa Cruz County Election’s Department’s Information Systems Analyst and the program coordinators. It was sent electronically to Sequoia, the vendor, where the ballot election files were created. Sequoia also provided the printed paper ballots. There was a unique file created for each precinct. Files were then sent back electronically to the SQL server which resides in the Information Systems Analyst’s office for updating and testing. Sequoia provided all testing scripts and assisted in the testing this past election.
F6
Prior to the November 2006 election, the ballot information was reviewed, modified and approved by the county program coordinators and the Information Systems Analyst until it was ready to be sealed. The Information Systems Analyst, via a memory stick, manually extracted the data and loaded it onto a stand-alone laptop system. The cartridges for the voting machines were written from this system. They were sealed and coded. Once sealed, they were ready for distribution to the voting machines.
F7
During the last election, some areas for improvement on warehouse check-in and out of equipment were noted. For example, the person checking out equipment was not identified. B. Warehouse Security
F8
All voting equipment and accessories for Santa Cruz County are stored in a secure warehouse within the city of Santa Cruz. The exception to this is the SQL server, which is used as a network server for the Elections Department, and the 400C (absentee paper ballot counter) which resides in the Information Systems Analyst’s secured office. All files are backed up and stored in a storage area offsite at the Elections Department warehouse.
F9
The results cartridges for the touch screens and memory packs for the scanners are created on a stand-alone computer at the warehouse. They are then loaded and sealed into the appropriate precinct equipment and stored until ready to be shipped to the polling place. Access to both the warehouse and office are controlled through the use of color-coded security badges. Four Elections Department supervisors with the widest access to the county's voting machines and voting materials have their own color-coded badge. Temporary employees, who must be escorted and supervised inside the secure area, have a different color badge, as do permanent Elections Department employees, visitors and exhibitors, and voting machine vendors.
F10
The warehouse has an alarm system, provided by First Alarm. An access card is required in order to enter. The Information Systems Analyst, Department Information Systems Specialist and the Election Officer have the First Alarm access code. Electronic Voting - 5
F11
A large door is locked from the inside. All equipment is within a caged area of the warehouse with controlled access. C. Poll Site Security/Physical Equipment
F12
The assigned person at each precinct picks up the voting equipment from the warehouse the day before the election. The cartridges are already in place and sealed. A poll worker takes the equipment home. On election day, they take it to the polling place and set it up.
F13
At the close of the polls, two designated persons break the seals on the results cartridge and the memory pack and remove them from the machines. Cartridges and seals are put in a sealable orange bag. The printer is removed from the touch screen machine for transport. The orange bag and printer are prepared by an inspector and a designated person. These items are taken to the election department, where the bags are checked, verified, and stored in the Information Systems Analyst office until ready to tally. The person who checked out the equipment and brought it to the polling site is also responsible for taking it back to the county building. All voting equipment is eventually returned to the warehouse for storage.
F14
After the November 2006 election, the above process was reviewed by election staff. It was found that there were delays in equipment check-in.
F15
The issue of fire protection of the polling places was not addressed when the polling places were chosen. Since most poll sites are in public buildings, it was assumed that the fire protection available at the poll site location would be relied on.
F16
The strategy to put just one touch screen at each polling place proved to be a good one. It satisfied the requirements for voter accessibility while providing more current technology for voters. The mixture of technology also provided backup. If the printer or other equipment had a problem, voters had another way to cast their votes. - 12 Electronic Voting
F17
Sequoia Systems is a state-approved vendor for the new voting equipment. They were chosen by Santa Cruz County to provide the voting equipment.
F18
The touch screen voting machine has a printer which records the votes. It has 300 feet of paper inside the machine. During the last election, the paper often jammed.
F19
During the November 2006 election, two or three scanners failed and at least 12 printers jammed. When the failed scanners were tested, it was determined that they probably had been damaged in transport.
F20
The 400C Ballot Counter Machine reads the ballots very quickly. However, the catch basket, which is located outside the machine, is not large enough to hold all of the ballots. As a result, ballots can get bent or be ejected onto the floor. - 6 Electronic Voting
F21
The results cartridge plugs into touch screen equipment. It contains a database for capturing the votes as they are input by the voter. This cartridge cannot be removed without breaking a seal.
F22
The memory pack plugs into the optical scanner. It also uses a database for capturing the votes as they are input when the ballot is scanned. The memory pack cannot be removed without breaking a seal.
F23
Firmware (software imbedded in the machine) operates the machines. The Secretary of State demands the firmware be at a specific level (version). It cannot be changed after 60 days prior to election. A test is run to ensure the firmware level (version) is correct.
F24
To ensure the reliability and accuracy of the equipment, logic and accuracy testing is conducted by the vendor and county personnel. Some experts believe that this testing is insufficient for validating the accuracy and reliability of the vote. They argue that it consists only of verifying whether the equipment is working. It does not evaluate the equipment’s security.
F25
After they are finished voting, voters who use the touch screen equipment can verify the accuracy of their votes by looking at a compilation of their votes that is displayed in a window on the machine.
F26
Following a written procedure, the designated poll worker and one other poll worker break the outer seal and assist the first voter to verify prior to his or her vote that the “total votes” displayed is zero. Both the poll worker and the voter sign an official document verifying that the vote count is zero.
F27
On 10 percent of machines, a random sample with full paper recount is taken to check that the machines are tallying correctly.
F28
After the November 2006 election, Capitola initiated a manual recount. Each precinct was reconciled separately. With approximately 3000 votes to count, it came out to within one vote of the machine count. The final election results did not change. 29.During the November 2006 election, a number of absentee ballots had to be redone due to the types of pens used. Some voters used pens that bled through the paper and could not be read by the scanner.
F30
Provisional ballots were being used for voters who had come to the wrong polling place. Some provisional ballots had to be redone because they were folded the wrong way. Electronic Voting - 7
F31
An organized training plan with documentation was provided for the poll workers and inspectors. One person at each polling site was trained and certified to use the machines. There were “rovers” who traveled between polling sites to check on machines and supplies.
F32
Before the November 2006 election, county staff did a lot of on-the-job training while concurrently preparing for the election because the equipment arrived late. 33, The training documentation from the vendor had to be completely redone because it had to be customized to the design of the Santa Cruz County election model.
F34
In the future, the Elections Department plans to create a professional DVD to supplement poll worker training.
F35
Poll workers have documentation binders which have flip charts and checklists. Also, they are trained how to deal with the press and observers.
F36
Poll workers indicated they wanted more “hands-on training” with the machines in addition to having more poll workers trained on the equipment. These machines are sophisticated computer equipment, and if something goes wrong, many poll workers don’t know what to do. (See Poll Worker Survey in the Appendix for more information.)
F37
The physical arrangement of the polling places was similar to past elections. This consistency contributed to a stable atmosphere.
F38
The touch screen machine was positioned with the back of the machine to the wall. This placement meant that the voter’s selections could be seen by others standing nearby.
F39
The county was proactive in making the touch screen machine wheel chair accessible by re-engineering the support legs. In addition, they custom designed carrying bags for the scanner.
F40
Santa Cruz County was sued by the State Attorney General for not following Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) regulations for polling sites. The parties agreed to settle the lawsuit without finding that the county had violated the ADA regulations.
F41
Some polling places that were shared by more than one precinct also shared touch screen machines. This arrangement caused some confusion because voters had to identify which precinct they were voting in as the first step in the voting process, and many did not know. - 8 Electronic Voting
F42
In the start-up process for the new voting system, the Department Information Systems Specialist, Elections Officer, Assistant County Clerk and the Information Systems Analyst were trained first, and then they were able to provide training for others. Sometimes training occurred simultaneously with the installation of the new equipment.
F43
The staffing for the poll places was conducted in the same manner as in previous elections. Polling place staff is typically temporary help from the community. The polling place supervisors are relied upon to pick up the equipment at the warehouse the day before the election, keep it at their houses overnight and take it to their polling places in the morning for set up.
F44
In an effort to educate the public, the Elections Department distributed thousands of voter pamphlets to the public via U.S. mail. The department personnel also gave speeches and distributed educational material at local public schools, bookstores, the Capitola Mall, and the county fair. Media promotion included television and public radio interviews and press releases.
F45
Despite the education campaign, some voters were confused as to how to mark their ballots. For example, some voters who used the paper ballots did not understand how to connect the arrows to the candidate or issue they were voting on.
F46
In general, voters who used the touch screen machine seemed unaware of the importance of verifying their votes by comparing them with the compilation of their ballot that was visible through a window on the machine.
F47
County election officials determined that there would be one touch screen at each polling place. The new scanner would be the main voting machine. They reported that this choice proved to be a good decision. Not only did it provide the necessary accommodations for voters with disabilities, but it also ensured the reliability of the voting process. Having a mixture of technologies ensured that votes could be cast in the event of equipment failures. For example, if the touch screen printer jammed, except for those who are sight impaired, voters had an option to use a paper ballot. Electronic Voting - 9
F48
A recent news release announced that Florida will shift its voting system to a system of casting paper ballots counted by scanning machines. Several counties around the country will be moving to adopt the touch screen system with the paper trail.
F49
On election day, the Grand Jury conducted a two-part poll worker survey and collected 104 surveys for analysis. The first part of the survey covered the poll worker training (see #4 above — Adequacy of Poll Worker Training), and the second part was a critique of the election day process. While most were extremely positive as to the work of the Elections Department, they made substantive recommendations for continued improvement of the elections process including the use and placement of the equipment. [See Appendix for full results of the survey.] One hundred and four poll workers out of a total of 917 in Santa Cruz County were surveyed. They were asked to rate aspects of the voting experience from 1 to 5, with five being the best rating possible. The results were as follows: • Training materials: 4.3 • Overall preparation: 4.0 • Adequacy of election day staffing: 4.5 • Ease of equipment set up: 4.3 • Workers indicated they wanted more training on the machines and “hands on” practice.
F50
The Grand Jury also conducted exit surveys with 320 voters throughout the county. (The total votes cast was recorded as 50,189 in 170 polling places.) The results of the survey are as follows: • Only about 19 percent of the sample chose to use the touch screen machines. • One hundred percent of those who chose to use the touch screen felt comfortable using it. • Ten percent of those who chose to use the paper ballot with optical scanner felt uncomfortable using it. B. Grand Jury Observations
F51
Members of the Grand Jury made general observations while conducting the exit voter and poll worker’ surveys at the November 2006 election. They witnessed the failure of some equipment and agreed with many of the - 10 Electronic Voting solutions suggested by the poll workers. [See Appendix for more information about the survey.]
F52
During the November 2006 election, it was observed that most poll workers gave paper ballots to the voters and did not indicate that the touch screen method was available.
F53
It was also observed that not all voters were offered a receipt for voting when they used the touch screen machine. Conclusions

Recommendations 14