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Extracted from Consolidated Report
This investigation was originally published as part of a larger consolidated report containing multiple investigations. View the consolidated PDF for the complete document.
Alameda County Grand Jury
• 2024-2025
BAD Roads and NO Building: Oakland’s Budget Problems Mean NO Bonds for the City’s Needs
⚠️ Translation Notice: This content has been automatically translated. The original English text is the official version. Translation may contain errors.
⚠️ Este contenido ha sido traducido automáticamente. El texto original en inglés es la versión oficial. La traducción puede contener errores.
Findings 64 findings
F25-1
Potholes and other street pavement failures have been a prevalent problem in the City of Oakland for many years.
F25-2
The City of Oakland needed to repair over 53,000 potholes or similar pavement failures in the most recent 2023-2024 Fiscal Year.
F25-3
Historically, liability claims and lawsuits from potholes and pavement failure have cost the City of Oakland millions of dollars.
F25-4
Complete repaving of streets costs the City of Oakland approximately $1 million per mile.
F25-5
The City of Oakland has not met its goals for significant repaving under its 2022 Five-Year Paving Plan, with no foreseeable date for completion.
F25-6
Without money from the sale of authorized Measure U bonds, the City of Oakland will not be able to undertake significant additional street repaving.
F25-7
High employee vacancy rates and the delays in approval of hiring slowed the City of Oakland’s in-house street repaving and repairs.
F25-8
The City of Oakland’s Local Business Enterprise and Small Local Business Enterprise programs limit the competition for Oakland’s Department of Transportation contracts for paving and street work, causing Oakland to not receive multiple bids, which could result in lower costs.
F25-9
The City of Oakland’s Department of Transportation lacks adequate control over change orders on paving and street projects, including failure to first identify approved funding.
F25-10
The City of Oakland has not conducted any audits under Measure KK or Measure U, as required by the measures. 37
F25-11
The City of Oakland’s I-Bond Oversight Committee has not met regularly since at least December 2022, as required.
F25-12
The City of Oakland (Mayor) has failed to fill the current vacancies on the I-Bond Oversight Committee.
F25-13
The I-Bond Oversight Committee has not provided regular or annual reports on Measure KK to the Oakland City Council since September 2022, nor on Measure U since its approval in November 2022.
F25-14
The website for the City of Oakland’s I-Bond Oversight Committee lacks complete information including most committee reports, and not all agendas, minutes, or recordings.
F25-15
The City of Oakland’s I-Bond Oversight Committee failed to conduct a self-evaluation, as required by its bylaws.
F25-16
The City of Oakland has failed to ensure that the I-Bond Oversight Committee has been fulfilling its duties, including meeting regularly, reporting as needed, and conducting self- evaluations as required.
25-17
Page 50
The Oakland City Council added the “extreme fiscal necessity” clause to Measure Q without open discussion and public debate.
F25-17
The Oakland City Council added the “extreme fiscal necessity” clause to Measure Q without open discussion and public debate.
25-18
Page 50
The Measure Q ballot language passed by voters in March 2020 did not define what constitutes an extreme fiscal necessity.
F25-18
The Measure Q ballot language passed by voters in March 2020 did not define what constitutes an extreme fiscal necessity.
25-19
Page 50
The declaration of extreme fiscal necessity allowed the Oakland City Council to divert funds intended for additional park services
F25-19
The declaration of extreme fiscal necessity allowed the Oakland City Council to divert funds intended for additional park services
25-20
Page 50
In its last disclosure of the maintenance of effort calculations, the City of Oakland reported a decrease in Measure Q funding for new park services from 45% to 32%.
F25-20
In its last disclosure of the maintenance of effort calculations, the City of Oakland reported a decrease in Measure Q funding for new park services from 45% to 32%.
25-21
Page 50
To date, community park stakeholders and Oakland city staff still do not agree on a definition of “extreme fiscal necessity.”
F25-21
To date, community park stakeholders and Oakland city staff still do not agree on a definition of “extreme fiscal necessity.”
25-22
Page 50
Measure Q requires biennial reports, and the Oakland City Auditor did not conduct the second biennial audit covering FY 2022-2023 and FY 2023-2024.
F25-22
Measure Q requires biennial reports, and the Oakland City Auditor did not conduct the second biennial audit covering FY 2022-2023 and FY 2023-2024.
25-23
Page 50
Measure Q was not included in the Oakland City Auditor’s FY 2024-2025 workplan.
F25-23
Measure Q was not included in the Oakland City Auditor’s FY 2024-2025 workplan.
25-24
Page 50
As recommended and funded in Measure Q, no independent financial audit has been conducted.
F25-24
As recommended and funded in Measure Q, no independent financial audit has been conducted.
25-25
Page 50
Oakland’s Parks and Recreation Advisory Commission complies with the reporting requirements in Ordinance No. 13622 (an ordinance updating the duties of the commission).
F25-25
Oakland’s Parks and Recreation Advisory Commission complies with the reporting requirements in Ordinance No. 13622 (an ordinance updating the duties of the commission).
25-26
Page 50
Oakland’s Commission on Homelessness has not met its oversight mandate of Measure Q including the preparation of annual reports as required by Ordinance No. 13584 (an ordinance updating the duties of the commission).
F25-26
Oakland’s Commission on Homelessness has not met its oversight mandate of Measure Q including the preparation of annual reports as required by Ordinance No. 13584 (an ordinance updating the duties of the commission).
25-27
Page 50
The City of Oakland has not prepared annual reports documenting revenues, expenditures and the status of projects funded by Measure Q as required by California Government Code 50075.3.
F25-27
The City of Oakland has not prepared annual reports documenting revenues, expenditures and the status of projects funded by Measure Q as required by California Government Code 50075.3. 49
25-28
Page 51
It is difficult to observe Oakland’s Parks and Recreation Advisory Commission meetings recorded on Zoom due to poor broadcast capabilities. (The Commission on Homelessness meetings recorded on KTOP are broadcast with better video and audio than PRAC meetings.)
F25-28
It is difficult to observe Oakland’s Parks and Recreation Advisory Commission meetings recorded on Zoom due to poor broadcast capabilities. (The Commission on Homelessness meetings recorded on KTOP are broadcast with better video and audio than PRAC meetings.)
F25-29
City of Oakland parking control technicians have the technology on their existing handheld devices that enables them to search some vehicle databases.
F25-30
The City of Oakland will save staff time and taxpayer dollars by avoiding issuing and ultimately dismissing tickets on illegally parked stolen vehicles.
F25-31
When a ticket is issued to a parked stolen vehicle, victims of crime suffer additional hardship.by needing to take affirmative steps to dismiss a parking ticket.
F25-32
DMV provides information on stolen vehicles to OakDOT and any OakDOT staff can be trained to access this information without involving OPD or DOJ.
F25-33
The Oakland Fire Department has met its goal of conducting annual wildfire inspections of virtually all private properties in the Oakland Hills area designated as the Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone.
F25-34
The Oakland Fire Department’s annual wildfire prevention inspections of private properties in the Oakland Hills finds a high level of compliance on the part of property owners. 73
F25-35
For city-owned properties, the Oakland City Council does not presently allocate sufficient resources for vegetation management to remove or mitigate fire risks.
F25-36
At the time of this report, the Oakland City Council has not yet developed an implementation plan for Measure MM, although the measure becomes effective on July 1, 2025.
F25-37
Oakland’s Department of Transportation lacks adequate enforcement of parking restrictions in the Oakland Hills which hinders the ability of emergency services to navigate narrow streets to ensure a timely response to emergencies.
F25-38
The Oakland City Council has not done an adequate job of educating Oakland Hills residents about emergency evacuation routes.
F25-39
Public education about evacuation routes, and availability of emergency warning systems (such as AC Alert), are critical to improving public safety in Oakland, especially in areas with high wildfire risk.
F25-40
The Logic and Accuracy Test of the Alameda County Registrar of Voters voting system tested only one of over a dozen ballot scanners used in the election.
F25-41
During Logic and Accuracy testing, sample ballots were pre-marked by the Registrar of Voters and observers were not permitted to examine the pre-marked ballots at any time to confirm they matched the count from the ballot scanner.
F25-42
Video observation (online) of the electoral process, including the ballot envelope sorting, signature verification, vote-by-mail processing, and ballot scanning, was without audio or any description to the viewer of what was happening in the video feed. 93
F25-43
During the in-person observation of ballot counting on election night, members of the public were required to be onsite by 8:00 p.m. but were not allowed entry into the Registrar of Voters counting room until after 10 p.m. During this time, ballots were being wheeled into the room while observers were kept waiting in a hallway outside, and online video feed was unavailable.
F25-44
Once admitted to view ballot counting in person on election night, observers were not allowed to ask any questions.
F25-45
Notices by the Registrar of Voters to the public of upcoming online observation video feeds of the election processes did not identify the start times or what the processes would be. The notice stated, “An election process will be conducted today. For ongoing updates, check the website where all election processes will be posted.”
F25-46
During the in-person observation of the 1% manual tally after the election, observers were given no explanation of the hand count process.
F25-47
During the in-person observation of the 1% manual tally after the election, observers were not allowed to ask questions concerning the process.
F25-48
In the updates of the vote counts starting on election night, it was stated that “570 of 570 Precincts Reported (100%),” giving the misleading impression that all ballots had been received or counted.
F25-49
While the Registrar of Voters was reporting live results to the Secretary of State (where the results were posted on the state’s website), not all of these same results were being posted on Alameda County’s local website. The Alameda County website did not include: the cumulative total number of processed ballots, total updated number of processed ballots, vote-by-mail ballots received before and after election day, estimated total ballots remaining, or ballots left to be cured.
F25-50
As reported by the Secretary of State’s website, Alameda County still had an estimated 187,135 ballots out of 683,644 total ballots cast remaining to be counted 10 days after the election. 94
F25-51
Alameda County’s election results were updated on the website five times on election night but not updated daily after the election.
F25-52
Delays in the tabulation and reporting of election results by the Registrar of Voters are caused in part by insufficient facilities, lack of equipment, and low staffing during ballot processing and counting.
Recommendations 9
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R7called for the city council to determine if parking in the Oakland Hills that obstructed road access was an enforcement priority, and if so, whether an enforcement program (with community input) should be implemented. Car Illegally Parked in the Oakland Hills 69 In December 2015, a follow-up audit found that the city had taken insufficient action. It concluded: The large number of resident and visitor vehicles in the Oakland hills creates unsafe congestion and, at times, possibly illegal parking situations including parking on streets too narrow to accommodate an emergency vehicle and parking in red “no parking” zones. Parking infractions are not regularly cited by Parking Enforcement which, according to the Fire Department, has indicated that the Oakland hills neighborhoods are not a priority parking enforcement area. Despite that strong recommendation, the city auditor again found in November 2017 that the illegally parked vehicles blocking Oakland hills roads was still a problem. That report, entitled, “Second Follow-up: Oakland Fire Department Vegetation Inspection Audit” specifically noted: OFD or Parking Enforcement [the predecessor to the Oakland Department of Transportation] must find a workable solution for the parking problem in the Oakland hills … Narrow roadways that quickly became blocked during the evacuation [in the 1991 Oakland-Berkeley Tunnel Hills Fire] contributed to the tragedy, as these streets were, for many residents, the only exit routes out of the area. Oakland still has not made sufficient progress in finding a “workable solution.” Although Oakland’s 2023-2024 Local Hazard Mitigation Plan Report touted “enhanced coordination with Department of Transportation and Oakland Police to enforce parking restrictions on Red Flag Days,” nearly every witness the Grand Jury interviewed questioned the adequacy of this enforcement. Another current concern is efforts to increase housing density in high fire risk areas, which would exacerbate the problem. The Grand Jury learned from the Parking and Mobility Unit in Oakland’s Department of Transportation (OakDOT) that it had arranged for the installation of additional “No Parking” signs in the hills in 2017, in response to an initiative of the Oakland Wildfire Prevention Working Group. Still, Oakland does not have any areas that are designated as “No Parking on Red Flag Days,” as do some municipalities. Consequently, there is no signage to limit parking and create additional access on those days. OakDOT’s parking control technicians (who are responsible for issuing tickets to illegally parked cars), conduct limited patrols in the Oakland Hills, although not with the same regularity as they patrol commercial zones (including areas with parking meters) or areas with street sweeping restrictions. The Grand Jury heard conflicting information about the level of parking enforcement in the Oakland Hills. While OakDOT may conduct enforcement and dispatches additional parking control technicians on days designated as Red Flag Days, it is evident that the current level of enforcement overall is insufficient. Oakland should increase the “no parking” zones in the hills, particularly on narrow streets or streets with curves that may be more difficult to navigate for large emergency vehicles. Indeed, the National Fire Safety Association states that road access for fire equipment should have a minimum unobstructed width of not less than 20 feet. To follow that guidance, parking in the Oakland Hills likely would have to be limited to one side on many narrow streets. Oakland also should add “no parking” zone in certain areas, so that those restrictions apply on Red Flag days – a solution used in other high fire risk areas in California. The Grand Jury recognizes that there likely would be costs involved in purchasing and placing new signage, as well as implementing increased enforcement to ensure evacuation routes are available and safe. We note these parking management solutions for consideration by the city. The Grand Jury did not investigate the amount of possible increased costs. To the extent that citations for parking violations bring in revenue, the cost of enforcement may be covered in part by collection of parking fines. Measure MM requires actions to provide “well-maintained, accessible” evacuation routes and to provide education. Although Measure MM implementation plans remain pending, the Grand Jury encourages the city to focus on safe evacuation planning with some urgency. This planning should include increased parking enforcement; public outreach and education so that residents will be aware of their evacuation zones and evacuation routes; and regular updates on coordination among Oakland departments and between Oakland and neighboring fire prevention agencies (including funds necessary for interagency training). Coordination With Other Agencies Because fires do not respect city boundaries, and problems with coordination were identified as an issue in the Tunnel Fire, the Grand Jury reviewed the current state of interdepartmental and interagency coordination. Since the Tunnel Fire, coordination has improved, including increased use of the same types of communication systems and equipment, as well as joint training on procedures to allow fire departments to work together when necessary. Oakland and nearby agencies also improved coordination through several multi-jurisdictional organizations. The Hills Emergency Forum was created after the Tunnel Fire and now includes the following partners: Oakland, Berkeley, El Cerrito, CAL FIRE, East Bay Regional Parks District, East Bay Municipal Utility District, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, the Moraga-Orinda Fire District, and the University of California, Berkeley. It meets regularly to discuss coordination of evacuation routes, clearing trails, training, and equipment. The forum’s coordination plans include mutual aid arrangements, as necessary to address wildfires (locally and outside the region). It also coordinates work with Civic Corps and community groups that assist local fire departments in clearing fire hazards. Finally, it provides information to members about securing grant funding. More recently, Oakland has participated in the new East Bay Wildfire Coalition of Governments. In 2021, the Oakland City Council, recognizing the need for coordination among public entities in the area, adopted a resolution directing the city administrator to participate in discussions about the possible formation of a joint powers authority for fire prevention and management among Easy Bay hills jurisdictions. Ultimately, the participants chose not to pursue a joint powers authority, at least for the present time. Instead, in 2023, they entered into a Memorandum of Understanding to form the East Bay Wildfire Coalition of Governments. The East Bay Wildfire Coalition of Governments, which now meets periodically to receive reports and discuss efforts to mitigate the risk of wildfire in the East Bay hills is comprised of the following members: Alameda and Contra Costa counties, Alameda County Fire Department, Contra Costa Fire Protection District, the Rodeo-Hercules Fire Prevention District, and the cities of Berkeley, Oakland, El Cerrito, and Richmond. In addition, the University of California, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, East Bay Regional Parks District, East Bay Municipal Utility District, and the East Bay Firesafe Councils (representing community members) participate as regional advisors. Separately, one recent example of successful coordination was the response to the Keller Fire in Oakland in October 2024. Before that fire started, the National Weather Service issued Red Flag warnings, including warnings of possible 40-mph winds. Because of the warnings, OFD pre-positioned fire engines and other firefighting apparatus in the hills. The planning included coordination with emergency services across the county. All cities with emergency service engines were “upstaffed,” making extra staff available to respond. As a result, OFD was able to move necessary equipment to the Keller scene immediately. In addition, CAL FIRE sent air resources almost immediately. Over 200 personnel coordinated to evacuate 254 structures. In all, 27 different jurisdictions were on the scene. Because of prior communications and coordinated training, responders were able to work together and prevent the fire from reaching more populous areas, which could have been catastrophic. Their combined efforts limited the Keller Fire to 15 acres, with damage to only two structures and no injuries.
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25-9Page 51The Oakland City Council should hold public hearings prior to declaring an extreme fiscal necessity to allow transparency and public debate.
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25-10Page 51The City of Oakland should develop maintenance of effort metrics and calculations that are published and available to the public for Measure Q and other applicable tax measures.
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25-11Page 51The Oakland City Auditor’s workplan for FY 2025-2026 must include the required second audit covering FY 2022-2023, FY 2023-2024, and FY 2024-2025.
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25-12Page 51The Oakland City’s Auditor’s workplans beyond FY 2025-2026 must include biennial audits in workplans for the life of Measure Q until FY 2039-2040, as required by Measure Q.
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25-13Page 51The City of Oakland should conduct the recommended independent financial audit of Measure Q within the next six months, with funding allowed by the measure.
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25-14Page 51To comply with state requirements for special parcel tax measures and to provide transparency to voters, the Oakland City Council must ensure that annual reports documenting revenues, expenditures, and the status of projects are completed in a timely manner.
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25-15Page 51The Oakland City Council must ensure that the Commission on Homelessness complies with its Measure Q oversight responsibilities as required by city ordinances.
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25-16Page 51In addition to Zoom, Oakland’s Parks and Recreation Advisory Commission meetings should be conducted at city hall, and broadcast and recorded on KTOP.
Conclusions 6
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CL1Bond sales are essential for the City of Oakland. They are needed not only for major capital improvements, but also for repaving the city’s streets. While the process for their issuance operates largely outside the city’s General Purpose Fund, the ongoing problems of that fund have brought an end to bond sales and put into question exactly when such sales can resume. All of this points to the need for officials to take meaningful action to deal with the city’s financial problems. Discussion of the problems and the possible solutions tend to focus on the need for more police officers and the closing and re-opening of fire stations, along with favorite programs that may or may not be funded. Lost in all of this is the need for a comprehensive examination of the city’s financial situation: the structural deficit, the depletion of reserves, and the repeated resorting to one-time sources of income to fund ongoing expenses. These are the financial facts. They are part of the disclosures for the issuing of bonds, and on which city officials will be questioned if sales are to go forward. At the time of this report, Oakland will be swearing in a new mayor and council member and proposing a new biennial budget. Presumably, this budget will contain capital projects, including repaving and affordable housing, that will hinge on the sale of bonds sometime during 2025. Whether that sale will happen, of course, will depend largely on Oakland’s financial status, and what potential bond buyers read in the city’s annual financial report and other disclosure documents. At this point, what those documents might say and what bond purchasers might think, is anyone’s guess. 22 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ The people of Oakland need the infrastructure necessary for civic life. Street repaving, improved facilities, and affordable housing are essential services that every Oaklander should expect. To deliver this infrastructure, city officials must work together and address the difficult financial challenges that face the city. In the face of inaction, Oakland’s infrastructure will continue to deteriorate. FINDINGS: None RECOMMENDATIONS: None RESPONSES REQUIRED: None 23 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ OAKLAND’S POTHOLES: A BUMPY ROAD AND INADEQUATE OVERSIGHT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The City of Oakland has a reputation for having some of the worst roads in the Bay Area. While potholes are the most visible problem, Oakland’s streets have other major problems including cracking, broken pavement, missing chunks of asphalt, and even whole sections of streets failing. It is not just drivers’ experience, but data confirms the terrible condition of Oakland’s roads. Twice, Oakland voters took extraordinary steps to try and fix the city’s streets. They passed enormous infrastructure bonds measures, Measure KK in 2016 and Measure U in 2022. Together, these measures authorized $1.45 billion in bonds, with $640 million devoted to transportation projects, including extensive street repaving. Yet, potholes and other bad pavement conditions persist in Oakland. In one year, the Oakland Department of Transportation (OakDOT) reported fixing 53,000 potholes or similar conditions – the equivalent of one repair for every eight of Oakland’s over 425,000 residents. The Grand Jury received multiple complaints about potholes and the deterioration of roads in the City of Oakland. Our investigation also revealed other issues, including potential liability for the city, and problems with the way road repairs are completed and how these repairs are funded. The Grand Jury’s investigation revealed two paramount issues. First, somewhat surprisingly, Oakland does not fund street paving, repair, or maintenance out of its General Purpose Fund, or main city budget. Instead, it relies primarily on bond measures to pay for repaving. For street repair and maintenance, as well as for some paving, Oakland has relied on transportation sales tax, gas tax, and vehicle registration fee revenue. Second, potholes are merely a symptom of the larger problem of the pavement in Oakland’s streets failing because of a lack of repaving over decades. The needed solution is large repaving projects, which Oakland sought to undertake through the approval of Measures KK and U bonds. Although Oakland made some progress in repaving streets with Measure KK and other funds, it has not met its goals for several reasons. To date, OakDOT has not received any money from Measure U. This gap is due in large part because Oakland did not sell any bonds in 2024 due to the city’s precarious fiscal situation. There is no clear date when the city may be able to sell bonds. As a result, despite Oakland’s significant steps with Measures KK and U, its paving may largely stop – a victim of the city’s fiscal issues. 24 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Additionally, the Grand Jury found other problems that delayed OakDOT’s paving and street repair work. These issues include delays in OakDOT obtaining approval to hire workers and not having adequate control over construction change orders on its projects. Finally, the Grand Jury discovered that the City of Oakland has not provided effective oversight regarding expenditures of bond funds under Measures KK and U. The city has not conducted any audits, despite both measures requiring them. The Affordable Housing and Infrastructure Public Oversight Committee (I-Bond Oversight Committee), created to provide independent citizen oversight, has also failed to perform its role: it has failed to meet regularly in recent years, failed to produce any reports since 2022, and has not been providing independent oversight.
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CL2The Grand Jury learned that Oakland does not fund paving or street maintenance and repair from its General Purpose Fund. Rather, the city relies on its share of Measure BB sales tax, gas tax, and vehicle license fee money. It also has funded repaving through bond funding, which requires special property taxes and long-term financing. The Grand Jury acknowledges that Oakland voters took significant steps to improve the condition of the city’s streets through their approval of Measures KK and U. The city also made some good repaving progress while it had Measure KK bond funding available. Nonetheless, potholes and other pavement failures remain prevalent. Two and a half years after Measure U, OakDOT has still not received any money from the measure for paving. Because of how Oakland pays for street repairs, it cannot accomplish significant repaving without being able to sell Measure U bonds. However, the city’s precarious financial condition may preclude the 35 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ city from selling bonds any time soon. To do so, Oakland must pass a two-year budget for the upcoming FYs 2025-2027 and deal with the city’s structural deficit in a realistic and meaningful manner. The Grand Jury’s investigation uncovered other issues that are hindering Oakland’s repaving and street repair efforts, including staff vacancies, equipment and vehicle failures, contracting problems, and restrictions preventing competition and keeping Oakland from getting the lowest bids on street projects. OakDOT also lacks control over change orders. Aside from the lack of bond funding, these issues delayed work and prevented Oakland from meeting its paving goals. Finally, the Grand Jury discovered a stunning lack of oversight of bond expenditures under Measures KK and U. Despite selling hundreds of millions of dollars in bonds under these measures, the I-Bond Oversight Committee has not provided effective oversight. The city has not conducted the required audits, as promised to Oakland voters in the measures’ language. Without the promised oversight and audits, Oakland voters and taxpayers do not know exactly how bond expenditures are being spent, nor whether they are proper. This lack of oversight affects all projects (streets, affordable housing, and facilities) that Measure KK and U cover. If Oakland sells bonds, it still must deliver appropriate and effective oversight afterward – not just make promises to get bond measures passed. Because the City of Oakland failed to repave its roads for decades, its streets have been in poor condition for a long time. Not only are potholes and other pavement failures a nuisance to drivers, but they result in vehicle damage and pose a hazard. Poorly maintained streets present serious liability issues for the city. In many cases, potholes and poor pavement conditions caused accidents that resulted in catastrophic injury, particularly to bicyclists. Even just a few of those cases resulted in substantial payouts by the city. The current overall conditions of Oakland’s streets are untenable. Without widespread repaving, Oakland's streets will continue to deteriorate. The problems greatly affect quality of life for everyone in Oakland. Including potential liability, they will only get worse without repaving. 36 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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CL3When voters choose to tax themselves for specific purposes (e.g., park maintenance) they expect increased services to be provided. The Grand Jury finds the lack of transparency, accountability, and reporting by the City of Oakland is troubling, creating serious doubts about what Oakland residents are actually getting from Measure Q. The Grand Jury calls for better stewardship of Measure Q. Maintenance of effort requirements should be protected and implemented whenever possible. The declaration of extreme fiscal necessity should be resolved based on transparent criteria. In addition, biennial and financial audits must be conducted as prescribed by the measure. The Oakland City Council needs to provide better oversight of the implementation of Measure Q. 48 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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CL4Each year, thousands of owners are victims of vehicle theft, and their vehicles end up being illegally parked and abandoned in Oakland. Receiving a parking ticket for something they did not do adds insult to injury. If OakDOT could immediately identify a parked stolen vehicle, it would be beneficial not only to the vehicle owner but also would save to the city time and money by not having to rescind and dismiss tickets. The Grand Jury recommends that Oakland find a solution to OakDOT’s ticketing of stolen parked vehicles, and strongly suggests best practices adopted by the SFMTA. Being a victim of vehicle theft is a great hardship to anyone who has experienced this type of crime. The Grand Jury believes the city should make the recommendations in this report a priority and hopes that OakDOT takes immediate action to meet with city officials so that it stops further injuring victims of vehicle theft. The Grand Jury questions why it has taken the city so long to take an interest in this matter, especially when another large city nearby implemented an available solution. The Grand Jury believes city officials should meet with the Department of Justice and coordinate with the Oakland Police Department and OakDOT to ameliorate this failure. 58 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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CL5The Grand Jury found that the City of Oakland conducts annual inspections of approximately 25,000 private properties in high fire risk areas with high compliance rates, despite limited resources available to the Oakland Fire Department. However, although Oakland conducts inspections of city-owned properties, it has lacked the resources to do an adequate job of managing and clearing flammable vegetation on those properties, thus failing to hold itself to the same standard that applies to privately-owned properties. Measure MM should provide the resources to allow Oakland to improve vegetation management as part of its wildfire 72 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ prevention program. At the same time, unless the city acts promptly to establish and appoint members to the oversight commission that Measure MM requires, its ability to achieve other vegetation management and wildfire prevention goals will be delayed. A positive development has been Oakland’s participation in coalitions of fire agencies, and its involvement of community groups that assist in fire safety education and vegetation management. At the same time, the Grand Jury found that Oakland has been far too slow to implement and enforce meaningful parking restrictions, which are necessary to allow emergency responders to access the Oakland Hills and to allow residents to evacuate in a fire. In virtually every recent fire disaster – whether the recent fires in the greater Los Angeles Area, recent fires in Northern California, or the 1991 Tunnel Fire – the inability of residents to evacuate and firefighters to move into fire areas quickly led to greater harm and risk to life and property. There is no excuse for additional delay in improving ingress and egress. As part of that implementation, Oakland should implement greater effective enforcement of current restrictions and should consider (1) adding parking restrictions on Red Flag Days, (2) limiting parking to one side of narrow streets, and (3) other measures as recommended by OFD to ensure access by emergency vehicles. In describing what has been accomplished, and what the Grand Jury believes still needs to be done, we do not fault the Oakland Fire Department for failing to resolve parking problems. The lack of ingress and egress are problems that require action by the city council, OakDOT’s Parking and Mobility Division, and the city administrator’s office. We further recognize that solutions involving increased parking restrictions may be unpopular with residents who do not want to see additional limitations where parking is already scarce. But failure to address this problem will continue to put the lives of residents and the safety of first responders at risk. It is now over 33 years since Oakland lost many lives in the Tunnel Fire. In the Grand Jury’s view, there is no excuse for further delay.
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CL6Overall, the Grand Jury was impressed with how the Alameda County Registrar of Voters conducted the November 5, 2024, general election. With so many federal, state, and local elections, 226 different ballot types and accompanying voter guides, over 900,000 registered voters spread over a large area, and a vast quantity of mail-in ballots to tabulate, it was not a job for either the unwary or the unprepared. The ROV was up to the task. 92 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ It is important for people to have faith in the electoral process to be assured that their vote is counted and that elections are conducted fairly. This faith is essential to democracy in a world where some countries routinely conduct sham elections, and many, disappointed in outcomes, will make unsubstantiated claims of cheating and unfairness in the process. For these and other reasons, the State of California enacted laws allowing the public to observe the election process and see how elections are run. The highly automated systems used are in large part a black box and not everything is visible to the ordinary voter. In this investigation, the Grand Jury saw a great deal of the inner workings of how the ROV ran an election, collected and counted ballots, and announced results. And, while the process appeared to run smoothly for the November 2024 election, the Grand Jury as observers were frustrated with several aspects. The L&A testing only checked one of over a dozen ballot scanners, and there was no way for observers to confirm the accuracy of the ballot scanning. Online observers had no audio or explanation of what was happening. In-person observers also were kept in the dark about many aspects of the process and were not allowed to ask questions of ROV employees. The posting of election results was delayed, incomplete, and at least with respect to the calling of precincts, misleading. Transparency is essential. The Grand Jury makes a number of recommendations to improve the system and allow a clearer view of the election process and the posting of results in Alameda County.
No Responses Found 1
Government entities assigned to respond to this report. No response documents have been linked in our database.
Oakland
City