Alameda County Grand Jury
2024-2025
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Findings & Recommendations
4 findings
F25-29:
City of Oakland parking control technicians have the technology on their existing handheld devices that enables them to search some vehicle databases.
F25-30:
The City of Oakland will save staff time and taxpayer dollars by avoiding issuing and ultimately dismissing tickets on illegally parked stolen vehicles.
F25-31:
When a ticket is issued to a parked stolen vehicle, victims of crime suffer additional hardship.by needing to take affirmative steps to dismiss a parking ticket.
F25-32:
DMV provides information on stolen vehicles to OakDOT and any OakDOT staff can be trained to access this information without involving OPD or DOJ.
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Findings & Recommendations
12 findings
F25-17:
The Oakland City Council added the “extreme fiscal necessity” clause to Measure Q without open discussion and public debate.
F25-18:
The Measure Q ballot language passed by voters in March 2020 did not define what constitutes an extreme fiscal necessity.
F25-19:
The declaration of extreme fiscal necessity allowed the Oakland City Council to divert funds intended for additional park services
F25-20:
In its last disclosure of the maintenance of effort calculations, the City of Oakland reported a decrease in Measure Q funding for new park services from 45% to 32%.
F25-21:
To date, community park stakeholders and Oakland city staff still do not agree on a definition of “extreme fiscal necessity.”
F25-22:
Measure Q requires biennial reports, and the Oakland City Auditor did not conduct the second biennial audit covering FY 2022-2023 and FY 2023-2024.
F25-23:
Measure Q was not included in the Oakland City Auditor’s FY 2024-2025 workplan.
F25-24:
As recommended and funded in Measure Q, no independent financial audit has been conducted.
F25-25:
Oakland’s Parks and Recreation Advisory Commission complies with the reporting requirements in Ordinance No. 13622 (an ordinance updating the duties of the commission).
F25-26:
Oakland’s Commission on Homelessness has not met its oversight mandate of Measure Q including the preparation of annual reports as required by Ordinance No. 13584 (an ordinance updating the duties of the commission).
F25-27:
The City of Oakland has not prepared annual reports documenting revenues, expenditures and the status of projects funded by Measure Q as required by California Government Code 50075.3. 49 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
F25-28:
It is difficult to observe Oakland’s Parks and Recreation Advisory Commission meetings recorded on Zoom due to poor broadcast capabilities. (The Commission on Homelessness meetings recorded on KTOP are broadcast with better video and audio than PRAC meetings.)
Additional Recommendations
8
Not linked to specific findings.
R1:
Development of performance measures, with emphasis on reducing the number of people experiencing homelessness in or adjacent to city parks.
R2:
Facilitation of citizen oversight on homelessness efforts with the city bringing regular operational and expenditure reports to the Commission on Homelessness, and that the Commission establish a regular agenda item for the purpose.
R3:
The Commission on Homelessness fulfill its statutory obligation by publishing an annual report including a section on Measure Q.
R4:
Conduct an annual audit of Measure Q funds collected and expended, as required by California Government Code sections 50071.1 and 50075.3.
R5:
For future special tax programs, the City Administrator’s Office initiate a best practice policy requiring an annual report on revenues, expenditures and the status of open projects, to make sure that the City satisfies California Government Code sections 50071.1 and 50075.3. Based on the findings in the auditor’s report, the Grand Jury is of the opinion that the city was not prepared to implement or evaluate the services mandated by Measure Q. Annual Reporting Reporting is required by the State of California for special parcel tax measures. Government Code section 50075.3 requires the chief fiscal officer to file annual reports with its governing body (for Oakland that would be the finance director, reporting to the city council) on the amount of funds collected and expended, and the status of associated projects. The Grand Jury learned that the finance director submitted a Measure Q funding report to the city council in March of 2022, documenting revenues and expenditures, but did not include the status of associated projects. Reporting to the city council is also required by the two oversight commissions (PRAC and the Commission on Homelessness) associated with Measure Q. Local ordinances have specific reporting requirements for parcel tax measures (Ordinances 13622 and 13584). The Grand Jury researched the city’s website and conducted interviews with city staff and discovered that while PRAC was in large part compliant with ordinance requirements, the Commission on Homelessness was not. 47 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Concern Over Measure Q Expenditures The lack of reliable reporting, audits, and the declaration of extreme fiscal necessity has led park advocates to question if Measure Q funds are being spent in accordance with the measure. The Parks and Recreation Advisory Commission outlined concerns in its annual report covering Fiscal Years 2022-2023 and 2023-2024: “During the reporting period, funds from Measure Q were allocated to other unrelated city expenses under the framework of extreme fiscal necessity despite stated concerns from PRAC and park advocates.” Examples of other questionable expenditures include:
R6:
In FY 2020-2021, salaries of three police officers and a high-level human services employee, including the director, were charged to Measure Q. After concerns were made public, these charges were reclassified and not charged to the measure.
R7:
Capital expenses associated with Union Point Park were charged to Measure Q. Park advocates asserted that the measure’s funding is meant for maintenance and minor repairs, and not capital projects. The Grand Jury learned that the city attorney opined that this expenditure was allowed under Measure Q, and the matter is still being challenged.
R8:
Excessive charges for high level administrators: for example, 6.4 positions in the city administrator’s office at a cost of $3.9 million that had previously not been billed to Measure Q. Given these concerns, the Grand Jury is alarmed by the fact that no annual financial audit has been conducted for Measure Q since it was passed. CONCLUSION When voters choose to tax themselves for specific purposes (e.g., park maintenance) they expect increased services to be provided. The Grand Jury finds the lack of transparency, accountability, and reporting by the City of Oakland is troubling, creating serious doubts about what Oakland residents are actually getting from Measure Q. The Grand Jury calls for better stewardship of Measure Q. Maintenance of effort requirements should be protected and implemented whenever possible. The declaration of extreme fiscal necessity should be resolved based on transparent criteria. In addition, biennial and financial audits must be conducted as prescribed by the measure. The Oakland City Council needs to provide better oversight of the implementation of Measure Q. 48 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Findings & Recommendations
16 findings
F25-1:
Potholes and other street pavement failures have been a prevalent problem in the City of Oakland for many years.
F25-2:
The City of Oakland needed to repair over 53,000 potholes or similar pavement failures in the most recent 2023-2024 Fiscal Year.
F25-3:
Historically, liability claims and lawsuits from potholes and pavement failure have cost the City of Oakland millions of dollars.
F25-4:
Complete repaving of streets costs the City of Oakland approximately $1 million per mile.
F25-5:
The City of Oakland has not met its goals for significant repaving under its 2022 Five-Year Paving Plan, with no foreseeable date for completion.
F25-6:
Without money from the sale of authorized Measure U bonds, the City of Oakland will not be able to undertake significant additional street repaving.
F25-7:
High employee vacancy rates and the delays in approval of hiring slowed the City of Oakland’s in-house street repaving and repairs.
F25-8:
The City of Oakland’s Local Business Enterprise and Small Local Business Enterprise programs limit the competition for Oakland’s Department of Transportation contracts for paving and street work, causing Oakland to not receive multiple bids, which could result in lower costs.
F25-9:
The City of Oakland’s Department of Transportation lacks adequate control over change orders on paving and street projects, including failure to first identify approved funding.
F25-10:
The City of Oakland has not conducted any audits under Measure KK or Measure U, as required by the measures. 37 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
F25-11:
The City of Oakland’s I-Bond Oversight Committee has not met regularly since at least December 2022, as required.
F25-12:
The City of Oakland (Mayor) has failed to fill the current vacancies on the I-Bond Oversight Committee.
F25-13:
The I-Bond Oversight Committee has not provided regular or annual reports on Measure KK to the Oakland City Council since September 2022, nor on Measure U since its approval in November 2022.
F25-14:
The website for the City of Oakland’s I-Bond Oversight Committee lacks complete information including most committee reports, and not all agendas, minutes, or recordings.
F25-15:
The City of Oakland’s I-Bond Oversight Committee failed to conduct a self-evaluation, as required by its bylaws.
F25-16:
The City of Oakland has failed to ensure that the I-Bond Oversight Committee has been fulfilling its duties, including meeting regularly, reporting as needed, and conducting self- evaluations as required.
Findings & Recommendations
7 findings
F25-33:
The Oakland Fire Department has met its goal of conducting annual wildfire inspections of virtually all private properties in the Oakland Hills area designated as the Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone.
F25-34:
The Oakland Fire Department’s annual wildfire prevention inspections of private properties in the Oakland Hills finds a high level of compliance on the part of property owners. 73 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
F25-35:
For city-owned properties, the Oakland City Council does not presently allocate sufficient resources for vegetation management to remove or mitigate fire risks.
F25-36:
At the time of this report, the Oakland City Council has not yet developed an implementation plan for Measure MM, although the measure becomes effective on July 1, 2025.
F25-37:
Oakland’s Department of Transportation lacks adequate enforcement of parking restrictions in the Oakland Hills which hinders the ability of emergency services to navigate narrow streets to ensure a timely response to emergencies.
F25-38:
The Oakland City Council has not done an adequate job of educating Oakland Hills residents about emergency evacuation routes.
F25-39:
Public education about evacuation routes, and availability of emergency warning systems (such as AC Alert), are critical to improving public safety in Oakland, especially in areas with high wildfire risk.
Additional Recommendations
1
Not linked to specific findings.
R7:
called for the city council to determine if parking in the Oakland Hills that obstructed road access was an enforcement priority, and if so, whether an enforcement program (with community input) should be implemented. Car Illegally Parked in the Oakland Hills 69 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ In December 2015, a follow-up audit found that the city had taken insufficient action. It concluded: The large number of resident and visitor vehicles in the Oakland hills creates unsafe congestion and, at times, possibly illegal parking situations including parking on streets too narrow to accommodate an emergency vehicle and parking in red “no parking” zones. Parking infractions are not regularly cited by Parking Enforcement which, according to the Fire Department, has indicated that the Oakland hills neighborhoods are not a priority parking enforcement area. Despite that strong recommendation, the city auditor again found in November 2017 that the illegally parked vehicles blocking Oakland hills roads was still a problem. That report, entitled, “Second Follow-up: Oakland Fire Department Vegetation Inspection Audit” specifically noted: OFD or Parking Enforcement [the predecessor to the Oakland Department of Transportation] must find a workable solution for the parking problem in the Oakland hills … Narrow roadways that quickly became blocked during the evacuation [in the 1991 Oakland-Berkeley Tunnel Hills Fire] contributed to the tragedy, as these streets were, for many residents, the only exit routes out of the area. Oakland still has not made sufficient progress in finding a “workable solution.” Although Oakland’s 2023-2024 Local Hazard Mitigation Plan Report touted “enhanced coordination with Department of Transportation and Oakland Police to enforce parking restrictions on Red Flag Days,” nearly every witness the Grand Jury interviewed questioned the adequacy of this enforcement. Another current concern is efforts to increase housing density in high fire risk areas, which would exacerbate the problem. The Grand Jury learned from the Parking and Mobility Unit in Oakland’s Department of Transportation (OakDOT) that it had arranged for the installation of additional “No Parking” signs in the hills in 2017, in response to an initiative of the Oakland Wildfire Prevention Working Group. Still, Oakland does not have any areas that are designated as “No Parking on Red Flag Days,” as do some municipalities. Consequently, there is no signage to limit parking and create additional access on those days. OakDOT’s parking control technicians (who are responsible for issuing tickets to illegally parked cars), conduct limited patrols in the Oakland Hills, although not with the same regularity as they patrol commercial zones (including areas with parking meters) or areas with street sweeping restrictions. The Grand Jury heard conflicting information about the level of parking enforcement in the Oakland Hills. While OakDOT may conduct enforcement and dispatches additional parking control technicians on days designated as Red Flag Days, it is evident that the current level of enforcement overall is insufficient. 70 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Oakland should increase the “no parking” zones in the hills, particularly on narrow streets or streets with curves that may be more difficult to navigate for large emergency vehicles. Indeed, the National Fire Safety Association states that road access for fire equipment should have a minimum unobstructed width of not less than 20 feet. To follow that guidance, parking in the Oakland Hills likely would have to be limited to one side on many narrow streets. Oakland also should add “no parking” zone in certain areas, so that those restrictions apply on Red Flag days – a solution used in other high fire risk areas in California. The Grand Jury recognizes that there likely would be costs involved in purchasing and placing new signage, as well as implementing increased enforcement to ensure evacuation routes are available and safe. We note these parking management solutions for consideration by the city. The Grand Jury did not investigate the amount of possible increased costs. To the extent that citations for parking violations bring in revenue, the cost of enforcement may be covered in part by collection of parking fines. Measure MM requires actions to provide “well-maintained, accessible” evacuation routes and to provide education. Although Measure MM implementation plans remain pending, the Grand Jury encourages the city to focus on safe evacuation planning with some urgency. This planning should include increased parking enforcement; public outreach and education so that residents will be aware of their evacuation zones and evacuation routes; and regular updates on coordination among Oakland departments and between Oakland and neighboring fire prevention agencies (including funds necessary for interagency training). Coordination With Other Agencies Because fires do not respect city boundaries, and problems with coordination were identified as an issue in the Tunnel Fire, the Grand Jury reviewed the current state of interdepartmental and interagency coordination. Since the Tunnel Fire, coordination has improved, including increased use of the same types of communication systems and equipment, as well as joint training on procedures to allow fire departments to work together when necessary. Oakland and nearby agencies also improved coordination through several multi-jurisdictional organizations. The Hills Emergency Forum was created after the Tunnel Fire and now includes the following partners: Oakland, Berkeley, El Cerrito, CAL FIRE, East Bay Regional Parks District, East Bay Municipal Utility District, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, the Moraga-Orinda Fire District, and the University of California, Berkeley. It meets regularly to discuss coordination of evacuation routes, clearing trails, training, and equipment. The forum’s coordination plans include mutual aid arrangements, as necessary to address wildfires (locally and outside the region). It also coordinates work with Civic Corps and community groups that assist local fire departments in clearing fire hazards. Finally, it provides information to members about securing grant funding. 71 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ More recently, Oakland has participated in the new East Bay Wildfire Coalition of Governments. In 2021, the Oakland City Council, recognizing the need for coordination among public entities in the area, adopted a resolution directing the city administrator to participate in discussions about the possible formation of a joint powers authority for fire prevention and management among Easy Bay hills jurisdictions. Ultimately, the participants chose not to pursue a joint powers authority, at least for the present time. Instead, in 2023, they entered into a Memorandum of Understanding to form the East Bay Wildfire Coalition of Governments. The East Bay Wildfire Coalition of Governments, which now meets periodically to receive reports and discuss efforts to mitigate the risk of wildfire in the East Bay hills is comprised of the following members: Alameda and Contra Costa counties, Alameda County Fire Department, Contra Costa Fire Protection District, the Rodeo-Hercules Fire Prevention District, and the cities of Berkeley, Oakland, El Cerrito, and Richmond. In addition, the University of California, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, East Bay Regional Parks District, East Bay Municipal Utility District, and the East Bay Firesafe Councils (representing community members) participate as regional advisors. Separately, one recent example of successful coordination was the response to the Keller Fire in Oakland in October 2024. Before that fire started, the National Weather Service issued Red Flag warnings, including warnings of possible 40-mph winds. Because of the warnings, OFD pre-positioned fire engines and other firefighting apparatus in the hills. The planning included coordination with emergency services across the county. All cities with emergency service engines were “upstaffed,” making extra staff available to respond. As a result, OFD was able to move necessary equipment to the Keller scene immediately. In addition, CAL FIRE sent air resources almost immediately. Over 200 personnel coordinated to evacuate 254 structures. In all, 27 different jurisdictions were on the scene. Because of prior communications and coordinated training, responders were able to work together and prevent the fire from reaching more populous areas, which could have been catastrophic. Their combined efforts limited the Keller Fire to 15 acres, with damage to only two structures and no injuries.
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Findings & Recommendations
52 findings
F25-1:
Potholes and other street pavement failures have been a prevalent problem in the City of Oakland for many years.
F25-2:
The City of Oakland needed to repair over 53,000 potholes or similar pavement failures in the most recent 2023-2024 Fiscal Year.
F25-3:
Historically, liability claims and lawsuits from potholes and pavement failure have cost the City of Oakland millions of dollars.
F25-4:
Complete repaving of streets costs the City of Oakland approximately $1 million per mile.
F25-5:
The City of Oakland has not met its goals for significant repaving under its 2022 Five-Year Paving Plan, with no foreseeable date for completion.
F25-6:
Without money from the sale of authorized Measure U bonds, the City of Oakland will not be able to undertake significant additional street repaving.
F25-7:
High employee vacancy rates and the delays in approval of hiring slowed the City of Oakland’s in-house street repaving and repairs.
F25-8:
The City of Oakland’s Local Business Enterprise and Small Local Business Enterprise programs limit the competition for Oakland’s Department of Transportation contracts for paving and street work, causing Oakland to not receive multiple bids, which could result in lower costs.
F25-9:
The City of Oakland’s Department of Transportation lacks adequate control over change orders on paving and street projects, including failure to first identify approved funding.
F25-10:
The City of Oakland has not conducted any audits under Measure KK or Measure U, as required by the measures. 37
F25-11:
The City of Oakland’s I-Bond Oversight Committee has not met regularly since at least December 2022, as required.
F25-12:
The City of Oakland (Mayor) has failed to fill the current vacancies on the I-Bond Oversight Committee.
F25-13:
The I-Bond Oversight Committee has not provided regular or annual reports on Measure KK to the Oakland City Council since September 2022, nor on Measure U since its approval in November 2022.
F25-14:
The website for the City of Oakland’s I-Bond Oversight Committee lacks complete information including most committee reports, and not all agendas, minutes, or recordings.
F25-15:
The City of Oakland’s I-Bond Oversight Committee failed to conduct a self-evaluation, as required by its bylaws.
F25-16:
The City of Oakland has failed to ensure that the I-Bond Oversight Committee has been fulfilling its duties, including meeting regularly, reporting as needed, and conducting self- evaluations as required.
F25-17:
The Oakland City Council added the “extreme fiscal necessity” clause to Measure Q without open discussion and public debate.
F25-18:
The Measure Q ballot language passed by voters in March 2020 did not define what constitutes an extreme fiscal necessity.
F25-19:
The declaration of extreme fiscal necessity allowed the Oakland City Council to divert funds intended for additional park services
F25-20:
In its last disclosure of the maintenance of effort calculations, the City of Oakland reported a decrease in Measure Q funding for new park services from 45% to 32%.
F25-21:
To date, community park stakeholders and Oakland city staff still do not agree on a definition of “extreme fiscal necessity.”
F25-22:
Measure Q requires biennial reports, and the Oakland City Auditor did not conduct the second biennial audit covering FY 2022-2023 and FY 2023-2024.
F25-23:
Measure Q was not included in the Oakland City Auditor’s FY 2024-2025 workplan.
F25-24:
As recommended and funded in Measure Q, no independent financial audit has been conducted.
F25-25:
Oakland’s Parks and Recreation Advisory Commission complies with the reporting requirements in Ordinance No. 13622 (an ordinance updating the duties of the commission).
F25-26:
Oakland’s Commission on Homelessness has not met its oversight mandate of Measure Q including the preparation of annual reports as required by Ordinance No. 13584 (an ordinance updating the duties of the commission).
F25-27:
The City of Oakland has not prepared annual reports documenting revenues, expenditures and the status of projects funded by Measure Q as required by California Government Code 50075.3. 49
F25-28:
It is difficult to observe Oakland’s Parks and Recreation Advisory Commission meetings recorded on Zoom due to poor broadcast capabilities. (The Commission on Homelessness meetings recorded on KTOP are broadcast with better video and audio than PRAC meetings.)
F25-29:
City of Oakland parking control technicians have the technology on their existing handheld devices that enables them to search some vehicle databases.
F25-30:
The City of Oakland will save staff time and taxpayer dollars by avoiding issuing and ultimately dismissing tickets on illegally parked stolen vehicles.
F25-31:
When a ticket is issued to a parked stolen vehicle, victims of crime suffer additional hardship.by needing to take affirmative steps to dismiss a parking ticket.
F25-32:
DMV provides information on stolen vehicles to OakDOT and any OakDOT staff can be trained to access this information without involving OPD or DOJ.
F25-33:
The Oakland Fire Department has met its goal of conducting annual wildfire inspections of virtually all private properties in the Oakland Hills area designated as the Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone.
F25-34:
The Oakland Fire Department’s annual wildfire prevention inspections of private properties in the Oakland Hills finds a high level of compliance on the part of property owners. 73
F25-35:
For city-owned properties, the Oakland City Council does not presently allocate sufficient resources for vegetation management to remove or mitigate fire risks.
F25-36:
At the time of this report, the Oakland City Council has not yet developed an implementation plan for Measure MM, although the measure becomes effective on July 1, 2025.
F25-37:
Oakland’s Department of Transportation lacks adequate enforcement of parking restrictions in the Oakland Hills which hinders the ability of emergency services to navigate narrow streets to ensure a timely response to emergencies.
F25-38:
The Oakland City Council has not done an adequate job of educating Oakland Hills residents about emergency evacuation routes.
F25-39:
Public education about evacuation routes, and availability of emergency warning systems (such as AC Alert), are critical to improving public safety in Oakland, especially in areas with high wildfire risk.
F25-40:
The Logic and Accuracy Test of the Alameda County Registrar of Voters voting system tested only one of over a dozen ballot scanners used in the election.
F25-41:
During Logic and Accuracy testing, sample ballots were pre-marked by the Registrar of Voters and observers were not permitted to examine the pre-marked ballots at any time to confirm they matched the count from the ballot scanner.
F25-42:
Video observation (online) of the electoral process, including the ballot envelope sorting, signature verification, vote-by-mail processing, and ballot scanning, was without audio or any description to the viewer of what was happening in the video feed. 93
F25-43:
During the in-person observation of ballot counting on election night, members of the public were required to be onsite by 8:00 p.m. but were not allowed entry into the Registrar of Voters counting room until after 10 p.m. During this time, ballots were being wheeled into the room while observers were kept waiting in a hallway outside, and online video feed was unavailable.
F25-44:
Once admitted to view ballot counting in person on election night, observers were not allowed to ask any questions.
F25-45:
Notices by the Registrar of Voters to the public of upcoming online observation video feeds of the election processes did not identify the start times or what the processes would be. The notice stated, “An election process will be conducted today. For ongoing updates, check the website where all election processes will be posted.”
F25-46:
During the in-person observation of the 1% manual tally after the election, observers were given no explanation of the hand count process.
F25-47:
During the in-person observation of the 1% manual tally after the election, observers were not allowed to ask questions concerning the process.
F25-48:
In the updates of the vote counts starting on election night, it was stated that “570 of 570 Precincts Reported (100%),” giving the misleading impression that all ballots had been received or counted.
F25-49:
While the Registrar of Voters was reporting live results to the Secretary of State (where the results were posted on the state’s website), not all of these same results were being posted on Alameda County’s local website. The Alameda County website did not include: the cumulative total number of processed ballots, total updated number of processed ballots, vote-by-mail ballots received before and after election day, estimated total ballots remaining, or ballots left to be cured.
F25-50:
As reported by the Secretary of State’s website, Alameda County still had an estimated 187,135 ballots out of 683,644 total ballots cast remaining to be counted 10 days after the election. 94
F25-51:
Alameda County’s election results were updated on the website five times on election night but not updated daily after the election.
F25-52:
Delays in the tabulation and reporting of election results by the Registrar of Voters are caused in part by insufficient facilities, lack of equipment, and low staffing during ballot processing and counting.
Additional Recommendations
1
Not linked to specific findings.
R7:
called for the city council to determine if parking in the Oakland Hills that obstructed road access was an enforcement priority, and if so, whether an enforcement program (with community input) should be implemented. Car Illegally Parked in the Oakland Hills 69 In December 2015, a follow-up audit found that the city had taken insufficient action. It concluded: The large number of resident and visitor vehicles in the Oakland hills creates unsafe congestion and, at times, possibly illegal parking situations including parking on streets too narrow to accommodate an emergency vehicle and parking in red “no parking” zones. Parking infractions are not regularly cited by Parking Enforcement which, according to the Fire Department, has indicated that the Oakland hills neighborhoods are not a priority parking enforcement area. Despite that strong recommendation, the city auditor again found in November 2017 that the illegally parked vehicles blocking Oakland hills roads was still a problem. That report, entitled, “Second Follow-up: Oakland Fire Department Vegetation Inspection Audit” specifically noted: OFD or Parking Enforcement [the predecessor to the Oakland Department of Transportation] must find a workable solution for the parking problem in the Oakland hills … Narrow roadways that quickly became blocked during the evacuation [in the 1991 Oakland-Berkeley Tunnel Hills Fire] contributed to the tragedy, as these streets were, for many residents, the only exit routes out of the area. Oakland still has not made sufficient progress in finding a “workable solution.” Although Oakland’s 2023-2024 Local Hazard Mitigation Plan Report touted “enhanced coordination with Department of Transportation and Oakland Police to enforce parking restrictions on Red Flag Days,” nearly every witness the Grand Jury interviewed questioned the adequacy of this enforcement. Another current concern is efforts to increase housing density in high fire risk areas, which would exacerbate the problem. The Grand Jury learned from the Parking and Mobility Unit in Oakland’s Department of Transportation (OakDOT) that it had arranged for the installation of additional “No Parking” signs in the hills in 2017, in response to an initiative of the Oakland Wildfire Prevention Working Group. Still, Oakland does not have any areas that are designated as “No Parking on Red Flag Days,” as do some municipalities. Consequently, there is no signage to limit parking and create additional access on those days. OakDOT’s parking control technicians (who are responsible for issuing tickets to illegally parked cars), conduct limited patrols in the Oakland Hills, although not with the same regularity as they patrol commercial zones (including areas with parking meters) or areas with street sweeping restrictions. The Grand Jury heard conflicting information about the level of parking enforcement in the Oakland Hills. While OakDOT may conduct enforcement and dispatches additional parking control technicians on days designated as Red Flag Days, it is evident that the current level of enforcement overall is insufficient. Oakland should increase the “no parking” zones in the hills, particularly on narrow streets or streets with curves that may be more difficult to navigate for large emergency vehicles. Indeed, the National Fire Safety Association states that road access for fire equipment should have a minimum unobstructed width of not less than 20 feet. To follow that guidance, parking in the Oakland Hills likely would have to be limited to one side on many narrow streets. Oakland also should add “no parking” zone in certain areas, so that those restrictions apply on Red Flag days – a solution used in other high fire risk areas in California. The Grand Jury recognizes that there likely would be costs involved in purchasing and placing new signage, as well as implementing increased enforcement to ensure evacuation routes are available and safe. We note these parking management solutions for consideration by the city. The Grand Jury did not investigate the amount of possible increased costs. To the extent that citations for parking violations bring in revenue, the cost of enforcement may be covered in part by collection of parking fines. Measure MM requires actions to provide “well-maintained, accessible” evacuation routes and to provide education. Although Measure MM implementation plans remain pending, the Grand Jury encourages the city to focus on safe evacuation planning with some urgency. This planning should include increased parking enforcement; public outreach and education so that residents will be aware of their evacuation zones and evacuation routes; and regular updates on coordination among Oakland departments and between Oakland and neighboring fire prevention agencies (including funds necessary for interagency training). Coordination With Other Agencies Because fires do not respect city boundaries, and problems with coordination were identified as an issue in the Tunnel Fire, the Grand Jury reviewed the current state of interdepartmental and interagency coordination. Since the Tunnel Fire, coordination has improved, including increased use of the same types of communication systems and equipment, as well as joint training on procedures to allow fire departments to work together when necessary. Oakland and nearby agencies also improved coordination through several multi-jurisdictional organizations. The Hills Emergency Forum was created after the Tunnel Fire and now includes the following partners: Oakland, Berkeley, El Cerrito, CAL FIRE, East Bay Regional Parks District, East Bay Municipal Utility District, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, the Moraga-Orinda Fire District, and the University of California, Berkeley. It meets regularly to discuss coordination of evacuation routes, clearing trails, training, and equipment. The forum’s coordination plans include mutual aid arrangements, as necessary to address wildfires (locally and outside the region). It also coordinates work with Civic Corps and community groups that assist local fire departments in clearing fire hazards. Finally, it provides information to members about securing grant funding. More recently, Oakland has participated in the new East Bay Wildfire Coalition of Governments. In 2021, the Oakland City Council, recognizing the need for coordination among public entities in the area, adopted a resolution directing the city administrator to participate in discussions about the possible formation of a joint powers authority for fire prevention and management among Easy Bay hills jurisdictions. Ultimately, the participants chose not to pursue a joint powers authority, at least for the present time. Instead, in 2023, they entered into a Memorandum of Understanding to form the East Bay Wildfire Coalition of Governments. The East Bay Wildfire Coalition of Governments, which now meets periodically to receive reports and discuss efforts to mitigate the risk of wildfire in the East Bay hills is comprised of the following members: Alameda and Contra Costa counties, Alameda County Fire Department, Contra Costa Fire Protection District, the Rodeo-Hercules Fire Prevention District, and the cities of Berkeley, Oakland, El Cerrito, and Richmond. In addition, the University of California, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, East Bay Regional Parks District, East Bay Municipal Utility District, and the East Bay Firesafe Councils (representing community members) participate as regional advisors. Separately, one recent example of successful coordination was the response to the Keller Fire in Oakland in October 2024. Before that fire started, the National Weather Service issued Red Flag warnings, including warnings of possible 40-mph winds. Because of the warnings, OFD pre-positioned fire engines and other firefighting apparatus in the hills. The planning included coordination with emergency services across the county. All cities with emergency service engines were “upstaffed,” making extra staff available to respond. As a result, OFD was able to move necessary equipment to the Keller scene immediately. In addition, CAL FIRE sent air resources almost immediately. Over 200 personnel coordinated to evacuate 254 structures. In all, 27 different jurisdictions were on the scene. Because of prior communications and coordinated training, responders were able to work together and prevent the fire from reaching more populous areas, which could have been catastrophic. Their combined efforts limited the Keller Fire to 15 acres, with damage to only two structures and no injuries.
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Findings & Recommendations
104 findings
25-1:
Potholes and other street pavement failures have been a prevalent problem in the City of Oakland for many years.
F25-1:
Potholes and other street pavement failures have been a prevalent problem in the City of Oakland for many years.
25-2:
The City of Oakland needed to repair over 53,000 potholes or similar pavement failures in the most recent 2023-2024 Fiscal Year.
F25-2:
The City of Oakland needed to repair over 53,000 potholes or similar pavement failures in the most recent 2023-2024 Fiscal Year.
25-3:
Historically, liability claims and lawsuits from potholes and pavement failure have cost the City of Oakland millions of dollars.
F25-3:
Historically, liability claims and lawsuits from potholes and pavement failure have cost the City of Oakland millions of dollars.
25-4:
Complete repaving of streets costs the City of Oakland approximately $1 million per mile.
F25-4:
Complete repaving of streets costs the City of Oakland approximately $1 million per mile.
25-5:
The City of Oakland has not met its goals for significant repaving under its 2022 Five-Year Paving Plan, with no foreseeable date for completion.
F25-5:
The City of Oakland has not met its goals for significant repaving under its 2022 Five-Year Paving Plan, with no foreseeable date for completion.
25-6:
Without money from the sale of authorized Measure U bonds, the City of Oakland will not be able to undertake significant additional street repaving.
F25-6:
Without money from the sale of authorized Measure U bonds, the City of Oakland will not be able to undertake significant additional street repaving.
25-7:
High employee vacancy rates and the delays in approval of hiring slowed the City of Oakland’s in-house street repaving and repairs.
F25-7:
High employee vacancy rates and the delays in approval of hiring slowed the City of Oakland’s in-house street repaving and repairs.
25-8:
The City of Oakland’s Local Business Enterprise and Small Local Business Enterprise programs limit the competition for Oakland’s Department of Transportation contracts for paving and street work, causing Oakland to not receive multiple bids, which could result in lower costs.
F25-8:
The City of Oakland’s Local Business Enterprise and Small Local Business Enterprise programs limit the competition for Oakland’s Department of Transportation contracts for paving and street work, causing Oakland to not receive multiple bids, which could result in lower costs.
25-9:
The City of Oakland’s Department of Transportation lacks adequate control over change orders on paving and street projects, including failure to first identify approved funding.
F25-9:
The City of Oakland’s Department of Transportation lacks adequate control over change orders on paving and street projects, including failure to first identify approved funding.
25-10:
The City of Oakland has not conducted any audits under Measure KK or Measure U, as required by the measures.
F25-10:
The City of Oakland has not conducted any audits under Measure KK or Measure U, as required by the measures. 37
25-11:
The City of Oakland’s I-Bond Oversight Committee has not met regularly since at least December 2022, as required.
F25-11:
The City of Oakland’s I-Bond Oversight Committee has not met regularly since at least December 2022, as required.
25-12:
The City of Oakland (Mayor) has failed to fill the current vacancies on the I-Bond Oversight Committee.
F25-12:
The City of Oakland (Mayor) has failed to fill the current vacancies on the I-Bond Oversight Committee.
25-13:
The I-Bond Oversight Committee has not provided regular or annual reports on Measure KK to the Oakland City Council since September 2022, nor on Measure U since its approval in November 2022.
F25-13:
The I-Bond Oversight Committee has not provided regular or annual reports on Measure KK to the Oakland City Council since September 2022, nor on Measure U since its approval in November 2022.
25-14:
The website for the City of Oakland’s I-Bond Oversight Committee lacks complete information including most committee reports, and not all agendas, minutes, or recordings.
F25-14:
The website for the City of Oakland’s I-Bond Oversight Committee lacks complete information including most committee reports, and not all agendas, minutes, or recordings.
25-15:
The City of Oakland’s I-Bond Oversight Committee failed to conduct a self-evaluation, as required by its bylaws.
F25-15:
The City of Oakland’s I-Bond Oversight Committee failed to conduct a self-evaluation, as required by its bylaws.
25-16:
The City of Oakland has failed to ensure that the I-Bond Oversight Committee has been fulfilling its duties, including meeting regularly, reporting as needed, and conducting selfevaluations as required.
F25-16:
The City of Oakland has failed to ensure that the I-Bond Oversight Committee has been fulfilling its duties, including meeting regularly, reporting as needed, and conducting self- evaluations as required.
25-17:
The Oakland City Council added the “extreme fiscal necessity” clause to Measure Q without open discussion and public debate.
F25-17:
The Oakland City Council added the “extreme fiscal necessity” clause to Measure Q without open discussion and public debate.
25-18:
The Measure Q ballot language passed by voters in March 2020 did not define what constitutes an extreme fiscal necessity.
F25-18:
The Measure Q ballot language passed by voters in March 2020 did not define what constitutes an extreme fiscal necessity.
25-19:
The declaration of extreme fiscal necessity allowed the Oakland City Council to divert funds intended for additional park services
F25-19:
The declaration of extreme fiscal necessity allowed the Oakland City Council to divert funds intended for additional park services
25-20:
In its last disclosure of the maintenance of effort calculations, the City of Oakland reported a decrease in Measure Q funding for new park services from 45% to 32%.
F25-20:
In its last disclosure of the maintenance of effort calculations, the City of Oakland reported a decrease in Measure Q funding for new park services from 45% to 32%.
25-21:
To date, community park stakeholders and Oakland city staff still do not agree on a definition of “extreme fiscal necessity.”
F25-21:
To date, community park stakeholders and Oakland city staff still do not agree on a definition of “extreme fiscal necessity.”
25-22:
Measure Q requires biennial reports, and the Oakland City Auditor did not conduct the second biennial audit covering FY 2022-2023 and FY 2023-2024.
F25-22:
Measure Q requires biennial reports, and the Oakland City Auditor did not conduct the second biennial audit covering FY 2022-2023 and FY 2023-2024.
25-23:
Measure Q was not included in the Oakland City Auditor’s FY 2024-2025 workplan.
F25-23:
Measure Q was not included in the Oakland City Auditor’s FY 2024-2025 workplan.
25-24:
As recommended and funded in Measure Q, no independent financial audit has been conducted.
F25-24:
As recommended and funded in Measure Q, no independent financial audit has been conducted.
25-25:
Oakland’s Parks and Recreation Advisory Commission complies with the reporting requirements in Ordinance No. 13622 (an ordinance updating the duties of the commission).
F25-25:
Oakland’s Parks and Recreation Advisory Commission complies with the reporting requirements in Ordinance No. 13622 (an ordinance updating the duties of the commission).
25-26:
Oakland’s Commission on Homelessness has not met its oversight mandate of Measure Q including the preparation of annual reports as required by Ordinance No. 13584 (an ordinance updating the duties of the commission).
F25-26:
Oakland’s Commission on Homelessness has not met its oversight mandate of Measure Q including the preparation of annual reports as required by Ordinance No. 13584 (an ordinance updating the duties of the commission).
25-27:
The City of Oakland has not prepared annual reports documenting revenues, expenditures and the status of projects funded by Measure Q as required by California Government Code 50075.3.
F25-27:
The City of Oakland has not prepared annual reports documenting revenues, expenditures and the status of projects funded by Measure Q as required by California Government Code 50075.3. 49
25-28:
It is difficult to observe Oakland’s Parks and Recreation Advisory Commission meetings recorded on Zoom due to poor broadcast capabilities. (The Commission on Homelessness meetings recorded on KTOP are broadcast with better video and audio than PRAC meetings.)
F25-28:
It is difficult to observe Oakland’s Parks and Recreation Advisory Commission meetings recorded on Zoom due to poor broadcast capabilities. (The Commission on Homelessness meetings recorded on KTOP are broadcast with better video and audio than PRAC meetings.)
25-29:
City of Oakland parking control technicians have the technology on their existing handheld devices that enables them to search some vehicle databases.
F25-29:
City of Oakland parking control technicians have the technology on their existing handheld devices that enables them to search some vehicle databases.
25-30:
The City of Oakland will save staff time and taxpayer dollars by avoiding issuing and ultimately dismissing tickets on illegally parked stolen vehicles.
F25-30:
The City of Oakland will save staff time and taxpayer dollars by avoiding issuing and ultimately dismissing tickets on illegally parked stolen vehicles.
25-31:
When a ticket is issued to a parked stolen vehicle, victims of crime suffer additional hardship.by needing to take affirmative steps to dismiss a parking ticket.
F25-31:
When a ticket is issued to a parked stolen vehicle, victims of crime suffer additional hardship.by needing to take affirmative steps to dismiss a parking ticket.
25-32:
DMV provides information on stolen vehicles to OakDOT and any OakDOT staff can be trained to access this information without involving OPD or DOJ.
F25-32:
DMV provides information on stolen vehicles to OakDOT and any OakDOT staff can be trained to access this information without involving OPD or DOJ.
25-33:
The Oakland Fire Department has met its goal of conducting annual wildfire inspections of virtually all private properties in the Oakland Hills area designated as the Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone.
F25-33:
The Oakland Fire Department has met its goal of conducting annual wildfire inspections of virtually all private properties in the Oakland Hills area designated as the Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone.
25-34:
The Oakland Fire Department’s annual wildfire prevention inspections of private properties in the Oakland Hills finds a high level of compliance on the part of property owners.
F25-34:
The Oakland Fire Department’s annual wildfire prevention inspections of private properties in the Oakland Hills finds a high level of compliance on the part of property owners. 73
25-35:
For city-owned properties, the Oakland City Council does not presently allocate sufficient resources for vegetation management to remove or mitigate fire risks.
F25-35:
For city-owned properties, the Oakland City Council does not presently allocate sufficient resources for vegetation management to remove or mitigate fire risks.
25-36:
At the time of this report, the Oakland City Council has not yet developed an implementation plan for Measure MM, although the measure becomes effective on July 1, 2025.
F25-36:
At the time of this report, the Oakland City Council has not yet developed an implementation plan for Measure MM, although the measure becomes effective on July 1, 2025.
25-37:
Oakland’s Department of Transportation lacks adequate enforcement of parking restrictions in the Oakland Hills which hinders the ability of emergency services to navigate narrow streets to ensure a timely response to emergencies.
F25-37:
Oakland’s Department of Transportation lacks adequate enforcement of parking restrictions in the Oakland Hills which hinders the ability of emergency services to navigate narrow streets to ensure a timely response to emergencies.
25-38:
The Oakland City Council has not done an adequate job of educating Oakland Hills residents about emergency evacuation routes.
F25-38:
The Oakland City Council has not done an adequate job of educating Oakland Hills residents about emergency evacuation routes.
25-39:
Public education about evacuation routes, and availability of emergency warning systems (such as AC Alert), are critical to improving public safety in Oakland, especially in areas with high wildfire risk.
F25-39:
Public education about evacuation routes, and availability of emergency warning systems (such as AC Alert), are critical to improving public safety in Oakland, especially in areas with high wildfire risk.
25-40:
The Logic and Accuracy Test of the Alameda County Registrar of Voters voting system tested only one of over a dozen ballot scanners used in the election.
F25-40:
The Logic and Accuracy Test of the Alameda County Registrar of Voters voting system tested only one of over a dozen ballot scanners used in the election.
25-41:
During Logic and Accuracy testing, sample ballots were pre-marked by the Registrar of Voters and observers were not permitted to examine the pre-marked ballots at any time to confirm they matched the count from the ballot scanner.
F25-41:
During Logic and Accuracy testing, sample ballots were pre-marked by the Registrar of Voters and observers were not permitted to examine the pre-marked ballots at any time to confirm they matched the count from the ballot scanner.
25-42:
Video observation (online) of the electoral process, including the ballot envelope sorting, signature verification, vote-by-mail processing, and ballot scanning, was without audio or any description to the viewer of what was happening in the video feed.
F25-42:
Video observation (online) of the electoral process, including the ballot envelope sorting, signature verification, vote-by-mail processing, and ballot scanning, was without audio or any description to the viewer of what was happening in the video feed. 93
25-43:
During the in-person observation of ballot counting on election night, members of the public were required to be onsite by 8:00 p.m. but were not allowed entry into the Registrar of Voters counting room until after 10 p.m. During this time, ballots were being wheeled into the room while observers were kept waiting in a hallway outside, and online video feed was unavailable.
F25-43:
During the in-person observation of ballot counting on election night, members of the public were required to be onsite by 8:00 p.m. but were not allowed entry into the Registrar of Voters counting room until after 10 p.m. During this time, ballots were being wheeled into the room while observers were kept waiting in a hallway outside, and online video feed was unavailable.
25-44:
Once admitted to view ballot counting in person on election night, observers were not allowed to ask any questions.
F25-44:
Once admitted to view ballot counting in person on election night, observers were not allowed to ask any questions.
25-45:
Notices by the Registrar of Voters to the public of upcoming online observation video feeds of the election processes did not identify the start times or what the processes would be. The notice stated, “An election process will be conducted today. For ongoing updates, check the website where all election processes will be posted.”
F25-45:
Notices by the Registrar of Voters to the public of upcoming online observation video feeds of the election processes did not identify the start times or what the processes would be. The notice stated, “An election process will be conducted today. For ongoing updates, check the website where all election processes will be posted.”
25-46:
During the in-person observation of the 1% manual tally after the election, observers were given no explanation of the hand count process.
F25-46:
During the in-person observation of the 1% manual tally after the election, observers were given no explanation of the hand count process.
25-47:
During the in-person observation of the 1% manual tally after the election, observers were not allowed to ask questions concerning the process.
F25-47:
During the in-person observation of the 1% manual tally after the election, observers were not allowed to ask questions concerning the process.
25-48:
In the updates of the vote counts starting on election night, it was stated that “570 of 570 Precincts Reported (100%),” giving the misleading impression that all ballots had been received or counted.
F25-48:
In the updates of the vote counts starting on election night, it was stated that “570 of 570 Precincts Reported (100%),” giving the misleading impression that all ballots had been received or counted.
25-49:
While the Registrar of Voters was reporting live results to the Secretary of State (where the results were posted on the state’s website), not all of these same results were being posted on Alameda County’s local website. The Alameda County website did not include: the cumulative total number of processed ballots, total updated number of processed ballots, vote-by-mail ballots received before and after election day, estimated total ballots remaining, or ballots left to be cured.
F25-49:
While the Registrar of Voters was reporting live results to the Secretary of State (where the results were posted on the state’s website), not all of these same results were being posted on Alameda County’s local website. The Alameda County website did not include: the cumulative total number of processed ballots, total updated number of processed ballots, vote-by-mail ballots received before and after election day, estimated total ballots remaining, or ballots left to be cured.
25-50:
As reported by the Secretary of State’s website, Alameda County still had an estimated 187,135 ballots out of 683,644 total ballots cast remaining to be counted 10 days after the election.
F25-50:
As reported by the Secretary of State’s website, Alameda County still had an estimated 187,135 ballots out of 683,644 total ballots cast remaining to be counted 10 days after the election. 94
25-51:
Alameda County’s election results were updated on the website five times on election night but not updated daily after the election.
F25-51:
Alameda County’s election results were updated on the website five times on election night but not updated daily after the election.
25-52:
Delays in the tabulation and reporting of election results by the Registrar of Voters are caused in part by insufficient facilities, lack of equipment, and low staffing during ballot processing and counting.
F25-52:
Delays in the tabulation and reporting of election results by the Registrar of Voters are caused in part by insufficient facilities, lack of equipment, and low staffing during ballot processing and counting.
Additional Recommendations
36
Not linked to specific findings.
R7:
called for the city council to determine if parking in the Oakland Hills that obstructed road access was an enforcement priority, and if so, whether an enforcement program (with community input) should be implemented. Car Illegally Parked in the Oakland Hills 69 In December 2015, a follow-up audit found that the city had taken insufficient action. It concluded: The large number of resident and visitor vehicles in the Oakland hills creates unsafe congestion and, at times, possibly illegal parking situations including parking on streets too narrow to accommodate an emergency vehicle and parking in red “no parking” zones. Parking infractions are not regularly cited by Parking Enforcement which, according to the Fire Department, has indicated that the Oakland hills neighborhoods are not a priority parking enforcement area. Despite that strong recommendation, the city auditor again found in November 2017 that the illegally parked vehicles blocking Oakland hills roads was still a problem. That report, entitled, “Second Follow-up: Oakland Fire Department Vegetation Inspection Audit” specifically noted: OFD or Parking Enforcement [the predecessor to the Oakland Department of Transportation] must find a workable solution for the parking problem in the Oakland hills … Narrow roadways that quickly became blocked during the evacuation [in the 1991 Oakland-Berkeley Tunnel Hills Fire] contributed to the tragedy, as these streets were, for many residents, the only exit routes out of the area. Oakland still has not made sufficient progress in finding a “workable solution.” Although Oakland’s 2023-2024 Local Hazard Mitigation Plan Report touted “enhanced coordination with Department of Transportation and Oakland Police to enforce parking restrictions on Red Flag Days,” nearly every witness the Grand Jury interviewed questioned the adequacy of this enforcement. Another current concern is efforts to increase housing density in high fire risk areas, which would exacerbate the problem. The Grand Jury learned from the Parking and Mobility Unit in Oakland’s Department of Transportation (OakDOT) that it had arranged for the installation of additional “No Parking” signs in the hills in 2017, in response to an initiative of the Oakland Wildfire Prevention Working Group. Still, Oakland does not have any areas that are designated as “No Parking on Red Flag Days,” as do some municipalities. Consequently, there is no signage to limit parking and create additional access on those days. OakDOT’s parking control technicians (who are responsible for issuing tickets to illegally parked cars), conduct limited patrols in the Oakland Hills, although not with the same regularity as they patrol commercial zones (including areas with parking meters) or areas with street sweeping restrictions. The Grand Jury heard conflicting information about the level of parking enforcement in the Oakland Hills. While OakDOT may conduct enforcement and dispatches additional parking control technicians on days designated as Red Flag Days, it is evident that the current level of enforcement overall is insufficient. Oakland should increase the “no parking” zones in the hills, particularly on narrow streets or streets with curves that may be more difficult to navigate for large emergency vehicles. Indeed, the National Fire Safety Association states that road access for fire equipment should have a minimum unobstructed width of not less than 20 feet. To follow that guidance, parking in the Oakland Hills likely would have to be limited to one side on many narrow streets. Oakland also should add “no parking” zone in certain areas, so that those restrictions apply on Red Flag days – a solution used in other high fire risk areas in California. The Grand Jury recognizes that there likely would be costs involved in purchasing and placing new signage, as well as implementing increased enforcement to ensure evacuation routes are available and safe. We note these parking management solutions for consideration by the city. The Grand Jury did not investigate the amount of possible increased costs. To the extent that citations for parking violations bring in revenue, the cost of enforcement may be covered in part by collection of parking fines. Measure MM requires actions to provide “well-maintained, accessible” evacuation routes and to provide education. Although Measure MM implementation plans remain pending, the Grand Jury encourages the city to focus on safe evacuation planning with some urgency. This planning should include increased parking enforcement; public outreach and education so that residents will be aware of their evacuation zones and evacuation routes; and regular updates on coordination among Oakland departments and between Oakland and neighboring fire prevention agencies (including funds necessary for interagency training). Coordination With Other Agencies Because fires do not respect city boundaries, and problems with coordination were identified as an issue in the Tunnel Fire, the Grand Jury reviewed the current state of interdepartmental and interagency coordination. Since the Tunnel Fire, coordination has improved, including increased use of the same types of communication systems and equipment, as well as joint training on procedures to allow fire departments to work together when necessary. Oakland and nearby agencies also improved coordination through several multi-jurisdictional organizations. The Hills Emergency Forum was created after the Tunnel Fire and now includes the following partners: Oakland, Berkeley, El Cerrito, CAL FIRE, East Bay Regional Parks District, East Bay Municipal Utility District, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, the Moraga-Orinda Fire District, and the University of California, Berkeley. It meets regularly to discuss coordination of evacuation routes, clearing trails, training, and equipment. The forum’s coordination plans include mutual aid arrangements, as necessary to address wildfires (locally and outside the region). It also coordinates work with Civic Corps and community groups that assist local fire departments in clearing fire hazards. Finally, it provides information to members about securing grant funding. More recently, Oakland has participated in the new East Bay Wildfire Coalition of Governments. In 2021, the Oakland City Council, recognizing the need for coordination among public entities in the area, adopted a resolution directing the city administrator to participate in discussions about the possible formation of a joint powers authority for fire prevention and management among Easy Bay hills jurisdictions. Ultimately, the participants chose not to pursue a joint powers authority, at least for the present time. Instead, in 2023, they entered into a Memorandum of Understanding to form the East Bay Wildfire Coalition of Governments. The East Bay Wildfire Coalition of Governments, which now meets periodically to receive reports and discuss efforts to mitigate the risk of wildfire in the East Bay hills is comprised of the following members: Alameda and Contra Costa counties, Alameda County Fire Department, Contra Costa Fire Protection District, the Rodeo-Hercules Fire Prevention District, and the cities of Berkeley, Oakland, El Cerrito, and Richmond. In addition, the University of California, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, East Bay Regional Parks District, East Bay Municipal Utility District, and the East Bay Firesafe Councils (representing community members) participate as regional advisors. Separately, one recent example of successful coordination was the response to the Keller Fire in Oakland in October 2024. Before that fire started, the National Weather Service issued Red Flag warnings, including warnings of possible 40-mph winds. Because of the warnings, OFD pre-positioned fire engines and other firefighting apparatus in the hills. The planning included coordination with emergency services across the county. All cities with emergency service engines were “upstaffed,” making extra staff available to respond. As a result, OFD was able to move necessary equipment to the Keller scene immediately. In addition, CAL FIRE sent air resources almost immediately. Over 200 personnel coordinated to evacuate 254 structures. In all, 27 different jurisdictions were on the scene. Because of prior communications and coordinated training, responders were able to work together and prevent the fire from reaching more populous areas, which could have been catastrophic. Their combined efforts limited the Keller Fire to 15 acres, with damage to only two structures and no injuries.
25-1:
The City of Oakland must make hiring of Department of Transportation positions a priority to ensure paving and pothole/street repairs continue, making certain that any departmental approval delays be addressed.
25-2:
The City of Oakland/Oakland Department of Transportation must complete implementation of the new change order control process from its change order manual.
25-3:
The City of Oakland/Oakland Department of Transportation must ensure that all change orders identify funding prior to approval for any street paving or other road repair project.
25-4:
The City of Oakland (Mayor) must promptly fill all vacancies on the I-Bond Oversight Committee.
25-5:
The Oakland City of Oakland must ensure that an audit of Measure KK’s expenditures is immediately conducted and reported to the city council.
25-6:
The City of Oakland must ensure that an external independent audit of Measure U’s expenditures is immediately conducted.
25-7:
The City of Oakland must take a more proactive role in the status of the I-Bond Oversight Committee, ensuring they meet regularly and perform their oversight duties.
25-8:
The City of Oakland must ensure that the I-Bond Oversight Committee website is complete and transparent, and includes all committee reports, agendas, minutes, and recordings, as well as all Measure KK reports from Oakland’s Finance Department.
25-9:
The Oakland City Council should hold public hearings prior to declaring an extreme fiscal necessity to allow transparency and public debate.
25-10:
The City of Oakland should develop maintenance of effort metrics and calculations that are published and available to the public for Measure Q and other applicable tax measures.
25-11:
The Oakland City Auditor’s workplan for FY 2025-2026 must include the required second audit covering FY 2022-2023, FY 2023-2024, and FY 2024-2025.
25-12:
The Oakland City’s Auditor’s workplans beyond FY 2025-2026 must include biennial audits in workplans for the life of Measure Q until FY 2039-2040, as required by Measure Q.
25-13:
The City of Oakland should conduct the recommended independent financial audit of Measure Q within the next six months, with funding allowed by the measure.
25-14:
To comply with state requirements for special parcel tax measures and to provide transparency to voters, the Oakland City Council must ensure that annual reports documenting revenues, expenditures, and the status of projects are completed in a timely manner.
25-15:
The Oakland City Council must ensure that the Commission on Homelessness complies with its Measure Q oversight responsibilities as required by city ordinances.
25-16:
In addition to Zoom, Oakland’s Parks and Recreation Advisory Commission meetings should be conducted at city hall, and broadcast and recorded on KTOP.
25-17:
The City of Oakland must implement technology to avoid issuing parking tickets to vehicles that have been reported as stolen to law enforcement.
25-18:
The City of Oakland must ensure that any new technology implemented to identify stolen vehicles is updated at least daily.
25-19:
All City of Oakland Department of Transportation parking enforcement staff should be trained on the use of stolen vehicle databases available from the CA Department of Motor Vehicles.
25-20:
The Oakland Fire Department must monitor the vegetation management inspection process to ensure that all private and public areas remain in full compliance with applicable fire safety regulations.
25-21:
Within six months, the Oakland City Council must review the progress of the new Measure MM oversight commission in order to ensure that it is in compliance with the requirements of Measure MM, operating with full transparency, and fulfilling its purpose under Measure MM as intended.
25-22:
Within six months, the Oakland City Council should make public its plans for the use of additional Measure MM funding to inspect and prioritize vegetation management.
25-23:
Oakland’s Department of Transportation must enforce parking restrictions in the areas covered by Measure MM at all times to ensure emergency vehicles have full access to all roads.
25-24:
The Oakland City Council should evaluate limiting parking to one side of the street in the Oakland Hills areas with a high fire risk where narrow roadways impede emergency vehicle ingress or resident egress, taking into consideration risk assessment and community consultation.
25-25:
The Oakland City Council must implement or expand public education programs to inform residents about emergency evacuation routes, fire safety procedures, and communication tools, such as AC Alert.
25-26:
For the Logic and Accuracy Testing, all ballot scanners should be available for testing, and future grand juries or other members of the public -- should they decide -- be able to randomly choose at least three of the available ballot scanners for testing.
25-27:
For the Logic and Accuracy test, public participants selected by the Alameda County Registrar of Voters should be allowed to submit pre-marked, pre-tabulated ballots for processing by the ballot scanners, and to be able to compare the pre-tabulated results with the results of the ballot scanners.
25-28:
When posting updates after the election, the Alameda County Registrar of Voters should clarify that “570 of 570 precincts reported (100.00%)” does not reflect that all ballots have yet been tabulated or received.
25-29:
When posting online updates after the election, the Alameda County Registrar of Voters should provide more detailed and updated information, such as: the cumulative total number of processed ballots, total number of processed ballots from the last report, vote-by-mail ballots received before and after election day, estimated total ballots remaining, and ballots left to be cured.
25-30:
When providing video feed of the Alameda County Registrar of Voters activities such as ballot envelope sorting, signature verification, vote-by-mail processing, and ballot scanning, the Registrar of Voters should post written explanations of what is being seen on the website where the video link is located.
25-31:
On election night, the Alameda County Registrar of Voters should ensure that the entire inperson and online ballot counting process be made available in a timelier manner after the polls close, with an explanation to observers as to any delays.
25-32:
During in-person observations, the Alameda County Registrar of Voters should provide a designated, trained employee to explain the observation process and answer questions.
25-33:
The Alameda County Registrar of Voters should update election results daily after election night.
25-34:
The Alameda County Registrar of Voters must identify the start times and the processes in its notifications to the public for observation.
25-35:
In order to ensure timely election results and reporting, the Alameda County Board of Supervisors must provide more resources to the Registrar of Voters, including larger facilities, additional equipment, and more staffing.
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Findings & Recommendations
64 findings
F25-1:
Potholes and other street pavement failures have been a prevalent problem in the City of Oakland for many years.
F25-2:
The City of Oakland needed to repair over 53,000 potholes or similar pavement failures in the most recent 2023-2024 Fiscal Year.
F25-3:
Historically, liability claims and lawsuits from potholes and pavement failure have cost the City of Oakland millions of dollars.
F25-4:
Complete repaving of streets costs the City of Oakland approximately $1 million per mile.
F25-5:
The City of Oakland has not met its goals for significant repaving under its 2022 Five-Year Paving Plan, with no foreseeable date for completion.
F25-6:
Without money from the sale of authorized Measure U bonds, the City of Oakland will not be able to undertake significant additional street repaving.
F25-7:
High employee vacancy rates and the delays in approval of hiring slowed the City of Oakland’s in-house street repaving and repairs.
F25-8:
The City of Oakland’s Local Business Enterprise and Small Local Business Enterprise programs limit the competition for Oakland’s Department of Transportation contracts for paving and street work, causing Oakland to not receive multiple bids, which could result in lower costs.
F25-9:
The City of Oakland’s Department of Transportation lacks adequate control over change orders on paving and street projects, including failure to first identify approved funding.
F25-10:
The City of Oakland has not conducted any audits under Measure KK or Measure U, as required by the measures. 37
F25-11:
The City of Oakland’s I-Bond Oversight Committee has not met regularly since at least December 2022, as required.
F25-12:
The City of Oakland (Mayor) has failed to fill the current vacancies on the I-Bond Oversight Committee.
F25-13:
The I-Bond Oversight Committee has not provided regular or annual reports on Measure KK to the Oakland City Council since September 2022, nor on Measure U since its approval in November 2022.
F25-14:
The website for the City of Oakland’s I-Bond Oversight Committee lacks complete information including most committee reports, and not all agendas, minutes, or recordings.
F25-15:
The City of Oakland’s I-Bond Oversight Committee failed to conduct a self-evaluation, as required by its bylaws.
F25-16:
The City of Oakland has failed to ensure that the I-Bond Oversight Committee has been fulfilling its duties, including meeting regularly, reporting as needed, and conducting self- evaluations as required.
25-17:
The Oakland City Council added the “extreme fiscal necessity” clause to Measure Q without open discussion and public debate.
F25-17:
The Oakland City Council added the “extreme fiscal necessity” clause to Measure Q without open discussion and public debate.
25-18:
The Measure Q ballot language passed by voters in March 2020 did not define what constitutes an extreme fiscal necessity.
F25-18:
The Measure Q ballot language passed by voters in March 2020 did not define what constitutes an extreme fiscal necessity.
25-19:
The declaration of extreme fiscal necessity allowed the Oakland City Council to divert funds intended for additional park services
F25-19:
The declaration of extreme fiscal necessity allowed the Oakland City Council to divert funds intended for additional park services
25-20:
In its last disclosure of the maintenance of effort calculations, the City of Oakland reported a decrease in Measure Q funding for new park services from 45% to 32%.
F25-20:
In its last disclosure of the maintenance of effort calculations, the City of Oakland reported a decrease in Measure Q funding for new park services from 45% to 32%.
25-21:
To date, community park stakeholders and Oakland city staff still do not agree on a definition of “extreme fiscal necessity.”
F25-21:
To date, community park stakeholders and Oakland city staff still do not agree on a definition of “extreme fiscal necessity.”
25-22:
Measure Q requires biennial reports, and the Oakland City Auditor did not conduct the second biennial audit covering FY 2022-2023 and FY 2023-2024.
F25-22:
Measure Q requires biennial reports, and the Oakland City Auditor did not conduct the second biennial audit covering FY 2022-2023 and FY 2023-2024.
25-23:
Measure Q was not included in the Oakland City Auditor’s FY 2024-2025 workplan.
F25-23:
Measure Q was not included in the Oakland City Auditor’s FY 2024-2025 workplan.
25-24:
As recommended and funded in Measure Q, no independent financial audit has been conducted.
F25-24:
As recommended and funded in Measure Q, no independent financial audit has been conducted.
25-25:
Oakland’s Parks and Recreation Advisory Commission complies with the reporting requirements in Ordinance No. 13622 (an ordinance updating the duties of the commission).
F25-25:
Oakland’s Parks and Recreation Advisory Commission complies with the reporting requirements in Ordinance No. 13622 (an ordinance updating the duties of the commission).
25-26:
Oakland’s Commission on Homelessness has not met its oversight mandate of Measure Q including the preparation of annual reports as required by Ordinance No. 13584 (an ordinance updating the duties of the commission).
F25-26:
Oakland’s Commission on Homelessness has not met its oversight mandate of Measure Q including the preparation of annual reports as required by Ordinance No. 13584 (an ordinance updating the duties of the commission).
25-27:
The City of Oakland has not prepared annual reports documenting revenues, expenditures and the status of projects funded by Measure Q as required by California Government Code 50075.3.
F25-27:
The City of Oakland has not prepared annual reports documenting revenues, expenditures and the status of projects funded by Measure Q as required by California Government Code 50075.3. 49
25-28:
It is difficult to observe Oakland’s Parks and Recreation Advisory Commission meetings recorded on Zoom due to poor broadcast capabilities. (The Commission on Homelessness meetings recorded on KTOP are broadcast with better video and audio than PRAC meetings.)
F25-28:
It is difficult to observe Oakland’s Parks and Recreation Advisory Commission meetings recorded on Zoom due to poor broadcast capabilities. (The Commission on Homelessness meetings recorded on KTOP are broadcast with better video and audio than PRAC meetings.)
F25-29:
City of Oakland parking control technicians have the technology on their existing handheld devices that enables them to search some vehicle databases.
F25-30:
The City of Oakland will save staff time and taxpayer dollars by avoiding issuing and ultimately dismissing tickets on illegally parked stolen vehicles.
F25-31:
When a ticket is issued to a parked stolen vehicle, victims of crime suffer additional hardship.by needing to take affirmative steps to dismiss a parking ticket.
F25-32:
DMV provides information on stolen vehicles to OakDOT and any OakDOT staff can be trained to access this information without involving OPD or DOJ.
F25-33:
The Oakland Fire Department has met its goal of conducting annual wildfire inspections of virtually all private properties in the Oakland Hills area designated as the Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone.
F25-34:
The Oakland Fire Department’s annual wildfire prevention inspections of private properties in the Oakland Hills finds a high level of compliance on the part of property owners. 73
F25-35:
For city-owned properties, the Oakland City Council does not presently allocate sufficient resources for vegetation management to remove or mitigate fire risks.
F25-36:
At the time of this report, the Oakland City Council has not yet developed an implementation plan for Measure MM, although the measure becomes effective on July 1, 2025.
F25-37:
Oakland’s Department of Transportation lacks adequate enforcement of parking restrictions in the Oakland Hills which hinders the ability of emergency services to navigate narrow streets to ensure a timely response to emergencies.
F25-38:
The Oakland City Council has not done an adequate job of educating Oakland Hills residents about emergency evacuation routes.
F25-39:
Public education about evacuation routes, and availability of emergency warning systems (such as AC Alert), are critical to improving public safety in Oakland, especially in areas with high wildfire risk.
F25-40:
The Logic and Accuracy Test of the Alameda County Registrar of Voters voting system tested only one of over a dozen ballot scanners used in the election.
F25-41:
During Logic and Accuracy testing, sample ballots were pre-marked by the Registrar of Voters and observers were not permitted to examine the pre-marked ballots at any time to confirm they matched the count from the ballot scanner.
F25-42:
Video observation (online) of the electoral process, including the ballot envelope sorting, signature verification, vote-by-mail processing, and ballot scanning, was without audio or any description to the viewer of what was happening in the video feed. 93
F25-43:
During the in-person observation of ballot counting on election night, members of the public were required to be onsite by 8:00 p.m. but were not allowed entry into the Registrar of Voters counting room until after 10 p.m. During this time, ballots were being wheeled into the room while observers were kept waiting in a hallway outside, and online video feed was unavailable.
F25-44:
Once admitted to view ballot counting in person on election night, observers were not allowed to ask any questions.
F25-45:
Notices by the Registrar of Voters to the public of upcoming online observation video feeds of the election processes did not identify the start times or what the processes would be. The notice stated, “An election process will be conducted today. For ongoing updates, check the website where all election processes will be posted.”
F25-46:
During the in-person observation of the 1% manual tally after the election, observers were given no explanation of the hand count process.
F25-47:
During the in-person observation of the 1% manual tally after the election, observers were not allowed to ask questions concerning the process.
F25-48:
In the updates of the vote counts starting on election night, it was stated that “570 of 570 Precincts Reported (100%),” giving the misleading impression that all ballots had been received or counted.
F25-49:
While the Registrar of Voters was reporting live results to the Secretary of State (where the results were posted on the state’s website), not all of these same results were being posted on Alameda County’s local website. The Alameda County website did not include: the cumulative total number of processed ballots, total updated number of processed ballots, vote-by-mail ballots received before and after election day, estimated total ballots remaining, or ballots left to be cured.
F25-50:
As reported by the Secretary of State’s website, Alameda County still had an estimated 187,135 ballots out of 683,644 total ballots cast remaining to be counted 10 days after the election. 94
F25-51:
Alameda County’s election results were updated on the website five times on election night but not updated daily after the election.
F25-52:
Delays in the tabulation and reporting of election results by the Registrar of Voters are caused in part by insufficient facilities, lack of equipment, and low staffing during ballot processing and counting.
Additional Recommendations
9
Not linked to specific findings.
R7:
called for the city council to determine if parking in the Oakland Hills that obstructed road access was an enforcement priority, and if so, whether an enforcement program (with community input) should be implemented. Car Illegally Parked in the Oakland Hills 69 In December 2015, a follow-up audit found that the city had taken insufficient action. It concluded: The large number of resident and visitor vehicles in the Oakland hills creates unsafe congestion and, at times, possibly illegal parking situations including parking on streets too narrow to accommodate an emergency vehicle and parking in red “no parking” zones. Parking infractions are not regularly cited by Parking Enforcement which, according to the Fire Department, has indicated that the Oakland hills neighborhoods are not a priority parking enforcement area. Despite that strong recommendation, the city auditor again found in November 2017 that the illegally parked vehicles blocking Oakland hills roads was still a problem. That report, entitled, “Second Follow-up: Oakland Fire Department Vegetation Inspection Audit” specifically noted: OFD or Parking Enforcement [the predecessor to the Oakland Department of Transportation] must find a workable solution for the parking problem in the Oakland hills … Narrow roadways that quickly became blocked during the evacuation [in the 1991 Oakland-Berkeley Tunnel Hills Fire] contributed to the tragedy, as these streets were, for many residents, the only exit routes out of the area. Oakland still has not made sufficient progress in finding a “workable solution.” Although Oakland’s 2023-2024 Local Hazard Mitigation Plan Report touted “enhanced coordination with Department of Transportation and Oakland Police to enforce parking restrictions on Red Flag Days,” nearly every witness the Grand Jury interviewed questioned the adequacy of this enforcement. Another current concern is efforts to increase housing density in high fire risk areas, which would exacerbate the problem. The Grand Jury learned from the Parking and Mobility Unit in Oakland’s Department of Transportation (OakDOT) that it had arranged for the installation of additional “No Parking” signs in the hills in 2017, in response to an initiative of the Oakland Wildfire Prevention Working Group. Still, Oakland does not have any areas that are designated as “No Parking on Red Flag Days,” as do some municipalities. Consequently, there is no signage to limit parking and create additional access on those days. OakDOT’s parking control technicians (who are responsible for issuing tickets to illegally parked cars), conduct limited patrols in the Oakland Hills, although not with the same regularity as they patrol commercial zones (including areas with parking meters) or areas with street sweeping restrictions. The Grand Jury heard conflicting information about the level of parking enforcement in the Oakland Hills. While OakDOT may conduct enforcement and dispatches additional parking control technicians on days designated as Red Flag Days, it is evident that the current level of enforcement overall is insufficient. Oakland should increase the “no parking” zones in the hills, particularly on narrow streets or streets with curves that may be more difficult to navigate for large emergency vehicles. Indeed, the National Fire Safety Association states that road access for fire equipment should have a minimum unobstructed width of not less than 20 feet. To follow that guidance, parking in the Oakland Hills likely would have to be limited to one side on many narrow streets. Oakland also should add “no parking” zone in certain areas, so that those restrictions apply on Red Flag days – a solution used in other high fire risk areas in California. The Grand Jury recognizes that there likely would be costs involved in purchasing and placing new signage, as well as implementing increased enforcement to ensure evacuation routes are available and safe. We note these parking management solutions for consideration by the city. The Grand Jury did not investigate the amount of possible increased costs. To the extent that citations for parking violations bring in revenue, the cost of enforcement may be covered in part by collection of parking fines. Measure MM requires actions to provide “well-maintained, accessible” evacuation routes and to provide education. Although Measure MM implementation plans remain pending, the Grand Jury encourages the city to focus on safe evacuation planning with some urgency. This planning should include increased parking enforcement; public outreach and education so that residents will be aware of their evacuation zones and evacuation routes; and regular updates on coordination among Oakland departments and between Oakland and neighboring fire prevention agencies (including funds necessary for interagency training). Coordination With Other Agencies Because fires do not respect city boundaries, and problems with coordination were identified as an issue in the Tunnel Fire, the Grand Jury reviewed the current state of interdepartmental and interagency coordination. Since the Tunnel Fire, coordination has improved, including increased use of the same types of communication systems and equipment, as well as joint training on procedures to allow fire departments to work together when necessary. Oakland and nearby agencies also improved coordination through several multi-jurisdictional organizations. The Hills Emergency Forum was created after the Tunnel Fire and now includes the following partners: Oakland, Berkeley, El Cerrito, CAL FIRE, East Bay Regional Parks District, East Bay Municipal Utility District, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, the Moraga-Orinda Fire District, and the University of California, Berkeley. It meets regularly to discuss coordination of evacuation routes, clearing trails, training, and equipment. The forum’s coordination plans include mutual aid arrangements, as necessary to address wildfires (locally and outside the region). It also coordinates work with Civic Corps and community groups that assist local fire departments in clearing fire hazards. Finally, it provides information to members about securing grant funding. More recently, Oakland has participated in the new East Bay Wildfire Coalition of Governments. In 2021, the Oakland City Council, recognizing the need for coordination among public entities in the area, adopted a resolution directing the city administrator to participate in discussions about the possible formation of a joint powers authority for fire prevention and management among Easy Bay hills jurisdictions. Ultimately, the participants chose not to pursue a joint powers authority, at least for the present time. Instead, in 2023, they entered into a Memorandum of Understanding to form the East Bay Wildfire Coalition of Governments. The East Bay Wildfire Coalition of Governments, which now meets periodically to receive reports and discuss efforts to mitigate the risk of wildfire in the East Bay hills is comprised of the following members: Alameda and Contra Costa counties, Alameda County Fire Department, Contra Costa Fire Protection District, the Rodeo-Hercules Fire Prevention District, and the cities of Berkeley, Oakland, El Cerrito, and Richmond. In addition, the University of California, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, East Bay Regional Parks District, East Bay Municipal Utility District, and the East Bay Firesafe Councils (representing community members) participate as regional advisors. Separately, one recent example of successful coordination was the response to the Keller Fire in Oakland in October 2024. Before that fire started, the National Weather Service issued Red Flag warnings, including warnings of possible 40-mph winds. Because of the warnings, OFD pre-positioned fire engines and other firefighting apparatus in the hills. The planning included coordination with emergency services across the county. All cities with emergency service engines were “upstaffed,” making extra staff available to respond. As a result, OFD was able to move necessary equipment to the Keller scene immediately. In addition, CAL FIRE sent air resources almost immediately. Over 200 personnel coordinated to evacuate 254 structures. In all, 27 different jurisdictions were on the scene. Because of prior communications and coordinated training, responders were able to work together and prevent the fire from reaching more populous areas, which could have been catastrophic. Their combined efforts limited the Keller Fire to 15 acres, with damage to only two structures and no injuries.
25-9:
The Oakland City Council should hold public hearings prior to declaring an extreme fiscal necessity to allow transparency and public debate.
25-10:
The City of Oakland should develop maintenance of effort metrics and calculations that are published and available to the public for Measure Q and other applicable tax measures.
25-11:
The Oakland City Auditor’s workplan for FY 2025-2026 must include the required second audit covering FY 2022-2023, FY 2023-2024, and FY 2024-2025.
25-12:
The Oakland City’s Auditor’s workplans beyond FY 2025-2026 must include biennial audits in workplans for the life of Measure Q until FY 2039-2040, as required by Measure Q.
25-13:
The City of Oakland should conduct the recommended independent financial audit of Measure Q within the next six months, with funding allowed by the measure.
25-14:
To comply with state requirements for special parcel tax measures and to provide transparency to voters, the Oakland City Council must ensure that annual reports documenting revenues, expenditures, and the status of projects are completed in a timely manner.
25-15:
The Oakland City Council must ensure that the Commission on Homelessness complies with its Measure Q oversight responsibilities as required by city ordinances.
25-16:
In addition to Zoom, Oakland’s Parks and Recreation Advisory Commission meetings should be conducted at city hall, and broadcast and recorded on KTOP.
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Findings & Recommendations
68 findings
25-1:
Potholes and other street pavement failures have been a prevalent problem in the City of Oakland for many years.
F25-1:
Potholes and other street pavement failures have been a prevalent problem in the City of Oakland for many years.
25-2:
The City of Oakland needed to repair over 53,000 potholes or similar pavement failures in the most recent 2023-2024 Fiscal Year.
F25-2:
The City of Oakland needed to repair over 53,000 potholes or similar pavement failures in the most recent 2023-2024 Fiscal Year.
25-3:
Historically, liability claims and lawsuits from potholes and pavement failure have cost the City of Oakland millions of dollars.
F25-3:
Historically, liability claims and lawsuits from potholes and pavement failure have cost the City of Oakland millions of dollars.
25-4:
Complete repaving of streets costs the City of Oakland approximately $1 million per mile.
F25-4:
Complete repaving of streets costs the City of Oakland approximately $1 million per mile.
25-5:
The City of Oakland has not met its goals for significant repaving under its 2022 Five-Year Paving Plan, with no foreseeable date for completion.
F25-5:
The City of Oakland has not met its goals for significant repaving under its 2022 Five-Year Paving Plan, with no foreseeable date for completion.
25-6:
Without money from the sale of authorized Measure U bonds, the City of Oakland will not be able to undertake significant additional street repaving.
F25-6:
Without money from the sale of authorized Measure U bonds, the City of Oakland will not be able to undertake significant additional street repaving.
25-7:
High employee vacancy rates and the delays in approval of hiring slowed the City of Oakland’s in-house street repaving and repairs.
F25-7:
High employee vacancy rates and the delays in approval of hiring slowed the City of Oakland’s in-house street repaving and repairs.
25-8:
The City of Oakland’s Local Business Enterprise and Small Local Business Enterprise programs limit the competition for Oakland’s Department of Transportation contracts for paving and street work, causing Oakland to not receive multiple bids, which could result in lower costs.
F25-8:
The City of Oakland’s Local Business Enterprise and Small Local Business Enterprise programs limit the competition for Oakland’s Department of Transportation contracts for paving and street work, causing Oakland to not receive multiple bids, which could result in lower costs.
25-9:
The City of Oakland’s Department of Transportation lacks adequate control over change orders on paving and street projects, including failure to first identify approved funding.
F25-9:
The City of Oakland’s Department of Transportation lacks adequate control over change orders on paving and street projects, including failure to first identify approved funding.
25-10:
The City of Oakland has not conducted any audits under Measure KK or Measure U, as required by the measures.
F25-10:
The City of Oakland has not conducted any audits under Measure KK or Measure U, as required by the measures. 37
25-11:
The City of Oakland’s I-Bond Oversight Committee has not met regularly since at least December 2022, as required.
F25-11:
The City of Oakland’s I-Bond Oversight Committee has not met regularly since at least December 2022, as required.
25-12:
The City of Oakland (Mayor) has failed to fill the current vacancies on the I-Bond Oversight Committee.
F25-12:
The City of Oakland (Mayor) has failed to fill the current vacancies on the I-Bond Oversight Committee.
25-13:
The I-Bond Oversight Committee has not provided regular or annual reports on Measure KK to the Oakland City Council since September 2022, nor on Measure U since its approval in November 2022.
F25-13:
The I-Bond Oversight Committee has not provided regular or annual reports on Measure KK to the Oakland City Council since September 2022, nor on Measure U since its approval in November 2022.
25-14:
The website for the City of Oakland’s I-Bond Oversight Committee lacks complete information including most committee reports, and not all agendas, minutes, or recordings.
F25-14:
The website for the City of Oakland’s I-Bond Oversight Committee lacks complete information including most committee reports, and not all agendas, minutes, or recordings.
25-15:
The City of Oakland’s I-Bond Oversight Committee failed to conduct a self-evaluation, as required by its bylaws.
F25-15:
The City of Oakland’s I-Bond Oversight Committee failed to conduct a self-evaluation, as required by its bylaws.
25-16:
The City of Oakland has failed to ensure that the I-Bond Oversight Committee has been fulfilling its duties, including meeting regularly, reporting as needed, and conducting self- evaluations as required.
F25-16:
The City of Oakland has failed to ensure that the I-Bond Oversight Committee has been fulfilling its duties, including meeting regularly, reporting as needed, and conducting self- evaluations as required.
F25-17:
The Oakland City Council added the “extreme fiscal necessity” clause to Measure Q without open discussion and public debate.
F25-18:
The Measure Q ballot language passed by voters in March 2020 did not define what constitutes an extreme fiscal necessity.
F25-19:
The declaration of extreme fiscal necessity allowed the Oakland City Council to divert funds intended for additional park services
F25-20:
In its last disclosure of the maintenance of effort calculations, the City of Oakland reported a decrease in Measure Q funding for new park services from 45% to 32%.
F25-21:
To date, community park stakeholders and Oakland city staff still do not agree on a definition of “extreme fiscal necessity.”
F25-22:
Measure Q requires biennial reports, and the Oakland City Auditor did not conduct the second biennial audit covering FY 2022-2023 and FY 2023-2024.
F25-23:
Measure Q was not included in the Oakland City Auditor’s FY 2024-2025 workplan.
F25-24:
As recommended and funded in Measure Q, no independent financial audit has been conducted.
F25-25:
Oakland’s Parks and Recreation Advisory Commission complies with the reporting requirements in Ordinance No. 13622 (an ordinance updating the duties of the commission).
F25-26:
Oakland’s Commission on Homelessness has not met its oversight mandate of Measure Q including the preparation of annual reports as required by Ordinance No. 13584 (an ordinance updating the duties of the commission).
F25-27:
The City of Oakland has not prepared annual reports documenting revenues, expenditures and the status of projects funded by Measure Q as required by California Government Code 50075.3. 49
F25-28:
It is difficult to observe Oakland’s Parks and Recreation Advisory Commission meetings recorded on Zoom due to poor broadcast capabilities. (The Commission on Homelessness meetings recorded on KTOP are broadcast with better video and audio than PRAC meetings.)
F25-29:
City of Oakland parking control technicians have the technology on their existing handheld devices that enables them to search some vehicle databases.
F25-30:
The City of Oakland will save staff time and taxpayer dollars by avoiding issuing and ultimately dismissing tickets on illegally parked stolen vehicles.
F25-31:
When a ticket is issued to a parked stolen vehicle, victims of crime suffer additional hardship.by needing to take affirmative steps to dismiss a parking ticket.
F25-32:
DMV provides information on stolen vehicles to OakDOT and any OakDOT staff can be trained to access this information without involving OPD or DOJ.
F25-33:
The Oakland Fire Department has met its goal of conducting annual wildfire inspections of virtually all private properties in the Oakland Hills area designated as the Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone.
F25-34:
The Oakland Fire Department’s annual wildfire prevention inspections of private properties in the Oakland Hills finds a high level of compliance on the part of property owners. 73
F25-35:
For city-owned properties, the Oakland City Council does not presently allocate sufficient resources for vegetation management to remove or mitigate fire risks.
F25-36:
At the time of this report, the Oakland City Council has not yet developed an implementation plan for Measure MM, although the measure becomes effective on July 1, 2025.
F25-37:
Oakland’s Department of Transportation lacks adequate enforcement of parking restrictions in the Oakland Hills which hinders the ability of emergency services to navigate narrow streets to ensure a timely response to emergencies.
F25-38:
The Oakland City Council has not done an adequate job of educating Oakland Hills residents about emergency evacuation routes.
F25-39:
Public education about evacuation routes, and availability of emergency warning systems (such as AC Alert), are critical to improving public safety in Oakland, especially in areas with high wildfire risk.
F25-40:
The Logic and Accuracy Test of the Alameda County Registrar of Voters voting system tested only one of over a dozen ballot scanners used in the election.
F25-41:
During Logic and Accuracy testing, sample ballots were pre-marked by the Registrar of Voters and observers were not permitted to examine the pre-marked ballots at any time to confirm they matched the count from the ballot scanner.
F25-42:
Video observation (online) of the electoral process, including the ballot envelope sorting, signature verification, vote-by-mail processing, and ballot scanning, was without audio or any description to the viewer of what was happening in the video feed. 93
F25-43:
During the in-person observation of ballot counting on election night, members of the public were required to be onsite by 8:00 p.m. but were not allowed entry into the Registrar of Voters counting room until after 10 p.m. During this time, ballots were being wheeled into the room while observers were kept waiting in a hallway outside, and online video feed was unavailable.
F25-44:
Once admitted to view ballot counting in person on election night, observers were not allowed to ask any questions.
F25-45:
Notices by the Registrar of Voters to the public of upcoming online observation video feeds of the election processes did not identify the start times or what the processes would be. The notice stated, “An election process will be conducted today. For ongoing updates, check the website where all election processes will be posted.”
F25-46:
During the in-person observation of the 1% manual tally after the election, observers were given no explanation of the hand count process.
F25-47:
During the in-person observation of the 1% manual tally after the election, observers were not allowed to ask questions concerning the process.
F25-48:
In the updates of the vote counts starting on election night, it was stated that “570 of 570 Precincts Reported (100%),” giving the misleading impression that all ballots had been received or counted.
F25-49:
While the Registrar of Voters was reporting live results to the Secretary of State (where the results were posted on the state’s website), not all of these same results were being posted on Alameda County’s local website. The Alameda County website did not include: the cumulative total number of processed ballots, total updated number of processed ballots, vote-by-mail ballots received before and after election day, estimated total ballots remaining, or ballots left to be cured.
F25-50:
As reported by the Secretary of State’s website, Alameda County still had an estimated 187,135 ballots out of 683,644 total ballots cast remaining to be counted 10 days after the election. 94
F25-51:
Alameda County’s election results were updated on the website five times on election night but not updated daily after the election.
F25-52:
Delays in the tabulation and reporting of election results by the Registrar of Voters are caused in part by insufficient facilities, lack of equipment, and low staffing during ballot processing and counting.
Additional Recommendations
9
Not linked to specific findings.
R7:
called for the city council to determine if parking in the Oakland Hills that obstructed road access was an enforcement priority, and if so, whether an enforcement program (with community input) should be implemented. Car Illegally Parked in the Oakland Hills 69 In December 2015, a follow-up audit found that the city had taken insufficient action. It concluded: The large number of resident and visitor vehicles in the Oakland hills creates unsafe congestion and, at times, possibly illegal parking situations including parking on streets too narrow to accommodate an emergency vehicle and parking in red “no parking” zones. Parking infractions are not regularly cited by Parking Enforcement which, according to the Fire Department, has indicated that the Oakland hills neighborhoods are not a priority parking enforcement area. Despite that strong recommendation, the city auditor again found in November 2017 that the illegally parked vehicles blocking Oakland hills roads was still a problem. That report, entitled, “Second Follow-up: Oakland Fire Department Vegetation Inspection Audit” specifically noted: OFD or Parking Enforcement [the predecessor to the Oakland Department of Transportation] must find a workable solution for the parking problem in the Oakland hills … Narrow roadways that quickly became blocked during the evacuation [in the 1991 Oakland-Berkeley Tunnel Hills Fire] contributed to the tragedy, as these streets were, for many residents, the only exit routes out of the area. Oakland still has not made sufficient progress in finding a “workable solution.” Although Oakland’s 2023-2024 Local Hazard Mitigation Plan Report touted “enhanced coordination with Department of Transportation and Oakland Police to enforce parking restrictions on Red Flag Days,” nearly every witness the Grand Jury interviewed questioned the adequacy of this enforcement. Another current concern is efforts to increase housing density in high fire risk areas, which would exacerbate the problem. The Grand Jury learned from the Parking and Mobility Unit in Oakland’s Department of Transportation (OakDOT) that it had arranged for the installation of additional “No Parking” signs in the hills in 2017, in response to an initiative of the Oakland Wildfire Prevention Working Group. Still, Oakland does not have any areas that are designated as “No Parking on Red Flag Days,” as do some municipalities. Consequently, there is no signage to limit parking and create additional access on those days. OakDOT’s parking control technicians (who are responsible for issuing tickets to illegally parked cars), conduct limited patrols in the Oakland Hills, although not with the same regularity as they patrol commercial zones (including areas with parking meters) or areas with street sweeping restrictions. The Grand Jury heard conflicting information about the level of parking enforcement in the Oakland Hills. While OakDOT may conduct enforcement and dispatches additional parking control technicians on days designated as Red Flag Days, it is evident that the current level of enforcement overall is insufficient. Oakland should increase the “no parking” zones in the hills, particularly on narrow streets or streets with curves that may be more difficult to navigate for large emergency vehicles. Indeed, the National Fire Safety Association states that road access for fire equipment should have a minimum unobstructed width of not less than 20 feet. To follow that guidance, parking in the Oakland Hills likely would have to be limited to one side on many narrow streets. Oakland also should add “no parking” zone in certain areas, so that those restrictions apply on Red Flag days – a solution used in other high fire risk areas in California. The Grand Jury recognizes that there likely would be costs involved in purchasing and placing new signage, as well as implementing increased enforcement to ensure evacuation routes are available and safe. We note these parking management solutions for consideration by the city. The Grand Jury did not investigate the amount of possible increased costs. To the extent that citations for parking violations bring in revenue, the cost of enforcement may be covered in part by collection of parking fines. Measure MM requires actions to provide “well-maintained, accessible” evacuation routes and to provide education. Although Measure MM implementation plans remain pending, the Grand Jury encourages the city to focus on safe evacuation planning with some urgency. This planning should include increased parking enforcement; public outreach and education so that residents will be aware of their evacuation zones and evacuation routes; and regular updates on coordination among Oakland departments and between Oakland and neighboring fire prevention agencies (including funds necessary for interagency training). Coordination With Other Agencies Because fires do not respect city boundaries, and problems with coordination were identified as an issue in the Tunnel Fire, the Grand Jury reviewed the current state of interdepartmental and interagency coordination. Since the Tunnel Fire, coordination has improved, including increased use of the same types of communication systems and equipment, as well as joint training on procedures to allow fire departments to work together when necessary. Oakland and nearby agencies also improved coordination through several multi-jurisdictional organizations. The Hills Emergency Forum was created after the Tunnel Fire and now includes the following partners: Oakland, Berkeley, El Cerrito, CAL FIRE, East Bay Regional Parks District, East Bay Municipal Utility District, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, the Moraga-Orinda Fire District, and the University of California, Berkeley. It meets regularly to discuss coordination of evacuation routes, clearing trails, training, and equipment. The forum’s coordination plans include mutual aid arrangements, as necessary to address wildfires (locally and outside the region). It also coordinates work with Civic Corps and community groups that assist local fire departments in clearing fire hazards. Finally, it provides information to members about securing grant funding. More recently, Oakland has participated in the new East Bay Wildfire Coalition of Governments. In 2021, the Oakland City Council, recognizing the need for coordination among public entities in the area, adopted a resolution directing the city administrator to participate in discussions about the possible formation of a joint powers authority for fire prevention and management among Easy Bay hills jurisdictions. Ultimately, the participants chose not to pursue a joint powers authority, at least for the present time. Instead, in 2023, they entered into a Memorandum of Understanding to form the East Bay Wildfire Coalition of Governments. The East Bay Wildfire Coalition of Governments, which now meets periodically to receive reports and discuss efforts to mitigate the risk of wildfire in the East Bay hills is comprised of the following members: Alameda and Contra Costa counties, Alameda County Fire Department, Contra Costa Fire Protection District, the Rodeo-Hercules Fire Prevention District, and the cities of Berkeley, Oakland, El Cerrito, and Richmond. In addition, the University of California, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, East Bay Regional Parks District, East Bay Municipal Utility District, and the East Bay Firesafe Councils (representing community members) participate as regional advisors. Separately, one recent example of successful coordination was the response to the Keller Fire in Oakland in October 2024. Before that fire started, the National Weather Service issued Red Flag warnings, including warnings of possible 40-mph winds. Because of the warnings, OFD pre-positioned fire engines and other firefighting apparatus in the hills. The planning included coordination with emergency services across the county. All cities with emergency service engines were “upstaffed,” making extra staff available to respond. As a result, OFD was able to move necessary equipment to the Keller scene immediately. In addition, CAL FIRE sent air resources almost immediately. Over 200 personnel coordinated to evacuate 254 structures. In all, 27 different jurisdictions were on the scene. Because of prior communications and coordinated training, responders were able to work together and prevent the fire from reaching more populous areas, which could have been catastrophic. Their combined efforts limited the Keller Fire to 15 acres, with damage to only two structures and no injuries.
25-1:
The City of Oakland must make hiring of Department of Transportation positions a priority to ensure paving and pothole/street repairs continue, making certain that any departmental approval delays be addressed.
25-2:
The City of Oakland/Oakland Department of Transportation must complete implementation of the new change order control process from its change order manual.
25-3:
The City of Oakland/Oakland Department of Transportation must ensure that all change orders identify funding prior to approval for any street paving or other road repair project.
25-4:
The City of Oakland (Mayor) must promptly fill all vacancies on the I-Bond Oversight Committee.
25-5:
The Oakland City of Oakland must ensure that an audit of Measure KK’s expenditures is immediately conducted and reported to the city council.
25-6:
The City of Oakland must ensure that an external independent audit of Measure U’s expenditures is immediately conducted.
25-7:
The City of Oakland must take a more proactive role in the status of the I-Bond Oversight Committee, ensuring they meet regularly and perform their oversight duties.
25-8:
The City of Oakland must ensure that the I-Bond Oversight Committee website is complete and transparent, and includes all committee reports, agendas, minutes, and recordings, as well as all Measure KK reports from Oakland’s Finance Department.
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Findings & Recommendations
59 findings
F25-1:
Potholes and other street pavement failures have been a prevalent problem in the City of Oakland for many years.
F25-2:
The City of Oakland needed to repair over 53,000 potholes or similar pavement failures in the most recent 2023-2024 Fiscal Year.
F25-3:
Historically, liability claims and lawsuits from potholes and pavement failure have cost the City of Oakland millions of dollars.
F25-4:
Complete repaving of streets costs the City of Oakland approximately $1 million per mile.
F25-5:
The City of Oakland has not met its goals for significant repaving under its 2022 Five-Year Paving Plan, with no foreseeable date for completion.
F25-6:
Without money from the sale of authorized Measure U bonds, the City of Oakland will not be able to undertake significant additional street repaving.
F25-7:
High employee vacancy rates and the delays in approval of hiring slowed the City of Oakland’s in-house street repaving and repairs.
F25-8:
The City of Oakland’s Local Business Enterprise and Small Local Business Enterprise programs limit the competition for Oakland’s Department of Transportation contracts for paving and street work, causing Oakland to not receive multiple bids, which could result in lower costs.
F25-9:
The City of Oakland’s Department of Transportation lacks adequate control over change orders on paving and street projects, including failure to first identify approved funding.
F25-10:
The City of Oakland has not conducted any audits under Measure KK or Measure U, as required by the measures. 37
F25-11:
The City of Oakland’s I-Bond Oversight Committee has not met regularly since at least December 2022, as required.
F25-12:
The City of Oakland (Mayor) has failed to fill the current vacancies on the I-Bond Oversight Committee.
F25-13:
The I-Bond Oversight Committee has not provided regular or annual reports on Measure KK to the Oakland City Council since September 2022, nor on Measure U since its approval in November 2022.
F25-14:
The website for the City of Oakland’s I-Bond Oversight Committee lacks complete information including most committee reports, and not all agendas, minutes, or recordings.
F25-15:
The City of Oakland’s I-Bond Oversight Committee failed to conduct a self-evaluation, as required by its bylaws.
F25-16:
The City of Oakland has failed to ensure that the I-Bond Oversight Committee has been fulfilling its duties, including meeting regularly, reporting as needed, and conducting self- evaluations as required.
F25-17:
The Oakland City Council added the “extreme fiscal necessity” clause to Measure Q without open discussion and public debate.
F25-18:
The Measure Q ballot language passed by voters in March 2020 did not define what constitutes an extreme fiscal necessity.
F25-19:
The declaration of extreme fiscal necessity allowed the Oakland City Council to divert funds intended for additional park services
F25-20:
In its last disclosure of the maintenance of effort calculations, the City of Oakland reported a decrease in Measure Q funding for new park services from 45% to 32%.
F25-21:
To date, community park stakeholders and Oakland city staff still do not agree on a definition of “extreme fiscal necessity.”
F25-22:
Measure Q requires biennial reports, and the Oakland City Auditor did not conduct the second biennial audit covering FY 2022-2023 and FY 2023-2024.
F25-23:
Measure Q was not included in the Oakland City Auditor’s FY 2024-2025 workplan.
F25-24:
As recommended and funded in Measure Q, no independent financial audit has been conducted.
F25-25:
Oakland’s Parks and Recreation Advisory Commission complies with the reporting requirements in Ordinance No. 13622 (an ordinance updating the duties of the commission).
F25-26:
Oakland’s Commission on Homelessness has not met its oversight mandate of Measure Q including the preparation of annual reports as required by Ordinance No. 13584 (an ordinance updating the duties of the commission).
F25-27:
The City of Oakland has not prepared annual reports documenting revenues, expenditures and the status of projects funded by Measure Q as required by California Government Code 50075.3. 49
F25-28:
It is difficult to observe Oakland’s Parks and Recreation Advisory Commission meetings recorded on Zoom due to poor broadcast capabilities. (The Commission on Homelessness meetings recorded on KTOP are broadcast with better video and audio than PRAC meetings.)
F25-29:
City of Oakland parking control technicians have the technology on their existing handheld devices that enables them to search some vehicle databases.
F25-30:
The City of Oakland will save staff time and taxpayer dollars by avoiding issuing and ultimately dismissing tickets on illegally parked stolen vehicles.
F25-31:
When a ticket is issued to a parked stolen vehicle, victims of crime suffer additional hardship.by needing to take affirmative steps to dismiss a parking ticket.
F25-32:
DMV provides information on stolen vehicles to OakDOT and any OakDOT staff can be trained to access this information without involving OPD or DOJ.
25-33:
The Oakland Fire Department has met its goal of conducting annual wildfire inspections of virtually all private properties in the Oakland Hills area designated as the Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone.
F25-33:
The Oakland Fire Department has met its goal of conducting annual wildfire inspections of virtually all private properties in the Oakland Hills area designated as the Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone.
25-34:
The Oakland Fire Department’s annual wildfire prevention inspections of private properties in the Oakland Hills finds a high level of compliance on the part of property owners.
F25-34:
The Oakland Fire Department’s annual wildfire prevention inspections of private properties in the Oakland Hills finds a high level of compliance on the part of property owners. 73
25-35:
For city-owned properties, the Oakland City Council does not presently allocate sufficient resources for vegetation management to remove or mitigate fire risks.
F25-35:
For city-owned properties, the Oakland City Council does not presently allocate sufficient resources for vegetation management to remove or mitigate fire risks.
25-36:
At the time of this report, the Oakland City Council has not yet developed an implementation plan for Measure MM, although the measure becomes effective on July 1, 2025.
F25-36:
At the time of this report, the Oakland City Council has not yet developed an implementation plan for Measure MM, although the measure becomes effective on July 1, 2025.
25-37:
Oakland’s Department of Transportation lacks adequate enforcement of parking restrictions in the Oakland Hills which hinders the ability of emergency services to navigate narrow streets to ensure a timely response to emergencies.
F25-37:
Oakland’s Department of Transportation lacks adequate enforcement of parking restrictions in the Oakland Hills which hinders the ability of emergency services to navigate narrow streets to ensure a timely response to emergencies.
25-38:
The Oakland City Council has not done an adequate job of educating Oakland Hills residents about emergency evacuation routes.
F25-38:
The Oakland City Council has not done an adequate job of educating Oakland Hills residents about emergency evacuation routes.
25-39:
Public education about evacuation routes, and availability of emergency warning systems (such as AC Alert), are critical to improving public safety in Oakland, especially in areas with high wildfire risk.
F25-39:
Public education about evacuation routes, and availability of emergency warning systems (such as AC Alert), are critical to improving public safety in Oakland, especially in areas with high wildfire risk.
F25-40:
The Logic and Accuracy Test of the Alameda County Registrar of Voters voting system tested only one of over a dozen ballot scanners used in the election.
F25-41:
During Logic and Accuracy testing, sample ballots were pre-marked by the Registrar of Voters and observers were not permitted to examine the pre-marked ballots at any time to confirm they matched the count from the ballot scanner.
F25-42:
Video observation (online) of the electoral process, including the ballot envelope sorting, signature verification, vote-by-mail processing, and ballot scanning, was without audio or any description to the viewer of what was happening in the video feed. 93
F25-43:
During the in-person observation of ballot counting on election night, members of the public were required to be onsite by 8:00 p.m. but were not allowed entry into the Registrar of Voters counting room until after 10 p.m. During this time, ballots were being wheeled into the room while observers were kept waiting in a hallway outside, and online video feed was unavailable.
F25-44:
Once admitted to view ballot counting in person on election night, observers were not allowed to ask any questions.
F25-45:
Notices by the Registrar of Voters to the public of upcoming online observation video feeds of the election processes did not identify the start times or what the processes would be. The notice stated, “An election process will be conducted today. For ongoing updates, check the website where all election processes will be posted.”
F25-46:
During the in-person observation of the 1% manual tally after the election, observers were given no explanation of the hand count process.
F25-47:
During the in-person observation of the 1% manual tally after the election, observers were not allowed to ask questions concerning the process.
F25-48:
In the updates of the vote counts starting on election night, it was stated that “570 of 570 Precincts Reported (100%),” giving the misleading impression that all ballots had been received or counted.
F25-49:
While the Registrar of Voters was reporting live results to the Secretary of State (where the results were posted on the state’s website), not all of these same results were being posted on Alameda County’s local website. The Alameda County website did not include: the cumulative total number of processed ballots, total updated number of processed ballots, vote-by-mail ballots received before and after election day, estimated total ballots remaining, or ballots left to be cured.
F25-50:
As reported by the Secretary of State’s website, Alameda County still had an estimated 187,135 ballots out of 683,644 total ballots cast remaining to be counted 10 days after the election. 94
F25-51:
Alameda County’s election results were updated on the website five times on election night but not updated daily after the election.
F25-52:
Delays in the tabulation and reporting of election results by the Registrar of Voters are caused in part by insufficient facilities, lack of equipment, and low staffing during ballot processing and counting.
Additional Recommendations
7
Not linked to specific findings.
R7:
called for the city council to determine if parking in the Oakland Hills that obstructed road access was an enforcement priority, and if so, whether an enforcement program (with community input) should be implemented. Car Illegally Parked in the Oakland Hills 69 In December 2015, a follow-up audit found that the city had taken insufficient action. It concluded: The large number of resident and visitor vehicles in the Oakland hills creates unsafe congestion and, at times, possibly illegal parking situations including parking on streets too narrow to accommodate an emergency vehicle and parking in red “no parking” zones. Parking infractions are not regularly cited by Parking Enforcement which, according to the Fire Department, has indicated that the Oakland hills neighborhoods are not a priority parking enforcement area. Despite that strong recommendation, the city auditor again found in November 2017 that the illegally parked vehicles blocking Oakland hills roads was still a problem. That report, entitled, “Second Follow-up: Oakland Fire Department Vegetation Inspection Audit” specifically noted: OFD or Parking Enforcement [the predecessor to the Oakland Department of Transportation] must find a workable solution for the parking problem in the Oakland hills … Narrow roadways that quickly became blocked during the evacuation [in the 1991 Oakland-Berkeley Tunnel Hills Fire] contributed to the tragedy, as these streets were, for many residents, the only exit routes out of the area. Oakland still has not made sufficient progress in finding a “workable solution.” Although Oakland’s 2023-2024 Local Hazard Mitigation Plan Report touted “enhanced coordination with Department of Transportation and Oakland Police to enforce parking restrictions on Red Flag Days,” nearly every witness the Grand Jury interviewed questioned the adequacy of this enforcement. Another current concern is efforts to increase housing density in high fire risk areas, which would exacerbate the problem. The Grand Jury learned from the Parking and Mobility Unit in Oakland’s Department of Transportation (OakDOT) that it had arranged for the installation of additional “No Parking” signs in the hills in 2017, in response to an initiative of the Oakland Wildfire Prevention Working Group. Still, Oakland does not have any areas that are designated as “No Parking on Red Flag Days,” as do some municipalities. Consequently, there is no signage to limit parking and create additional access on those days. OakDOT’s parking control technicians (who are responsible for issuing tickets to illegally parked cars), conduct limited patrols in the Oakland Hills, although not with the same regularity as they patrol commercial zones (including areas with parking meters) or areas with street sweeping restrictions. The Grand Jury heard conflicting information about the level of parking enforcement in the Oakland Hills. While OakDOT may conduct enforcement and dispatches additional parking control technicians on days designated as Red Flag Days, it is evident that the current level of enforcement overall is insufficient. Oakland should increase the “no parking” zones in the hills, particularly on narrow streets or streets with curves that may be more difficult to navigate for large emergency vehicles. Indeed, the National Fire Safety Association states that road access for fire equipment should have a minimum unobstructed width of not less than 20 feet. To follow that guidance, parking in the Oakland Hills likely would have to be limited to one side on many narrow streets. Oakland also should add “no parking” zone in certain areas, so that those restrictions apply on Red Flag days – a solution used in other high fire risk areas in California. The Grand Jury recognizes that there likely would be costs involved in purchasing and placing new signage, as well as implementing increased enforcement to ensure evacuation routes are available and safe. We note these parking management solutions for consideration by the city. The Grand Jury did not investigate the amount of possible increased costs. To the extent that citations for parking violations bring in revenue, the cost of enforcement may be covered in part by collection of parking fines. Measure MM requires actions to provide “well-maintained, accessible” evacuation routes and to provide education. Although Measure MM implementation plans remain pending, the Grand Jury encourages the city to focus on safe evacuation planning with some urgency. This planning should include increased parking enforcement; public outreach and education so that residents will be aware of their evacuation zones and evacuation routes; and regular updates on coordination among Oakland departments and between Oakland and neighboring fire prevention agencies (including funds necessary for interagency training). Coordination With Other Agencies Because fires do not respect city boundaries, and problems with coordination were identified as an issue in the Tunnel Fire, the Grand Jury reviewed the current state of interdepartmental and interagency coordination. Since the Tunnel Fire, coordination has improved, including increased use of the same types of communication systems and equipment, as well as joint training on procedures to allow fire departments to work together when necessary. Oakland and nearby agencies also improved coordination through several multi-jurisdictional organizations. The Hills Emergency Forum was created after the Tunnel Fire and now includes the following partners: Oakland, Berkeley, El Cerrito, CAL FIRE, East Bay Regional Parks District, East Bay Municipal Utility District, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, the Moraga-Orinda Fire District, and the University of California, Berkeley. It meets regularly to discuss coordination of evacuation routes, clearing trails, training, and equipment. The forum’s coordination plans include mutual aid arrangements, as necessary to address wildfires (locally and outside the region). It also coordinates work with Civic Corps and community groups that assist local fire departments in clearing fire hazards. Finally, it provides information to members about securing grant funding. More recently, Oakland has participated in the new East Bay Wildfire Coalition of Governments. In 2021, the Oakland City Council, recognizing the need for coordination among public entities in the area, adopted a resolution directing the city administrator to participate in discussions about the possible formation of a joint powers authority for fire prevention and management among Easy Bay hills jurisdictions. Ultimately, the participants chose not to pursue a joint powers authority, at least for the present time. Instead, in 2023, they entered into a Memorandum of Understanding to form the East Bay Wildfire Coalition of Governments. The East Bay Wildfire Coalition of Governments, which now meets periodically to receive reports and discuss efforts to mitigate the risk of wildfire in the East Bay hills is comprised of the following members: Alameda and Contra Costa counties, Alameda County Fire Department, Contra Costa Fire Protection District, the Rodeo-Hercules Fire Prevention District, and the cities of Berkeley, Oakland, El Cerrito, and Richmond. In addition, the University of California, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, East Bay Regional Parks District, East Bay Municipal Utility District, and the East Bay Firesafe Councils (representing community members) participate as regional advisors. Separately, one recent example of successful coordination was the response to the Keller Fire in Oakland in October 2024. Before that fire started, the National Weather Service issued Red Flag warnings, including warnings of possible 40-mph winds. Because of the warnings, OFD pre-positioned fire engines and other firefighting apparatus in the hills. The planning included coordination with emergency services across the county. All cities with emergency service engines were “upstaffed,” making extra staff available to respond. As a result, OFD was able to move necessary equipment to the Keller scene immediately. In addition, CAL FIRE sent air resources almost immediately. Over 200 personnel coordinated to evacuate 254 structures. In all, 27 different jurisdictions were on the scene. Because of prior communications and coordinated training, responders were able to work together and prevent the fire from reaching more populous areas, which could have been catastrophic. Their combined efforts limited the Keller Fire to 15 acres, with damage to only two structures and no injuries.
25-20:
The Oakland Fire Department must monitor the vegetation management inspection process to ensure that all private and public areas remain in full compliance with applicable fire safety regulations.
25-21:
Within six months, the Oakland City Council must review the progress of the new Measure MM oversight commission in order to ensure that it is in compliance with the requirements of Measure MM, operating with full transparency, and fulfilling its purpose under Measure MM as intended.
25-22:
Within six months, the Oakland City Council should make public its plans for the use of additional Measure MM funding to inspect and prioritize vegetation management.
25-23:
Oakland’s Department of Transportation must enforce parking restrictions in the areas covered by Measure MM at all times to ensure emergency vehicles have full access to all roads.
25-24:
The Oakland City Council should evaluate limiting parking to one side of the street in the Oakland Hills areas with a high fire risk where narrow roadways impede emergency vehicle ingress or resident egress, taking into consideration risk assessment and community consultation.
25-25:
The Oakland City Council must implement or expand public education programs to inform residents about emergency evacuation routes, fire safety procedures, and communication tools, such as AC Alert.
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Findings & Recommendations
52 findings
F25-1:
Potholes and other street pavement failures have been a prevalent problem in the City of Oakland for many years.
F25-2:
The City of Oakland needed to repair over 53,000 potholes or similar pavement failures in the most recent 2023-2024 Fiscal Year.
F25-3:
Historically, liability claims and lawsuits from potholes and pavement failure have cost the City of Oakland millions of dollars.
F25-4:
Complete repaving of streets costs the City of Oakland approximately $1 million per mile.
F25-5:
The City of Oakland has not met its goals for significant repaving under its 2022 Five-Year Paving Plan, with no foreseeable date for completion.
F25-6:
Without money from the sale of authorized Measure U bonds, the City of Oakland will not be able to undertake significant additional street repaving.
F25-7:
High employee vacancy rates and the delays in approval of hiring slowed the City of Oakland’s in-house street repaving and repairs.
F25-8:
The City of Oakland’s Local Business Enterprise and Small Local Business Enterprise programs limit the competition for Oakland’s Department of Transportation contracts for paving and street work, causing Oakland to not receive multiple bids, which could result in lower costs.
F25-9:
The City of Oakland’s Department of Transportation lacks adequate control over change orders on paving and street projects, including failure to first identify approved funding.
F25-10:
The City of Oakland has not conducted any audits under Measure KK or Measure U, as required by the measures. 37
F25-11:
The City of Oakland’s I-Bond Oversight Committee has not met regularly since at least December 2022, as required.
F25-12:
The City of Oakland (Mayor) has failed to fill the current vacancies on the I-Bond Oversight Committee.
F25-13:
The I-Bond Oversight Committee has not provided regular or annual reports on Measure KK to the Oakland City Council since September 2022, nor on Measure U since its approval in November 2022.
F25-14:
The website for the City of Oakland’s I-Bond Oversight Committee lacks complete information including most committee reports, and not all agendas, minutes, or recordings.
F25-15:
The City of Oakland’s I-Bond Oversight Committee failed to conduct a self-evaluation, as required by its bylaws.
F25-16:
The City of Oakland has failed to ensure that the I-Bond Oversight Committee has been fulfilling its duties, including meeting regularly, reporting as needed, and conducting self- evaluations as required.
F25-17:
The Oakland City Council added the “extreme fiscal necessity” clause to Measure Q without open discussion and public debate.
F25-18:
The Measure Q ballot language passed by voters in March 2020 did not define what constitutes an extreme fiscal necessity.
F25-19:
The declaration of extreme fiscal necessity allowed the Oakland City Council to divert funds intended for additional park services
F25-20:
In its last disclosure of the maintenance of effort calculations, the City of Oakland reported a decrease in Measure Q funding for new park services from 45% to 32%.
F25-21:
To date, community park stakeholders and Oakland city staff still do not agree on a definition of “extreme fiscal necessity.”
F25-22:
Measure Q requires biennial reports, and the Oakland City Auditor did not conduct the second biennial audit covering FY 2022-2023 and FY 2023-2024.
F25-23:
Measure Q was not included in the Oakland City Auditor’s FY 2024-2025 workplan.
F25-24:
As recommended and funded in Measure Q, no independent financial audit has been conducted.
F25-25:
Oakland’s Parks and Recreation Advisory Commission complies with the reporting requirements in Ordinance No. 13622 (an ordinance updating the duties of the commission).
F25-26:
Oakland’s Commission on Homelessness has not met its oversight mandate of Measure Q including the preparation of annual reports as required by Ordinance No. 13584 (an ordinance updating the duties of the commission).
F25-27:
The City of Oakland has not prepared annual reports documenting revenues, expenditures and the status of projects funded by Measure Q as required by California Government Code 50075.3. 49
F25-28:
It is difficult to observe Oakland’s Parks and Recreation Advisory Commission meetings recorded on Zoom due to poor broadcast capabilities. (The Commission on Homelessness meetings recorded on KTOP are broadcast with better video and audio than PRAC meetings.)
F25-29:
City of Oakland parking control technicians have the technology on their existing handheld devices that enables them to search some vehicle databases.
F25-30:
The City of Oakland will save staff time and taxpayer dollars by avoiding issuing and ultimately dismissing tickets on illegally parked stolen vehicles.
F25-31:
When a ticket is issued to a parked stolen vehicle, victims of crime suffer additional hardship.by needing to take affirmative steps to dismiss a parking ticket.
F25-32:
DMV provides information on stolen vehicles to OakDOT and any OakDOT staff can be trained to access this information without involving OPD or DOJ.
F25-33:
The Oakland Fire Department has met its goal of conducting annual wildfire inspections of virtually all private properties in the Oakland Hills area designated as the Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone.
F25-34:
The Oakland Fire Department’s annual wildfire prevention inspections of private properties in the Oakland Hills finds a high level of compliance on the part of property owners. 73
F25-35:
For city-owned properties, the Oakland City Council does not presently allocate sufficient resources for vegetation management to remove or mitigate fire risks.
F25-36:
At the time of this report, the Oakland City Council has not yet developed an implementation plan for Measure MM, although the measure becomes effective on July 1, 2025.
F25-37:
Oakland’s Department of Transportation lacks adequate enforcement of parking restrictions in the Oakland Hills which hinders the ability of emergency services to navigate narrow streets to ensure a timely response to emergencies.
F25-38:
The Oakland City Council has not done an adequate job of educating Oakland Hills residents about emergency evacuation routes.
F25-39:
Public education about evacuation routes, and availability of emergency warning systems (such as AC Alert), are critical to improving public safety in Oakland, especially in areas with high wildfire risk.
F25-40:
The Logic and Accuracy Test of the Alameda County Registrar of Voters voting system tested only one of over a dozen ballot scanners used in the election.
F25-41:
During Logic and Accuracy testing, sample ballots were pre-marked by the Registrar of Voters and observers were not permitted to examine the pre-marked ballots at any time to confirm they matched the count from the ballot scanner.
F25-42:
Video observation (online) of the electoral process, including the ballot envelope sorting, signature verification, vote-by-mail processing, and ballot scanning, was without audio or any description to the viewer of what was happening in the video feed. 93
F25-43:
During the in-person observation of ballot counting on election night, members of the public were required to be onsite by 8:00 p.m. but were not allowed entry into the Registrar of Voters counting room until after 10 p.m. During this time, ballots were being wheeled into the room while observers were kept waiting in a hallway outside, and online video feed was unavailable.
F25-44:
Once admitted to view ballot counting in person on election night, observers were not allowed to ask any questions.
F25-45:
Notices by the Registrar of Voters to the public of upcoming online observation video feeds of the election processes did not identify the start times or what the processes would be. The notice stated, “An election process will be conducted today. For ongoing updates, check the website where all election processes will be posted.”
F25-46:
During the in-person observation of the 1% manual tally after the election, observers were given no explanation of the hand count process.
F25-47:
During the in-person observation of the 1% manual tally after the election, observers were not allowed to ask questions concerning the process.
F25-48:
In the updates of the vote counts starting on election night, it was stated that “570 of 570 Precincts Reported (100%),” giving the misleading impression that all ballots had been received or counted.
F25-49:
While the Registrar of Voters was reporting live results to the Secretary of State (where the results were posted on the state’s website), not all of these same results were being posted on Alameda County’s local website. The Alameda County website did not include: the cumulative total number of processed ballots, total updated number of processed ballots, vote-by-mail ballots received before and after election day, estimated total ballots remaining, or ballots left to be cured.
F25-50:
As reported by the Secretary of State’s website, Alameda County still had an estimated 187,135 ballots out of 683,644 total ballots cast remaining to be counted 10 days after the election. 94
F25-51:
Alameda County’s election results were updated on the website five times on election night but not updated daily after the election.
F25-52:
Delays in the tabulation and reporting of election results by the Registrar of Voters are caused in part by insufficient facilities, lack of equipment, and low staffing during ballot processing and counting.
Additional Recommendations
1
Not linked to specific findings.
R7:
called for the city council to determine if parking in the Oakland Hills that obstructed road access was an enforcement priority, and if so, whether an enforcement program (with community input) should be implemented. Car Illegally Parked in the Oakland Hills 69 In December 2015, a follow-up audit found that the city had taken insufficient action. It concluded: The large number of resident and visitor vehicles in the Oakland hills creates unsafe congestion and, at times, possibly illegal parking situations including parking on streets too narrow to accommodate an emergency vehicle and parking in red “no parking” zones. Parking infractions are not regularly cited by Parking Enforcement which, according to the Fire Department, has indicated that the Oakland hills neighborhoods are not a priority parking enforcement area. Despite that strong recommendation, the city auditor again found in November 2017 that the illegally parked vehicles blocking Oakland hills roads was still a problem. That report, entitled, “Second Follow-up: Oakland Fire Department Vegetation Inspection Audit” specifically noted: OFD or Parking Enforcement [the predecessor to the Oakland Department of Transportation] must find a workable solution for the parking problem in the Oakland hills … Narrow roadways that quickly became blocked during the evacuation [in the 1991 Oakland-Berkeley Tunnel Hills Fire] contributed to the tragedy, as these streets were, for many residents, the only exit routes out of the area. Oakland still has not made sufficient progress in finding a “workable solution.” Although Oakland’s 2023-2024 Local Hazard Mitigation Plan Report touted “enhanced coordination with Department of Transportation and Oakland Police to enforce parking restrictions on Red Flag Days,” nearly every witness the Grand Jury interviewed questioned the adequacy of this enforcement. Another current concern is efforts to increase housing density in high fire risk areas, which would exacerbate the problem. The Grand Jury learned from the Parking and Mobility Unit in Oakland’s Department of Transportation (OakDOT) that it had arranged for the installation of additional “No Parking” signs in the hills in 2017, in response to an initiative of the Oakland Wildfire Prevention Working Group. Still, Oakland does not have any areas that are designated as “No Parking on Red Flag Days,” as do some municipalities. Consequently, there is no signage to limit parking and create additional access on those days. OakDOT’s parking control technicians (who are responsible for issuing tickets to illegally parked cars), conduct limited patrols in the Oakland Hills, although not with the same regularity as they patrol commercial zones (including areas with parking meters) or areas with street sweeping restrictions. The Grand Jury heard conflicting information about the level of parking enforcement in the Oakland Hills. While OakDOT may conduct enforcement and dispatches additional parking control technicians on days designated as Red Flag Days, it is evident that the current level of enforcement overall is insufficient. Oakland should increase the “no parking” zones in the hills, particularly on narrow streets or streets with curves that may be more difficult to navigate for large emergency vehicles. Indeed, the National Fire Safety Association states that road access for fire equipment should have a minimum unobstructed width of not less than 20 feet. To follow that guidance, parking in the Oakland Hills likely would have to be limited to one side on many narrow streets. Oakland also should add “no parking” zone in certain areas, so that those restrictions apply on Red Flag days – a solution used in other high fire risk areas in California. The Grand Jury recognizes that there likely would be costs involved in purchasing and placing new signage, as well as implementing increased enforcement to ensure evacuation routes are available and safe. We note these parking management solutions for consideration by the city. The Grand Jury did not investigate the amount of possible increased costs. To the extent that citations for parking violations bring in revenue, the cost of enforcement may be covered in part by collection of parking fines. Measure MM requires actions to provide “well-maintained, accessible” evacuation routes and to provide education. Although Measure MM implementation plans remain pending, the Grand Jury encourages the city to focus on safe evacuation planning with some urgency. This planning should include increased parking enforcement; public outreach and education so that residents will be aware of their evacuation zones and evacuation routes; and regular updates on coordination among Oakland departments and between Oakland and neighboring fire prevention agencies (including funds necessary for interagency training). Coordination With Other Agencies Because fires do not respect city boundaries, and problems with coordination were identified as an issue in the Tunnel Fire, the Grand Jury reviewed the current state of interdepartmental and interagency coordination. Since the Tunnel Fire, coordination has improved, including increased use of the same types of communication systems and equipment, as well as joint training on procedures to allow fire departments to work together when necessary. Oakland and nearby agencies also improved coordination through several multi-jurisdictional organizations. The Hills Emergency Forum was created after the Tunnel Fire and now includes the following partners: Oakland, Berkeley, El Cerrito, CAL FIRE, East Bay Regional Parks District, East Bay Municipal Utility District, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, the Moraga-Orinda Fire District, and the University of California, Berkeley. It meets regularly to discuss coordination of evacuation routes, clearing trails, training, and equipment. The forum’s coordination plans include mutual aid arrangements, as necessary to address wildfires (locally and outside the region). It also coordinates work with Civic Corps and community groups that assist local fire departments in clearing fire hazards. Finally, it provides information to members about securing grant funding. More recently, Oakland has participated in the new East Bay Wildfire Coalition of Governments. In 2021, the Oakland City Council, recognizing the need for coordination among public entities in the area, adopted a resolution directing the city administrator to participate in discussions about the possible formation of a joint powers authority for fire prevention and management among Easy Bay hills jurisdictions. Ultimately, the participants chose not to pursue a joint powers authority, at least for the present time. Instead, in 2023, they entered into a Memorandum of Understanding to form the East Bay Wildfire Coalition of Governments. The East Bay Wildfire Coalition of Governments, which now meets periodically to receive reports and discuss efforts to mitigate the risk of wildfire in the East Bay hills is comprised of the following members: Alameda and Contra Costa counties, Alameda County Fire Department, Contra Costa Fire Protection District, the Rodeo-Hercules Fire Prevention District, and the cities of Berkeley, Oakland, El Cerrito, and Richmond. In addition, the University of California, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, East Bay Regional Parks District, East Bay Municipal Utility District, and the East Bay Firesafe Councils (representing community members) participate as regional advisors. Separately, one recent example of successful coordination was the response to the Keller Fire in Oakland in October 2024. Before that fire started, the National Weather Service issued Red Flag warnings, including warnings of possible 40-mph winds. Because of the warnings, OFD pre-positioned fire engines and other firefighting apparatus in the hills. The planning included coordination with emergency services across the county. All cities with emergency service engines were “upstaffed,” making extra staff available to respond. As a result, OFD was able to move necessary equipment to the Keller scene immediately. In addition, CAL FIRE sent air resources almost immediately. Over 200 personnel coordinated to evacuate 254 structures. In all, 27 different jurisdictions were on the scene. Because of prior communications and coordinated training, responders were able to work together and prevent the fire from reaching more populous areas, which could have been catastrophic. Their combined efforts limited the Keller Fire to 15 acres, with damage to only two structures and no injuries.
Findings & Recommendations
13 findings
F25-40:
The Logic and Accuracy Test of the Alameda County Registrar of Voters voting system tested only one of over a dozen ballot scanners used in the election.
F25-41:
During Logic and Accuracy testing, sample ballots were pre-marked by the Registrar of Voters and observers were not permitted to examine the pre-marked ballots at any time to confirm they matched the count from the ballot scanner.
F25-42:
Video observation (online) of the electoral process, including the ballot envelope sorting, signature verification, vote-by-mail processing, and ballot scanning, was without audio or any description to the viewer of what was happening in the video feed. 93 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
F25-43:
During the in-person observation of ballot counting on election night, members of the public were required to be onsite by 8:00 p.m. but were not allowed entry into the Registrar of Voters counting room until after 10 p.m. During this time, ballots were being wheeled into the room while observers were kept waiting in a hallway outside, and online video feed was unavailable.
F25-44:
Once admitted to view ballot counting in person on election night, observers were not allowed to ask any questions.
F25-45:
Notices by the Registrar of Voters to the public of upcoming online observation video feeds of the election processes did not identify the start times or what the processes would be. The notice stated, “An election process will be conducted today. For ongoing updates, check the website where all election processes will be posted.”
F25-46:
During the in-person observation of the 1% manual tally after the election, observers were given no explanation of the hand count process.
F25-47:
During the in-person observation of the 1% manual tally after the election, observers were not allowed to ask questions concerning the process.
F25-48:
In the updates of the vote counts starting on election night, it was stated that “570 of 570 Precincts Reported (100%),” giving the misleading impression that all ballots had been received or counted.
F25-49:
While the Registrar of Voters was reporting live results to the Secretary of State (where the results were posted on the state’s website), not all of these same results were being posted on Alameda County’s local website. The Alameda County website did not include: the cumulative total number of processed ballots, total updated number of processed ballots, vote-by-mail ballots received before and after election day, estimated total ballots remaining, or ballots left to be cured.
F25-50:
As reported by the Secretary of State’s website, Alameda County still had an estimated 187,135 ballots out of 683,644 total ballots cast remaining to be counted 10 days after the election. 94 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
F25-51:
Alameda County’s election results were updated on the website five times on election night but not updated daily after the election.
F25-52:
Delays in the tabulation and reporting of election results by the Registrar of Voters are caused in part by insufficient facilities, lack of equipment, and low staffing during ballot processing and counting.
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Findings & Recommendations
4 findings
F25-29:
City of Oakland parking control technicians have the technology on their existing handheld devices that enables them to search some vehicle databases.
F25-30:
The City of Oakland will save staff time and taxpayer dollars by avoiding issuing and ultimately dismissing tickets on illegally parked stolen vehicles.
F25-31:
When a ticket is issued to a parked stolen vehicle, victims of crime suffer additional hardship.by needing to take affirmative steps to dismiss a parking ticket.
F25-32:
DMV provides information on stolen vehicles to OakDOT and any OakDOT staff can be trained to access this information without involving OPD or DOJ.
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Findings & Recommendations
4 findings
F25-29:
City of Oakland parking control technicians have the technology on their existing handheld devices that enables them to search some vehicle databases.
F25-30:
The City of Oakland will save staff time and taxpayer dollars by avoiding issuing and ultimately dismissing tickets on illegally parked stolen vehicles.
F25-31:
When a ticket is issued to a parked stolen vehicle, victims of crime suffer additional hardship.by needing to take affirmative steps to dismiss a parking ticket.
F25-32:
DMV provides information on stolen vehicles to OakDOT and any OakDOT staff can be trained to access this information without involving OPD or DOJ.
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Findings & Recommendations
4 findings
F25-29:
City of Oakland parking control technicians have the technology on their existing handheld devices that enables them to search some vehicle databases.
F25-30:
The City of Oakland will save staff time and taxpayer dollars by avoiding issuing and ultimately dismissing tickets on illegally parked stolen vehicles.
F25-31:
When a ticket is issued to a parked stolen vehicle, victims of crime suffer additional hardship.by needing to take affirmative steps to dismiss a parking ticket.
F25-32:
DMV provides information on stolen vehicles to OakDOT and any OakDOT staff can be trained to access this information without involving OPD or DOJ.
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Findings & Recommendations
4 findings
F25-29:
City of Oakland parking control technicians have the technology on their existing handheld devices that enables them to search some vehicle databases.
F25-30:
The City of Oakland will save staff time and taxpayer dollars by avoiding issuing and ultimately dismissing tickets on illegally parked stolen vehicles.
F25-31:
When a ticket is issued to a parked stolen vehicle, victims of crime suffer additional hardship.by needing to take affirmative steps to dismiss a parking ticket.
F25-32:
DMV provides information on stolen vehicles to OakDOT and any OakDOT staff can be trained to access this information without involving OPD or DOJ.
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Findings & Recommendations
4 findings
F25-29:
City of Oakland parking control technicians have the technology on their existing handheld devices that enables them to search some vehicle databases.
F25-30:
The City of Oakland will save staff time and taxpayer dollars by avoiding issuing and ultimately dismissing tickets on illegally parked stolen vehicles.
F25-31:
When a ticket is issued to a parked stolen vehicle, victims of crime suffer additional hardship.by needing to take affirmative steps to dismiss a parking ticket.
F25-32:
DMV provides information on stolen vehicles to OakDOT and any OakDOT staff can be trained to access this information without involving OPD or DOJ.
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Findings & Recommendations
4 findings
F25-29:
City of Oakland parking control technicians have the technology on their existing handheld devices that enables them to search some vehicle databases.
F25-30:
The City of Oakland will save staff time and taxpayer dollars by avoiding issuing and ultimately dismissing tickets on illegally parked stolen vehicles.
F25-31:
When a ticket is issued to a parked stolen vehicle, victims of crime suffer additional hardship.by needing to take affirmative steps to dismiss a parking ticket.
F25-32:
DMV provides information on stolen vehicles to OakDOT and any OakDOT staff can be trained to access this information without involving OPD or DOJ.
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Findings & Recommendations
12 findings
F25-17:
The Oakland City Council added the “extreme fiscal necessity” clause to Measure Q without open discussion and public debate.
F25-18:
The Measure Q ballot language passed by voters in March 2020 did not define what constitutes an extreme fiscal necessity.
F25-19:
The declaration of extreme fiscal necessity allowed the Oakland City Council to divert funds intended for additional park services
F25-20:
In its last disclosure of the maintenance of effort calculations, the City of Oakland reported a decrease in Measure Q funding for new park services from 45% to 32%.
F25-21:
To date, community park stakeholders and Oakland city staff still do not agree on a definition of “extreme fiscal necessity.”
F25-22:
Measure Q requires biennial reports, and the Oakland City Auditor did not conduct the second biennial audit covering FY 2022-2023 and FY 2023-2024.
F25-23:
Measure Q was not included in the Oakland City Auditor’s FY 2024-2025 workplan.
F25-24:
As recommended and funded in Measure Q, no independent financial audit has been conducted.
F25-25:
Oakland’s Parks and Recreation Advisory Commission complies with the reporting requirements in Ordinance No. 13622 (an ordinance updating the duties of the commission).
F25-26:
Oakland’s Commission on Homelessness has not met its oversight mandate of Measure Q including the preparation of annual reports as required by Ordinance No. 13584 (an ordinance updating the duties of the commission).
F25-27:
The City of Oakland has not prepared annual reports documenting revenues, expenditures and the status of projects funded by Measure Q as required by California Government Code 50075.3. 49 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
F25-28:
It is difficult to observe Oakland’s Parks and Recreation Advisory Commission meetings recorded on Zoom due to poor broadcast capabilities. (The Commission on Homelessness meetings recorded on KTOP are broadcast with better video and audio than PRAC meetings.)
Additional Recommendations
8
Not linked to specific findings.
R1:
Development of performance measures, with emphasis on reducing the number of people experiencing homelessness in or adjacent to city parks.
R2:
Facilitation of citizen oversight on homelessness efforts with the city bringing regular operational and expenditure reports to the Commission on Homelessness, and that the Commission establish a regular agenda item for the purpose.
R3:
The Commission on Homelessness fulfill its statutory obligation by publishing an annual report including a section on Measure Q.
R4:
Conduct an annual audit of Measure Q funds collected and expended, as required by California Government Code sections 50071.1 and 50075.3.
R5:
For future special tax programs, the City Administrator’s Office initiate a best practice policy requiring an annual report on revenues, expenditures and the status of open projects, to make sure that the City satisfies California Government Code sections 50071.1 and 50075.3. Based on the findings in the auditor’s report, the Grand Jury is of the opinion that the city was not prepared to implement or evaluate the services mandated by Measure Q. Annual Reporting Reporting is required by the State of California for special parcel tax measures. Government Code section 50075.3 requires the chief fiscal officer to file annual reports with its governing body (for Oakland that would be the finance director, reporting to the city council) on the amount of funds collected and expended, and the status of associated projects. The Grand Jury learned that the finance director submitted a Measure Q funding report to the city council in March of 2022, documenting revenues and expenditures, but did not include the status of associated projects. Reporting to the city council is also required by the two oversight commissions (PRAC and the Commission on Homelessness) associated with Measure Q. Local ordinances have specific reporting requirements for parcel tax measures (Ordinances 13622 and 13584). The Grand Jury researched the city’s website and conducted interviews with city staff and discovered that while PRAC was in large part compliant with ordinance requirements, the Commission on Homelessness was not. 47 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Concern Over Measure Q Expenditures The lack of reliable reporting, audits, and the declaration of extreme fiscal necessity has led park advocates to question if Measure Q funds are being spent in accordance with the measure. The Parks and Recreation Advisory Commission outlined concerns in its annual report covering Fiscal Years 2022-2023 and 2023-2024: “During the reporting period, funds from Measure Q were allocated to other unrelated city expenses under the framework of extreme fiscal necessity despite stated concerns from PRAC and park advocates.” Examples of other questionable expenditures include:
R6:
In FY 2020-2021, salaries of three police officers and a high-level human services employee, including the director, were charged to Measure Q. After concerns were made public, these charges were reclassified and not charged to the measure.
R7:
Capital expenses associated with Union Point Park were charged to Measure Q. Park advocates asserted that the measure’s funding is meant for maintenance and minor repairs, and not capital projects. The Grand Jury learned that the city attorney opined that this expenditure was allowed under Measure Q, and the matter is still being challenged.
R8:
Excessive charges for high level administrators: for example, 6.4 positions in the city administrator’s office at a cost of $3.9 million that had previously not been billed to Measure Q. Given these concerns, the Grand Jury is alarmed by the fact that no annual financial audit has been conducted for Measure Q since it was passed. CONCLUSION When voters choose to tax themselves for specific purposes (e.g., park maintenance) they expect increased services to be provided. The Grand Jury finds the lack of transparency, accountability, and reporting by the City of Oakland is troubling, creating serious doubts about what Oakland residents are actually getting from Measure Q. The Grand Jury calls for better stewardship of Measure Q. Maintenance of effort requirements should be protected and implemented whenever possible. The declaration of extreme fiscal necessity should be resolved based on transparent criteria. In addition, biennial and financial audits must be conducted as prescribed by the measure. The Oakland City Council needs to provide better oversight of the implementation of Measure Q. 48 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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Findings & Recommendations
12 findings
F25-17:
The Oakland City Council added the “extreme fiscal necessity” clause to Measure Q without open discussion and public debate.
F25-18:
The Measure Q ballot language passed by voters in March 2020 did not define what constitutes an extreme fiscal necessity.
F25-19:
The declaration of extreme fiscal necessity allowed the Oakland City Council to divert funds intended for additional park services
F25-20:
In its last disclosure of the maintenance of effort calculations, the City of Oakland reported a decrease in Measure Q funding for new park services from 45% to 32%.
F25-21:
To date, community park stakeholders and Oakland city staff still do not agree on a definition of “extreme fiscal necessity.”
F25-22:
Measure Q requires biennial reports, and the Oakland City Auditor did not conduct the second biennial audit covering FY 2022-2023 and FY 2023-2024.
F25-23:
Measure Q was not included in the Oakland City Auditor’s FY 2024-2025 workplan.
F25-24:
As recommended and funded in Measure Q, no independent financial audit has been conducted.
F25-25:
Oakland’s Parks and Recreation Advisory Commission complies with the reporting requirements in Ordinance No. 13622 (an ordinance updating the duties of the commission).
F25-26:
Oakland’s Commission on Homelessness has not met its oversight mandate of Measure Q including the preparation of annual reports as required by Ordinance No. 13584 (an ordinance updating the duties of the commission).
F25-27:
The City of Oakland has not prepared annual reports documenting revenues, expenditures and the status of projects funded by Measure Q as required by California Government Code 50075.3. 49 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
F25-28:
It is difficult to observe Oakland’s Parks and Recreation Advisory Commission meetings recorded on Zoom due to poor broadcast capabilities. (The Commission on Homelessness meetings recorded on KTOP are broadcast with better video and audio than PRAC meetings.)
Additional Recommendations
8
Not linked to specific findings.
R1:
Development of performance measures, with emphasis on reducing the number of people experiencing homelessness in or adjacent to city parks.
R2:
Facilitation of citizen oversight on homelessness efforts with the city bringing regular operational and expenditure reports to the Commission on Homelessness, and that the Commission establish a regular agenda item for the purpose.
R3:
The Commission on Homelessness fulfill its statutory obligation by publishing an annual report including a section on Measure Q.
R4:
Conduct an annual audit of Measure Q funds collected and expended, as required by California Government Code sections 50071.1 and 50075.3.
R5:
For future special tax programs, the City Administrator’s Office initiate a best practice policy requiring an annual report on revenues, expenditures and the status of open projects, to make sure that the City satisfies California Government Code sections 50071.1 and 50075.3. Based on the findings in the auditor’s report, the Grand Jury is of the opinion that the city was not prepared to implement or evaluate the services mandated by Measure Q. Annual Reporting Reporting is required by the State of California for special parcel tax measures. Government Code section 50075.3 requires the chief fiscal officer to file annual reports with its governing body (for Oakland that would be the finance director, reporting to the city council) on the amount of funds collected and expended, and the status of associated projects. The Grand Jury learned that the finance director submitted a Measure Q funding report to the city council in March of 2022, documenting revenues and expenditures, but did not include the status of associated projects. Reporting to the city council is also required by the two oversight commissions (PRAC and the Commission on Homelessness) associated with Measure Q. Local ordinances have specific reporting requirements for parcel tax measures (Ordinances 13622 and 13584). The Grand Jury researched the city’s website and conducted interviews with city staff and discovered that while PRAC was in large part compliant with ordinance requirements, the Commission on Homelessness was not. 47 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Concern Over Measure Q Expenditures The lack of reliable reporting, audits, and the declaration of extreme fiscal necessity has led park advocates to question if Measure Q funds are being spent in accordance with the measure. The Parks and Recreation Advisory Commission outlined concerns in its annual report covering Fiscal Years 2022-2023 and 2023-2024: “During the reporting period, funds from Measure Q were allocated to other unrelated city expenses under the framework of extreme fiscal necessity despite stated concerns from PRAC and park advocates.” Examples of other questionable expenditures include:
R6:
In FY 2020-2021, salaries of three police officers and a high-level human services employee, including the director, were charged to Measure Q. After concerns were made public, these charges were reclassified and not charged to the measure.
R7:
Capital expenses associated with Union Point Park were charged to Measure Q. Park advocates asserted that the measure’s funding is meant for maintenance and minor repairs, and not capital projects. The Grand Jury learned that the city attorney opined that this expenditure was allowed under Measure Q, and the matter is still being challenged.
R8:
Excessive charges for high level administrators: for example, 6.4 positions in the city administrator’s office at a cost of $3.9 million that had previously not been billed to Measure Q. Given these concerns, the Grand Jury is alarmed by the fact that no annual financial audit has been conducted for Measure Q since it was passed. CONCLUSION When voters choose to tax themselves for specific purposes (e.g., park maintenance) they expect increased services to be provided. The Grand Jury finds the lack of transparency, accountability, and reporting by the City of Oakland is troubling, creating serious doubts about what Oakland residents are actually getting from Measure Q. The Grand Jury calls for better stewardship of Measure Q. Maintenance of effort requirements should be protected and implemented whenever possible. The declaration of extreme fiscal necessity should be resolved based on transparent criteria. In addition, biennial and financial audits must be conducted as prescribed by the measure. The Oakland City Council needs to provide better oversight of the implementation of Measure Q. 48 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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Findings & Recommendations
12 findings
F25-17:
The Oakland City Council added the “extreme fiscal necessity” clause to Measure Q without open discussion and public debate.
F25-18:
The Measure Q ballot language passed by voters in March 2020 did not define what constitutes an extreme fiscal necessity.
F25-19:
The declaration of extreme fiscal necessity allowed the Oakland City Council to divert funds intended for additional park services
F25-20:
In its last disclosure of the maintenance of effort calculations, the City of Oakland reported a decrease in Measure Q funding for new park services from 45% to 32%.
F25-21:
To date, community park stakeholders and Oakland city staff still do not agree on a definition of “extreme fiscal necessity.”
F25-22:
Measure Q requires biennial reports, and the Oakland City Auditor did not conduct the second biennial audit covering FY 2022-2023 and FY 2023-2024.
F25-23:
Measure Q was not included in the Oakland City Auditor’s FY 2024-2025 workplan.
F25-24:
As recommended and funded in Measure Q, no independent financial audit has been conducted.
F25-25:
Oakland’s Parks and Recreation Advisory Commission complies with the reporting requirements in Ordinance No. 13622 (an ordinance updating the duties of the commission).
F25-26:
Oakland’s Commission on Homelessness has not met its oversight mandate of Measure Q including the preparation of annual reports as required by Ordinance No. 13584 (an ordinance updating the duties of the commission).
F25-27:
The City of Oakland has not prepared annual reports documenting revenues, expenditures and the status of projects funded by Measure Q as required by California Government Code 50075.3. 49 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
F25-28:
It is difficult to observe Oakland’s Parks and Recreation Advisory Commission meetings recorded on Zoom due to poor broadcast capabilities. (The Commission on Homelessness meetings recorded on KTOP are broadcast with better video and audio than PRAC meetings.)
Additional Recommendations
8
Not linked to specific findings.
R1:
Development of performance measures, with emphasis on reducing the number of people experiencing homelessness in or adjacent to city parks.
R2:
Facilitation of citizen oversight on homelessness efforts with the city bringing regular operational and expenditure reports to the Commission on Homelessness, and that the Commission establish a regular agenda item for the purpose.
R3:
The Commission on Homelessness fulfill its statutory obligation by publishing an annual report including a section on Measure Q.
R4:
Conduct an annual audit of Measure Q funds collected and expended, as required by California Government Code sections 50071.1 and 50075.3.
R5:
For future special tax programs, the City Administrator’s Office initiate a best practice policy requiring an annual report on revenues, expenditures and the status of open projects, to make sure that the City satisfies California Government Code sections 50071.1 and 50075.3. Based on the findings in the auditor’s report, the Grand Jury is of the opinion that the city was not prepared to implement or evaluate the services mandated by Measure Q. Annual Reporting Reporting is required by the State of California for special parcel tax measures. Government Code section 50075.3 requires the chief fiscal officer to file annual reports with its governing body (for Oakland that would be the finance director, reporting to the city council) on the amount of funds collected and expended, and the status of associated projects. The Grand Jury learned that the finance director submitted a Measure Q funding report to the city council in March of 2022, documenting revenues and expenditures, but did not include the status of associated projects. Reporting to the city council is also required by the two oversight commissions (PRAC and the Commission on Homelessness) associated with Measure Q. Local ordinances have specific reporting requirements for parcel tax measures (Ordinances 13622 and 13584). The Grand Jury researched the city’s website and conducted interviews with city staff and discovered that while PRAC was in large part compliant with ordinance requirements, the Commission on Homelessness was not. 47 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Concern Over Measure Q Expenditures The lack of reliable reporting, audits, and the declaration of extreme fiscal necessity has led park advocates to question if Measure Q funds are being spent in accordance with the measure. The Parks and Recreation Advisory Commission outlined concerns in its annual report covering Fiscal Years 2022-2023 and 2023-2024: “During the reporting period, funds from Measure Q were allocated to other unrelated city expenses under the framework of extreme fiscal necessity despite stated concerns from PRAC and park advocates.” Examples of other questionable expenditures include:
R6:
In FY 2020-2021, salaries of three police officers and a high-level human services employee, including the director, were charged to Measure Q. After concerns were made public, these charges were reclassified and not charged to the measure.
R7:
Capital expenses associated with Union Point Park were charged to Measure Q. Park advocates asserted that the measure’s funding is meant for maintenance and minor repairs, and not capital projects. The Grand Jury learned that the city attorney opined that this expenditure was allowed under Measure Q, and the matter is still being challenged.
R8:
Excessive charges for high level administrators: for example, 6.4 positions in the city administrator’s office at a cost of $3.9 million that had previously not been billed to Measure Q. Given these concerns, the Grand Jury is alarmed by the fact that no annual financial audit has been conducted for Measure Q since it was passed. CONCLUSION When voters choose to tax themselves for specific purposes (e.g., park maintenance) they expect increased services to be provided. The Grand Jury finds the lack of transparency, accountability, and reporting by the City of Oakland is troubling, creating serious doubts about what Oakland residents are actually getting from Measure Q. The Grand Jury calls for better stewardship of Measure Q. Maintenance of effort requirements should be protected and implemented whenever possible. The declaration of extreme fiscal necessity should be resolved based on transparent criteria. In addition, biennial and financial audits must be conducted as prescribed by the measure. The Oakland City Council needs to provide better oversight of the implementation of Measure Q. 48 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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Findings & Recommendations
12 findings
F25-17:
The Oakland City Council added the “extreme fiscal necessity” clause to Measure Q without open discussion and public debate.
F25-18:
The Measure Q ballot language passed by voters in March 2020 did not define what constitutes an extreme fiscal necessity.
F25-19:
The declaration of extreme fiscal necessity allowed the Oakland City Council to divert funds intended for additional park services
F25-20:
In its last disclosure of the maintenance of effort calculations, the City of Oakland reported a decrease in Measure Q funding for new park services from 45% to 32%.
F25-21:
To date, community park stakeholders and Oakland city staff still do not agree on a definition of “extreme fiscal necessity.”
F25-22:
Measure Q requires biennial reports, and the Oakland City Auditor did not conduct the second biennial audit covering FY 2022-2023 and FY 2023-2024.
F25-23:
Measure Q was not included in the Oakland City Auditor’s FY 2024-2025 workplan.
F25-24:
As recommended and funded in Measure Q, no independent financial audit has been conducted.
F25-25:
Oakland’s Parks and Recreation Advisory Commission complies with the reporting requirements in Ordinance No. 13622 (an ordinance updating the duties of the commission).
F25-26:
Oakland’s Commission on Homelessness has not met its oversight mandate of Measure Q including the preparation of annual reports as required by Ordinance No. 13584 (an ordinance updating the duties of the commission).
F25-27:
The City of Oakland has not prepared annual reports documenting revenues, expenditures and the status of projects funded by Measure Q as required by California Government Code 50075.3. 49 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
F25-28:
It is difficult to observe Oakland’s Parks and Recreation Advisory Commission meetings recorded on Zoom due to poor broadcast capabilities. (The Commission on Homelessness meetings recorded on KTOP are broadcast with better video and audio than PRAC meetings.)
Additional Recommendations
8
Not linked to specific findings.
R1:
Development of performance measures, with emphasis on reducing the number of people experiencing homelessness in or adjacent to city parks.
R2:
Facilitation of citizen oversight on homelessness efforts with the city bringing regular operational and expenditure reports to the Commission on Homelessness, and that the Commission establish a regular agenda item for the purpose.
R3:
The Commission on Homelessness fulfill its statutory obligation by publishing an annual report including a section on Measure Q.
R4:
Conduct an annual audit of Measure Q funds collected and expended, as required by California Government Code sections 50071.1 and 50075.3.
R5:
For future special tax programs, the City Administrator’s Office initiate a best practice policy requiring an annual report on revenues, expenditures and the status of open projects, to make sure that the City satisfies California Government Code sections 50071.1 and 50075.3. Based on the findings in the auditor’s report, the Grand Jury is of the opinion that the city was not prepared to implement or evaluate the services mandated by Measure Q. Annual Reporting Reporting is required by the State of California for special parcel tax measures. Government Code section 50075.3 requires the chief fiscal officer to file annual reports with its governing body (for Oakland that would be the finance director, reporting to the city council) on the amount of funds collected and expended, and the status of associated projects. The Grand Jury learned that the finance director submitted a Measure Q funding report to the city council in March of 2022, documenting revenues and expenditures, but did not include the status of associated projects. Reporting to the city council is also required by the two oversight commissions (PRAC and the Commission on Homelessness) associated with Measure Q. Local ordinances have specific reporting requirements for parcel tax measures (Ordinances 13622 and 13584). The Grand Jury researched the city’s website and conducted interviews with city staff and discovered that while PRAC was in large part compliant with ordinance requirements, the Commission on Homelessness was not. 47 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Concern Over Measure Q Expenditures The lack of reliable reporting, audits, and the declaration of extreme fiscal necessity has led park advocates to question if Measure Q funds are being spent in accordance with the measure. The Parks and Recreation Advisory Commission outlined concerns in its annual report covering Fiscal Years 2022-2023 and 2023-2024: “During the reporting period, funds from Measure Q were allocated to other unrelated city expenses under the framework of extreme fiscal necessity despite stated concerns from PRAC and park advocates.” Examples of other questionable expenditures include:
R6:
In FY 2020-2021, salaries of three police officers and a high-level human services employee, including the director, were charged to Measure Q. After concerns were made public, these charges were reclassified and not charged to the measure.
R7:
Capital expenses associated with Union Point Park were charged to Measure Q. Park advocates asserted that the measure’s funding is meant for maintenance and minor repairs, and not capital projects. The Grand Jury learned that the city attorney opined that this expenditure was allowed under Measure Q, and the matter is still being challenged.
R8:
Excessive charges for high level administrators: for example, 6.4 positions in the city administrator’s office at a cost of $3.9 million that had previously not been billed to Measure Q. Given these concerns, the Grand Jury is alarmed by the fact that no annual financial audit has been conducted for Measure Q since it was passed. CONCLUSION When voters choose to tax themselves for specific purposes (e.g., park maintenance) they expect increased services to be provided. The Grand Jury finds the lack of transparency, accountability, and reporting by the City of Oakland is troubling, creating serious doubts about what Oakland residents are actually getting from Measure Q. The Grand Jury calls for better stewardship of Measure Q. Maintenance of effort requirements should be protected and implemented whenever possible. The declaration of extreme fiscal necessity should be resolved based on transparent criteria. In addition, biennial and financial audits must be conducted as prescribed by the measure. The Oakland City Council needs to provide better oversight of the implementation of Measure Q. 48 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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Findings & Recommendations
12 findings
F25-17:
The Oakland City Council added the “extreme fiscal necessity” clause to Measure Q without open discussion and public debate.
F25-18:
The Measure Q ballot language passed by voters in March 2020 did not define what constitutes an extreme fiscal necessity.
F25-19:
The declaration of extreme fiscal necessity allowed the Oakland City Council to divert funds intended for additional park services
F25-20:
In its last disclosure of the maintenance of effort calculations, the City of Oakland reported a decrease in Measure Q funding for new park services from 45% to 32%.
F25-21:
To date, community park stakeholders and Oakland city staff still do not agree on a definition of “extreme fiscal necessity.”
F25-22:
Measure Q requires biennial reports, and the Oakland City Auditor did not conduct the second biennial audit covering FY 2022-2023 and FY 2023-2024.
F25-23:
Measure Q was not included in the Oakland City Auditor’s FY 2024-2025 workplan.
F25-24:
As recommended and funded in Measure Q, no independent financial audit has been conducted.
F25-25:
Oakland’s Parks and Recreation Advisory Commission complies with the reporting requirements in Ordinance No. 13622 (an ordinance updating the duties of the commission).
F25-26:
Oakland’s Commission on Homelessness has not met its oversight mandate of Measure Q including the preparation of annual reports as required by Ordinance No. 13584 (an ordinance updating the duties of the commission).
F25-27:
The City of Oakland has not prepared annual reports documenting revenues, expenditures and the status of projects funded by Measure Q as required by California Government Code 50075.3. 49 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
F25-28:
It is difficult to observe Oakland’s Parks and Recreation Advisory Commission meetings recorded on Zoom due to poor broadcast capabilities. (The Commission on Homelessness meetings recorded on KTOP are broadcast with better video and audio than PRAC meetings.)
Additional Recommendations
8
Not linked to specific findings.
R1:
Development of performance measures, with emphasis on reducing the number of people experiencing homelessness in or adjacent to city parks.
R2:
Facilitation of citizen oversight on homelessness efforts with the city bringing regular operational and expenditure reports to the Commission on Homelessness, and that the Commission establish a regular agenda item for the purpose.
R3:
The Commission on Homelessness fulfill its statutory obligation by publishing an annual report including a section on Measure Q.
R4:
Conduct an annual audit of Measure Q funds collected and expended, as required by California Government Code sections 50071.1 and 50075.3.
R5:
For future special tax programs, the City Administrator’s Office initiate a best practice policy requiring an annual report on revenues, expenditures and the status of open projects, to make sure that the City satisfies California Government Code sections 50071.1 and 50075.3. Based on the findings in the auditor’s report, the Grand Jury is of the opinion that the city was not prepared to implement or evaluate the services mandated by Measure Q. Annual Reporting Reporting is required by the State of California for special parcel tax measures. Government Code section 50075.3 requires the chief fiscal officer to file annual reports with its governing body (for Oakland that would be the finance director, reporting to the city council) on the amount of funds collected and expended, and the status of associated projects. The Grand Jury learned that the finance director submitted a Measure Q funding report to the city council in March of 2022, documenting revenues and expenditures, but did not include the status of associated projects. Reporting to the city council is also required by the two oversight commissions (PRAC and the Commission on Homelessness) associated with Measure Q. Local ordinances have specific reporting requirements for parcel tax measures (Ordinances 13622 and 13584). The Grand Jury researched the city’s website and conducted interviews with city staff and discovered that while PRAC was in large part compliant with ordinance requirements, the Commission on Homelessness was not. 47 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Concern Over Measure Q Expenditures The lack of reliable reporting, audits, and the declaration of extreme fiscal necessity has led park advocates to question if Measure Q funds are being spent in accordance with the measure. The Parks and Recreation Advisory Commission outlined concerns in its annual report covering Fiscal Years 2022-2023 and 2023-2024: “During the reporting period, funds from Measure Q were allocated to other unrelated city expenses under the framework of extreme fiscal necessity despite stated concerns from PRAC and park advocates.” Examples of other questionable expenditures include:
R6:
In FY 2020-2021, salaries of three police officers and a high-level human services employee, including the director, were charged to Measure Q. After concerns were made public, these charges were reclassified and not charged to the measure.
R7:
Capital expenses associated with Union Point Park were charged to Measure Q. Park advocates asserted that the measure’s funding is meant for maintenance and minor repairs, and not capital projects. The Grand Jury learned that the city attorney opined that this expenditure was allowed under Measure Q, and the matter is still being challenged.
R8:
Excessive charges for high level administrators: for example, 6.4 positions in the city administrator’s office at a cost of $3.9 million that had previously not been billed to Measure Q. Given these concerns, the Grand Jury is alarmed by the fact that no annual financial audit has been conducted for Measure Q since it was passed. CONCLUSION When voters choose to tax themselves for specific purposes (e.g., park maintenance) they expect increased services to be provided. The Grand Jury finds the lack of transparency, accountability, and reporting by the City of Oakland is troubling, creating serious doubts about what Oakland residents are actually getting from Measure Q. The Grand Jury calls for better stewardship of Measure Q. Maintenance of effort requirements should be protected and implemented whenever possible. The declaration of extreme fiscal necessity should be resolved based on transparent criteria. In addition, biennial and financial audits must be conducted as prescribed by the measure. The Oakland City Council needs to provide better oversight of the implementation of Measure Q. 48 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
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Findings & Recommendations
12 findings
F25-17:
The Oakland City Council added the “extreme fiscal necessity” clause to Measure Q without open discussion and public debate.
F25-18:
The Measure Q ballot language passed by voters in March 2020 did not define what constitutes an extreme fiscal necessity.
F25-19:
The declaration of extreme fiscal necessity allowed the Oakland City Council to divert funds intended for additional park services
F25-20:
In its last disclosure of the maintenance of effort calculations, the City of Oakland reported a decrease in Measure Q funding for new park services from 45% to 32%.
F25-21:
To date, community park stakeholders and Oakland city staff still do not agree on a definition of “extreme fiscal necessity.”
F25-22:
Measure Q requires biennial reports, and the Oakland City Auditor did not conduct the second biennial audit covering FY 2022-2023 and FY 2023-2024.
F25-23:
Measure Q was not included in the Oakland City Auditor’s FY 2024-2025 workplan.
F25-24:
As recommended and funded in Measure Q, no independent financial audit has been conducted.
F25-25:
Oakland’s Parks and Recreation Advisory Commission complies with the reporting requirements in Ordinance No. 13622 (an ordinance updating the duties of the commission).
F25-26:
Oakland’s Commission on Homelessness has not met its oversight mandate of Measure Q including the preparation of annual reports as required by Ordinance No. 13584 (an ordinance updating the duties of the commission).
F25-27:
The City of Oakland has not prepared annual reports documenting revenues, expenditures and the status of projects funded by Measure Q as required by California Government Code 50075.3. 49 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
F25-28:
It is difficult to observe Oakland’s Parks and Recreation Advisory Commission meetings recorded on Zoom due to poor broadcast capabilities. (The Commission on Homelessness meetings recorded on KTOP are broadcast with better video and audio than PRAC meetings.)
Additional Recommendations
8
Not linked to specific findings.
R1:
Development of performance measures, with emphasis on reducing the number of people experiencing homelessness in or adjacent to city parks.
R2:
Facilitation of citizen oversight on homelessness efforts with the city bringing regular operational and expenditure reports to the Commission on Homelessness, and that the Commission establish a regular agenda item for the purpose.
R3:
The Commission on Homelessness fulfill its statutory obligation by publishing an annual report including a section on Measure Q.
R4:
Conduct an annual audit of Measure Q funds collected and expended, as required by California Government Code sections 50071.1 and 50075.3.
R5:
For future special tax programs, the City Administrator’s Office initiate a best practice policy requiring an annual report on revenues, expenditures and the status of open projects, to make sure that the City satisfies California Government Code sections 50071.1 and 50075.3. Based on the findings in the auditor’s report, the Grand Jury is of the opinion that the city was not prepared to implement or evaluate the services mandated by Measure Q. Annual Reporting Reporting is required by the State of California for special parcel tax measures. Government Code section 50075.3 requires the chief fiscal officer to file annual reports with its governing body (for Oakland that would be the finance director, reporting to the city council) on the amount of funds collected and expended, and the status of associated projects. The Grand Jury learned that the finance director submitted a Measure Q funding report to the city council in March of 2022, documenting revenues and expenditures, but did not include the status of associated projects. Reporting to the city council is also required by the two oversight commissions (PRAC and the Commission on Homelessness) associated with Measure Q. Local ordinances have specific reporting requirements for parcel tax measures (Ordinances 13622 and 13584). The Grand Jury researched the city’s website and conducted interviews with city staff and discovered that while PRAC was in large part compliant with ordinance requirements, the Commission on Homelessness was not. 47 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Concern Over Measure Q Expenditures The lack of reliable reporting, audits, and the declaration of extreme fiscal necessity has led park advocates to question if Measure Q funds are being spent in accordance with the measure. The Parks and Recreation Advisory Commission outlined concerns in its annual report covering Fiscal Years 2022-2023 and 2023-2024: “During the reporting period, funds from Measure Q were allocated to other unrelated city expenses under the framework of extreme fiscal necessity despite stated concerns from PRAC and park advocates.” Examples of other questionable expenditures include:
R6:
In FY 2020-2021, salaries of three police officers and a high-level human services employee, including the director, were charged to Measure Q. After concerns were made public, these charges were reclassified and not charged to the measure.
R7:
Capital expenses associated with Union Point Park were charged to Measure Q. Park advocates asserted that the measure’s funding is meant for maintenance and minor repairs, and not capital projects. The Grand Jury learned that the city attorney opined that this expenditure was allowed under Measure Q, and the matter is still being challenged.
R8:
Excessive charges for high level administrators: for example, 6.4 positions in the city administrator’s office at a cost of $3.9 million that had previously not been billed to Measure Q. Given these concerns, the Grand Jury is alarmed by the fact that no annual financial audit has been conducted for Measure Q since it was passed. CONCLUSION When voters choose to tax themselves for specific purposes (e.g., park maintenance) they expect increased services to be provided. The Grand Jury finds the lack of transparency, accountability, and reporting by the City of Oakland is troubling, creating serious doubts about what Oakland residents are actually getting from Measure Q. The Grand Jury calls for better stewardship of Measure Q. Maintenance of effort requirements should be protected and implemented whenever possible. The declaration of extreme fiscal necessity should be resolved based on transparent criteria. In addition, biennial and financial audits must be conducted as prescribed by the measure. The Oakland City Council needs to provide better oversight of the implementation of Measure Q. 48 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Findings & Recommendations
16 findings
F25-1:
Potholes and other street pavement failures have been a prevalent problem in the City of Oakland for many years.
F25-2:
The City of Oakland needed to repair over 53,000 potholes or similar pavement failures in the most recent 2023-2024 Fiscal Year.
F25-3:
Historically, liability claims and lawsuits from potholes and pavement failure have cost the City of Oakland millions of dollars.
F25-4:
Complete repaving of streets costs the City of Oakland approximately $1 million per mile.
F25-5:
The City of Oakland has not met its goals for significant repaving under its 2022 Five-Year Paving Plan, with no foreseeable date for completion.
F25-6:
Without money from the sale of authorized Measure U bonds, the City of Oakland will not be able to undertake significant additional street repaving.
F25-7:
High employee vacancy rates and the delays in approval of hiring slowed the City of Oakland’s in-house street repaving and repairs.
F25-8:
The City of Oakland’s Local Business Enterprise and Small Local Business Enterprise programs limit the competition for Oakland’s Department of Transportation contracts for paving and street work, causing Oakland to not receive multiple bids, which could result in lower costs.
F25-9:
The City of Oakland’s Department of Transportation lacks adequate control over change orders on paving and street projects, including failure to first identify approved funding.
F25-10:
The City of Oakland has not conducted any audits under Measure KK or Measure U, as required by the measures. 37 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
F25-11:
The City of Oakland’s I-Bond Oversight Committee has not met regularly since at least December 2022, as required.
F25-12:
The City of Oakland (Mayor) has failed to fill the current vacancies on the I-Bond Oversight Committee.
F25-13:
The I-Bond Oversight Committee has not provided regular or annual reports on Measure KK to the Oakland City Council since September 2022, nor on Measure U since its approval in November 2022.
F25-14:
The website for the City of Oakland’s I-Bond Oversight Committee lacks complete information including most committee reports, and not all agendas, minutes, or recordings.
F25-15:
The City of Oakland’s I-Bond Oversight Committee failed to conduct a self-evaluation, as required by its bylaws.
F25-16:
The City of Oakland has failed to ensure that the I-Bond Oversight Committee has been fulfilling its duties, including meeting regularly, reporting as needed, and conducting self- evaluations as required.
Findings & Recommendations
16 findings
F25-1:
Potholes and other street pavement failures have been a prevalent problem in the City of Oakland for many years.
F25-2:
The City of Oakland needed to repair over 53,000 potholes or similar pavement failures in the most recent 2023-2024 Fiscal Year.
F25-3:
Historically, liability claims and lawsuits from potholes and pavement failure have cost the City of Oakland millions of dollars.
F25-4:
Complete repaving of streets costs the City of Oakland approximately $1 million per mile.
F25-5:
The City of Oakland has not met its goals for significant repaving under its 2022 Five-Year Paving Plan, with no foreseeable date for completion.
F25-6:
Without money from the sale of authorized Measure U bonds, the City of Oakland will not be able to undertake significant additional street repaving.
F25-7:
High employee vacancy rates and the delays in approval of hiring slowed the City of Oakland’s in-house street repaving and repairs.
F25-8:
The City of Oakland’s Local Business Enterprise and Small Local Business Enterprise programs limit the competition for Oakland’s Department of Transportation contracts for paving and street work, causing Oakland to not receive multiple bids, which could result in lower costs.
F25-9:
The City of Oakland’s Department of Transportation lacks adequate control over change orders on paving and street projects, including failure to first identify approved funding.
F25-10:
The City of Oakland has not conducted any audits under Measure KK or Measure U, as required by the measures. 37 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
F25-11:
The City of Oakland’s I-Bond Oversight Committee has not met regularly since at least December 2022, as required.
F25-12:
The City of Oakland (Mayor) has failed to fill the current vacancies on the I-Bond Oversight Committee.
F25-13:
The I-Bond Oversight Committee has not provided regular or annual reports on Measure KK to the Oakland City Council since September 2022, nor on Measure U since its approval in November 2022.
F25-14:
The website for the City of Oakland’s I-Bond Oversight Committee lacks complete information including most committee reports, and not all agendas, minutes, or recordings.
F25-15:
The City of Oakland’s I-Bond Oversight Committee failed to conduct a self-evaluation, as required by its bylaws.
F25-16:
The City of Oakland has failed to ensure that the I-Bond Oversight Committee has been fulfilling its duties, including meeting regularly, reporting as needed, and conducting self- evaluations as required.
Findings & Recommendations
16 findings
F25-1:
Potholes and other street pavement failures have been a prevalent problem in the City of Oakland for many years.
F25-2:
The City of Oakland needed to repair over 53,000 potholes or similar pavement failures in the most recent 2023-2024 Fiscal Year.
F25-3:
Historically, liability claims and lawsuits from potholes and pavement failure have cost the City of Oakland millions of dollars.
F25-4:
Complete repaving of streets costs the City of Oakland approximately $1 million per mile.
F25-5:
The City of Oakland has not met its goals for significant repaving under its 2022 Five-Year Paving Plan, with no foreseeable date for completion.
F25-6:
Without money from the sale of authorized Measure U bonds, the City of Oakland will not be able to undertake significant additional street repaving.
F25-7:
High employee vacancy rates and the delays in approval of hiring slowed the City of Oakland’s in-house street repaving and repairs.
F25-8:
The City of Oakland’s Local Business Enterprise and Small Local Business Enterprise programs limit the competition for Oakland’s Department of Transportation contracts for paving and street work, causing Oakland to not receive multiple bids, which could result in lower costs.
F25-9:
The City of Oakland’s Department of Transportation lacks adequate control over change orders on paving and street projects, including failure to first identify approved funding.
F25-10:
The City of Oakland has not conducted any audits under Measure KK or Measure U, as required by the measures. 37 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
F25-11:
The City of Oakland’s I-Bond Oversight Committee has not met regularly since at least December 2022, as required.
F25-12:
The City of Oakland (Mayor) has failed to fill the current vacancies on the I-Bond Oversight Committee.
F25-13:
The I-Bond Oversight Committee has not provided regular or annual reports on Measure KK to the Oakland City Council since September 2022, nor on Measure U since its approval in November 2022.
F25-14:
The website for the City of Oakland’s I-Bond Oversight Committee lacks complete information including most committee reports, and not all agendas, minutes, or recordings.
F25-15:
The City of Oakland’s I-Bond Oversight Committee failed to conduct a self-evaluation, as required by its bylaws.
F25-16:
The City of Oakland has failed to ensure that the I-Bond Oversight Committee has been fulfilling its duties, including meeting regularly, reporting as needed, and conducting self- evaluations as required.
Findings & Recommendations
16 findings
F25-1:
Potholes and other street pavement failures have been a prevalent problem in the City of Oakland for many years.
F25-2:
The City of Oakland needed to repair over 53,000 potholes or similar pavement failures in the most recent 2023-2024 Fiscal Year.
F25-3:
Historically, liability claims and lawsuits from potholes and pavement failure have cost the City of Oakland millions of dollars.
F25-4:
Complete repaving of streets costs the City of Oakland approximately $1 million per mile.
F25-5:
The City of Oakland has not met its goals for significant repaving under its 2022 Five-Year Paving Plan, with no foreseeable date for completion.
F25-6:
Without money from the sale of authorized Measure U bonds, the City of Oakland will not be able to undertake significant additional street repaving.
F25-7:
High employee vacancy rates and the delays in approval of hiring slowed the City of Oakland’s in-house street repaving and repairs.
F25-8:
The City of Oakland’s Local Business Enterprise and Small Local Business Enterprise programs limit the competition for Oakland’s Department of Transportation contracts for paving and street work, causing Oakland to not receive multiple bids, which could result in lower costs.
F25-9:
The City of Oakland’s Department of Transportation lacks adequate control over change orders on paving and street projects, including failure to first identify approved funding.
F25-10:
The City of Oakland has not conducted any audits under Measure KK or Measure U, as required by the measures. 37 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
F25-11:
The City of Oakland’s I-Bond Oversight Committee has not met regularly since at least December 2022, as required.
F25-12:
The City of Oakland (Mayor) has failed to fill the current vacancies on the I-Bond Oversight Committee.
F25-13:
The I-Bond Oversight Committee has not provided regular or annual reports on Measure KK to the Oakland City Council since September 2022, nor on Measure U since its approval in November 2022.
F25-14:
The website for the City of Oakland’s I-Bond Oversight Committee lacks complete information including most committee reports, and not all agendas, minutes, or recordings.
F25-15:
The City of Oakland’s I-Bond Oversight Committee failed to conduct a self-evaluation, as required by its bylaws.
F25-16:
The City of Oakland has failed to ensure that the I-Bond Oversight Committee has been fulfilling its duties, including meeting regularly, reporting as needed, and conducting self- evaluations as required.
Findings & Recommendations
16 findings
F25-1:
Potholes and other street pavement failures have been a prevalent problem in the City of Oakland for many years.
F25-2:
The City of Oakland needed to repair over 53,000 potholes or similar pavement failures in the most recent 2023-2024 Fiscal Year.
F25-3:
Historically, liability claims and lawsuits from potholes and pavement failure have cost the City of Oakland millions of dollars.
F25-4:
Complete repaving of streets costs the City of Oakland approximately $1 million per mile.
F25-5:
The City of Oakland has not met its goals for significant repaving under its 2022 Five-Year Paving Plan, with no foreseeable date for completion.
F25-6:
Without money from the sale of authorized Measure U bonds, the City of Oakland will not be able to undertake significant additional street repaving.
F25-7:
High employee vacancy rates and the delays in approval of hiring slowed the City of Oakland’s in-house street repaving and repairs.
F25-8:
The City of Oakland’s Local Business Enterprise and Small Local Business Enterprise programs limit the competition for Oakland’s Department of Transportation contracts for paving and street work, causing Oakland to not receive multiple bids, which could result in lower costs.
F25-9:
The City of Oakland’s Department of Transportation lacks adequate control over change orders on paving and street projects, including failure to first identify approved funding.
F25-10:
The City of Oakland has not conducted any audits under Measure KK or Measure U, as required by the measures. 37 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
F25-11:
The City of Oakland’s I-Bond Oversight Committee has not met regularly since at least December 2022, as required.
F25-12:
The City of Oakland (Mayor) has failed to fill the current vacancies on the I-Bond Oversight Committee.
F25-13:
The I-Bond Oversight Committee has not provided regular or annual reports on Measure KK to the Oakland City Council since September 2022, nor on Measure U since its approval in November 2022.
F25-14:
The website for the City of Oakland’s I-Bond Oversight Committee lacks complete information including most committee reports, and not all agendas, minutes, or recordings.
F25-15:
The City of Oakland’s I-Bond Oversight Committee failed to conduct a self-evaluation, as required by its bylaws.
F25-16:
The City of Oakland has failed to ensure that the I-Bond Oversight Committee has been fulfilling its duties, including meeting regularly, reporting as needed, and conducting self- evaluations as required.
Findings & Recommendations
16 findings
F25-1:
Potholes and other street pavement failures have been a prevalent problem in the City of Oakland for many years.
F25-2:
The City of Oakland needed to repair over 53,000 potholes or similar pavement failures in the most recent 2023-2024 Fiscal Year.
F25-3:
Historically, liability claims and lawsuits from potholes and pavement failure have cost the City of Oakland millions of dollars.
F25-4:
Complete repaving of streets costs the City of Oakland approximately $1 million per mile.
F25-5:
The City of Oakland has not met its goals for significant repaving under its 2022 Five-Year Paving Plan, with no foreseeable date for completion.
F25-6:
Without money from the sale of authorized Measure U bonds, the City of Oakland will not be able to undertake significant additional street repaving.
F25-7:
High employee vacancy rates and the delays in approval of hiring slowed the City of Oakland’s in-house street repaving and repairs.
F25-8:
The City of Oakland’s Local Business Enterprise and Small Local Business Enterprise programs limit the competition for Oakland’s Department of Transportation contracts for paving and street work, causing Oakland to not receive multiple bids, which could result in lower costs.
F25-9:
The City of Oakland’s Department of Transportation lacks adequate control over change orders on paving and street projects, including failure to first identify approved funding.
F25-10:
The City of Oakland has not conducted any audits under Measure KK or Measure U, as required by the measures. 37 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
F25-11:
The City of Oakland’s I-Bond Oversight Committee has not met regularly since at least December 2022, as required.
F25-12:
The City of Oakland (Mayor) has failed to fill the current vacancies on the I-Bond Oversight Committee.
F25-13:
The I-Bond Oversight Committee has not provided regular or annual reports on Measure KK to the Oakland City Council since September 2022, nor on Measure U since its approval in November 2022.
F25-14:
The website for the City of Oakland’s I-Bond Oversight Committee lacks complete information including most committee reports, and not all agendas, minutes, or recordings.
F25-15:
The City of Oakland’s I-Bond Oversight Committee failed to conduct a self-evaluation, as required by its bylaws.
F25-16:
The City of Oakland has failed to ensure that the I-Bond Oversight Committee has been fulfilling its duties, including meeting regularly, reporting as needed, and conducting self- evaluations as required.
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Full Details →
Findings & Recommendations
7 findings
F25-33:
The Oakland Fire Department has met its goal of conducting annual wildfire inspections of virtually all private properties in the Oakland Hills area designated as the Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone.
F25-34:
The Oakland Fire Department’s annual wildfire prevention inspections of private properties in the Oakland Hills finds a high level of compliance on the part of property owners. 73 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
F25-35:
For city-owned properties, the Oakland City Council does not presently allocate sufficient resources for vegetation management to remove or mitigate fire risks.
F25-36:
At the time of this report, the Oakland City Council has not yet developed an implementation plan for Measure MM, although the measure becomes effective on July 1, 2025.
F25-37:
Oakland’s Department of Transportation lacks adequate enforcement of parking restrictions in the Oakland Hills which hinders the ability of emergency services to navigate narrow streets to ensure a timely response to emergencies.
F25-38:
The Oakland City Council has not done an adequate job of educating Oakland Hills residents about emergency evacuation routes.
F25-39:
Public education about evacuation routes, and availability of emergency warning systems (such as AC Alert), are critical to improving public safety in Oakland, especially in areas with high wildfire risk.
Additional Recommendations
1
Not linked to specific findings.
R7:
called for the city council to determine if parking in the Oakland Hills that obstructed road access was an enforcement priority, and if so, whether an enforcement program (with community input) should be implemented. Car Illegally Parked in the Oakland Hills 69 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ In December 2015, a follow-up audit found that the city had taken insufficient action. It concluded: The large number of resident and visitor vehicles in the Oakland hills creates unsafe congestion and, at times, possibly illegal parking situations including parking on streets too narrow to accommodate an emergency vehicle and parking in red “no parking” zones. Parking infractions are not regularly cited by Parking Enforcement which, according to the Fire Department, has indicated that the Oakland hills neighborhoods are not a priority parking enforcement area. Despite that strong recommendation, the city auditor again found in November 2017 that the illegally parked vehicles blocking Oakland hills roads was still a problem. That report, entitled, “Second Follow-up: Oakland Fire Department Vegetation Inspection Audit” specifically noted: OFD or Parking Enforcement [the predecessor to the Oakland Department of Transportation] must find a workable solution for the parking problem in the Oakland hills … Narrow roadways that quickly became blocked during the evacuation [in the 1991 Oakland-Berkeley Tunnel Hills Fire] contributed to the tragedy, as these streets were, for many residents, the only exit routes out of the area. Oakland still has not made sufficient progress in finding a “workable solution.” Although Oakland’s 2023-2024 Local Hazard Mitigation Plan Report touted “enhanced coordination with Department of Transportation and Oakland Police to enforce parking restrictions on Red Flag Days,” nearly every witness the Grand Jury interviewed questioned the adequacy of this enforcement. Another current concern is efforts to increase housing density in high fire risk areas, which would exacerbate the problem. The Grand Jury learned from the Parking and Mobility Unit in Oakland’s Department of Transportation (OakDOT) that it had arranged for the installation of additional “No Parking” signs in the hills in 2017, in response to an initiative of the Oakland Wildfire Prevention Working Group. Still, Oakland does not have any areas that are designated as “No Parking on Red Flag Days,” as do some municipalities. Consequently, there is no signage to limit parking and create additional access on those days. OakDOT’s parking control technicians (who are responsible for issuing tickets to illegally parked cars), conduct limited patrols in the Oakland Hills, although not with the same regularity as they patrol commercial zones (including areas with parking meters) or areas with street sweeping restrictions. The Grand Jury heard conflicting information about the level of parking enforcement in the Oakland Hills. While OakDOT may conduct enforcement and dispatches additional parking control technicians on days designated as Red Flag Days, it is evident that the current level of enforcement overall is insufficient. 70 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Oakland should increase the “no parking” zones in the hills, particularly on narrow streets or streets with curves that may be more difficult to navigate for large emergency vehicles. Indeed, the National Fire Safety Association states that road access for fire equipment should have a minimum unobstructed width of not less than 20 feet. To follow that guidance, parking in the Oakland Hills likely would have to be limited to one side on many narrow streets. Oakland also should add “no parking” zone in certain areas, so that those restrictions apply on Red Flag days – a solution used in other high fire risk areas in California. The Grand Jury recognizes that there likely would be costs involved in purchasing and placing new signage, as well as implementing increased enforcement to ensure evacuation routes are available and safe. We note these parking management solutions for consideration by the city. The Grand Jury did not investigate the amount of possible increased costs. To the extent that citations for parking violations bring in revenue, the cost of enforcement may be covered in part by collection of parking fines. Measure MM requires actions to provide “well-maintained, accessible” evacuation routes and to provide education. Although Measure MM implementation plans remain pending, the Grand Jury encourages the city to focus on safe evacuation planning with some urgency. This planning should include increased parking enforcement; public outreach and education so that residents will be aware of their evacuation zones and evacuation routes; and regular updates on coordination among Oakland departments and between Oakland and neighboring fire prevention agencies (including funds necessary for interagency training). Coordination With Other Agencies Because fires do not respect city boundaries, and problems with coordination were identified as an issue in the Tunnel Fire, the Grand Jury reviewed the current state of interdepartmental and interagency coordination. Since the Tunnel Fire, coordination has improved, including increased use of the same types of communication systems and equipment, as well as joint training on procedures to allow fire departments to work together when necessary. Oakland and nearby agencies also improved coordination through several multi-jurisdictional organizations. The Hills Emergency Forum was created after the Tunnel Fire and now includes the following partners: Oakland, Berkeley, El Cerrito, CAL FIRE, East Bay Regional Parks District, East Bay Municipal Utility District, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, the Moraga-Orinda Fire District, and the University of California, Berkeley. It meets regularly to discuss coordination of evacuation routes, clearing trails, training, and equipment. The forum’s coordination plans include mutual aid arrangements, as necessary to address wildfires (locally and outside the region). It also coordinates work with Civic Corps and community groups that assist local fire departments in clearing fire hazards. Finally, it provides information to members about securing grant funding. 71 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ More recently, Oakland has participated in the new East Bay Wildfire Coalition of Governments. In 2021, the Oakland City Council, recognizing the need for coordination among public entities in the area, adopted a resolution directing the city administrator to participate in discussions about the possible formation of a joint powers authority for fire prevention and management among Easy Bay hills jurisdictions. Ultimately, the participants chose not to pursue a joint powers authority, at least for the present time. Instead, in 2023, they entered into a Memorandum of Understanding to form the East Bay Wildfire Coalition of Governments. The East Bay Wildfire Coalition of Governments, which now meets periodically to receive reports and discuss efforts to mitigate the risk of wildfire in the East Bay hills is comprised of the following members: Alameda and Contra Costa counties, Alameda County Fire Department, Contra Costa Fire Protection District, the Rodeo-Hercules Fire Prevention District, and the cities of Berkeley, Oakland, El Cerrito, and Richmond. In addition, the University of California, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, East Bay Regional Parks District, East Bay Municipal Utility District, and the East Bay Firesafe Councils (representing community members) participate as regional advisors. Separately, one recent example of successful coordination was the response to the Keller Fire in Oakland in October 2024. Before that fire started, the National Weather Service issued Red Flag warnings, including warnings of possible 40-mph winds. Because of the warnings, OFD pre-positioned fire engines and other firefighting apparatus in the hills. The planning included coordination with emergency services across the county. All cities with emergency service engines were “upstaffed,” making extra staff available to respond. As a result, OFD was able to move necessary equipment to the Keller scene immediately. In addition, CAL FIRE sent air resources almost immediately. Over 200 personnel coordinated to evacuate 254 structures. In all, 27 different jurisdictions were on the scene. Because of prior communications and coordinated training, responders were able to work together and prevent the fire from reaching more populous areas, which could have been catastrophic. Their combined efforts limited the Keller Fire to 15 acres, with damage to only two structures and no injuries.
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Findings & Recommendations
7 findings
F25-33:
The Oakland Fire Department has met its goal of conducting annual wildfire inspections of virtually all private properties in the Oakland Hills area designated as the Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone.
F25-34:
The Oakland Fire Department’s annual wildfire prevention inspections of private properties in the Oakland Hills finds a high level of compliance on the part of property owners. 73 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
F25-35:
For city-owned properties, the Oakland City Council does not presently allocate sufficient resources for vegetation management to remove or mitigate fire risks.
F25-36:
At the time of this report, the Oakland City Council has not yet developed an implementation plan for Measure MM, although the measure becomes effective on July 1, 2025.
F25-37:
Oakland’s Department of Transportation lacks adequate enforcement of parking restrictions in the Oakland Hills which hinders the ability of emergency services to navigate narrow streets to ensure a timely response to emergencies.
F25-38:
The Oakland City Council has not done an adequate job of educating Oakland Hills residents about emergency evacuation routes.
F25-39:
Public education about evacuation routes, and availability of emergency warning systems (such as AC Alert), are critical to improving public safety in Oakland, especially in areas with high wildfire risk.
Additional Recommendations
1
Not linked to specific findings.
R7:
called for the city council to determine if parking in the Oakland Hills that obstructed road access was an enforcement priority, and if so, whether an enforcement program (with community input) should be implemented. Car Illegally Parked in the Oakland Hills 69 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ In December 2015, a follow-up audit found that the city had taken insufficient action. It concluded: The large number of resident and visitor vehicles in the Oakland hills creates unsafe congestion and, at times, possibly illegal parking situations including parking on streets too narrow to accommodate an emergency vehicle and parking in red “no parking” zones. Parking infractions are not regularly cited by Parking Enforcement which, according to the Fire Department, has indicated that the Oakland hills neighborhoods are not a priority parking enforcement area. Despite that strong recommendation, the city auditor again found in November 2017 that the illegally parked vehicles blocking Oakland hills roads was still a problem. That report, entitled, “Second Follow-up: Oakland Fire Department Vegetation Inspection Audit” specifically noted: OFD or Parking Enforcement [the predecessor to the Oakland Department of Transportation] must find a workable solution for the parking problem in the Oakland hills … Narrow roadways that quickly became blocked during the evacuation [in the 1991 Oakland-Berkeley Tunnel Hills Fire] contributed to the tragedy, as these streets were, for many residents, the only exit routes out of the area. Oakland still has not made sufficient progress in finding a “workable solution.” Although Oakland’s 2023-2024 Local Hazard Mitigation Plan Report touted “enhanced coordination with Department of Transportation and Oakland Police to enforce parking restrictions on Red Flag Days,” nearly every witness the Grand Jury interviewed questioned the adequacy of this enforcement. Another current concern is efforts to increase housing density in high fire risk areas, which would exacerbate the problem. The Grand Jury learned from the Parking and Mobility Unit in Oakland’s Department of Transportation (OakDOT) that it had arranged for the installation of additional “No Parking” signs in the hills in 2017, in response to an initiative of the Oakland Wildfire Prevention Working Group. Still, Oakland does not have any areas that are designated as “No Parking on Red Flag Days,” as do some municipalities. Consequently, there is no signage to limit parking and create additional access on those days. OakDOT’s parking control technicians (who are responsible for issuing tickets to illegally parked cars), conduct limited patrols in the Oakland Hills, although not with the same regularity as they patrol commercial zones (including areas with parking meters) or areas with street sweeping restrictions. The Grand Jury heard conflicting information about the level of parking enforcement in the Oakland Hills. While OakDOT may conduct enforcement and dispatches additional parking control technicians on days designated as Red Flag Days, it is evident that the current level of enforcement overall is insufficient. 70 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Oakland should increase the “no parking” zones in the hills, particularly on narrow streets or streets with curves that may be more difficult to navigate for large emergency vehicles. Indeed, the National Fire Safety Association states that road access for fire equipment should have a minimum unobstructed width of not less than 20 feet. To follow that guidance, parking in the Oakland Hills likely would have to be limited to one side on many narrow streets. Oakland also should add “no parking” zone in certain areas, so that those restrictions apply on Red Flag days – a solution used in other high fire risk areas in California. The Grand Jury recognizes that there likely would be costs involved in purchasing and placing new signage, as well as implementing increased enforcement to ensure evacuation routes are available and safe. We note these parking management solutions for consideration by the city. The Grand Jury did not investigate the amount of possible increased costs. To the extent that citations for parking violations bring in revenue, the cost of enforcement may be covered in part by collection of parking fines. Measure MM requires actions to provide “well-maintained, accessible” evacuation routes and to provide education. Although Measure MM implementation plans remain pending, the Grand Jury encourages the city to focus on safe evacuation planning with some urgency. This planning should include increased parking enforcement; public outreach and education so that residents will be aware of their evacuation zones and evacuation routes; and regular updates on coordination among Oakland departments and between Oakland and neighboring fire prevention agencies (including funds necessary for interagency training). Coordination With Other Agencies Because fires do not respect city boundaries, and problems with coordination were identified as an issue in the Tunnel Fire, the Grand Jury reviewed the current state of interdepartmental and interagency coordination. Since the Tunnel Fire, coordination has improved, including increased use of the same types of communication systems and equipment, as well as joint training on procedures to allow fire departments to work together when necessary. Oakland and nearby agencies also improved coordination through several multi-jurisdictional organizations. The Hills Emergency Forum was created after the Tunnel Fire and now includes the following partners: Oakland, Berkeley, El Cerrito, CAL FIRE, East Bay Regional Parks District, East Bay Municipal Utility District, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, the Moraga-Orinda Fire District, and the University of California, Berkeley. It meets regularly to discuss coordination of evacuation routes, clearing trails, training, and equipment. The forum’s coordination plans include mutual aid arrangements, as necessary to address wildfires (locally and outside the region). It also coordinates work with Civic Corps and community groups that assist local fire departments in clearing fire hazards. Finally, it provides information to members about securing grant funding. 71 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ More recently, Oakland has participated in the new East Bay Wildfire Coalition of Governments. In 2021, the Oakland City Council, recognizing the need for coordination among public entities in the area, adopted a resolution directing the city administrator to participate in discussions about the possible formation of a joint powers authority for fire prevention and management among Easy Bay hills jurisdictions. Ultimately, the participants chose not to pursue a joint powers authority, at least for the present time. Instead, in 2023, they entered into a Memorandum of Understanding to form the East Bay Wildfire Coalition of Governments. The East Bay Wildfire Coalition of Governments, which now meets periodically to receive reports and discuss efforts to mitigate the risk of wildfire in the East Bay hills is comprised of the following members: Alameda and Contra Costa counties, Alameda County Fire Department, Contra Costa Fire Protection District, the Rodeo-Hercules Fire Prevention District, and the cities of Berkeley, Oakland, El Cerrito, and Richmond. In addition, the University of California, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, East Bay Regional Parks District, East Bay Municipal Utility District, and the East Bay Firesafe Councils (representing community members) participate as regional advisors. Separately, one recent example of successful coordination was the response to the Keller Fire in Oakland in October 2024. Before that fire started, the National Weather Service issued Red Flag warnings, including warnings of possible 40-mph winds. Because of the warnings, OFD pre-positioned fire engines and other firefighting apparatus in the hills. The planning included coordination with emergency services across the county. All cities with emergency service engines were “upstaffed,” making extra staff available to respond. As a result, OFD was able to move necessary equipment to the Keller scene immediately. In addition, CAL FIRE sent air resources almost immediately. Over 200 personnel coordinated to evacuate 254 structures. In all, 27 different jurisdictions were on the scene. Because of prior communications and coordinated training, responders were able to work together and prevent the fire from reaching more populous areas, which could have been catastrophic. Their combined efforts limited the Keller Fire to 15 acres, with damage to only two structures and no injuries.
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Full Details →
Findings & Recommendations
7 findings
F25-33:
The Oakland Fire Department has met its goal of conducting annual wildfire inspections of virtually all private properties in the Oakland Hills area designated as the Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone.
F25-34:
The Oakland Fire Department’s annual wildfire prevention inspections of private properties in the Oakland Hills finds a high level of compliance on the part of property owners. 73 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
F25-35:
For city-owned properties, the Oakland City Council does not presently allocate sufficient resources for vegetation management to remove or mitigate fire risks.
F25-36:
At the time of this report, the Oakland City Council has not yet developed an implementation plan for Measure MM, although the measure becomes effective on July 1, 2025.
F25-37:
Oakland’s Department of Transportation lacks adequate enforcement of parking restrictions in the Oakland Hills which hinders the ability of emergency services to navigate narrow streets to ensure a timely response to emergencies.
F25-38:
The Oakland City Council has not done an adequate job of educating Oakland Hills residents about emergency evacuation routes.
F25-39:
Public education about evacuation routes, and availability of emergency warning systems (such as AC Alert), are critical to improving public safety in Oakland, especially in areas with high wildfire risk.
Additional Recommendations
1
Not linked to specific findings.
R7:
called for the city council to determine if parking in the Oakland Hills that obstructed road access was an enforcement priority, and if so, whether an enforcement program (with community input) should be implemented. Car Illegally Parked in the Oakland Hills 69 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ In December 2015, a follow-up audit found that the city had taken insufficient action. It concluded: The large number of resident and visitor vehicles in the Oakland hills creates unsafe congestion and, at times, possibly illegal parking situations including parking on streets too narrow to accommodate an emergency vehicle and parking in red “no parking” zones. Parking infractions are not regularly cited by Parking Enforcement which, according to the Fire Department, has indicated that the Oakland hills neighborhoods are not a priority parking enforcement area. Despite that strong recommendation, the city auditor again found in November 2017 that the illegally parked vehicles blocking Oakland hills roads was still a problem. That report, entitled, “Second Follow-up: Oakland Fire Department Vegetation Inspection Audit” specifically noted: OFD or Parking Enforcement [the predecessor to the Oakland Department of Transportation] must find a workable solution for the parking problem in the Oakland hills … Narrow roadways that quickly became blocked during the evacuation [in the 1991 Oakland-Berkeley Tunnel Hills Fire] contributed to the tragedy, as these streets were, for many residents, the only exit routes out of the area. Oakland still has not made sufficient progress in finding a “workable solution.” Although Oakland’s 2023-2024 Local Hazard Mitigation Plan Report touted “enhanced coordination with Department of Transportation and Oakland Police to enforce parking restrictions on Red Flag Days,” nearly every witness the Grand Jury interviewed questioned the adequacy of this enforcement. Another current concern is efforts to increase housing density in high fire risk areas, which would exacerbate the problem. The Grand Jury learned from the Parking and Mobility Unit in Oakland’s Department of Transportation (OakDOT) that it had arranged for the installation of additional “No Parking” signs in the hills in 2017, in response to an initiative of the Oakland Wildfire Prevention Working Group. Still, Oakland does not have any areas that are designated as “No Parking on Red Flag Days,” as do some municipalities. Consequently, there is no signage to limit parking and create additional access on those days. OakDOT’s parking control technicians (who are responsible for issuing tickets to illegally parked cars), conduct limited patrols in the Oakland Hills, although not with the same regularity as they patrol commercial zones (including areas with parking meters) or areas with street sweeping restrictions. The Grand Jury heard conflicting information about the level of parking enforcement in the Oakland Hills. While OakDOT may conduct enforcement and dispatches additional parking control technicians on days designated as Red Flag Days, it is evident that the current level of enforcement overall is insufficient. 70 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Oakland should increase the “no parking” zones in the hills, particularly on narrow streets or streets with curves that may be more difficult to navigate for large emergency vehicles. Indeed, the National Fire Safety Association states that road access for fire equipment should have a minimum unobstructed width of not less than 20 feet. To follow that guidance, parking in the Oakland Hills likely would have to be limited to one side on many narrow streets. Oakland also should add “no parking” zone in certain areas, so that those restrictions apply on Red Flag days – a solution used in other high fire risk areas in California. The Grand Jury recognizes that there likely would be costs involved in purchasing and placing new signage, as well as implementing increased enforcement to ensure evacuation routes are available and safe. We note these parking management solutions for consideration by the city. The Grand Jury did not investigate the amount of possible increased costs. To the extent that citations for parking violations bring in revenue, the cost of enforcement may be covered in part by collection of parking fines. Measure MM requires actions to provide “well-maintained, accessible” evacuation routes and to provide education. Although Measure MM implementation plans remain pending, the Grand Jury encourages the city to focus on safe evacuation planning with some urgency. This planning should include increased parking enforcement; public outreach and education so that residents will be aware of their evacuation zones and evacuation routes; and regular updates on coordination among Oakland departments and between Oakland and neighboring fire prevention agencies (including funds necessary for interagency training). Coordination With Other Agencies Because fires do not respect city boundaries, and problems with coordination were identified as an issue in the Tunnel Fire, the Grand Jury reviewed the current state of interdepartmental and interagency coordination. Since the Tunnel Fire, coordination has improved, including increased use of the same types of communication systems and equipment, as well as joint training on procedures to allow fire departments to work together when necessary. Oakland and nearby agencies also improved coordination through several multi-jurisdictional organizations. The Hills Emergency Forum was created after the Tunnel Fire and now includes the following partners: Oakland, Berkeley, El Cerrito, CAL FIRE, East Bay Regional Parks District, East Bay Municipal Utility District, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, the Moraga-Orinda Fire District, and the University of California, Berkeley. It meets regularly to discuss coordination of evacuation routes, clearing trails, training, and equipment. The forum’s coordination plans include mutual aid arrangements, as necessary to address wildfires (locally and outside the region). It also coordinates work with Civic Corps and community groups that assist local fire departments in clearing fire hazards. Finally, it provides information to members about securing grant funding. 71 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ More recently, Oakland has participated in the new East Bay Wildfire Coalition of Governments. In 2021, the Oakland City Council, recognizing the need for coordination among public entities in the area, adopted a resolution directing the city administrator to participate in discussions about the possible formation of a joint powers authority for fire prevention and management among Easy Bay hills jurisdictions. Ultimately, the participants chose not to pursue a joint powers authority, at least for the present time. Instead, in 2023, they entered into a Memorandum of Understanding to form the East Bay Wildfire Coalition of Governments. The East Bay Wildfire Coalition of Governments, which now meets periodically to receive reports and discuss efforts to mitigate the risk of wildfire in the East Bay hills is comprised of the following members: Alameda and Contra Costa counties, Alameda County Fire Department, Contra Costa Fire Protection District, the Rodeo-Hercules Fire Prevention District, and the cities of Berkeley, Oakland, El Cerrito, and Richmond. In addition, the University of California, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, East Bay Regional Parks District, East Bay Municipal Utility District, and the East Bay Firesafe Councils (representing community members) participate as regional advisors. Separately, one recent example of successful coordination was the response to the Keller Fire in Oakland in October 2024. Before that fire started, the National Weather Service issued Red Flag warnings, including warnings of possible 40-mph winds. Because of the warnings, OFD pre-positioned fire engines and other firefighting apparatus in the hills. The planning included coordination with emergency services across the county. All cities with emergency service engines were “upstaffed,” making extra staff available to respond. As a result, OFD was able to move necessary equipment to the Keller scene immediately. In addition, CAL FIRE sent air resources almost immediately. Over 200 personnel coordinated to evacuate 254 structures. In all, 27 different jurisdictions were on the scene. Because of prior communications and coordinated training, responders were able to work together and prevent the fire from reaching more populous areas, which could have been catastrophic. Their combined efforts limited the Keller Fire to 15 acres, with damage to only two structures and no injuries.
Quick View
Full Details →
Findings & Recommendations
7 findings
F25-33:
The Oakland Fire Department has met its goal of conducting annual wildfire inspections of virtually all private properties in the Oakland Hills area designated as the Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone.
F25-34:
The Oakland Fire Department’s annual wildfire prevention inspections of private properties in the Oakland Hills finds a high level of compliance on the part of property owners. 73 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
F25-35:
For city-owned properties, the Oakland City Council does not presently allocate sufficient resources for vegetation management to remove or mitigate fire risks.
F25-36:
At the time of this report, the Oakland City Council has not yet developed an implementation plan for Measure MM, although the measure becomes effective on July 1, 2025.
F25-37:
Oakland’s Department of Transportation lacks adequate enforcement of parking restrictions in the Oakland Hills which hinders the ability of emergency services to navigate narrow streets to ensure a timely response to emergencies.
F25-38:
The Oakland City Council has not done an adequate job of educating Oakland Hills residents about emergency evacuation routes.
F25-39:
Public education about evacuation routes, and availability of emergency warning systems (such as AC Alert), are critical to improving public safety in Oakland, especially in areas with high wildfire risk.
Additional Recommendations
1
Not linked to specific findings.
R7:
called for the city council to determine if parking in the Oakland Hills that obstructed road access was an enforcement priority, and if so, whether an enforcement program (with community input) should be implemented. Car Illegally Parked in the Oakland Hills 69 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ In December 2015, a follow-up audit found that the city had taken insufficient action. It concluded: The large number of resident and visitor vehicles in the Oakland hills creates unsafe congestion and, at times, possibly illegal parking situations including parking on streets too narrow to accommodate an emergency vehicle and parking in red “no parking” zones. Parking infractions are not regularly cited by Parking Enforcement which, according to the Fire Department, has indicated that the Oakland hills neighborhoods are not a priority parking enforcement area. Despite that strong recommendation, the city auditor again found in November 2017 that the illegally parked vehicles blocking Oakland hills roads was still a problem. That report, entitled, “Second Follow-up: Oakland Fire Department Vegetation Inspection Audit” specifically noted: OFD or Parking Enforcement [the predecessor to the Oakland Department of Transportation] must find a workable solution for the parking problem in the Oakland hills … Narrow roadways that quickly became blocked during the evacuation [in the 1991 Oakland-Berkeley Tunnel Hills Fire] contributed to the tragedy, as these streets were, for many residents, the only exit routes out of the area. Oakland still has not made sufficient progress in finding a “workable solution.” Although Oakland’s 2023-2024 Local Hazard Mitigation Plan Report touted “enhanced coordination with Department of Transportation and Oakland Police to enforce parking restrictions on Red Flag Days,” nearly every witness the Grand Jury interviewed questioned the adequacy of this enforcement. Another current concern is efforts to increase housing density in high fire risk areas, which would exacerbate the problem. The Grand Jury learned from the Parking and Mobility Unit in Oakland’s Department of Transportation (OakDOT) that it had arranged for the installation of additional “No Parking” signs in the hills in 2017, in response to an initiative of the Oakland Wildfire Prevention Working Group. Still, Oakland does not have any areas that are designated as “No Parking on Red Flag Days,” as do some municipalities. Consequently, there is no signage to limit parking and create additional access on those days. OakDOT’s parking control technicians (who are responsible for issuing tickets to illegally parked cars), conduct limited patrols in the Oakland Hills, although not with the same regularity as they patrol commercial zones (including areas with parking meters) or areas with street sweeping restrictions. The Grand Jury heard conflicting information about the level of parking enforcement in the Oakland Hills. While OakDOT may conduct enforcement and dispatches additional parking control technicians on days designated as Red Flag Days, it is evident that the current level of enforcement overall is insufficient. 70 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Oakland should increase the “no parking” zones in the hills, particularly on narrow streets or streets with curves that may be more difficult to navigate for large emergency vehicles. Indeed, the National Fire Safety Association states that road access for fire equipment should have a minimum unobstructed width of not less than 20 feet. To follow that guidance, parking in the Oakland Hills likely would have to be limited to one side on many narrow streets. Oakland also should add “no parking” zone in certain areas, so that those restrictions apply on Red Flag days – a solution used in other high fire risk areas in California. The Grand Jury recognizes that there likely would be costs involved in purchasing and placing new signage, as well as implementing increased enforcement to ensure evacuation routes are available and safe. We note these parking management solutions for consideration by the city. The Grand Jury did not investigate the amount of possible increased costs. To the extent that citations for parking violations bring in revenue, the cost of enforcement may be covered in part by collection of parking fines. Measure MM requires actions to provide “well-maintained, accessible” evacuation routes and to provide education. Although Measure MM implementation plans remain pending, the Grand Jury encourages the city to focus on safe evacuation planning with some urgency. This planning should include increased parking enforcement; public outreach and education so that residents will be aware of their evacuation zones and evacuation routes; and regular updates on coordination among Oakland departments and between Oakland and neighboring fire prevention agencies (including funds necessary for interagency training). Coordination With Other Agencies Because fires do not respect city boundaries, and problems with coordination were identified as an issue in the Tunnel Fire, the Grand Jury reviewed the current state of interdepartmental and interagency coordination. Since the Tunnel Fire, coordination has improved, including increased use of the same types of communication systems and equipment, as well as joint training on procedures to allow fire departments to work together when necessary. Oakland and nearby agencies also improved coordination through several multi-jurisdictional organizations. The Hills Emergency Forum was created after the Tunnel Fire and now includes the following partners: Oakland, Berkeley, El Cerrito, CAL FIRE, East Bay Regional Parks District, East Bay Municipal Utility District, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, the Moraga-Orinda Fire District, and the University of California, Berkeley. It meets regularly to discuss coordination of evacuation routes, clearing trails, training, and equipment. The forum’s coordination plans include mutual aid arrangements, as necessary to address wildfires (locally and outside the region). It also coordinates work with Civic Corps and community groups that assist local fire departments in clearing fire hazards. Finally, it provides information to members about securing grant funding. 71 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ More recently, Oakland has participated in the new East Bay Wildfire Coalition of Governments. In 2021, the Oakland City Council, recognizing the need for coordination among public entities in the area, adopted a resolution directing the city administrator to participate in discussions about the possible formation of a joint powers authority for fire prevention and management among Easy Bay hills jurisdictions. Ultimately, the participants chose not to pursue a joint powers authority, at least for the present time. Instead, in 2023, they entered into a Memorandum of Understanding to form the East Bay Wildfire Coalition of Governments. The East Bay Wildfire Coalition of Governments, which now meets periodically to receive reports and discuss efforts to mitigate the risk of wildfire in the East Bay hills is comprised of the following members: Alameda and Contra Costa counties, Alameda County Fire Department, Contra Costa Fire Protection District, the Rodeo-Hercules Fire Prevention District, and the cities of Berkeley, Oakland, El Cerrito, and Richmond. In addition, the University of California, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, East Bay Regional Parks District, East Bay Municipal Utility District, and the East Bay Firesafe Councils (representing community members) participate as regional advisors. Separately, one recent example of successful coordination was the response to the Keller Fire in Oakland in October 2024. Before that fire started, the National Weather Service issued Red Flag warnings, including warnings of possible 40-mph winds. Because of the warnings, OFD pre-positioned fire engines and other firefighting apparatus in the hills. The planning included coordination with emergency services across the county. All cities with emergency service engines were “upstaffed,” making extra staff available to respond. As a result, OFD was able to move necessary equipment to the Keller scene immediately. In addition, CAL FIRE sent air resources almost immediately. Over 200 personnel coordinated to evacuate 254 structures. In all, 27 different jurisdictions were on the scene. Because of prior communications and coordinated training, responders were able to work together and prevent the fire from reaching more populous areas, which could have been catastrophic. Their combined efforts limited the Keller Fire to 15 acres, with damage to only two structures and no injuries.
Quick View
Full Details →
Findings & Recommendations
7 findings
F25-33:
The Oakland Fire Department has met its goal of conducting annual wildfire inspections of virtually all private properties in the Oakland Hills area designated as the Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone.
F25-34:
The Oakland Fire Department’s annual wildfire prevention inspections of private properties in the Oakland Hills finds a high level of compliance on the part of property owners. 73 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
F25-35:
For city-owned properties, the Oakland City Council does not presently allocate sufficient resources for vegetation management to remove or mitigate fire risks.
F25-36:
At the time of this report, the Oakland City Council has not yet developed an implementation plan for Measure MM, although the measure becomes effective on July 1, 2025.
F25-37:
Oakland’s Department of Transportation lacks adequate enforcement of parking restrictions in the Oakland Hills which hinders the ability of emergency services to navigate narrow streets to ensure a timely response to emergencies.
F25-38:
The Oakland City Council has not done an adequate job of educating Oakland Hills residents about emergency evacuation routes.
F25-39:
Public education about evacuation routes, and availability of emergency warning systems (such as AC Alert), are critical to improving public safety in Oakland, especially in areas with high wildfire risk.
Additional Recommendations
1
Not linked to specific findings.
R7:
called for the city council to determine if parking in the Oakland Hills that obstructed road access was an enforcement priority, and if so, whether an enforcement program (with community input) should be implemented. Car Illegally Parked in the Oakland Hills 69 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ In December 2015, a follow-up audit found that the city had taken insufficient action. It concluded: The large number of resident and visitor vehicles in the Oakland hills creates unsafe congestion and, at times, possibly illegal parking situations including parking on streets too narrow to accommodate an emergency vehicle and parking in red “no parking” zones. Parking infractions are not regularly cited by Parking Enforcement which, according to the Fire Department, has indicated that the Oakland hills neighborhoods are not a priority parking enforcement area. Despite that strong recommendation, the city auditor again found in November 2017 that the illegally parked vehicles blocking Oakland hills roads was still a problem. That report, entitled, “Second Follow-up: Oakland Fire Department Vegetation Inspection Audit” specifically noted: OFD or Parking Enforcement [the predecessor to the Oakland Department of Transportation] must find a workable solution for the parking problem in the Oakland hills … Narrow roadways that quickly became blocked during the evacuation [in the 1991 Oakland-Berkeley Tunnel Hills Fire] contributed to the tragedy, as these streets were, for many residents, the only exit routes out of the area. Oakland still has not made sufficient progress in finding a “workable solution.” Although Oakland’s 2023-2024 Local Hazard Mitigation Plan Report touted “enhanced coordination with Department of Transportation and Oakland Police to enforce parking restrictions on Red Flag Days,” nearly every witness the Grand Jury interviewed questioned the adequacy of this enforcement. Another current concern is efforts to increase housing density in high fire risk areas, which would exacerbate the problem. The Grand Jury learned from the Parking and Mobility Unit in Oakland’s Department of Transportation (OakDOT) that it had arranged for the installation of additional “No Parking” signs in the hills in 2017, in response to an initiative of the Oakland Wildfire Prevention Working Group. Still, Oakland does not have any areas that are designated as “No Parking on Red Flag Days,” as do some municipalities. Consequently, there is no signage to limit parking and create additional access on those days. OakDOT’s parking control technicians (who are responsible for issuing tickets to illegally parked cars), conduct limited patrols in the Oakland Hills, although not with the same regularity as they patrol commercial zones (including areas with parking meters) or areas with street sweeping restrictions. The Grand Jury heard conflicting information about the level of parking enforcement in the Oakland Hills. While OakDOT may conduct enforcement and dispatches additional parking control technicians on days designated as Red Flag Days, it is evident that the current level of enforcement overall is insufficient. 70 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Oakland should increase the “no parking” zones in the hills, particularly on narrow streets or streets with curves that may be more difficult to navigate for large emergency vehicles. Indeed, the National Fire Safety Association states that road access for fire equipment should have a minimum unobstructed width of not less than 20 feet. To follow that guidance, parking in the Oakland Hills likely would have to be limited to one side on many narrow streets. Oakland also should add “no parking” zone in certain areas, so that those restrictions apply on Red Flag days – a solution used in other high fire risk areas in California. The Grand Jury recognizes that there likely would be costs involved in purchasing and placing new signage, as well as implementing increased enforcement to ensure evacuation routes are available and safe. We note these parking management solutions for consideration by the city. The Grand Jury did not investigate the amount of possible increased costs. To the extent that citations for parking violations bring in revenue, the cost of enforcement may be covered in part by collection of parking fines. Measure MM requires actions to provide “well-maintained, accessible” evacuation routes and to provide education. Although Measure MM implementation plans remain pending, the Grand Jury encourages the city to focus on safe evacuation planning with some urgency. This planning should include increased parking enforcement; public outreach and education so that residents will be aware of their evacuation zones and evacuation routes; and regular updates on coordination among Oakland departments and between Oakland and neighboring fire prevention agencies (including funds necessary for interagency training). Coordination With Other Agencies Because fires do not respect city boundaries, and problems with coordination were identified as an issue in the Tunnel Fire, the Grand Jury reviewed the current state of interdepartmental and interagency coordination. Since the Tunnel Fire, coordination has improved, including increased use of the same types of communication systems and equipment, as well as joint training on procedures to allow fire departments to work together when necessary. Oakland and nearby agencies also improved coordination through several multi-jurisdictional organizations. The Hills Emergency Forum was created after the Tunnel Fire and now includes the following partners: Oakland, Berkeley, El Cerrito, CAL FIRE, East Bay Regional Parks District, East Bay Municipal Utility District, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, the Moraga-Orinda Fire District, and the University of California, Berkeley. It meets regularly to discuss coordination of evacuation routes, clearing trails, training, and equipment. The forum’s coordination plans include mutual aid arrangements, as necessary to address wildfires (locally and outside the region). It also coordinates work with Civic Corps and community groups that assist local fire departments in clearing fire hazards. Finally, it provides information to members about securing grant funding. 71 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ More recently, Oakland has participated in the new East Bay Wildfire Coalition of Governments. In 2021, the Oakland City Council, recognizing the need for coordination among public entities in the area, adopted a resolution directing the city administrator to participate in discussions about the possible formation of a joint powers authority for fire prevention and management among Easy Bay hills jurisdictions. Ultimately, the participants chose not to pursue a joint powers authority, at least for the present time. Instead, in 2023, they entered into a Memorandum of Understanding to form the East Bay Wildfire Coalition of Governments. The East Bay Wildfire Coalition of Governments, which now meets periodically to receive reports and discuss efforts to mitigate the risk of wildfire in the East Bay hills is comprised of the following members: Alameda and Contra Costa counties, Alameda County Fire Department, Contra Costa Fire Protection District, the Rodeo-Hercules Fire Prevention District, and the cities of Berkeley, Oakland, El Cerrito, and Richmond. In addition, the University of California, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, East Bay Regional Parks District, East Bay Municipal Utility District, and the East Bay Firesafe Councils (representing community members) participate as regional advisors. Separately, one recent example of successful coordination was the response to the Keller Fire in Oakland in October 2024. Before that fire started, the National Weather Service issued Red Flag warnings, including warnings of possible 40-mph winds. Because of the warnings, OFD pre-positioned fire engines and other firefighting apparatus in the hills. The planning included coordination with emergency services across the county. All cities with emergency service engines were “upstaffed,” making extra staff available to respond. As a result, OFD was able to move necessary equipment to the Keller scene immediately. In addition, CAL FIRE sent air resources almost immediately. Over 200 personnel coordinated to evacuate 254 structures. In all, 27 different jurisdictions were on the scene. Because of prior communications and coordinated training, responders were able to work together and prevent the fire from reaching more populous areas, which could have been catastrophic. Their combined efforts limited the Keller Fire to 15 acres, with damage to only two structures and no injuries.
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Findings & Recommendations
7 findings
F25-33:
The Oakland Fire Department has met its goal of conducting annual wildfire inspections of virtually all private properties in the Oakland Hills area designated as the Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone.
F25-34:
The Oakland Fire Department’s annual wildfire prevention inspections of private properties in the Oakland Hills finds a high level of compliance on the part of property owners. 73 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
F25-35:
For city-owned properties, the Oakland City Council does not presently allocate sufficient resources for vegetation management to remove or mitigate fire risks.
F25-36:
At the time of this report, the Oakland City Council has not yet developed an implementation plan for Measure MM, although the measure becomes effective on July 1, 2025.
F25-37:
Oakland’s Department of Transportation lacks adequate enforcement of parking restrictions in the Oakland Hills which hinders the ability of emergency services to navigate narrow streets to ensure a timely response to emergencies.
F25-38:
The Oakland City Council has not done an adequate job of educating Oakland Hills residents about emergency evacuation routes.
F25-39:
Public education about evacuation routes, and availability of emergency warning systems (such as AC Alert), are critical to improving public safety in Oakland, especially in areas with high wildfire risk.
Additional Recommendations
1
Not linked to specific findings.
R7:
called for the city council to determine if parking in the Oakland Hills that obstructed road access was an enforcement priority, and if so, whether an enforcement program (with community input) should be implemented. Car Illegally Parked in the Oakland Hills 69 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ In December 2015, a follow-up audit found that the city had taken insufficient action. It concluded: The large number of resident and visitor vehicles in the Oakland hills creates unsafe congestion and, at times, possibly illegal parking situations including parking on streets too narrow to accommodate an emergency vehicle and parking in red “no parking” zones. Parking infractions are not regularly cited by Parking Enforcement which, according to the Fire Department, has indicated that the Oakland hills neighborhoods are not a priority parking enforcement area. Despite that strong recommendation, the city auditor again found in November 2017 that the illegally parked vehicles blocking Oakland hills roads was still a problem. That report, entitled, “Second Follow-up: Oakland Fire Department Vegetation Inspection Audit” specifically noted: OFD or Parking Enforcement [the predecessor to the Oakland Department of Transportation] must find a workable solution for the parking problem in the Oakland hills … Narrow roadways that quickly became blocked during the evacuation [in the 1991 Oakland-Berkeley Tunnel Hills Fire] contributed to the tragedy, as these streets were, for many residents, the only exit routes out of the area. Oakland still has not made sufficient progress in finding a “workable solution.” Although Oakland’s 2023-2024 Local Hazard Mitigation Plan Report touted “enhanced coordination with Department of Transportation and Oakland Police to enforce parking restrictions on Red Flag Days,” nearly every witness the Grand Jury interviewed questioned the adequacy of this enforcement. Another current concern is efforts to increase housing density in high fire risk areas, which would exacerbate the problem. The Grand Jury learned from the Parking and Mobility Unit in Oakland’s Department of Transportation (OakDOT) that it had arranged for the installation of additional “No Parking” signs in the hills in 2017, in response to an initiative of the Oakland Wildfire Prevention Working Group. Still, Oakland does not have any areas that are designated as “No Parking on Red Flag Days,” as do some municipalities. Consequently, there is no signage to limit parking and create additional access on those days. OakDOT’s parking control technicians (who are responsible for issuing tickets to illegally parked cars), conduct limited patrols in the Oakland Hills, although not with the same regularity as they patrol commercial zones (including areas with parking meters) or areas with street sweeping restrictions. The Grand Jury heard conflicting information about the level of parking enforcement in the Oakland Hills. While OakDOT may conduct enforcement and dispatches additional parking control technicians on days designated as Red Flag Days, it is evident that the current level of enforcement overall is insufficient. 70 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Oakland should increase the “no parking” zones in the hills, particularly on narrow streets or streets with curves that may be more difficult to navigate for large emergency vehicles. Indeed, the National Fire Safety Association states that road access for fire equipment should have a minimum unobstructed width of not less than 20 feet. To follow that guidance, parking in the Oakland Hills likely would have to be limited to one side on many narrow streets. Oakland also should add “no parking” zone in certain areas, so that those restrictions apply on Red Flag days – a solution used in other high fire risk areas in California. The Grand Jury recognizes that there likely would be costs involved in purchasing and placing new signage, as well as implementing increased enforcement to ensure evacuation routes are available and safe. We note these parking management solutions for consideration by the city. The Grand Jury did not investigate the amount of possible increased costs. To the extent that citations for parking violations bring in revenue, the cost of enforcement may be covered in part by collection of parking fines. Measure MM requires actions to provide “well-maintained, accessible” evacuation routes and to provide education. Although Measure MM implementation plans remain pending, the Grand Jury encourages the city to focus on safe evacuation planning with some urgency. This planning should include increased parking enforcement; public outreach and education so that residents will be aware of their evacuation zones and evacuation routes; and regular updates on coordination among Oakland departments and between Oakland and neighboring fire prevention agencies (including funds necessary for interagency training). Coordination With Other Agencies Because fires do not respect city boundaries, and problems with coordination were identified as an issue in the Tunnel Fire, the Grand Jury reviewed the current state of interdepartmental and interagency coordination. Since the Tunnel Fire, coordination has improved, including increased use of the same types of communication systems and equipment, as well as joint training on procedures to allow fire departments to work together when necessary. Oakland and nearby agencies also improved coordination through several multi-jurisdictional organizations. The Hills Emergency Forum was created after the Tunnel Fire and now includes the following partners: Oakland, Berkeley, El Cerrito, CAL FIRE, East Bay Regional Parks District, East Bay Municipal Utility District, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, the Moraga-Orinda Fire District, and the University of California, Berkeley. It meets regularly to discuss coordination of evacuation routes, clearing trails, training, and equipment. The forum’s coordination plans include mutual aid arrangements, as necessary to address wildfires (locally and outside the region). It also coordinates work with Civic Corps and community groups that assist local fire departments in clearing fire hazards. Finally, it provides information to members about securing grant funding. 71 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ More recently, Oakland has participated in the new East Bay Wildfire Coalition of Governments. In 2021, the Oakland City Council, recognizing the need for coordination among public entities in the area, adopted a resolution directing the city administrator to participate in discussions about the possible formation of a joint powers authority for fire prevention and management among Easy Bay hills jurisdictions. Ultimately, the participants chose not to pursue a joint powers authority, at least for the present time. Instead, in 2023, they entered into a Memorandum of Understanding to form the East Bay Wildfire Coalition of Governments. The East Bay Wildfire Coalition of Governments, which now meets periodically to receive reports and discuss efforts to mitigate the risk of wildfire in the East Bay hills is comprised of the following members: Alameda and Contra Costa counties, Alameda County Fire Department, Contra Costa Fire Protection District, the Rodeo-Hercules Fire Prevention District, and the cities of Berkeley, Oakland, El Cerrito, and Richmond. In addition, the University of California, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, East Bay Regional Parks District, East Bay Municipal Utility District, and the East Bay Firesafe Councils (representing community members) participate as regional advisors. Separately, one recent example of successful coordination was the response to the Keller Fire in Oakland in October 2024. Before that fire started, the National Weather Service issued Red Flag warnings, including warnings of possible 40-mph winds. Because of the warnings, OFD pre-positioned fire engines and other firefighting apparatus in the hills. The planning included coordination with emergency services across the county. All cities with emergency service engines were “upstaffed,” making extra staff available to respond. As a result, OFD was able to move necessary equipment to the Keller scene immediately. In addition, CAL FIRE sent air resources almost immediately. Over 200 personnel coordinated to evacuate 254 structures. In all, 27 different jurisdictions were on the scene. Because of prior communications and coordinated training, responders were able to work together and prevent the fire from reaching more populous areas, which could have been catastrophic. Their combined efforts limited the Keller Fire to 15 acres, with damage to only two structures and no injuries.
Findings & Recommendations
13 findings
F25-40:
The Logic and Accuracy Test of the Alameda County Registrar of Voters voting system tested only one of over a dozen ballot scanners used in the election.
F25-41:
During Logic and Accuracy testing, sample ballots were pre-marked by the Registrar of Voters and observers were not permitted to examine the pre-marked ballots at any time to confirm they matched the count from the ballot scanner.
F25-42:
Video observation (online) of the electoral process, including the ballot envelope sorting, signature verification, vote-by-mail processing, and ballot scanning, was without audio or any description to the viewer of what was happening in the video feed. 93 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
F25-43:
During the in-person observation of ballot counting on election night, members of the public were required to be onsite by 8:00 p.m. but were not allowed entry into the Registrar of Voters counting room until after 10 p.m. During this time, ballots were being wheeled into the room while observers were kept waiting in a hallway outside, and online video feed was unavailable.
F25-44:
Once admitted to view ballot counting in person on election night, observers were not allowed to ask any questions.
F25-45:
Notices by the Registrar of Voters to the public of upcoming online observation video feeds of the election processes did not identify the start times or what the processes would be. The notice stated, “An election process will be conducted today. For ongoing updates, check the website where all election processes will be posted.”
F25-46:
During the in-person observation of the 1% manual tally after the election, observers were given no explanation of the hand count process.
F25-47:
During the in-person observation of the 1% manual tally after the election, observers were not allowed to ask questions concerning the process.
F25-48:
In the updates of the vote counts starting on election night, it was stated that “570 of 570 Precincts Reported (100%),” giving the misleading impression that all ballots had been received or counted.
F25-49:
While the Registrar of Voters was reporting live results to the Secretary of State (where the results were posted on the state’s website), not all of these same results were being posted on Alameda County’s local website. The Alameda County website did not include: the cumulative total number of processed ballots, total updated number of processed ballots, vote-by-mail ballots received before and after election day, estimated total ballots remaining, or ballots left to be cured.
F25-50:
As reported by the Secretary of State’s website, Alameda County still had an estimated 187,135 ballots out of 683,644 total ballots cast remaining to be counted 10 days after the election. 94 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
F25-51:
Alameda County’s election results were updated on the website five times on election night but not updated daily after the election.
F25-52:
Delays in the tabulation and reporting of election results by the Registrar of Voters are caused in part by insufficient facilities, lack of equipment, and low staffing during ballot processing and counting.
Findings & Recommendations
13 findings
F25-40:
The Logic and Accuracy Test of the Alameda County Registrar of Voters voting system tested only one of over a dozen ballot scanners used in the election.
F25-41:
During Logic and Accuracy testing, sample ballots were pre-marked by the Registrar of Voters and observers were not permitted to examine the pre-marked ballots at any time to confirm they matched the count from the ballot scanner.
F25-42:
Video observation (online) of the electoral process, including the ballot envelope sorting, signature verification, vote-by-mail processing, and ballot scanning, was without audio or any description to the viewer of what was happening in the video feed. 93 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
F25-43:
During the in-person observation of ballot counting on election night, members of the public were required to be onsite by 8:00 p.m. but were not allowed entry into the Registrar of Voters counting room until after 10 p.m. During this time, ballots were being wheeled into the room while observers were kept waiting in a hallway outside, and online video feed was unavailable.
F25-44:
Once admitted to view ballot counting in person on election night, observers were not allowed to ask any questions.
F25-45:
Notices by the Registrar of Voters to the public of upcoming online observation video feeds of the election processes did not identify the start times or what the processes would be. The notice stated, “An election process will be conducted today. For ongoing updates, check the website where all election processes will be posted.”
F25-46:
During the in-person observation of the 1% manual tally after the election, observers were given no explanation of the hand count process.
F25-47:
During the in-person observation of the 1% manual tally after the election, observers were not allowed to ask questions concerning the process.
F25-48:
In the updates of the vote counts starting on election night, it was stated that “570 of 570 Precincts Reported (100%),” giving the misleading impression that all ballots had been received or counted.
F25-49:
While the Registrar of Voters was reporting live results to the Secretary of State (where the results were posted on the state’s website), not all of these same results were being posted on Alameda County’s local website. The Alameda County website did not include: the cumulative total number of processed ballots, total updated number of processed ballots, vote-by-mail ballots received before and after election day, estimated total ballots remaining, or ballots left to be cured.
F25-50:
As reported by the Secretary of State’s website, Alameda County still had an estimated 187,135 ballots out of 683,644 total ballots cast remaining to be counted 10 days after the election. 94 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
F25-51:
Alameda County’s election results were updated on the website five times on election night but not updated daily after the election.
F25-52:
Delays in the tabulation and reporting of election results by the Registrar of Voters are caused in part by insufficient facilities, lack of equipment, and low staffing during ballot processing and counting.
Findings & Recommendations
13 findings
F25-40:
The Logic and Accuracy Test of the Alameda County Registrar of Voters voting system tested only one of over a dozen ballot scanners used in the election.
F25-41:
During Logic and Accuracy testing, sample ballots were pre-marked by the Registrar of Voters and observers were not permitted to examine the pre-marked ballots at any time to confirm they matched the count from the ballot scanner.
F25-42:
Video observation (online) of the electoral process, including the ballot envelope sorting, signature verification, vote-by-mail processing, and ballot scanning, was without audio or any description to the viewer of what was happening in the video feed. 93 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
F25-43:
During the in-person observation of ballot counting on election night, members of the public were required to be onsite by 8:00 p.m. but were not allowed entry into the Registrar of Voters counting room until after 10 p.m. During this time, ballots were being wheeled into the room while observers were kept waiting in a hallway outside, and online video feed was unavailable.
F25-44:
Once admitted to view ballot counting in person on election night, observers were not allowed to ask any questions.
F25-45:
Notices by the Registrar of Voters to the public of upcoming online observation video feeds of the election processes did not identify the start times or what the processes would be. The notice stated, “An election process will be conducted today. For ongoing updates, check the website where all election processes will be posted.”
F25-46:
During the in-person observation of the 1% manual tally after the election, observers were given no explanation of the hand count process.
F25-47:
During the in-person observation of the 1% manual tally after the election, observers were not allowed to ask questions concerning the process.
F25-48:
In the updates of the vote counts starting on election night, it was stated that “570 of 570 Precincts Reported (100%),” giving the misleading impression that all ballots had been received or counted.
F25-49:
While the Registrar of Voters was reporting live results to the Secretary of State (where the results were posted on the state’s website), not all of these same results were being posted on Alameda County’s local website. The Alameda County website did not include: the cumulative total number of processed ballots, total updated number of processed ballots, vote-by-mail ballots received before and after election day, estimated total ballots remaining, or ballots left to be cured.
F25-50:
As reported by the Secretary of State’s website, Alameda County still had an estimated 187,135 ballots out of 683,644 total ballots cast remaining to be counted 10 days after the election. 94 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
F25-51:
Alameda County’s election results were updated on the website five times on election night but not updated daily after the election.
F25-52:
Delays in the tabulation and reporting of election results by the Registrar of Voters are caused in part by insufficient facilities, lack of equipment, and low staffing during ballot processing and counting.
Findings & Recommendations
13 findings
F25-40:
The Logic and Accuracy Test of the Alameda County Registrar of Voters voting system tested only one of over a dozen ballot scanners used in the election.
F25-41:
During Logic and Accuracy testing, sample ballots were pre-marked by the Registrar of Voters and observers were not permitted to examine the pre-marked ballots at any time to confirm they matched the count from the ballot scanner.
F25-42:
Video observation (online) of the electoral process, including the ballot envelope sorting, signature verification, vote-by-mail processing, and ballot scanning, was without audio or any description to the viewer of what was happening in the video feed. 93 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
F25-43:
During the in-person observation of ballot counting on election night, members of the public were required to be onsite by 8:00 p.m. but were not allowed entry into the Registrar of Voters counting room until after 10 p.m. During this time, ballots were being wheeled into the room while observers were kept waiting in a hallway outside, and online video feed was unavailable.
F25-44:
Once admitted to view ballot counting in person on election night, observers were not allowed to ask any questions.
F25-45:
Notices by the Registrar of Voters to the public of upcoming online observation video feeds of the election processes did not identify the start times or what the processes would be. The notice stated, “An election process will be conducted today. For ongoing updates, check the website where all election processes will be posted.”
F25-46:
During the in-person observation of the 1% manual tally after the election, observers were given no explanation of the hand count process.
F25-47:
During the in-person observation of the 1% manual tally after the election, observers were not allowed to ask questions concerning the process.
F25-48:
In the updates of the vote counts starting on election night, it was stated that “570 of 570 Precincts Reported (100%),” giving the misleading impression that all ballots had been received or counted.
F25-49:
While the Registrar of Voters was reporting live results to the Secretary of State (where the results were posted on the state’s website), not all of these same results were being posted on Alameda County’s local website. The Alameda County website did not include: the cumulative total number of processed ballots, total updated number of processed ballots, vote-by-mail ballots received before and after election day, estimated total ballots remaining, or ballots left to be cured.
F25-50:
As reported by the Secretary of State’s website, Alameda County still had an estimated 187,135 ballots out of 683,644 total ballots cast remaining to be counted 10 days after the election. 94 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
F25-51:
Alameda County’s election results were updated on the website five times on election night but not updated daily after the election.
F25-52:
Delays in the tabulation and reporting of election results by the Registrar of Voters are caused in part by insufficient facilities, lack of equipment, and low staffing during ballot processing and counting.
Findings & Recommendations
13 findings
F25-40:
The Logic and Accuracy Test of the Alameda County Registrar of Voters voting system tested only one of over a dozen ballot scanners used in the election.
F25-41:
During Logic and Accuracy testing, sample ballots were pre-marked by the Registrar of Voters and observers were not permitted to examine the pre-marked ballots at any time to confirm they matched the count from the ballot scanner.
F25-42:
Video observation (online) of the electoral process, including the ballot envelope sorting, signature verification, vote-by-mail processing, and ballot scanning, was without audio or any description to the viewer of what was happening in the video feed. 93 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
F25-43:
During the in-person observation of ballot counting on election night, members of the public were required to be onsite by 8:00 p.m. but were not allowed entry into the Registrar of Voters counting room until after 10 p.m. During this time, ballots were being wheeled into the room while observers were kept waiting in a hallway outside, and online video feed was unavailable.
F25-44:
Once admitted to view ballot counting in person on election night, observers were not allowed to ask any questions.
F25-45:
Notices by the Registrar of Voters to the public of upcoming online observation video feeds of the election processes did not identify the start times or what the processes would be. The notice stated, “An election process will be conducted today. For ongoing updates, check the website where all election processes will be posted.”
F25-46:
During the in-person observation of the 1% manual tally after the election, observers were given no explanation of the hand count process.
F25-47:
During the in-person observation of the 1% manual tally after the election, observers were not allowed to ask questions concerning the process.
F25-48:
In the updates of the vote counts starting on election night, it was stated that “570 of 570 Precincts Reported (100%),” giving the misleading impression that all ballots had been received or counted.
F25-49:
While the Registrar of Voters was reporting live results to the Secretary of State (where the results were posted on the state’s website), not all of these same results were being posted on Alameda County’s local website. The Alameda County website did not include: the cumulative total number of processed ballots, total updated number of processed ballots, vote-by-mail ballots received before and after election day, estimated total ballots remaining, or ballots left to be cured.
F25-50:
As reported by the Secretary of State’s website, Alameda County still had an estimated 187,135 ballots out of 683,644 total ballots cast remaining to be counted 10 days after the election. 94 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
F25-51:
Alameda County’s election results were updated on the website five times on election night but not updated daily after the election.
F25-52:
Delays in the tabulation and reporting of election results by the Registrar of Voters are caused in part by insufficient facilities, lack of equipment, and low staffing during ballot processing and counting.
Findings & Recommendations
13 findings
F25-40:
The Logic and Accuracy Test of the Alameda County Registrar of Voters voting system tested only one of over a dozen ballot scanners used in the election.
F25-41:
During Logic and Accuracy testing, sample ballots were pre-marked by the Registrar of Voters and observers were not permitted to examine the pre-marked ballots at any time to confirm they matched the count from the ballot scanner.
F25-42:
Video observation (online) of the electoral process, including the ballot envelope sorting, signature verification, vote-by-mail processing, and ballot scanning, was without audio or any description to the viewer of what was happening in the video feed. 93 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
F25-43:
During the in-person observation of ballot counting on election night, members of the public were required to be onsite by 8:00 p.m. but were not allowed entry into the Registrar of Voters counting room until after 10 p.m. During this time, ballots were being wheeled into the room while observers were kept waiting in a hallway outside, and online video feed was unavailable.
F25-44:
Once admitted to view ballot counting in person on election night, observers were not allowed to ask any questions.
F25-45:
Notices by the Registrar of Voters to the public of upcoming online observation video feeds of the election processes did not identify the start times or what the processes would be. The notice stated, “An election process will be conducted today. For ongoing updates, check the website where all election processes will be posted.”
F25-46:
During the in-person observation of the 1% manual tally after the election, observers were given no explanation of the hand count process.
F25-47:
During the in-person observation of the 1% manual tally after the election, observers were not allowed to ask questions concerning the process.
F25-48:
In the updates of the vote counts starting on election night, it was stated that “570 of 570 Precincts Reported (100%),” giving the misleading impression that all ballots had been received or counted.
F25-49:
While the Registrar of Voters was reporting live results to the Secretary of State (where the results were posted on the state’s website), not all of these same results were being posted on Alameda County’s local website. The Alameda County website did not include: the cumulative total number of processed ballots, total updated number of processed ballots, vote-by-mail ballots received before and after election day, estimated total ballots remaining, or ballots left to be cured.
F25-50:
As reported by the Secretary of State’s website, Alameda County still had an estimated 187,135 ballots out of 683,644 total ballots cast remaining to be counted 10 days after the election. 94 2024-2025 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report ______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
F25-51:
Alameda County’s election results were updated on the website five times on election night but not updated daily after the election.
F25-52:
Delays in the tabulation and reporting of election results by the Registrar of Voters are caused in part by insufficient facilities, lack of equipment, and low staffing during ballot processing and counting.