Score: +11 (11/6/0)

San Francisco County Grand Jury • 2020-2021

Van Ness Avenue: What Lies Beneath

30 pages Consolidated Report

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⚠️ Translation Notice: This content has been automatically translated. The original English text is the official version. Translation may contain errors.

⚠️ Este contenido ha sido traducido automáticamente. El texto original en inglés es la versión oficial. La traducción puede contener errores.

Findings 14 findings

The delays in completion of the Van Ness BRT Project were caused primarily by avoidable setbacks in replacement of the water and sewer infrastructure.

The potential impact of utility replacement on the cost and duration of the overall project was given insufficient consideration in the initial planning process.

The potential impact of utility replacement was known to City engineers to be a major risk but was only considered a moderate risk and assigned no mitigation strategy in the official risk register.

Project timelines could not be estimated accurately because documents did not reflect the extent and location of underground utilities accurately.

The evaluation rubric for preconstruction contract bids weighted cost too heavily, as compared to technical expertise, even after project-specific legislation allowed for a lower weight to be assigned to cost.

Practical work during preconstruction that could have derisked the subsequent construction phase of the project was insufficient.

Review of preconstruction deliverables did not sufficiently measure the contractor’s preparedness for construction, which resulted in both inaccurate cost estimates and timelines.

The effectiveness of the CMGC contract was greatly reduced because the general contractor was brought into the design process too late.

Underspecification in technical requirements led to additional costs for work that could have been predicted and included in the original contract.

F10

Contention over underspecified or unclear contract terms and technical requirements led to a deterioration in the relationship between the City and Walsh, the general contractor.

F11

The removal of Synergy, the underground subcontractor, from the project, partially as a result of poor cost estimates, contributed to the deterioration of the relationship between Walsh, the general contractor, and the City.

F12

The contentious relationship between Walsh, the general contractor, and the City made it difficult to resolve problems as they arose, despite close collaboration being one of the potential advantages of the CMGC contract.

F13

Lack of an in-the-field point of contact between Walsh and the City during early stages of construction led to delays and increased costs on the project. 19

F14

Confusion related to the contractual requirements for pedestrian monitoring contributed to the deterioration of the relationship between Walsh, the general contractor, and the City.

Recommendations 12

R1

By June 2022, the City should adopt a policy that all capital project feasibility plans include an itemized assessment of risks to project timelines and costs, which must be accompanied with specific procedures that will be undertaken to mitigate those risks early in the project.
R2

By June 2022, the City should adopt a policy that all capital project sponsors publish, before proceeding to the construction phase, an itemized assessment of derisking activities actually performed.
R3

By June 2022, the Board of Supervisors and SFPUC should review and update policies and regulations to ensure that detailed as-built documentation of both private and public utilities is filed after all underground projects (whether undertaken by SFPUC, another City agency, or a private enterprise), with sufficient resolution and precision to allow accurate design of any future work.
R4

The Board of Supervisors should direct all City departments to adopt a policy that all projects that involve underground work in the City’s main corridors include, as part of the design process, the use of exploratory potholing, or another equivalent industry best-practice to identify unknown underground obstructions adhering to CI/ASCE 38-02 (“Standard Guideline for the Collection and Depiction of Existing Subsurface Utility Data“) Quality Level A. This policy should take effect for all contracts signed after January 1, 2022, and the work should be required to be performed before final construction terms or prices are agreed to.
R5

By June 2022, and before entering into future CMGC relationships, the Board of Supervisors should direct all City departments to adopt, publish, and enforce in all future contracts industry-standard best practices for management of CMGC projects.
R6

The adopted CMGC management policy should specifically include the industry best practice of awarding the contract before project design continues past 30% completion. 20
R7

By June 2022, the Board of Supervisors should amend Section 6.68 of the Administrative Code to remove the mandatory cost criterion in awarding CMGC contracts.
R8

SFMTA should establish a policy for review of technical quality of preconstruction and design deliverables, to be used in all CMGC or design contracts signed after January 2022, including in-the-field validation of key assumptions of site conditions by City engineers.
R9

Beginning January 1, 2022, SFMTA should assign to every CMGC project a dedicated in-the-field contractor liaison to facilitate collaborative problem resolution, and sufficient support staff to monitor actual progress and site conditions.
R10

By June 2022, the City should adopt a policy that any public communication about a planned or in-progress capital project that includes disruption of public services or right-of-way should include itemized assessments of risk to projected costs and duration.
R11

Beginning immediately, and in all future capital or maintenance projects that require pedestrian monitors, the City should ensure that associated costs are either specifically included in the primary construction contract, or explicitly planned for and funded by the City, before construction begins. 21
R38-02

(“Standard Guideline for the Collection and Depiction of Existing Subsurface Utility Data“) Quality Level A. This policy should take effect for all contracts signed after January 1, 2022, and the work should be required to be performed before final construction terms or prices are agreed to. R5. By June 2022, and before entering into future CMGC relationships, the Board of Supervisors should direct all City departments to adopt, publish, and enforce in all future contracts industry-standard best practices for management of CMGC projects. R6. The adopted CMGC management policy should specifically include the industry best practice of awarding the contract before project design continues past 30% completion. R7. By June 2022, the Board of Supervisors should amend Section 6.68 of the Administrative Code to remove the mandatory cost criterion in awarding CMGC contracts. R8. SFMTA should establish a policy for review of technical quality of preconstruction and design deliverables, to be used in all CMGC or design contracts signed after January 2022, including in-the-field validation of key assumptions of site conditions by City engineers. R9. Beginning January 1, 2022, SFMTA should assign to every CMGC project a dedicated in-the-field contractor liaison to facilitate collaborative problem resolution, and sufficient support staff to monitor actual progress and site conditions. R10. By June 2022, the City should adopt a policy that any public communication about a planned or in-progress capital project that includes disruption of public services or right-of-way should include itemized assessments of risk to projected costs and duration. R11. Beginning immediately, and in all future capital or maintenance projects that require pedestrian monitors, the City should ensure that associated costs are either specifically included in the primary construction contract, or explicitly planned for and funded by the City, before construction begins. Request for Responses Pursuant to Penal Code sections 933 and 933.05, the Civil Grand Jury requests responses as follows: From these City agencies : • From the Office of the Mayor: Findings 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14 Recommendations 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11 • From the General Manager of San Francisco Public Utilities Commission: Findings 1,2,3,4,6,8,9,11 Recommendations 1,2,3,4,5 • From the San Francisco Public Utilities Commission: Findings 1,2,3,4,6,8,9,11 Recommendations 1,2,3,4,5 • From the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency: Findings 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14 Recommendations 1,2,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11 • From the Office of the SFMTA Board of Directors: Findings 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14 Recommendations 1,2,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11 From the following governing body : • From the Board of Supervisors: Findings 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14 Recommendations 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11 Invited Responses The Civil Grand Jury invites responses from the below City agency as follows: • From San Francisco Public Works: Findings 1,2,3,5,6,8 Recommendations 1,2,4,5,6,7 22 Bibliography Associated General Contractors of America and the National Association of State Facilities Administrators. CM/GC Guidelines for Public Owners. PDF file. https://www.agc. org/sites/default/files/Files/Programs%20%26%20Industry%20Relations/CM_GC_ Guidelines.pdf California Department of Transportation. Caltrans Procedures for Construction Manager/ General Contractor (CMGC) Pilot Program Projects. PDF File. https://dot.ca.gov/-/ media/dot-media/programs/design/documents/caltrans-cmgc-procedures-a11y.pdf City and County of San Francisco. Legal Text of Proposition K. PDF file. http://www.amlegal. com/pdffiles/sanfran/2003-11-04-PropK.pdf City and County of San Francisco Civil Grand Jury. Central Subway Too Much Money for Too Little Benefit. PDF File. https://civilgrandjury.sfgov.org/2010_2011/Central_ SubwayToo_Much_Money_for_Too_Little_Benefit.pdf City and County of San Francisco Civil Grand Jury. San Francisco’s City Construction Program: It Needs Work. PDF file. https://civilgrandjury.sfgov.org/2014_2015/14-15_CGJ_ Report_SF_Construction_Program_It_Needs_Work_7_16_15.pdf Colorado Department of Transportation. Construction Manager/General Contractor. PDF File. https://www.codot.gov/business/designsupport/adp-db-cmgc/documents/cmgc- manual Department of Elections, “November 4, 2003 Consolidated Municipal Election.” City and County of San Francisco. https://sfelections.sfgov.org/results-summary-nov-2003 Ellis, Ralph D., Jr. and Lee, Seung-hyun. “Developing Best Practices for Avoiding Utility Relocation Delays.” American Society of Civil Engineers. King, John. “SF’s Bus-Friendly Remake of Van Ness is Nearing an End, the City Says. For Real.” San Francisco Chronicle. October 21, 2020. https://www.sfchronicle.com/ bayarea/article/S-F-s-bus-friendly-remake-of-Van-Ness-is-15662812.php Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Laws and Regulations, Standard 1926.1408, https://www.osha.gov/laws-regs/regulations/standardnumber/1926/1926.1408 Rodriguez, Joe Fitzgerald. “City Hall Toilets Knocked out by Van Ness BRT Construction Mishap.” San Francisco Examiner. November 8, 2019. https://www.sfexaminer.com/ news/city-hall-toilets-knocked-out-by-van-ness-brt-construction-mishap/ Rodriguez, Joe Fitzgerald. “Van Ness Bus Rapid Transit Construction Delayed Another 5 Months.” San Francisco Examiner. April 24, 2018. https://www.sfexaminer.com/news/ van-ness-bus-rapid-transit-construction-delayed-another-5-months/ 23 San Francisco County Transportation Authority. Final Environmental Impact Statement/ Environmental Impact Report: Van Ness Avenue Bus Rapid Transit Project. PDF File. July 2013. https://www.sfcta.org/sites/default/files/2019-02/Van_Ness_BRT_Final_EIS_EIR_ Volume_I.pdf San Francisco County Transportation Authority, The Four Corridor Plan, PDF file. https:// ia800400.us.archive.org/21/items/fourcorridorplan95sanf/fourcorridorplan95sanf.pdf San Francisco County Transportation Authority. Van Ness BRT Feasibility Study. PDF file. https:// www.sfcta.org/sites/default/files/2019-02/Van%20Ness%20BRTFeasibilityStudy_Dec_2006. pdf 24

Conclusions 1

CL1 Page 18

Given the importance and prominent visibility of the corridor, the Van Ness Project has been watched closely by the public from its beginning. The ongoing delay in project completion and the multiple reported completion dates have damaged the public’s confidence in SFMTA to keep its promises. It is understandable that a project of this magnitude and complexity would take many years to plan and construct. But the missteps during the planning and preconstruction phases that eventually impacted construction adversely affected users of the roadway as well as residents and businesses along the corridor. The Jury identified multiple missed opportunities to predict the cost and duration of the project accurately. Mistakes that happened early in the planning and design phases were compounded as the project progressed. While it is true that the unexpected condition of the underground infrastructure is the primary cause of the delay, more work could have been done to anticipate what actually lay beneath the surface, and much of the delay could have been avoided. Although it is too late to correct these deficiencies on the Van Ness Project, the City should take steps to ensure the same mistakes do not occur in the future. The Jury’s findings and recommendations are listed below. 18

Agency Responses 1

Government agencies' official responses to this report's findings and recommendations. Click on a response to see the structured breakdown.

A Fluid Concern Report MatrixQuick view summary of A Fluid Concern: San Francisco Must Improve Fuel

August 28, 2021 • 50 pages • 17 responses • Score: +11 (+11, 6, 0) View Details ▾

PDF

17 responses to findings and recommendations

The delays in completion of the Van Ness BRT Project were caused primarily by avoidable setbacks in replacement of the water and sewer infrastructure.

Response: Agree Score: +1

Agree/ Disagree) Date] A Fluid Concern: F1 In the aftermath of a major Mayor Agree San Francisco Must earthquake (magnitude 7.

The potential impact of utility replacement on the cost and duration of the overall project was given insufficient consideration in the initial planning process.

Response: Agree Score: +1

Agree/ Disagree) Date] A Fluid Concern: F2 If these shortages resulted in lack of Mayor Agree San Francisco Must power to lifeline infrastructure [August 28, 2021] Improve Fuel facilities and/or lack of fuel for critical Resilience lifeline vehicles, the resulting [June 29, 2021] cascading failures of other lifelines could have life safety and quality-oflife impacts greater than the fuel and power shortages themselves.

The potential impact of utility replacement was known to City engineers to be a major risk but was only considered a moderate risk and assigned no mitigation strategy in the official risk register.

Response: Disagree Partially Score: 0

Agree/ Disagree) Date] A Fluid Concern: F3 The City's lack of agency sponsorship Mayor Disagree partially While we agree that we can always dedicate more resources to San Francisco Must and dedicated staffing and budgeting [August 28, 2021] improve fuel resiliency, there is and continues to be agency Improve Fuel for fuel resilience efforts weakens its sponsorship on fuel resilience.

Project timelines could not be estimated accurately because documents did not reflect the extent and location of underground utilities accurately.

Response: Agree Score: +1

Agree/ Disagree) Date] A Fluid Concern: F4 The cessation of fuel resilience Mayor Disagree wholly The COVID-19 pandemic was and continues to be the world's most San Francisco Must progress during COVID indicates that [August 28, 2021] significant emergency within the last century.

The Board of Supervisors should direct all City departments to adopt a policy that all projects that involve underground work in the City’s main corridors include, as part of the design process, the use of exploratory potholing, or another equivalent industry best-practice to identify unknown underground obstructions adhering to CI/ASCE 38-02 (“Standard Guideline for the Collection and Depiction of Existing Subsurface Utility Data“) Quality Level A. This policy should take effect for all contrac...

Response: Will Implement

Score: +1

R4 By December 2022, the Department Mayor Has not yet been This recommendation will be implemented by December 2022.

Response: Disagree Partially Score: 0

Agree/ Disagree) Date] A Fluid Concern: F5 In the aftermath of a major disaster, Mayor Disagree partially The Department of Emergency Management (DEM) managed a San Francisco Must it will be difficult for emergency [August 28, 2021] citywide continuity of operations planning working group in 2018 Improve Fuel responders to catalog the citywide and 2019 that asked City departments to consider resources Resilience fuel needs of backup generators.

By June 2022, and before entering into future CMGC relationships, the Board of Supervisors should direct all City departments to adopt, publish, and enforce in all future contracts industry-standard best practices for management of CMGC projects.

Response: Will Implement

Score: +1

R5 By June 2023, the Department of Mayor Has not yet been This recommendation will be implemented by June 2023.

Practical work during preconstruction that could have derisked the subsequent construction phase of the project was insufficient.

Response: Disagree Partially Score: 0

Agree/ Disagree) Date] A Fluid Concern: F6 It is impossible to determine how Mayor Disagree partially It is impossible to predict the exact amount of fuel that will be San Francisco Must much fuel storage is needed to meet [August 28, 2021] needed since emergencies are unpredictable and performance of Improve Fuel emergency demands after a disaster Bay Area pipelines and refineries are not well understood.

The adopted CMGC management policy should specifically include the industry best practice of awarding the contract before project design continues past 30% completion. 20

Response: Will Implement

Score: +1

R6 By December 2023, the Department Mayor Has not yet been This recommendation will be implemented by December 2023 in San Francisco Must [for F7] of Emergency Management should [August 28, 2021] implemented but coordination with the City Administrator's Office.

Review of preconstruction deliverables did not sufficiently measure the contractor’s preparedness for construction, which resulted in both inaccurate cost estimates and timelines.

Response: Agree Score: +1

Agree/ Disagree) Date] A Fluid Concern: F7 Compiling inventories of available Mayor Agree San Francisco Must fuel in a disaster will likely take at [August 28, 2021] Improve Fuel least half a day and will rely partly on Resilience manual assessment of sites by [June 29, 2021] personnel who might themselves be unavailable under disaster conditions.

The effectiveness of the CMGC contract was greatly reduced because the general contractor was brought into the design process too late.

Response: Disagree Partially Score: 0

Agree/ Disagree) Date] A Fluid Concern: F8 The City will have a severely limited City Disagree partially The City has service stations where fuel can be siphoned from San Francisco Must and unreliable ability in a disaster to Administrator generators that are not in use.

Underspecification in technical requirements led to additional costs for work that could have been predicted and included in the original contract.

Response: Agree Score: +1

Agree/ Disagree) Date] A Fluid Concern: F9 The City has not invested in City Disagree wholly A key technological investment the City is prioritizing is fuel San Francisco Must technological solutions to augment Administrator pumping, transport, and refueling equipment in the form of fuel Improve Fuel the ability to refuel critical vehicles [August 28, 2021] trucks.

F10

Contention over underspecified or unclear contract terms and technical requirements led to a deterioration in the relationship between the City and Walsh, the general contractor.

Response: Disagree Partially Score: 0

Agree/ Disagree) Date] A Fluid Concern: F10 The usability of privately-held local City Disagree partially The usability of privately-held local fuel reserves in a disaster is San Francisco Must fuel reserves in a disaster is uncertain Administrator uncertain, but this is mainly due to a limited ability for the City to Improve Fuel due to the lack of partnerships [August 28, 2021] access these reserves rather than due to lack of partnerships.

F11

Response: Agree Score: +1

Agree/ Disagree) Date] A Fluid Concern: F11 Opportunities to expand fuel reserves City Agree San Francisco Must within the City are very rare due to Administrator Improve Fuel geographic constraints but very [August 28, 2021] Resilience valuable for fuel resilience.

F12

Response: Agree Score: +1

Agree/ Disagree) Date] A Fluid Concern: F12 In the aftermath of a region-wide City Agree San Francisco Must disaster such as a major earthquake, Administrator Improve Fuel the ability of the City's two [August 28, 2021] Resilience contracted suppliers to deliver fuel [June 29, 2021] might be compromised temporarily because they would both be susceptible to the same infrastructure failures.

F13

Lack of an in-the-field point of contact between Walsh and the City during early stages of construction led to delays and increased costs on the project. 19

Response: Agree Score: +1

Agree/ Disagree) Date] A Fluid Concern: F13 The City has not contracted with an City Agree San Francisco Must emergency out-of-region backup Administrator Improve Fuel vendor in case the two regular [August 28, 2021] Resilience vendors cannot deliver fuel, as [June 29, 2021] recommended by the California Energy Commission, despite the risk of region-wide disruptions compromising both.

F14

Confusion related to the contractual requirements for pedestrian monitoring contributed to the deterioration of the relationship between Walsh, the general contractor, and the City.

Response: Disagree Partially Score: 0

Agree/ Disagree) Date] A Fluid Concern: F14 Although the City's two fuel suppliers City Disagree partially The City's fuel vendors continuously engage in San Francisco's fuel San Francisco Must are contractually responsible for Administrator resilience planning, including participating in specific fuel-related Improve Fuel providing technical support on [August 28, 2021] simulation exercises and providing guidance and technical advice.

No Responses Found 4

Government entities assigned to respond to this report. No response documents have been linked in our database.

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