Alameda County Grand Jury • 2017-2018

Oakland’s $860 Million Crisis: Unfunded Retiree Healthcare

Published: September 26, 2018 132 pages Consolidated Report
Ver PDF original

Findings 37 findings

18-1 Page 1
The city of Oakland’s current method of funding OPEB benefits underfunds its annual required contribution by at least $40 million.
18-2 Page 1
The city of Oakland currently has no meaningful plan to address its $860 million unfunded OPEB liability, jeopardizing the city’s longterm financial viability.
18-3 Page 1
Rapidly increasing retiree health costs are squeezing city budgets and reducing funding for essential city services.
18-4 Page 1
The city of Oakland has no revenue stream (anticipated revenue growth, new taxes or new bonds) sufficient to make payments that will amortize its unfunded OPEB liability over the next 20 or 30 years.
18-5 Page 1
Solving Oakland’s OPEB problem will require substantial political will and the cooperation of Oakland’s bargaining units to make complex and unpopular structural changes to Oakland’s retiree benefits program.
18-6 Page 1
Staff and Board of Education efforts to circumvent established budgeting policies along with board efforts to interfere in the administrative responsibilities of the superintendent invite financial instability and contribute to Oakland Unified School District’s financial problems.
18-7 Page 1
Oakland Unified School District’s inability to control overstaffing and poor position control decisions have contributed to the district’s financial instability.
18-8 Page 1
Lack of transparency related to Oakland Unified School District’s financial positions has led to mistrust between the district, the community, and labor organizations.
18-9 Page 1
High turnover of key administrators has created an atmosphere of mistrust, destroying the continuity of the district’s educational mission, and crippling the district’s effectiveness in addressing its most pressing fiscal issues.
18-10 Page 1
Financial instability and high staff turnover contribute to poor student performance.
18-11 Page 1
Operating 86 schools is unsustainable and will lead the district to insolvency.
18-12 Page 1
Collaboration between traditional public schools and charter schools operating in the district benefit all students in Oakland Unified School District.
18-13 Page 1
The ticket policies of Alameda County and the Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum Authority allow elected and appointed officials and their staff members to attend multiple high-value events for the purpose of “inspecting,” “reviewing, or “evaluating” the facilities when no reports are ever generated after the events about the conditions observed.
18-14 Page 1
Free tickets often are used as a perk of office or employment rather than a public asset to be managed and utilized for a public purpose as required by law.
18-15 Page 1
Some 802 forms are carelessly prepared, and omit or erroneously report important information such as dates of events, number of tickets distributed, the name of the event, the identity of the actual recipient, or the public purpose for which the tickets were used, undermining the goal of transparency required by FPPC regulation 18944.1.
18-16 Page 1
The 802 forms often do not account for all of the tickets to Arena and Coliseum events in the Alameda County and the Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum Authority’s luxury suites, indicating either that valuable resources have been wasted, or the tickets were used but not accounted for. No one is responsible for ensuring that all tickets to all events have been correctly and accurately reported.
18-17 Page 1
The ticket policies of Alameda County and the Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum Authority list reasons for attending events that are vague and lack credibility.
18-18 Page 1
The ticket policies of Alameda County and the Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum Authority do not contain limitations on the number of tickets that can be used by officials and employees, allowing tickets to be used by the same individuals over and over again.
18-19 Page 1
Alameda County and the Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum Authority have no defined procedures and practices for offering tickets to worthy community organizations and individuals, or county employees other than those working directly for the officials who distribute them. Distribution practices vary from office to office.
18-20 Page 1
Although Alameda County and the Oakland-Alameda Coliseum Authority claim an important public purpose for the tickets is to give them to worthy community-based organizations for use as fundraisers, the 802 forms show that high-value tickets with the biggest fundraising potential are seldom distributed to non-profits or schools, especially the most valuable playoff tickets.
18-21 Page 1
Alameda County has insufficiently analyzed whether its distribution of free tickets to elected officials and county employees meets the IRS criteria for exclusion from taxable income, putting the county at risk of sanctions for improper withholding.
18-22 Page 1
Loans from the city of Oakland for affordable housing rental projects are typically provided for a term of up to fifty-five years and, in exchange, rents are restricted for that same period, making the rents affordable to lower-income households. No repayment is expected until the end of the loan period or upon transfer of the property, giving the public the perception that these transactions are grants of public money rather than traditional loans.
18-23 Page 1
Oakland’s Housing and Community Development Department has failed to inspect and audit all of its affordable housing stock annually, putting lower-income households renting at projects like E.C. Reems at risk of living in substandard conditions.
18-24 Page 1
The Housing and Community Development Department’s failure either to provide building inspection training for staff or partner with Oakland’s Building Services Department to inspect its affordablehousing stock inhibits the agency’s ability to respond to tenant complaints and protect the residents properly.
18-25 Page 1
The Housing and Community Development Department’s use of outdated technology to catalogue and manage data regarding the city of Oakland’s affordable-housing stock prevents consistent oversight of those projects, putting public funds at risk.
18-26 Page 1
Failure to maintain consistent policies related to the selection process for affordable housing developers, especially in the area of financial strength of applicants, invites project management failures like the one that took place at the E.C. Reems Apartments.
18-27 Page 1
The relationship between Alameda Health System and OakCare Medical Group has been characterized, in the past, as contentious and lacking in transparency. In large measure, this is a function of the outsized role that OakCare plays in the medical leadership and medical staff at Alameda Health System. While the contract and management processes have improved under the current contract, the ability to build a sustainable health system to serve the county is hampered by lack of alignment between the medical leadership and staff and the strategic directions of Alameda Health System.
18-28 Page 1
Policies and procedures related to the use of public resources by management and leadership OakCare have been inadequately developed and followed. This includes use of public space, public equipment, and direct public budgetary expenditures for activity that supports the private medical group.
18-29 Page 1
Policies and procedures related to the acquisition and management of contracts and grants received from federal and state agencies and private foundations by affiliated physicians who are members of OakCare Medical Group have been inadequately developed and followed.
18-30 Page 1
The lack of clear lines of responsibility and communication between Oakland Public Works and the East Bay Regional Park District in notifying the public about Lake Temescal closures and the reasons for those closures gives the perception that public agencies are keeping important information from the community.
18-31 Page 1
Failure to supervise third party contractors repairing Oakland’s sewer lines and failure to require them to submit detailed reports of their repairs impede compliance with state reporting requirements and make it difficult to troubleshoot when future problems occurs on the same sewer lines.
18-32 Page 1
Oakland Public Works’ current sewer related training and technical certifications focus on only a few key employees, resulting in its sewer crews lacking broad technical knowledge. This lack of depth limits operational flexibility and succession planning.
18-33 Page 1
The Grand Jury learned that in two cases during 2017, onsite estimates that sewage overflows exceeded 50,000 gallons were later reduced below 50,000 gallons by a supervisor back at the office, giving the perception that the volume was reduced to avoid additional testing and reporting required by the state.
18-34 Page 1
The Oakland City Council bypassed its Workforce Development Board in 2016 by giving public funds directly to favored job programs without accountability standards built into the grants, without sufficient consideration of Workforce Development’s strategic goals, and without appropriate evaluation as to whether the programs’ efforts were successful.
18-35 Page 1
The Alameda County Water District is not sufficiently transparent with its customers about the costs of current employee compensation and retiree benefits, and how these impact rate increases.
18-36 Page 1
Droughts can significantly reduce the revenue of the Alameda County Water District, while the fixed costs of providing quality water remain high.
18-37 Page 1
The Alameda County Water District has provided overly generous salaries and benefits to its employees over the years, even in times of economic downturns.

Recommendations 36

Conclusions 18