Napa County Grand Jury
2007-2008
From the annual report
The consolidated year-end volume. The individual investigations it contains are listed separately below.
📑 Year-End Report
The full consolidated volume; individual reports are listed below.
Individual reports (12)
Findings and recommendations not yet extracted.
Additional Recommendations
7
Not linked to specific findings.
R1:
NVC continue to support efforts at the State level to secure a more stable funding mechanism that is not tied to K- 14 funding. District staff continues to participate on various committees at the state level that focus on community college finance and funding issues. Proposition 92, the most significant recent effort to change community college funding, was defeated in the February, 2008 election. However, the proposition created a greater awareness regarding the funding problems faced by community colleges. The State Chancellor's Office and the Community College League are continuing their efforts to draw increased scrutiny to this issue. A member of the Board of Trustees is elected to the California Community College Trustees (CCCT) board that is continuing to advocate for legislation that separates community college funding from the K-12 funding.
R2:
NVC Board of Trustees proceeds expeditiously to convert the unfunded health care liabilities from a "pay-as-you-go" to an accrual basis. The Board of Trustees is reviewing numerous options regarding the unfunded retiree health care liability. At the Board's direction over the past five years, the college budget has included an increasing amount of set-aside beyond the pay-as-you-go amount. A subcommittee of the Board is currently reviewing options for generating additional funds to address this issue by utilizing allowable investment options and other financial methods. The subcommittee is planning to report back to the full Board in Fall, 2008.
R3:
NVC inform the public when promoting new bond issues, not only of what will be gained by the passage of the bond issue, but what will be lost if the bond issue does not pass. Napa Valley College appreciates the attention the Grand Jury brought to the importance of communicating effectively with the community—not only during a bond campaign, but on an ongoing basis. This recommendation also reaffirms what we heard from many members of the community subsequent to the failure of Measure L-that that were disappointed and regretful that they had not realized what projects would not go forward if the bond did not pass. Additionally, we believe that communicating needs, along with accomplishments, has the benefit of actually increasing community support for the college. The unique strength of the community college lies in an honest, open dialog between the college and the community, and the college is committed to finding new ways to increase opportunities for that dialog to flourish.
R4:
NVC take a more pro-active role in informing the public about its accomplishments and needs. Last year, the college hired a marketing strategist to assist the college in developing new marketing strategies to strengthen its ongoing communication with the community. The college will receive a final report from the marketing strategist early in the Fall semester and will incorporate those strategies into our existing efforts, which include: weekly press releases to local media (area newspapers, radio, college website); paid advertising campaign around each registration period; monthly cable TV show on Channel 27; a college DVD used at outreach events; community publications such as President's Report to the Community; brochures, posters, flyers about events and programs; active outreach to area high schools, including financial aid outreach; participation in community events in Napa County; highway signs; campus tours; staff participation in service clubs; hosting professional conferences; college president, staff, and Foundation members speak and represent college in the community.
R5:
NVC provide campus-wide wireless access to benefit the faculty, the students and Campus Security. College staff is currently gathering cost information regarding wireless access. The staff is very aware of the significant security issues involved with a wireless environment. Any further steps that the college takes regarding wireless access will be designed to protect the security of the administrative computing system as well as the security of the faculty, staff and students. The college must also carefully review the cost/benefit aspects of such an expensive undertaking. Any system for the Campus Police would need to be separated from a college-wide system. Options available for these purposes are also under review.
R6:
NVC provide computers with wireless capabilities be installed in campus police cars. The college is exploring the option of a mobile unit that is a tag-on to Verizon's wireless system, requiring no implementation from the college Information Technology Department. The upgrade would allow police officers in the field to access vital student records, warrant status, and other information that is routinely needed without the delay caused by contacting the department by phone or radio. Our police vehicles already have computer mounts, reducing the expense of installation. The power source to run this system is generated by the vehicle. The system can be used by college police staff assigned to the Upper Valley Campus in St. Helena to interact with the main campus. Having wireless capabilities in police vehicles is consistent with other County law enforcement.
R7:
NVC install a campus-wide alert/alarm system to inform those on campus of emergency situations and what actions/precautions be taken. The college is currently evaluating a computer-based system that would augment the current emergency alert systems (AlertU, emergency phones, and email). The LYNX system, a computer server that operates over the existing network, would bring new capabilities that would allow the college to "push" emergency information to computers, phones, pagers, cell phones, and public displays. The Napa Valley College Board of Trustees, faculty, and staff would again like to thank the members of the Grand Jury who served on the college review team. We will make every effort to fully respond to their insightful comments and recommendations. It was a pleasure to work with them, and we greatly appreciate their excellent service to our community. Sincerely, Wece Vi. nul on Dr. Chris McCarthy Bruce Ketron President, Board of Trustees Superintendent/President
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Findings & Recommendations
15 findings
F1:
The County of Napa: a. pension benefit for employees is a defined-benefit plan. b. plan for its non-safety employees and the Board of Supervisors is a “2.5% at 55” plan. c. plan for safety employees is a “3% at 50” plan. d. vesting period for County employees is 5 years and for the Board of Supervisors 8 years. e. total cost to Napa County taxpayers to fund employee retirement benefits over the next two years will be $39,377,900. f. BOS monthly salary is currently $7,017, with full medical and dental coverage for themselves and their family. They also enjoy a defined- benefit pension that includes a monthly annuity.
F2:
The City of Napa: a. retirement benefit for its employees (with limited exceptions) is a defined-benefit plan. b. plan for its non-safety employees and the Mayor and Council members is a “2.7% at 55” plan. c. plan for its safety employees is a “3% at 55” plan. d. vesting period for the City of Napa employees is 5 years and for the Mayor and City Council members 8 years. e. current annual cost to provide medical benefits to retired employees is $1,400,000, a more than six-fold increase from $227,240 in 2002. f. estimates it will spend approximately $44,000,000 over the next six years to fund pension benefits, assuming a flat salary increase of 5%.
F3:
OPEB: a. The County of Napa also provides OPEB for its retired employees and elected officials, some for their lifetime. b. The City of Napa also provides OPEB to its retired employees and elected officials, some for their lifetime. 10 c. The costs of OPEB, particularly health insurance have experienced double-digit percentage increases in the past 5 years. d. Early retirement of City and County employees, allowed by the pension plans, obligates the City and County to provide OPEB for a longer period of time until a retiree becomes eligible for Medicare at age 65. e. The unfunded OPEB for the County of Napa is between $37 and $51 million and the City $2.8 million. f. The County has started reducing its unfunded OPEB liability and intends to be fully funded in 14 years.
Related Recommendations (2)
R2:
The City of Napa and County of Napa each adopt a resolution stating that it will participate in talks regarding health care reform. 11
R4:
Both the City of Napa and Napa County review the time period of the OPEB coverage to determine if it could be reduced, e.g. by adjusting the retirement age percent formulas to reflect a 2.5% at 62 instead of age 55 for miscellaneous employees, or to reflect 3% at 55 instead of age 50 for safety employees, the OPEB liability could be significantly reduced. REQUEST FOR RESPONSES 2007-2008 Napa County Grand jury requests responses from: • County Executive Officer • Napa County Auditor-Controller • Napa County Board of Supervisors • City Council of Napa • Mayor of the City of Napa • City of Napa Finance Director
F4:
Pensions: a. The costs to both the City and County for pension benefits are rising so rapidly that they can adversely impact the provision of other governmental services. b. The unfunded liability by the County of Napa for pension benefits is $52.5 million. c. The unfunded liability by the City of Napa for pension benefits is $49.3 million.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4:
Both the City of Napa and Napa County review the time period of the OPEB coverage to determine if it could be reduced, e.g. by adjusting the retirement age percent formulas to reflect a 2.5% at 62 instead of age 55 for miscellaneous employees, or to reflect 3% at 55 instead of age 50 for safety employees, the OPEB liability could be significantly reduced. REQUEST FOR RESPONSES 2007-2008 Napa County Grand jury requests responses from: • County Executive Officer • Napa County Auditor-Controller • Napa County Board of Supervisors • City Council of Napa • Mayor of the City of Napa • City of Napa Finance Director
F5:
The City needs to budget more funds to more rapidly reduce its unfunded pension liability.
F6:
The consequences of the failure to manage these unfunded liabilities can result in tax increases, reduced services and impaired borrowing ability.
F7:
GASB 45 government agencies providing retiree health care and other non-pension retirement benefits must disclose the future and accrued cost of those benefits to the public within the next four years.
F8:
Government agencies pay more of their compensation in the form of benefits than in the private business sector.
F9:
Government entities do not need to provide these high levels of pension benefits to attract and retain employees.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
A shift to defined-contribution plans for all new employees of the City and the County be considered as a priority.
F10:
Having the Board of Supervisors and the City Council negotiate or approve wages and benefits on behalf of themselves, although legally permissible, is a classic conflict of interest.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
A commission or task force be established to recommend and/or to vote on any wage, pension or OPEB for the BOS or City Council.
F11:
Private sector defined-benefit pensions are a thing of the past, retiree health care is virtually non-existent and wages, on average, are no greater than their public sector counter-parts.
F12:
The average age at which current City of Napa employees retire is 57 years for miscellaneous employees and 52 for safety employees.
F13:
The average age at which current Napa County employees retire is 62 for miscellaneous employees and 57 for safety employees.
F14:
A defined-contribution plan allows the plan to define the level of contribution the employer and the employee will make.
F15:
A defined-contribution plan provides advantages to the employees and reduces the cost of retirement benefits over time.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
A shift to defined-contribution plans for all new employees of the City and the County be considered as a priority.
Findings & Recommendations
10 findings
F1:
the condition of the streets and roads in Napa County has been judged to be among the worst in the nine Bay Area counties.
F2:
the local governments in Napa County have little to no control over the sources of funding for road maintenance and improvements.
Related Recommendations (2)
R1:
the Board of Supervisors place on the ballot at the next scheduled election or at any subsequent election which takes place prior to the end of the year 2008, a ballot measure calling for a dedicated sales tax for the express and sole purpose of providing street and road maintenance and related street and road improvements in the County of Napa and its local municipalities.
R2:
the County of Napa join with other jurisdictions to seek action by the State Legislature to index the gasoline tax to an inflation factor.
F3:
the existing revenue sources are not sufficient to improve the deteriorating streets and roads in Napa County.
Related Recommendations (2)
R1:
the Board of Supervisors place on the ballot at the next scheduled election or at any subsequent election which takes place prior to the end of the year 2008, a ballot measure calling for a dedicated sales tax for the express and sole purpose of providing street and road maintenance and related street and road improvements in the County of Napa and its local municipalities.
R2:
the County of Napa join with other jurisdictions to seek action by the State Legislature to index the gasoline tax to an inflation factor.
F4:
County Roads Department Budget a. the current annual budget of the County Roads Department is approximately $7,000,000, which barely covers minimum maintenance standards. b. to bring the condition of the roads up to the PCI “good” level, an additional $11,700,000 per year would be needed above the current annual budgeted amount. c. an investment of more than $200,000,000 is needed over a 25-year period to bring all Napa County paved roads into a “good” PCI level.
F5:
the imbalance in the County of Napa and its local municipalities between the roads maintenance and capital improvements needs and the existing revenue sources can not be remedied by increased efficiencies or by reducing programs and services.
F6:
new sources of revenues to fund streets and roads maintenance needs and related capital improvement projects must be found in order to maintain a safe and reliable transportation system for local citizens and visitors to the County and its cities.
Related Recommendations (2)
R1:
the Board of Supervisors place on the ballot at the next scheduled election or at any subsequent election which takes place prior to the end of the year 2008, a ballot measure calling for a dedicated sales tax for the express and sole purpose of providing street and road maintenance and related street and road improvements in the County of Napa and its local municipalities.
R2:
the County of Napa join with other jurisdictions to seek action by the State Legislature to index the gasoline tax to an inflation factor.
F7:
the County of Napa receives no matching funding from the Federal or State governments because it has no “self-help” tax such as a dedicated sales tax, thereby losing access to millions of dollars in matching funds from the federal and state governments.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
the Board of Supervisors place on the ballot at the next scheduled election or at any subsequent election which takes place prior to the end of the year 2008, a ballot measure calling for a dedicated sales tax for the express and sole purpose of providing street and road maintenance and related street and road improvements in the County of Napa and its local municipalities.
F8:
there is a need to establish a formal standard for repair of road damage and to fill the vacant Assistant Road Coordinator position.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4:
formal standards be adopted and implemented for road repairs of potholes and after-construction cuts and a qualified person be hired to inspect and approve these repairs.
F9:
FEMA reimbursement is often delayed because of improper recordkeeping in emergency situations and because of incomplete or improperly produced requests for reimbursement. 10
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
an employee of Public Works be FEMA trained, assigned to the task of recordkeeping in emergency situations, and responsible for the completion of requests for reimbursement of emergency repairs.
F10:
the County of Napa Public Works Safety manual is out of date and requires revision to come into compliance with current safety standards.
Related Recommendations (1)
R5:
the County Public Works Safety Manual be brought up to date with current safety regulations. REQUEST FOR RESPONSES The 2007-2008 Grand Jury requests responses from:
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Findings & Recommendations
14 findings
F1:
Through the implementation of a communications repeater voting system and the implementation of simulcast broadcasting the Napa County Public Safety Radio System has been significantly enhanced.
F2:
The Berryessa Peak radio repeater station is not equipped with a microwave relay system.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
The Berryessa Peak public safety radio repeater be equipped with a microwave relay system.
F3:
The Public Notification System soon to be implemented will provide emergency response agencies with a powerful communications tool.
F4:
The only Napa County PSAP with Emergency Medical Dispatch qualified personnel is the Napa Central Dispatch PSAP.
F5:
Napa County PSAPs have elected not to receive wireless 911 calls directly from the caller.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
County PSAP organizations initiate action to receive wireless 911 calls directly.
F6:
Napa Central Dispatch places a separate landline call to CAL FIRE ECC rather than conferencing the call with 911 callers. This action precludes the ECC from receiving E- 911 Called ID information without resorting to additional hardware or software modifications.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
As an interim policy, the Napa Central Dispatch PSAP immediately begin to “conference” the CAL FIRE ECC on fire dispatch or medical/fire dispatch calls.
F7:
It is essential that VoIP users fully understand how their particular telephone company routes 911 calls.
F8:
The American Canyon Fire Department has “Rip and Run” communications equipment to receive E-911 Caller ID information from the Napa Central Dispatch.
F9:
The Napa Central Dispatch policies and procedures appear to be out of date and generally in a state of neglect.
F10:
The Napa Central Dispatch training materials appear to be inadequate and seem to consist, in a large part, of vendor manuals.
F11:
CAL FIRE ECC dispatch personnel appear to be unaware of the Napa County Fire Department dispatch policies.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4:
CAL FIRE ECC dispatchers be made aware of the requirements of the Napa County Fire Department dispatch related procedures.
F12:
The CAL FIRE ECC does maintain communications records, but no formal records of dispatch errors are maintained.
F13:
None of the PSAP organizations investigated by the Grand Jury have quality assurance programs, or even the basic elements of such a program, in place.
Related Recommendations (1)
R5:
On an urgent basis the Napa County PSAPs institute formal quality assurance programs, preferably audited by outside third party organizations qualified in the area of emergency communications.
F14:
Combining existing primary PSAP functions into a single consolidated PSAP would appear to better serve the citizens of Napa County than the current system.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6:
The Master Plan be modified to include a consolidated Napa County PSAP and planning be initiated to establish the facility. REQUEST FOR RESPONSES The 2007/2008 Grand Jury requests responses from:
Additional Recommendations
1
Not linked to specific findings.
R03-03:
Attempted Child Abduction 19
Findings & Recommendations
18 findings
F1:
Lack of Authority. a. the MOU between the County of Napa and Volunteer Departments does appear to give authority to the Napa County Fire Chief to establish and enforce volunteer department hiring, training/operating policies and procedures, however subsequent provisions within the MOU take that authority away. b. the County has not evaluated the operation of all Napa County fire departments.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
the County Board of Supervisors establish a commission to review the overall operation of all Napa County fire departments with respect to the establishment of a central Napa County Fire Department.
F2:
Training Problems: a. Based on Federal, State, Cal OSHA, and County requirements, Napa County has not defined the minimum acceptable level of training for new 29 volunteer firefighters and continued training for all volunteer firefighters as County employees. b. procedural requirements impacting the safety of firefighters and the public alike, dating at least to 1996, have not been fully developed and enforced. c. the hiring and training policies of the nine Volunteer Fire Departments vary significantly and it is unclear whether specific hiring and training requirements exist. d. some Napa County Volunteer firefighters do not possess the basic EMT qualifications although 80-85% of fire department emergency calls are medical in nature. e. firefighter instructors assigned to Napa County volunteer firefighters have no specific experience qualifications in their job descriptions. f. the NCFD budget for current year includes $83,143 for one fulltime training fire captain.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
the County Board of Supervisors consider the hire of a dedicated Napa County employee whose primary responsibility would be to focus on the coordination and support of the County Volunteer firefighters.
F3:
the Board of Supervisors has not insured that the provisions of the County/NCFD were fully implemented.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
the MOU between the County of Napa and Volunteer Departments be amended to grant the Napa County Fire Chief clear authority to establish and enforce volunteer department training and operating policies and procedures.
F4:
the NCFD has apparently not always maintained the training certificates and other records that were submitted to it by the Volunteer Fire Departments.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4:
recognizing that volunteer firefighters are effectively county employees while engaged in fire department activities, Napa County establish a level of training that meets all applicable Federal, State, Cal OSHA and County requirements. Non-compliance with the law is not a viable option and places the County at risk.
F5:
there is broad support among County firefighters for an integrated County fire department that includes all the fire departments in the County.
Related Recommendations (1)
R5:
all Volunteer firefighters be trained and certified as Firefighter I/EMTs, and the training be provided and paid for by the County.
F6:
of the authorized 250, there are now less than 200 Volunteer firefighters, a decline of 20% over the past five years. Napa County cannot afford to replace Volunteer firefighters with paid firefighters, nor would this be desirable.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6:
all training of volunteer firefighters be provided by fully qualified instructors meeting all applicable standards.
F7:
the volunteer stipend system neither reflects the number of response calls which a volunteer makes nor rewards volunteers for advanced qualifications.
Related Recommendations (1)
R7:
the upgrading of the Napa County Fire Department Policies and Procedures Manual be addressed as a high priority with specific timeline goals established and monitored. Specific policies which must be implemented immediately are: a. A grievance procedure which provides a mechanism for the department personnel to raise and address issues which adversely affect their abilities to perform duties, personnel problems, and accusation of wrongdoing. b. Volunteer Firefighter Driver/Operator requirements be formally defined. Existing drivers should be given adequate time to complete the requirements, but not “grandfathered.” c. minimum emergency response driver training standards for AEV drivers be established. d. all new AEV drivers be required to complete the training prior to operating their vehicles in a Code 3 response. e. existing AEV drivers be given a reasonable time to complete the requisite training, but not be “grandfathered.” f. the County require that the owners of private vehicles operating as an AEV provide written evidence that they either have an appropriate AEV rider on their vehicle insurance or written documentation from their insurance company that the vehicle is covered while operating as an AEV. 32 g. the County establish a policy that details equal accommodations for Volunteer firefighters who are part of a County deployed strike team to that of their paid counterparts.
F8:
NCFD Policies and Procedures: a. the upgrading of the NCFD Policies and Procedures Manual, which was to have been completed by 1998, has not been addressed, the Manual does not contain a grievance procedure, nor does it define volunteer Firefighter Driver/Operator requirements.
Related Recommendations (1)
R8:
the volunteer stipend be based on the number of emergency responses made by the volunteer while retaining the training requirement as an eligibility criteria. In addition, a tiered compensation system which rewards advanced qualifications be implemented.
F9:
Strike Teams: a. Volunteer firefighters who are part of a County deployed strike team are not provided accommodations equal to their paid counterparts. b. it takes several months for Volunteer firefighters who were part of a County deployed strike team to be paid for their time. c. the NCFD has a fund to permit timely payment of strike team volunteer firefighters.
Related Recommendations (1)
R9:
the County fund the required emergency response driver training for volunteer firefighters.
F10:
AEV: a. no training/qualifications requirements exist for AEV drivers. b. there is no system to verify if AEV drivers have their vehicles properly insured. c. the County does not reimburse individual volunteer firefighters for any additional insurance premium costs incurred for the operation of authorized AEVs.
Related Recommendations (1)
R10:
the County reimburse individual volunteer firefighters for any additional insurance premium costs incurred for the operation of properly authorized AEVs.
F11:
Fire Stations: 30 a. the current location of Station #10 imposes significant travel requirements for responding volunteers. b. there is no sign or street light on the road to indicate the entrance to the Capell Valley Volunteer Fire Department. c. the Carneros Volunteer Fire Department, Milton Road station is old, sits in the flood plain and is in need of upgrading. d. the Carneros satellite building leaks profusely when it rains and paved parking is limited for responding Volunteer firefighters. e. the Dry Creek-Lokoya Volunteer Fire Department station needs running water, a septic system, a flush toilet and an exhaust system. f. the Soda Canyon Volunteer Fire station needs potable water and a water system upgrade. g. the Soda Canyon Volunteer Fire station has no usable apparatus at this fire station, so responds from the Monticello Fire station. Response time has been extended to an unacceptable 30+ minutes to some areas within the Soda Canyon service area. h. the Soda Canyon Volunteer Fire station driveway/volunteer parking is currently restricted by new neighbor entrance/gate in noncompliance with Napa County Code, Title 18.
Related Recommendations (1)
R11:
the funds to pay a Volunteer firefighter who was part of a County deployed strike team be made available on a routine basis and in a timely manner to insure that they are promptly compensated for their time.
F12:
Apparatus: a. three NCFD engines and one water tender predate 1985, and eleven engines and one rescue vehicle predate 1991. b. the above stated vehicles do not meet current NCFD 1901 safety standards for fire apparatus. c. the Gordon Valley Volunteer Fire Department needs a water tender. d. the Soda Canyon Volunteer Fire Department needs a smaller Type IV unit (suitable for the smaller country roads, dirt roads, smaller driveways and bridges characteristic of the area) to be housed at the Soda Canyon station. e. the Soda Canyon Volunteer Fire Department needs a rescue truck with defibrillator housed at the Soda Canyon station.
Related Recommendations (1)
R12:
Fire Stations: a. relocate the Station #10 to a combined Napa City/County fire station in Browns Valley. b. the County install a road sign and light on the road at the entrance to the Capell Valley Volunteer Fire Station. c. the County rectify the restricted access/parking issue at the Soda Canyon Fire Station regarding new neighbor entrance gate.
F13:
Fundraising: a. many of the nine Volunteer Fire Departments do annual fundraising for capital improvements and other department needs. b. proceeds from the Carneros Run 2008, are to benefit the Carneros Volunteer Fire Department new building fund. c. proceeds from the Winemakers Classic are to benefit the Dry Creek- Lokoya capital campaign for expanded station construction.
Related Recommendations (1)
R13:
Apparatus: a. the County replace as soon as possible, all firefighting vehicles that predate 1991, with vehicles that are appropriate for the individual service area requirements. b. the County provide as soon as possible, a water tender to Gordon Valley Volunteer Fire Department. c. the County provide as soon as possible, a Type IV unit and a rescue vehicle with defibrillator that will fit into and be housed at Soda Canyon station.
F14:
the Soda Canyon Volunteer Fire Department service area has the second highest number of emergency incidents in Napa County.
Related Recommendations (1)
R14:
the NCFD continue the policy of consulting the Volunteer Chief or appointed representative from a given volunteer fire department when equipment is being selected for their use.
F15:
the NCFD has modified the makeup of the selection committee charged with specifying the purchase of “appropriate sized emergency response vehicles” to the area of service.
Related Recommendations (1)
R15:
all fire departments within Napa County have the same rapid entry system locks with a “universal” Key.
F16:
California Fire Code requires that an approved rapid emergency entry gate switch or padlock be installed where access to or within a structure or area is restricted because of secured openings or where immediate access is necessary for life- saving or fire-fighting purposes. 31
Related Recommendations (1)
R16:
Volunteer fire departments receive greater support from the County and in return, relinquish some of their long held independence. REQUEST FOR RESPONSES The 2007-2008 Grand Jury requests responses from: o The Napa County Board of Supervisors to all the above. o The Napa County Fire Chief to all of the above, except #12. o Chiefs: City of Napa, and Calistoga Fire Departments to Recommendation #15 33 o All Volunteer Napa County Fire Chiefs (optional response as per discretion of each)
F17:
much of Napa County is considered a high fire hazard environment.
F18:
Napa County residents who live in rural areas can expect an emergency response time of 14 minutes; Napa County residents who live in remote (travel distance of > 8 miles) can expect emergency response time of 14+ minutes or more.
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Findings & Recommendations
3 findings
F5:
(Safely Surrendered Baby Law) That the Safely Surrendered Baby Law program has saved the lives of many infants, one in Napa, and can save the lives of many more. Fire District / City Response to Finding 5: We agree that this law can save lives.
Related Recommendations (1)
R5:
That all municipal Fire Departments continue to actively provide information about the Safely Surrendered Baby Law program to the public, including all middle and high schools in Napa County, as a part of their public education programs. Fire District / City Response to Recommendation 5: Presently, the Fire District / City does not have the resources to expand the public education program to include the Safely Surrendered Baby Law program to middle and high school students. The Fire District will begin to implement this educational program to the extent that it can in the future. We will obtain public information materials regarding this program to provide to the public. We will provide access to the informational materials by displaying them in public areas of all Fire District and City facilities. We will also make the materials available during public education displays throughout the community. Received APR - 4 2008 Maria de Como
F6:
(Emergency Operations Plan) That the City of American Canyon, currently operating under the Napa County Emergency Plan, has not established or adopted a disaster response plan specific to American Canyon. Fire District / City Response to Finding 6 We agree that the City of American Canyon should have an Emergency Operations Plan specific to American Canyon.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6:
That the American Canyon City Council adopt an emergency plan specific to the City of American Canyon and the American Canyon Fire District. Fire District / City Response to Recommendation 6 An Emergency Operations Plan specific to American Canyon is in the process of being drafted. Our goal is to have the plan adopted by the council prior to the August 2008 County-wide Earthquake scenario functional exercise. As a part of the overall Emergency Operations plan, the Fire Chief is also in the process of developing Priority and Mass Medication plans and Flu Pandemic plans specific to the community of American Canyon. With the opening of the new Public Safety Facility in July 2007, the community has its first dedicated Emergency Operations Center (EOC) designed for that function located in an essential services building. The American Canyon Fire and Police Chief's are also participating in a County-wide shared mass emergency notification system.
F8:
(NFPA 1710) That while the National Fire Protection Association 1710 recommends each engine responding to a fire call be staffed with four firefighting personnel, Napa Fire Department, American Canyon Fire District, and Calistoga Fire Department frequently respond with three firefighting personnel on each engine. Fire District / City Response to Finding 8: We agree with this finding.
Related Recommendations (1)
R8:
That all Municipal Fire Departments conform to the recommendation of the National Fire Protection Association regarding the number of firefighting personnel on engines responding to a fire call. Fire District / City Response to Recommendation 8: NFPA 1710 is a standard established in 2001 that sets minimum criteria for effectiveness and efficiency of emergency operations to protect the safety of the Public and Fire Department employees. The services covered in 1710 include, but are not limited to, fire suppression and emergency medical operations. The standard describes requirements for delivery of services, response capabilities, incident management, and strategy. . * • Key points identified in NFPA 1710 are as follows: minimum engine and truck staffing staffing for BLS response and staffing for ALS response Fire departments must be capable of establishing a Rapid Intervention Team (RIT) at all incidents. Fire departments must staff chief's aide positions. Response times of 4 minutes for the first arriving fire unit and/or the arrival of the full alarm assignment in 8 minutes. Fire departments must be capable of establishing incident command, water supply, attacks line(s), backup line(s), search and rescue team(s), ventilation team(s) and RIT at all structural fires; these "benchmark" requirements are based upon a 2000 square foot detached single family dwelling. Urban FD's will have to increase the requirements according to the occupancies & hazards in their community. minimum requirements for health and safety, incident management, training, communications and pre-incident planning. Fire departments must inform the public about their response capabilities and the consequences of not meeting this specified deployment criteria. The American Canyon Fire Protection District recognizes the value of complying with NFPA 1710 guidelines and is making efforts to reach all of the benchmarks created by the standard for measuring career fire department performance and staffing levels. One of the biggest misconceptions about NFPA 1710 is that it requires four-person staffing of every apparatus. In fact, NFPA 1710's definition of company in section 3.8.1 indicates that the engine-company complement may arrive on different pieces of apparatus as long as they are dispatched and arrive at the same time, continuously operate together and are managed by one company officer. For example, a two-person engine and two-person medic dispatched at the same time and arriving together would be in compliance. Mutual aid and automatic-aid agreements also may be used to comply. Due to budget limitations, it is currently necessary to utilize available staffing in a way that enhances our capability to respond to a second simultaneous call in District (72% medical aids) by staffing more than one apparatus. . . . The following are corrections to the 2007-2008 Grand Jury Report: - American Canyon Fire District Personnel Fire Chief • Assistant Fire Chief "A" Shift 1 Captain 1 Engineer 3 Firefighters 1 Captain "B" Shift 1 Engineer 4 Firefighters 2 Captains "C" Shift 3 Firefighters Reserve Firefighters available as needed ٠ Corrections Fire Chief Assistant Fire Chief "A" Shift 2 Captains 3 Firefighters (Driver-operator qualified) "B" Shift 2 Captains 3 Firefighters (Driver-operator qualified) 2 Captains "C" Shift 3 Firefighters (Driver-operator qualified) Reserve Firefighters - maximum of 20 . . . . . . /10 Paragraph 1 One Administrative Assistant supports the firefighter personnel. Firefighter assignments are one to two Fire Captains per shift, 48 hours on, 96 hours off; five to six firefighters per shift 48 hours on, 96 hours off. A plan is in place to increase to six captains, two per shift. This change would allow for two responding vehicles with three firefighter personnel per vehicle. At the same time, there is a plan to consolidate the firefighter and engineer positions. There is also a plan to increase shift personnel to six firefighters per shift in 2009. Long-range plans call for a second fire facility to be constricted in an area west of Highway 29 in American Canyon. Corrections One Administrative Assistant supports the firefighter personnel. Firefighter assignments are 2 Fire Captains and 3 firefighter/driver-operators per shift 48 hours on, 96 hours off. Five personnel are assigned to each shift with a minimum staffing of four. The engineer classification has been eliminated. Long-range plans could call for a second fire facility to be constructed in an area west of Highway 29 in American Canyon. A plan to increase shift personnel to six firefighters in 2009 has not been adopted by the Board of Directors. Paragraph 2 - Residency requirement There is a residency requirement for firefighters to live within 50 miles and be available for callbacks. Correction There is no residency and/or callback requirement. Paragraph 2 - Automatic Aid Automatic aid response from Vallejo and Napa provides eight more firefighting personnel and additional equipment in response to an emergency incident. Correction The Fire District has separate automatic aid agreements with Vallejo and Cal Fire / Napa County that provide additional staffing and equipment in the event of structure fires or major vehicle accidents. - Equipment 2 swiftwater rescue boats with diving team
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Findings & Recommendations
29 findings
F1:
The oversight of the renovations of the Calistoga and Mondavi Farmworker Housing Centers was the responsibility of the Board of Commissioners of the NVHA with advisory input from the FWHOC.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
All Joint Powers Authorities (JPA) have a clear, defined set of rules for its members as they come from different municipalities with different operating procedures. The JPA members must know which rules are to be followed. It is the responsibility of the JPA Counsel to update members as rules change.
F2:
Due to a number of post contract changes in the projects required by the NCCDPD and the County Fire Marshall, there were major costs incurred in excess of the original contract prices on both projects; $1,020,118 for Calistoga and $ 742,264 for Mondavi, resulting in a total overrun of $1,762,382.
F3:
The Board of Commissioners of the NVHA failed to exercise control over the Calistoga and Mondavi projects when, based on the information available to them during the projects, they knew, or should have known, that the cost of these renovations was far exceeding contract amounts.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
Members of these County agencies and advisory groups attend the meetings, read the agenda material before they vote and remain vigilant. As a matter of policy, they not simply rely upon staff but rather follow the precept outlined in Ordinance 05-01, to read and understand what comes before them.
F4:
The FWHOC failed in its designated responsibilities to discuss and make recommendations to the NVHA and the Supervisors with regard to the progress, the costs incurred and the availability of funds to pay for the renovations. The Committee members knew, or should have known, that the costs were exceeding contract amounts.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
Members of these County agencies and advisory groups attend the meetings, read the agenda material before they vote and remain vigilant. As a matter of policy, they not simply rely upon staff but rather follow the precept outlined in Ordinance 05-01, to read and understand what comes before them.
F5:
The problem of cash shortfalls surfaced in April 2006, when all of the Grant funds were expended to pay for charges. The deficit continued to grow to the end of the projects resulting in a cash shortfall of $1,453,711.
F6:
The Commissioners of the NVHA and the members of the FWHOC failed to inquire into who was providing the cash to cover the shortfall so the renovations could be completed.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
Members of these County agencies and advisory groups attend the meetings, read the agenda material before they vote and remain vigilant. As a matter of policy, they not simply rely upon staff but rather follow the precept outlined in Ordinance 05-01, to read and understand what comes before them.
F7:
The NVHA and the FWHOC were more focused on having the renovations of the Calistoga and Mondavi Farmworker Housing Centers completed by the fall harvest of 2006, than how they were being financed.
F8:
During construction of these projects, many of the NVHA Commissioners and FWHOC members did not regularly attend meetings and many meetings had to be canceled for lack of a quorum.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
Members of these County agencies and advisory groups attend the meetings, read the agenda material before they vote and remain vigilant. As a matter of policy, they not simply rely upon staff but rather follow the precept outlined in Ordinance 05-01, to read and understand what comes before them.
F9:
The Executive Director of the NVHA and HACN, without informing the NVHA Board of Commissioners or the FWHOC and without authorization from the City of Napa and HACN, used City of Napa and HACN funds in excess of $2,000,000. The ability to thus manipulate funds was due, in part, to the same incumbent occupying 32 management roles for two distinct organizations (NVHA and HACN) where their funds had been commingled.
Related Recommendations (1)
R12:
Governmental entities must avoid having one individual serve in an executive position with access to financial resources for two organizations. Such a policy will significantly reduce the opportunity for conflict of interest and commingling or misallocation of funds. REQUEST FOR RESPONSES The 2007-2008 Grand Jury requests responses from: • Napa County Board of Supervisors on Recommendations: 1-4, 5, 6, 10,
F10:
The NVHA Board, the FWHOC and the City of Napa were informed of the unauthorized use of funds after all the charges for the renovations were incurred.
F11:
While the Executive Director’s intentions may have been to complete the renovations prior to the 2006 fall harvest, this does not excuse use of City of Napa funds and HACN funds without authorization of the City of Napa and the HACN.
F12:
The City of Napa Finance Department had an outdated and inadequate financial/accounting system, operated by an insufficient and under trained staff. The Finance Department was not aware of the unauthorized use of City of Napa and HACN funds to pay for the NVHA Calistoga and Mondavi projects until after the projects were completed and all costs were paid.
Related Recommendations (2)
R8:
The City of Napa continue to take steps to improve the operation of its Finance Department and install systems to allow it to have current and accurate financial information.
R9:
The Finance Department be headed by an accounting professional and have sufficient trained staff to maintain operations.
F13:
The NCCDPD issued a building permit for the Calistoga renovations based on an inadequate plan review. In addition, the NCCDPD delayed the Calistoga project by taking three months to issue a building permit after it had signed-off on the submitted plans.
Related Recommendations (2)
R5:
For any future capital improvement project of NCHA, a professional project manager or the Public Works Department be retained and the project be sent out for bid after a building permit is issued and the financing for the project is in place.
R7:
The NCCDPD assure that thorough plan checks are done and that permits are issued on a timely basis.
F14:
The NVHA sent the Mondavi project out to bid before the building permits were issued, resulting in many change orders.
Related Recommendations (1)
R5:
For any future capital improvement project of NCHA, a professional project manager or the Public Works Department be retained and the project be sent out for bid after a building permit is issued and the financing for the project is in place.
F15:
The NVHA undertook to manage the Calistoga and Mondavi projects without sufficient prior experience in construction management.
Related Recommendations (1)
R5:
For any future capital improvement project of NCHA, a professional project manager or the Public Works Department be retained and the project be sent out for bid after a building permit is issued and the financing for the project is in place.
F16:
The NVHA Executive Director had both actual and implied authority from the NVHA Board to authorize and approve the change orders on the two projects.
F17:
The NVHA Board of Commissioners and the FWHOC members had contemporaneous knowledge that the Executive Director was approving and signing change orders but none of them objected.
F18:
In the aftermath of these projects, there had been an effort by some government officials to focus blame solely on the former NVHA Executive Director.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4:
The Board of Supervisors, acting as the NCHA, take steps to restore the public’s trust in the management of farmworker housing.
F19:
County Counsel’s memorandum to the Board of Supervisors dated December 18, 2006, criticizing the NVHA Executive Director, is based on an incomplete, insufficient investigation.
F20:
Documents supplied to meeting agendas do not always list the author(s) of the document(s).
Related Recommendations (1)
R10:
All supporting documents for the Agenda for public agency meetings in Napa County list the name of the author(s).
F21:
An independent accounting firm reported numerous problems with the controls and oversight of NVHA in a Management Report to the NVHA Commissioners.
F22:
The NVHA Commissioners agreed with most of the audit findings in a response to the auditors which was apparently never made public.
F23:
The NVHA does not yet have a capital improvements budget. 33
Related Recommendations (1)
R11:
The NCHA establish a capital improvement fund for the farmworker housing centers.
F24:
The Settlement Agreement between the County of Napa and the Cities of Napa, American Canyon, St. Helena and Calistoga and the town of Yountville and their respective housing authorities allocating the repayment of the City of Napa funds used by the NVHA, was a reasonable way to resolve this financial issue.
F25:
The first sentence of Recital L to the Settlement Agreement erroneously states that the Executive Director did not have authority to sign change orders. This Recital was drafted by the County Counsel.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6:
Agreements to which local governmental agencies are parties not contain false statements in the recitals. 34
F26:
There was no formal training or orientation program for people appointed to, or who volunteered to be on, the FWHOC or the NVHA.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
A training manual be developed and training provided for new members of any County agency and advisory group. The training must include the legal basis for that entity and other regulations that are important to know in carrying out their role and the requirements of the Brown Act.
F27:
From the Grand Jury’s own investigation and the audit of NVHA’s books by the independent auditor, it appears that all of the funds were expended on the project and that no one appeared to profit individually.
F28:
The renovations to the Calistoga and Mondavi Farmworkers Housing Centers provide a safe, clean and habitable abode for the farmworkers.
F2006:
In preparing the Mondavi plans, the architect used the same building codes that were earlier used in the Calistoga project as the plans for that project had been so readily approved by the initial plan checker and the then Fire Marshall. The Mondavi plans were submitted to the NCCDPD on October 5, 2005, shortly before the building inspectors started to raise issues with the Calistoga project. In light of the problems incurred with the Calistoga plans, the architect warned NVHA against starting the bidding process until the Mondavi plans were finally approved. NVHA, in its desire to begin the Mondavi project as soon as possible, disregarded the architect’s warning and sent out the plans for public bid on October 24, 2005. NVHA awarded the job on December 6, 2005, and signed the construction contract for $1,170,535 on February 6, 2006. However, on the first review of the Mondavi plans on December 22, 2005, the plan checker insisted that the plans conform to the R1 occupancy definition, a different occupancy level than the architect had used in preparation of the plans. This plan checker also noted that the Building Code used by the architect did not have the current supplement. The marked up plans were returned to the architect who made the necessary changes and resubmitted the plans. On January 20, 2006, the plan checker completed a second check of the plans and required further changes. During this time period, the architect was meeting with the Director of the NCCDPD to resolve the corrections occurring with the Calistoga project. It was then decided, by the Director of the NCCDPD, that the Mondavi plans should be reviewed taking into account the many changes to the Calistoga project. This resulted in a third and fourth plan checker review of the Mondavi plans on February 13, 2006, and on March 6, 2006. The changes from these reviews are referred to as DELTA 4 changes and ultimately cost $309,663. A building permit for the Mondavi project was issued on March 28, 2006, and construction began shortly thereafter. Final inspection of the Mondavi Farmworker Center and approval for occupancy was conducted on September 21, 2006, some six months after construction began. Unlike the Calistoga project, the corrections to the plans were done in a timely fashion and resulted in a R1 code compliant set of plans upon which a building permit was issued. The additional expenses on this project are set forth in Appendix 4. The major faults on the Mondavi Project are the NVHA did not have a budget for the Mondavi project against which the actual cost could be measured so that appropriate steps could be taken to secure proper funding; and the NVHA did not follow the advice of the architect not to send out the project for bid until the building permit was issued. Had NVHA done so, the bid price would have included the changes and the cost of the project could have been addressed. On November 21, 2005, NVHA signed a contract for the renovation of a mobile home to house the Mondavi Center’s manager and cook. The renovation included placing the mobile home on a permanent foundation. The contract price was $60,744. This phase of the project was completed on February 20, 2006, two weeks after the contract was signed with the general contractor. The final cost for the mobile home renovation was $76,936. In the final analysis, it is difficult to identify what items were overruns and what items would have been required if a thorough plan check had been performed. What is clear is that the NVHA did not have any idea of what needed to be done and what would be the total cost for these projects. This lack of foresight set into motion a series of events, which, once started, were difficult to stop. c) Facility Review During the course of this investigation, the Grand Jury toured the Calistoga and Mondavi Centers and noted significant construction deficiencies and deferred maintenance. The overall impression was that the facilities were safe, clean and a considerable improvement over the facilities before the renovations. The NVHA did not prepare a capital improvement or maintenance plan. d) Project Time Line In order to further show the interaction between the construction phase (explained above) and the financial phase (to be addressed in the next Section) for both projects, the Grand Jury constructed a time line which is set forth in Appendix 5. 4) Overview of the Projects: What Caused the Lack of Adequate Financing? a) City of Napa Finance Department Accepted Practice for Funding Capital Improvement Projects As previously noted, the finances of the NVHA were managed by the City of Napa Finance Department and the HACN pursuant to a contract for those services. The HACN had its own cash account within the Finance Department 13 until July 2005. It was an accepted practice of the Finance Department to allow a Napa City or HACN capital account to go negative if there were sufficient accounts receivable to cover the negative amount. However, neither the City Council nor the Board of the HACN authorized or gave permission to the Executive Director of the HACN to advance Napa City funds or HACN funds against NVHA approved Grants (NVHA accounts receivable) for the NVHA construction and renovation expenses incurred for the Calistoga and Mondavi Farmworker Housing Centers. In this case, the NVHA accounts receivable included the approved Joe Serna Jr. Grants which the Finance Department knew, or should have known about. Also included were the committed funds from the Napa County Low Income Housing Trust Fund and part of the reserve fund of the CSA#4 Funds. It is uncertain whether or not the Finance Department knew of the existence of these additional funds. As funds were actually received from the above sources and from private donations, these funds would be credited to the NVHA Capital Fund (Fund 41). Prior to July 2005, the amount of funding, if authorized, that could have been advanced to cover a negative balance in NVHA Capital Fund (Fund 41), would have been limited to the amount of funding in the HACN separate cash account within the Finance Department. This limiting factor was removed when the separate cash account was merged into the Napa City cash account which had sufficient monies, if authorized, to cover any negative balance within the NVHA Capital Fund (Fund 41). b) NVHA Funding for These Projects The Joe Serna Jr. Grant required 100% matching funds, with up to 50% in real estate and the remainder in cash. Ten percent of the grant was withheld until a final inspection was completed and a Certificate of Occupancy was issued for the project. As can be seen from Table 2, NVHA needed to raise an additional $ 1,250,754 above the $1,170,523 in matching funds. This fact was not recognized by the NVHA when the renovation projects of the farmworker housing were undertaken. The time line in Appendix 5 sets forth when the various grants were applied for, granted and paid out by the State of California. TABLE 2. GRANTS PRIOR TO JANUARY 1, 2007 Funding Grant Matching Source Funding Funds Final cost Funds Needed Calistoga Joe Serna #1 $1,066,046.00 $533,023.00 Joe Serna #3 $ 500,000.00 $250,000.00 Total $1,566,046.00 $783,023.00 $2,624,875.00 $1,058,829.00 Mondavi Joe Serna #2 $ 775,000.00 $387,500.00 $2,137,448.00 $1,362,448.00 Total $2,341,046.00 $1,170,523.00 $4,762,323.00 $2,421,277.00 NVHA received an anonymous donation of $250,000 of which $218,611 was used. NVHA had a commitment from the Napa County Affordable Housing Trust of $500,000 which was received in June 2006. As a further funding source, NVHA planned to use up to $250,000 but instead used only $220,152 from the CSA#4 reserve funds that were received in December of 2006. The NVHA also received other donations and income during this time in the amount of $28,803. The total money raised and received prior to January 1, 2007, was $967,566 which was $202,957 short of the required matching funds. The total shortfall was $1,453,711 the sum of $1,250,754 ($2,421,277 - $1,170,523) and $202,957. By the end of December 2006, it was clear that the program had serious financial problems. The question is, when should the responsible governmental agencies have ascertained the lack of available funds? Using the information obtained during its investigation, the Grand Jury was able to document what the balance of the NVHA capital account (Fund 41) should have been at the end of each month (Figure 1). FIGURE 1. NVHA CAPITAL ACCOUNT BALANCE BY MONTH NVHA Capital Account (Fund 41) Month End Balance 1300000 1100000 900000 700000 500000 300000 100000 -100000 -300000 -500000 -700000 -900000 -1100000 -1300000 -1500000 -1700000 -1900000 -2100000 -2300000 -2500000 -2700000 -2900000 -3100000 16 Sep-04 Oct-04 Nov-04 Dec-04 Jan-05 Feb-05 Mar-05 Apr-05 May-05 Jun-05 Jul-05 Aug-05 Sep-05 Oct-05 Nov-05 Dec-05 Jan-06 Feb-06 Mar-06 Apr-06 May-06 Jun-06 Jul-06 Aug-06 Sep-06 Oct-06 Nov-06 Dec-06 Jan-07 Finance Dept Cash View NVHA Acct. Rec. View The Finance Department line is strictly a cash balance which accounts for charges as they were paid and money as deposited. The NVHA line includes the three Joe Serna Jr. Grants when they were approved as being accounts receivable, all other money when deposited and all charges when paid. From the NVHA line, it is clear that as of the end of April 2006, all the funds had been used to cover expenses. It appears from the Finance Department line, that if the Finance Department had balanced and then reviewed Fund 41, at the end of each month, they would have been alerted of a potential problem in October 2005. However, if at that time the Finance Department contacted NVHA, they would have been told that the negative amount was covered by approved Grants. The matter of the use of City of Napa or HACN funds for the NVHA projects would have been evident at that time and could have been addressed and resolved. By the end of April 2006, all the Grant funds were designated to pay pending charges and Fund 41, went negative as illustrated by the NVHA line. At this time, April, 2006, the Finance Department’s line would have indicated a deficit of approximately $1,500,000 most of which was not covered by any Grant funding. The unfunded deficit would have continued to grow and at the end of the projects would have been approximately $1,400,000 as shown by the NVHA line. According to the Finance Department line, the deficit was over $3,000,000 which was reduced to approximately $2,200,000 by December 2006. The difference between the two lines in December 2006, is the $775,000 from Joe Serna Jr. Grant #2. Although this Grant was approved, it could not be drawn against until the title to the Mondavi project was transferred into the NVHA name, which occurred in 2007. The Executive Director knew that unauthorized funds were being advanced against NVHA accounts receivables and that at least by mid 2006, knew there were not enough committed funds to cover the expenses being accrued. While he did make an attempt to obtain additional funds from the Napa County Affordable Housing Trust, he failed to provide an estimate of what funds were required and therefore no further funding was granted. While the Executive Director did not know the exact amount, there was enough information to give an estimate. Further the Executive Director stated many times that due to the inadequate plan check on the Calistoga Farmworker Housing Center, the Executive Director looked to Napa County to supply funding. The Grand Jury has not been able to ascertain whether the Executive Director made such a request to the County. In any event, this source of funding did not materialize. It is not known why the Executive Director did not apply for another Joe Serna Jr. Grant for the Mondavi Farmworker Housing Center in mid 2006, as was done later in 2007. The Executive Director of the NVHA and HACN did not seek permission from the City of Napa to draw against their cash fund without having a confirmed source of funds to cover the advancement. It was not until late October 2006, that the Executive Director brought the unfunded expenditures (then stated as $1,613,904) to the attention of the FWHOC and the Board of Commissioners of the NVHA. The unfunded expenditures were then brought to the attention of the City of Napa Attorney in November 2006. As previously noted, the Executive Director resigned in December 2006. The negative balance of Fund 41, as of January 1, 2007, had two components, a funded portion and an unfunded portion as shown in TABLE 3. TABLE 3. CITY OF NAPA FUNDS ADVANCED AS OF JANUARY, 2007 Advanced $2,228,711.00 Joe Serna #3 Funded $775,000.00 Unfunded $1,453,711.00 17 The unfunded amount of $1,453,711 was eventually funded. The Joe Serna Jr. Grant #4 was approved in May 2007, for $691,000 which left an unfunded shortfall of $762,711. After a donation of $205,000 was made by the Napa Valley Vintners (NVV) for these projects, the remaining unfunded amount was $555,771 owed to the City of Napa Housing Authority. This $555,771 was finally covered by a settlement agreement between the NVHA, the City of Napa, the HACN, the City of American Canyon, the County of Napa and the Housing Authorities of the Cities of Calistoga and St. Helena and the Town of Yountville. TABLE 4. SOURCES FOR UNFUNDED OBLIGATIONS POST JANUARY, 2007 (AS SHOWN IN TABLE 3) Joe Serna #4 $691,000.00 Auction Napa Valley 2007 $205,000.00 Settlement Agreement $557,711.00 Total $1,453,711.00 What is disturbing to the Grand Jury about this scenario is although the Executive Director told at least the Board of the NVHA and the FWHOC that there were ongoing increases in costs and that funds were being sought, no one, not the Board of NVHA, the FWHOC, nor the Deputy County Counsel, acting as counsel for the NVHA, asked the simple obvious question: “Where are the funds coming from to pay the contractor’s charges?” The Grand Jury posed this question to the above-mentioned representatives: “Since you knew that a Joe Serna Jr. grant in the amount of $775,000 for the Mondavi project could not be drawn against until the title to the land was transferred to the NVHA and that the NVHA approved and signed two Mondavi contracts for $60,744 and $1,170,532 respectively, where did you think the cash would come from to pay the contractor until the title to the land was transferred?” No meaningful response was given. DISCUSSION 1) The Blame Game The Executive Director of the NVHA appeared at a Special Meeting of the NVHA on December 20, 2006. The meeting minutes only report that he read a public statement. It is not clear why the minutes do not describe his statement of apology and concerns about the role of others given the magnitude of the overruns. The Grand Jury has obtained a copy of the statement9 which reads in part: The situation created by my decision to cover the cost overruns and funding the project deficit of NVHA with HACN reserve funds has caused me one of my greatest personal and professional challenges of my life... At the time, based upon my ongoing communication with both the FWOC and NVHA, I believed that my decision was necessary... I feel relieved that I can now respond in public. I have already in private session apologized and taken responsibility for my actions with the NVHA and HACN Board of Directors... I was attempting to provide to all of you the most updated information on the problems we were experience[ing], why we were experiencing them, the cost impacts and that the NVHA was going to need to identify and raise funds to cover the cost overruns. Hindsight is always 20/20. Looking back I wish I could have found a better way to communicate the problem... I must also bring to the attention of my two boards and the community that there were several other mistakes made by other public employees of the County of Napa throughout this construction project…These mistakes were a direct cause of a major portion of the cost overruns and had nothing to do with the actions of the NVHA. The report put together by County Counsel, is an attempt to explain away a number of these mistakes made by several county departments, including his own which is responsible for providing legal services to the NVHA since I became Executive Director. The Executive Director wrote a letter to the Napa Valley Register10 in which he stated: 19 On December 20, 2006…I publicly apologized to my two boards, the Farmworker Oversight committee, industry organizations…and the general public for actions I was responsible for that played a major role in creating a funding crisis... The most glaring omission from this report is the identification of what agency provided legal counsel to both the [FWHOC] and the [NVHA], reviewed and approved the bid documents and construction contracts for both projects and also reviewed all staff reports and change order logs that were provided...I know that an independent investigation and audit of the public documents will show the truth on this matter. Following the public awareness of the overruns, the Director of Napa Valley Grapegrowers Association wrote a letter11 to the Board of Supervisors, members of the NVHA, the County Executive and the Mayor of Napa publicly acknowledging that he did not know of the extraordinary cost overruns for a period of one year since they were first reported to the FWHOC. It reads in part, As you know, I represent the NVG on the Napa County Farmworker Housing Oversight Committee [FWHOC], and in that capacity became aware of the extraordinary cost overruns for the renovation of the Calistoga and Mondavi camps at the October 27, 2006 meeting of that committee. The NVG has discussed this issue …and would like to express our deep concern about these expenditures and the process that went into approving costs related to renovating the camps. Similarly, the President of the NVV wrote a letter12 to the NVHA Board of Directors, its Executive Director, the Chairman of the Board of Supervisors and the Mayor of Napa. It stated in part, It has come to the NVV’s attention, however, that the recent renovations of the Calistoga and Mondavi farmworker housing centers, which were budgeted at $3 million, have over-run by $1.5 million, … The NVV understands that none of these over-runs were approved by the Housing Authority Board of Directors. Furthermore, the size of the overruns was a surprise to the Napa County Farmworker Oversight Committee. Frankly, the NVV is deeply concerned at this level of financial mismanagement on the part of the Housing Authority staff. …we can no longer support these programs unless the following actions are taken: • A full accounting, by an outside auditor,… • Development of an approved plan to pay for the over-runs… 20 • Assurance that the Housing Authority staff responsible for expenditure of unauthorized funds are held accountable. • New policies and procedures are established to prevent recurrence of this type of situation in the future. The letter concluded by noting that the self-assessed fees paid by the grape- growing community were to be renewed early in 2007, and the approval would be strongly influenced by the confidence they have in the integrity of the system for administering these funds. Here too, it is troublesome that an organization which had membership on the FWHOC implies that they did not know of the overruns and suggest that none of the overruns were accepted by the NVHA. It suggests that they had no idea that the Board of Commissioners had adopted a resolution granting such authority to the Executive Director. 2) The Written Record of the Contemporaneous Knowledge of the Overruns As can be seen in the previous section, the public response of members of the NVHA and the FWHOC was to deny any knowledge of the overruns and to suggest that the Executive Director acted on his own. The Grand Jury has reviewed the meeting minutes for the NVHA and the FWHOC and presents an abridged version of the relevant sections from the public record in Appendix 6, to allow the reader to judge what was said and when it was said. Many meetings were cancelled, usually because of a lack of a quorum, but an agenda and staff reports had been prepared in advance and distributed to members. The Grand Jury found the same statements repeated in the minutes, month after month, of how funds were to be requested from the County Board of Supervisors and other sources without substantive discussion of when the request would be submitted and how much money would be required. It is important to note that in October 2005, the FWHOC was told of a $500,000 overrun. The NVHA was aware of the overrun by at least February, 2006, as they were voting to request an additional grant from the State. They also knew in April and May of 2006, of over $1,500,000 in change orders and unexpected costs. Throughout this time frame both entities were made aware of the series of problems in obtaining approved, workable plans from the NCCDPD and the necessity to lease a private farmworker camp due to the closure of the camps under prolonged renovation. An email dated February 2006, written by a member of the FWHOC to the chairs of the NVHA and the FWHOC and others questioned 21 the overruns and the economic feasibility of renovations. The Grand Jury found that none of the email recipients took any substantive action. In addition to membership on the FWHOC or the NVHA, many members also attended meetings of an ad hoc farmworker advocacy and farmworker committee which met regularly to discuss issues such as the renovations. At the March 6, 2006, meeting of the Farmworker Committee, with members from the NVV present, an extensive discussion of “costly and time-consuming additions, some unanticipated and some required by the county have occurred at Calistoga.” It was reported that the additions were then at $600,000 above budget. Various committee members expressed their concern about this situation and decided they wanted a meeting with Supervisors to discuss the county’s role. A meeting was subsequently held with two County Supervisors “to discuss the permit problems and subsequent cost overruns that have occurred with the renovations”. Both Supervisors expressed concern about the situation and were aware of similar complaints. They also agreed that “all county departments should be on the same page with NVHA and others involved in farmworker issues”.13 In June 2006, the minutes mention that a Supervisor had called a meeting of all county departments to discuss how to expedite the project. These minutes show that many grapegrowers, vintners and others were knowledgeable about the renovation overruns from different sources. 3) The Lack of Management and Oversight by the Governmental Entities Previous Background Sections have described the planning process, funding sources for the farmworker housing renovations and the oral and written record of these government entities. In this Section, the emphasis is on the management role played by members of numerous organizations. It should be noted that several people held membership on both the FWHOC and the Board of Commissioners of the NVHA and that, by statute, two members of the NVHA were County Supervisors. It is therefore reasonable to expect that news of problems reported at one entity would be known to members of all entities. The Editors of the Napa Valley Register ended 2006, by noting that, “The buck doesn’t stop with Dreier.” 14 They outlined the role played by the Executive Director and then found fault with the NVHA Board of Commissioners, the advisory Farmworker Oversight Committee and the County planners for their role in the overruns. The Grand Jury presents its findings on these, and additional, parties below. a) NVHA Board of Commissioners and FWHOC The Grand Jury looked at how the NVHA Board of Commissioners and the FWHOC managed the information provided by staff. Although these people are 22 finance professionals, career management consultants, career public servants and very interested parties (Farm Bureau, Napa Grapegrowers, Napa Vintners), we detected little oversight for these projects. The record reveals that members of these entities missed many meetings. In fact, numerous meetings were cancelled during the summer of 2006, due to lack of a quorum when the renovation projects were going full bore. A staff administrative assistant often called members prior to meetings to remind them to attend. Data packages were prepared prior to each meeting by the NVHA staff and sent to the Deputy County Counsel for review and approval before being sent to the Boards. There is no evidence in the meeting minutes that any member suggested that the projects be slowed or halted. There is no evidence that anyone asked where the funds were coming from to cover the increased project needs or what funds were being used for the current costs paid to the contractor. The Grand Jury has evaluated the cash flow for the two construction projects and noted a serious, prolonged shortfall that was not dealt with by management. When the overruns became public knowledge, many members of the FWHOC voiced their “deep concern at this level of financial mismanagement on the part of the Housing Authority Staff” and wanted “assurance that the Housing Authority staff responsible for expenditure of unauthorized funds are held accountable.” The Grand Jury found no accountability has been forthcoming from any of these individuals, who had advisory or leadership roles. The Grand Jury found that people trusted the Executive Director and accepted the Executive Director’s version of the problems and efforts to find financing, “there was no reason not to believe him, never any reason to doubt him.” Packages of information were provided by staff for meetings; those reading the information thought the budget was covered as presented, “I assumed that everything [the Executive Director] did was according to Hoyle, as did others around the table.” While the Grand Jury recognizes that written staff reports do not reveal a sense of urgency, or a clear budget overview of the financial situation, the Grand Jury questions why the NVHA Board did not engage in any analysis of the situation. It is interesting to note that the operating budget for the farmworker centers was presented in great detail each month while the capital budget was remarkably devoid of details. One person indicated that, “This was not rocket science, you listen and read and make decisions—it was disgusting that deeper analysis was not done”. Further evidence of a lack of vigilance can be observed in the fact that the NVHA was found to have operated without an approved budget.15 Due to the need for plan modifications and hence, project delays, the NVHA Board voted16 to lease a farmworker center from a vintner, first for two months and then, as problems persisted, for additional time. Therefore, one might 23 conclude that they were cognizant of the construction delays even if not of the costs. Several people offered, as an excuse for not asking a lot of questions, the fact that people of good will and intentions join committees and boards to perform a service to the community. While they are anxious to serve, they may not have the necessary experience with construction projects, finance or applicable ordinances and thus, there is a tendency to accept reports by staff without much in-depth probing, to act as a rubber stamp, trusting the integrity of the staff. While this lack of comprehension may well be the norm, Napa County voters approved Measure Z17 in 2006, which requires the Supervisors to certify that they have read and approve a particular motion before them because there was evidence that they were “not always reading and aware of what they were passing into law.” By extension, what is important for the Supervisors is important for all who serve the public—to take responsibility for their actions and to act in the best interests of the citizens of Napa County. While it is understandable that it is difficult for many members to develop accounting skills and management skills on the job as volunteers, the Grand Jury does think that life-experience, common sense and intuition need to be used. Members should be provided with training on best practices for committees and an understanding of the framework in which their entity operates as they assume membership. When the news of the overspending became public in December 2006, the County Auditor-Controller recommended that an outside auditing firm without prior commitments with the NVHA or the County, be hired to review the books of the NVHA. This firm made observations and recommendations to management on the following topics in a presentation (June 11, 2007) and report to the NVHA which are annotated below. The accounting firm noted: • That the NVHA did not have formal budget policies and procedures and did not formally adopt an annual operating budget. There was no accounts receivable system in place. The NVHA did not prepare a capital improvement budget. It is essential to have a budget based on projects length to ensure that all capital expenditures are properly authorized by the board and to provide the board control over capital expenditures. • That NVHA did not have its own bank accounts; all funds were commingled with HACN funds. Bank reconciliations were not reviewed by anyone other than the preparer which allowed errors to go undetected. • That the City of Napa and the HACN advanced approximately $2,000,000 to NVHA without approval of the NVHA Board or the City of Napa and the HACN. 24 • That the NVHA did not comply with the Joe Serna Grant agreement by not submitting an annual certified report to the State of California Department of Housing and Community Development nor were some operating and capital reserves maintained in a separate bank account. • That the financial position of the NVHA did not appear healthy due to the significant amount owed to the City of Napa and the HACN which was advanced to the NVHA to cover the significant cost overrun on the Calistoga and Mondavi center renovation projects. During the Grand Jury’s investigation, one person stated, “The report was a big black-eye for anyone in public office, a big embarrassment.” At their June 11, 2007, meeting, the NVHA Board of Commissioners accepted the filing of the independent audits and requested staff to prepare a response to the Management Recommendations. This response of the NVHA, prepared by the staff, does not appear in the public record. The Grand Jury has obtained a copy of the NVHA Management Letter responses issued under the signature of the Chair of the NVHA dated June 26, 2007. The NVHA Management Letter responses concurred with most findings except a few deemed not applicable. The Grand Jury notes that the NVHA Board of Commissioners which had earlier promised the public transparency and a full accounting of what allowed the overruns to take place, essentially buried this letter and the response which explained that they were responsible due to a lack of operating controls. They did not dispute this in their acceptance of the report. b) NVHA Executive Director The Executive Director of the NVHA, with concurrence of the Board, set the stage for all of the untoward events to take place by sending the plans for the Mondavi Center out to bid without having approved plans. This added to the financial problems initiated by the NCCDPD’s inadequate review of the Calistoga Center plans. It is not clear why the Executive Director did not obtain experienced personnel to manage these construction projects as was done to build the River Ranch camp. Apparently, the NVHA had solicited assistance from the County Public Works Department but was turned down due to lack of time. The Grand Jury was told that an external manager was not sought in order to keep the budget low. Thus, a staff person, with no formal training or experience in the management of construction projects and without an appropriate knowledge base, was put in a position by the Executive Director where numerous decisions had to be made. As noted previously, the Executive Director of the NVHA failed to inform the Boards of the NVHA or HACN, or the FWHOC, that he had been using City of Napa funds to pay for the overruns until late in October 2006. c) County Counsel Legal services to the NVHA were furnished under contract by the County Counsel’s office. These attorneys prepared and approved NVHA resolutions, agenda, minutes and documents relating to the bidding and contracting process. On December 18, 2006, after the overruns had become public, the County Counsel issued a memorandum18 to the Board of Supervisors, portions of which are presented in Appendix 7. The memorandum attempted to dissect the by-laws and actions taken by the NVHA Board of Commissioners regarding who had responsibility to sign the construction contracts and any change orders. The Grand Jury found it troubling that this memorandum by the County Counsel is at odds with the written documents by which the Executive Director was given the authority to enter into construction contracts and change orders by motions of the NVHA Board of Commissioners. A thorough review of the housing renovation projects by the Grand Jury has not revealed any evidence that anyone ever told the Executive Director not to sign change orders, not to pay bills, or to stop the projects until sufficient money was obtained. Indeed, members of the NVHA Board of Commissioners confirmed that “[the Executive Director] functioned as the project director and it was his job to sign for payment.” The memorandum never questions the role and actions of the NVHA Board of Commissioners or other parties; all of its emphasis was on the possible unauthorized actions by the Executive Director. Parenthetically, it must be mentioned that the County Counsel had responsibility for NVHA legal matters and that a Deputy County Counsel reviewed all contracts and reports and attended, or was supposed to attend, all NVHA Board meetings. The County Counsel’s December 18, 2006, Memorandum states that: The NVHA’s only authorization of its Executive Director to act as its representative in relation to both contracts is contained in the NVHA resolutions (05-03 and 05-13) which initially approved each contract. After approving award of the construction contract, each of these resolutions states only that: “Section 2. Authorizes the Executive Director to execute the contract documents as necessary.” 26 As discussed above, it is doubtful whether the Executive Director had the discretionary authority to approve and bind the NVHA as Owner to post- award changes in the contract price or plans and specifications affecting the contract price. The Grand Jury finds this last sentence to be disingenuous as County Counsel has the responsibility to insure that the operation of the NVHA proceeds within the law and, in fact, the County Counsel’s office drafted these resolutions for adoption by the Board. Further, the record is replete with references to change orders being signed by the Executive Director. The NVHA Board of Commissioners acquiesced in the signing of change orders by the Executive Director, which is evidence of how they interpreted this Resolution. The NVHA Board either granted explicit authority or implicit authority to allow the Executive Director to sign change orders. The memorandum goes on to promise investigations that were never completed. The County Counsel’s office initiated an investigation to determine culpability but it was terminated when the Settlement Agreement19 was signed. During that investigation, no members of the NVHA or the FWHOC were interviewed by the County Counsel’s office. Five months after this memorandum was written, a Settlement Agreement was drafted and approved by all member entities of the NVHA and the City of Napa. The Agreement has a series of paragraphs, Recitals, which describe key items that led to the drafting of the document. It is important to highlight one of these Recitals, as it was intended to be the last, official word on the overrun saga: Recital L. The NVHA Executive Director did not obtain the approval of the NVHA Board of Commissioners to execute any of the additional work which resulted in the Total Cost Overages…Upon learning of the Total Cost Overages, representatives of the governing boards NVHA, the member agencies of NVHA, and the Napa Entities each disputed responsibility for payment of all or some portion of the Total Cost Overages. The Grand Jury takes exception with the portion of Recital L that states the Executive Director did not obtain approval from the NVHA Board of Commissioners to execute the additional work. The NVHA Board of Commissioner resolutions and meeting minutes and our investigations, belie this notion. Recital L also implies that these organizations only recently learned of the overages, which, as we have already discussed above, is not what the NVHA and FWHOC minutes reflect. Prior to a Board vote, staff typically prepares an explanatory document that describes the requested action, financial impact and background information. It is intriguing to read the supportive documentation prepared for the NVHA20 and for the City of Napa21 for the Settlement Agreement, which was drafted by a Deputy County Counsel and the City of Napa Attorney. What makes these documents of such interest, is that they mirror each of the Recitals (E-R) of the Settlement Agreement in most every detail except that they fail to mention the Executive Director and any actions he is alleged to have taken that is otherwise noted in Recital L. The Grand Jury understands that this portion of Recital L was insisted upon by County Counsel. The City of Napa Attorney did not want it in the Agreement. Thus the Grand Jury wonders what the motivation of the County Counsel was in singling out the Executive Director from all those involved, and reporting him guilty of signing change orders without authorization, first in the County Counsel Memorandum and then in Recital L of the Settlement Agreement, when the record reveals otherwise. After reviewing these and numerous other documents relating to the farmworker housing issues, the Grand Jury has reluctantly concluded that the services provided by the County Counsel’s office were occasionally performed in a careless manner. d) City of Napa Finance Department The City of Napa Finance Department allowed the overruns to proceed without check due to the commingling of accounts and general accounting inadequacies. The independent accounting firm brought in after the overruns became public, reviewed all contracts, change orders and financial statements and almost all of the receipts and invoices. While there were weaknesses in the system, it did not find any suspicious financial dealing. All revenues and expenses were properly documented and were related to the project. The City had significant turnover in the Finance Department between 2001, and 2005. Key people left or were let go, resulting in a situation with no knowledgeable leaders and a dysfunctional finance system. The then Finance Director was not an accounting professional and was not focused on the needs of the Department. The computer system used by the City was created in 1976. There is no documentation of the software, which made it difficult to make changes. Approximately 2 years ago, the City began to consider the purchase of a new system. Installation of the new system is said to be progressing satisfactorily and should be operational in July 2008. The culture of the Finance Department allowed the HACN to stand apart and they were not required to follow the City’s policies and procedures. Thus, the staff in Finance did not feel that they had any authority over the HACN finances. During the period of time from 2004-2005, one accounting technician handled the Housing Authority funds. This position was eliminated due to budget cuts resulting in the loss of the Finance Department person who was primarily responsible for handling the Housing Accounts. This resulted in the loss of institutional knowledge. Starting in November 2006, the staff was finally empowered to question the management of the Housing finances. In October 2006, the then Finance Manager who was preparing a State Controller Report for the NVHA, discovered a negative cash balance, called Housing to question this finding and was told that they knew about it. The NVHA Executive Director informed the City Attorney of the situation on November 15, 2006. The Finance Director retired in February 2007. The current Finance Director is prioritizing the department needs to correct the years of benign neglect. Among the recent activities are completion of 3 years of back audits, a budgeting process, the hiring of experienced personnel and the implementation of the new accounting software. e) Napa County Conservation, Development & Planning Department The NCCDPD admits it performed an inadequate review of the Calistoga Center plans that resulted in the need for numerous change orders to the original contract. There was also an excessive, unexplained delay between approval of the plan by the checker and the issuance of a permit. f) County Executive Staff After the Calistoga Center permit was received and construction begun, field inspectors from NCCDPD and the Fire Marshall began to request numerous changes to the plans. A meeting was held with the NVHA staff, a Supervisor, the County Executive Officer and the Director of the NCCDPD to see if a clear plan could be developed. It is, therefore, fair to assume that at least these County leaders were aware of the issues in April 2006. As reported in the NVHA and FWHOC minutes, the Executive Director discussed with the Manager of the Community Partnership Department the possibility of attaining additional funds from the County Affordable Housing Trust Fund to cover the project needs. While there was correspondence on this subject, the Executive Director did not respond to repeated requests from this Manager for an estimate of the total overruns and the amount of the additional funds required. 29 2) The Aftermath: The Key Events of 2007 How did the governmental agencies respond to this crisis in governmental stewardship of public funds? The responses varied among the officials involved in trying to restore the public’s trust. Some can be severely criticized for disclaiming prior knowledge of the overruns, which they clearly had to have had, and some for deflecting responsibility or failing to immediately disclose that unauthorized funds had been taken from one entity to cover costs of another. As both the NVHA and NCHA Board minutes reflect, there were several closed sessions which obviously dealt with this matter. The Grand Jury reminds all of the public stewards of section 54,950 of the California Government Code (the Brown Act) which provides in part: The people do not give their public servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is good for them not to know. The people insist on remaining informed so that they may retain control over the instruments they have created. When the County’s Auditor-Controller learned of financial problems with these projects in November 2006, the Auditor-Controller immediately insisted that the NVHA retain an independent accounting firm to audit NVHA’s finances over the 18-month period during which these problems occurred. This Auditor-Controller recommended an independent accounting firm that had never done any business with the County, the City of Napa, the NVHA or any of the agencies involved in this matter. The NVHA was prohibited from paying any more bills without the prior review and authorization of the County Auditor-Controller. In the spring of 2007, action was taken to have the County regain control of the farmworker housing centers. With the NCHA set to take over operational responsibility for the farmworker centers from NVHA on July 1, 2007, the County Auditor-Controller requested the adoption of a resolution whereby the NCHA would adopt the County budgetary and purchase procedures as its own set procedures. This was approved by the NCHA on March 27, 2007. The Auditor- Controller then started the budgetary process for the NCHA’s fiscal year 2007- 2008 continuing to insure that controls would be maintained. At their March 27, 2007, meeting, the NCHA voted to create the Napa County Housing Commission (NCHC). The main purpose of the NCHC would be to provide input to the NCHA regarding operations of the farmworker housing centers and advise the Board of Supervisors on the allocation of annual assessments imposed within CSA#4. Once the present assessment renewal was 30 completed on or about June 30, 2007, there was no longer a need for a CSA#4 Advisory Committee. Likewise, the creation of NCHC eliminated the need for the FWHOC. On April 24, 2007, the ordinance creating the NCHC was adopted and the FWHOC was dissolved. The CSA#4 Advisory Committee was dissolved effective July 1, 2007. The functions of the two separate committees under the old NVHA, the FWHOC and the CSA#4 Advisory Committee, were then consolidated into a single Commission. The County expects this change to streamline the advisory process and at the same time, “address and resolve the public perception that oversight of the farm labor camps was so diffused among existing committees, that a less than desirable level of accountability exists.” The Grand Jury believes that the County’s first expectation should be realized but believes that the public’s perception will not be so easily altered merely by this change, as some of the same people who served on the NVHA and the FWHOC during the events described in this report, were appointed to serve on the NCHC. The Grand Jury expects that appropriate oversight is now in place to prevent any recurrence of financial mismanagement. While the foregoing changes were being made, the various governmental entities involved were negotiating a resolution of the NVHA debt to the City of Napa, a result of the unauthorized use of the City’s money. This was principally done out of public view. The public learned the results of these negotiations when a NVHA Farmworker Housing Settlement Agreement to cover a portion of the total cost overages of $2,228,711, for renovation of the Calistoga and Mondavi Farmworker Centers, was presented to the NCHA and the Board of Supervisors at their meetings on May 22, 2007. The settlement agreement was approved by all parties with the County of Napa paying $185,904, the City of Napa paying $185,904 and the Cities of American Canyon, Calistoga, St. Helena and Yountville, each paying $46,476. As noted above, the rest of the overage was covered by various sources, principally the State of California Joe Serna, Jr. Farmworker Grants and the NVV contributions. This was indeed an expensive occurrence, not only financially, but also in the loss of public trust. Unfortunately the questions asked by those working to resolve the problem and to restore the public trust, “When it’s the public’s money, you don’t spend without funds or a budget” or “How can you spend money that is not there?”, were not asked by those responsible for the farmworker housing projects in 2005 and 2006. The Grand Jury concludes that it may have spent more time trying to understand the events surrounding the renovation and financing of the two farmworker housing centers than those charged with the responsibility to carry out the original projects. The Grand Jury hopes that these findings will give the public a better understanding of this breakdown of governmental stewardship and are used 31 constructively to improve the governance of future authorities, boards and committees in Napa County. FINDINGS The 2007-2008 Grand Jury finds that: 1. The oversight of the renovations of the Calistoga and Mondavi Farmworker Housing Centers was the responsibility of the Board of Commissioners of the NVHA with advisory input from the FWHOC.
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Findings & Recommendations
16 findings
F1:
NVC has a projected increase in student enrollment over the next ten years.
F2:
NVC is tied to a K-14 funding system/mechanism dictated by the State.
F3:
NVC did not make clear to the citizens of Napa the causes of the increase in cost of the projects of Measure N.
F4:
NVC did not make clear to the citizens of Napa the impact of the failure to pass measure L. 16
F5:
NVC needs to improve and increase its facilities so as to provide for the growing higher educational needs of our community.
F6:
NVCCD currently has a $40,000,000 plus unfunded liability for Other Post Employment Benefits for current and retired employees. These benefits are currently funded on a "pay as you go" basis.
F7:
the NVC CDC has been restructured to prevent misuse of the services.
F8:
NVC does not have a campus-wide, stay-in-place notification system besides the PA/bull horn in each of the Campus Police vehicles.
F9:
there are no “Columbine” locks on classroom doors.
F10:
NVC has instituted the SMS Text Alert system.
F11:
the Board of Trustees voted to train and arm the Campus Police as a security measure.
F12:
Campus Police do not have computers in their Campus vehicles.
F13:
NVC does not have a wireless communications system.
F14:
the solar field and chiller plant help reduce costs to the general fund and over time will pay for themselves.
F15:
The Inmate Welfare Trust Fund and its use for the funding of certain Jail custodial and food staff training does not impart sufficient substantive job skills facilitating inmate transition from detention to the general population.
F16:
The use of Inmate Welfare Trust Fund funds for new evidence-based programs for inmate rehabilitation is a reasonable use of such funds. 9
Additional Recommendations
7
Not linked to specific findings.
R1:
NVC continue to support efforts at the State level to secure a more stable funding mechanism that is not tied to K-14 funding.
R2:
NVC Board of Trustees proceed expeditiously to convert the unfunded health care liabilities from a “pay-as-you-go” to an accrual basis.
R3:
NVC inform the public when promoting new bond issues, not only of what will be gained by the passage of the Bond issue but what will be lost if the Bond issue does not pass.
R4:
NVC take a more pro-active role in informing the public about its accomplishments and needs.
R5:
NVC provide campus-wide wireless access to benefit the faculty, the students and Campus Security.
R6:
computers with wireless capabilities be installed in campus police cars.
R7:
NVC install a campus wide alert/alarm system to inform those on campus of emergency situations and what actions/precautions be taken. REQUEST FOR RESPONSES The 2007-2008 Grand Jury requests responses to all recommendations from: • NVC President • NVC Board of Trustees
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