Alameda County Grand Jury
2002-2003
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Findings & Recommendations
15 findings
F1:
The 1999/2000 FCMAT report placed all key players on notice of impending financial disaster for the OUSD and without substantial spending cuts the system would have major deficits. The report was explicit that OUSD was experiencing declining enrollment, and OUSD needed to monitor enrollment closely. In addition, the report was clear that the district was overestimating its ADA percentage and as such, was further overestimating its revenues. Finally, FCMAT explicitly warned that if not careful, the special education subsidies would be in the tens of millions of dollars.
F2:
The ACOE was specifically on notice. They knew the OUSD had difficulty closing its books in 1999 for the 1998/1999 year. They gave a qualified approval to the OUSD 40 2002-2003 ALAMEDA COUNTY CIVIL GRAND JURY FINAL REPORT____________ _______________________________ Education Committee 1999/2000 first interim in December 1999, indicating their serious concern with district finances. The FCMAT report should have given them even greater concern. Finally, the ACOE was well aware of the enormous turnover in OUSD financial management with different financial leadership in each of the 1999/2000, 2000/2001, and 2001/2002 fiscal years. This turnover, in itself, should have triggered heightened oversight.
F3:
The OUSD Multi-Year Projections 2001-2006 report issued in early 2001 made clear the financial situation of OUSD needed immediate attention. The report did not have to be read carefully. The report was printed in color and projected deficits were displayed in red numbers and were clearly visible even for those unable or unwilling to study the details of the report. The report showed the likelihood of large deficits if appropriate actions were not taken.
F4:
The board delay in purchasing the new computer system cost the district a year in making the changeover. This meant the new system was not operational until July 2002, the beginning of the 2002/2003 year. Had the system been purchased more expeditiously, the fiscal crisis might have been realized a year sooner.
F5:
Grand Jury interviews indicated that the old computer system, however cumbersome, did provide relevant data. Rigorous analysis of the data from the old system would have produced useful results. The new system made seeing problems easier, but its absence cannot be seen as an acceptable excuse for OUSD fiscal mismanagement.
F6:
The teacher salary increase may have been necessary to retain teachers and to replace the 500 or so emergency credentialed teachers with fully credentialed teachers. The issue is not whether the teachers deserved the raise, or whether the raise was necessary to forestall a strike; rather, that paying for the $40+ million per year increase required substantial cuts in other parts of the system. These substantial cuts were not implemented by the board and superintendent. 41 2002-2003 ALAMEDA COUNTY CIVIL GRAND JURY FINAL REPORT____________ _______________________________ Education Committee
F7:
The separation of the various financial departments into isolated enclaves, with little information passed between them, was a recipe for disaster. This isolation was partly responsible for the use of budget estimates, rather than actual spending and revenue data, as the basis for financial reports. This seriously compromised both the internal OUSD control and external oversight systems. Data labeled as “actuals” must be the actual data and must be continually tested for what that partial year spending means for projecting the full year’s costs. The Grand Jury did not determine whether the false data occurred by intent or by negligence. It defies belief that neither OUSD nor ACOE discovered the problem.
F8:
The increased salaries allowed OUSD to replace emergency credentialed teachers with fully credentialed teachers. This reduced vacancies and also had the predictable impact of radically increasing the total salary bill. Somehow there was no budget for these additional costs.
F9:
Some of those interviewed pointed accusatory fingers at the Human Resources (HR) department for hiring people without budgeted positions being available. The Grand Jury found that HR was tasked with hiring new credentialed staff to replace those on emergency credentials. They were successful in doing so. The problem was that HR did not require each hire to be properly accounted for in all parts of the financial system or for those separate departments to even coordinate vacancies and hiring.
F10:
The school board is ultimately responsible for the OUSD. The board was on notice from both the FCMAT and MYP reports that finances were tight and major cuts were required. The board members should have asked more questions and demanded better answers. Had the board done even the most basic calculations, they would have seen that with salary increases of 24%, increases in special education encroachment, and declining 42 2002-2003 ALAMEDA COUNTY CIVIL GRAND JURY FINAL REPORT____________ _______________________________ Education Committee revenue, that the OUSD would not have been able to balance their budget. However, board members are, for the most part, not financial people. Without staff of their own to independently review district finances, it is not realistic to expect the board to do its own rigorous financial analysis. Nevertheless, the OUSD board could have required OUSD staff to provide simple spreadsheets showing how enrollment was meeting budget estimates, and whether salary increases were being offset by spending reductions.
F11:
The OUSD superintendent was able to take a dysfunctional district and institute important educational changes in a relatively short time. In addition, he constantly asked his financial staff whether the budgets were balanced and was repeatedly assured that everything was in order. These reassurances were all the more credible given the positive ACOE certifications and the KPMG audit. It can plausibly be argued that he did everything a superintendent could be expected to do without being his own chief financial officer. Nevertheless, the superintendent is the person ultimately responsible for the operation of the OUSD. When serious problems arise he must be held accountable.
F12:
It is not credible that OUSD first “discovered” the deficit problem when the new computer system was activated. More likely, the new system indicated the sheer magnitude of the deficit. The deputy superintendent was on notice from both the FCMAT and MYP reports of the precarious state of OUSD finances. Moreover, he was aware of the declining enrollment (and its financial costs) from his October 2001, attendance reports, which resulted in his declaring spending moratoriums in November
F13:
The Grand Jury found that there was a difference of opinion as to whether the generally applauded OUSD reforms could have taken place without budget deficits. Some argued that absent greatly increased teacher spending the reforms would not have taken place. The increase in teacher salaries resulted in more certified teachers being in the system. Others argued that had they known the true nature of the deficits, they could have acted sooner to reduce spending without seriously jeopardizing the reforms.
F14:
The Grand Jury learned that COEs are empowered to intervene much earlier and more aggressively than stated by the ACOE. Moreover, the Grand Jury was informed that the ACOE is considered to be in the bottom 25% of aggressiveness of COEs in the state. Under AB1200, the ACOE is clearly empowered to intervene whenever it suspects problems. The ACOE argument that they did everything they could under the law is not acceptable. The ACOE did not need the OUSD financial system on the ACOE computer to request detailed data. The ACOE was aware, and made OUSD explicitly aware, of the problems and impact of declining enrollment. They knew that OUSD was deficit spending. They could easily calculate (or require OUSD to calculate) the cost impacts of the salary increase. They were under no obligation to take the OUSD numbers at face value. Even assuming that OUSD was simply in error (and not deliberately falsifying its books), they had an obligation to help OUSD be clear where they stood financially. 44 2002-2003 ALAMEDA COUNTY CIVIL GRAND JURY FINAL REPORT____________ _______________________________ Education Committee ACOE gave a qualified certification for the 1999/2000 first interim report. They could have done the same in 2001/2002 when they strongly suspected OUSD problems. If the ACOE suspected OUSD financial data was incorrect, ACOE had an obligation to request detailed proof to the contrary. The Grand Jury learned that the previous deputy superintendent, while at the ACOE, would drop into district offices and demand to see actual data. In addition, he kept spreadsheets of 5 years’ history of critical budget and enrollment data. It is up to the school districts to satisfy the COE of their financial health. Without that, the COE can give them a qualified rating until they provide sufficient information to satisfy the COE. This is reflected in data available from the state of California, in records of discussions on AB1200, and the subsequent AB139, which clarifies and strengthens the role of the COE.
F15:
The real tragedy, and the primary failing in oversight, is that the 2001/2002 problems weren't caught sooner. Precarious school district finances can turn negative very quickly. Given the difficulty of reducing spending in the major spending category, teachers salaries, during a particular year, it is understandable that there was a large deficit in one school year. What is unconscionable is that the situation was allowed to roll over to the 2002/2003 year. It took much too long to identify the problems, and even longer to begin solving them. CONCLUSION The system for financing public school districts requires overhaul. Districts throughout the state and throughout Alameda County are in serious financial difficulty with many facing financial disaster. However, inadequate funding is not an excuse for failure to operate within those constraints. Similarly, it is not an excuse for those tasked with providing oversight, and who do not act proactively or aggressively until a crisis has gotten out of hand. 45 2002-2003 ALAMEDA COUNTY CIVIL GRAND JURY FINAL REPORT____________ _______________________________ Education Committee More specifically:
Additional Recommendations
2
Not linked to specific findings.
R1:
the current site sits on an active earthquake fault, 2) the current facility is seriously deteriorated, and 3) there had been debate as to whether its capacity is sufficient. For over a decade the need for a new facility has been recognized but there had been no definitive action taken by the Board of Supervisors except the initiation of an EPA report on four possible sites. Previous grand juries expressed serious concerns for the delays in building a new facility. The Board of Supervisors has approved the need for a new facility. Alameda County has been awarded a $33.2 million federal grant by the state Board of Corrections (BOC) to assist in financing this project. However, the grant is contingent on a start and completion date. The original start date was 2/28/02, with a completion date of 6/30/05. The start date was extended to January 2003. This date has passed. Alameda County asked for another extension date and received verbal approval. According to the Alameda County general services administrator, the completion date has been extended to June 2006. 71 2002-2003 ALAMEDA COUNTY CIVIL GRAND JURY FINAL REPORT_____ ______________________________________ Law & Justice Committee Three major issues contributed to the delay in building the new juvenile hall. The first was the selection of a building site and size. The site selected limits the size of the hall (number of beds). Four sites were evaluated: the county-owned property in the city of Dublin near the Santa Rita Jail; the Glen Dyer Detention Center site (North County Jail in Oakland); the Pardee/Swan Site, a 34-acre Port of Oakland owned property near the Oakland airport; and the existing San Leandro property site. The second issue that contributed to the delay dealt with construction costs. Preliminary estimates, including furnishings and fixtures, are estimated at close to $175 million for the entire complex, including the court and probation facilities. The cost to build on property not owned by the county, the Pardee/Swan site, if the property could be purchased from the Port of Oakland, increases building costs by more than $30 million. The third issue that contributed to the delayed decision revolves around the family of juvenile detainees. How far the family and friends may have to travel to visit or return home with juveniles who are released was a concern.
R03-11:
through 03-15 Alameda County Office of Education Recommendations 03-09 and 03-10 51
Findings & Recommendations
3 findings
F1:
Reduced funding for MediCal county administration, with Alameda County suffering a $1.2 million decrease;
F2:
Elimination of advertising for MediCal Healthy Families Program and grants to community based organizations; 88 2002-2003 ALAMEDA COUNTY CIVIL GRAND JURY FINAL REPORT____ _______________________________________ Health Committee
F3:
The governor’s veto of the Legislature’s $22.1 augmentation for a 2-month bridge from MediCal to the Healthy Families Program for parents and children. The Alameda Alliance for Health is projecting a $5 million loss for the current year and has adjusted its budget accordingly. In an attempt to continue coverage, the Alliance has established a provider network. With the Alliance’s mixed model network, including a continuum of direct solo physician contracts, Alliance members have choices in their health care. However, the Alliance still has problems recruiting specialty physicians in areas such as rheumatology, orthopedic surgery, dermatology, neurology and urology. There is also a shortage of physicians willing to contract in the Tri-Valley area. The high cost of living in the Bay Area and concerns regarding the financial viability of provider groups affect the recruitment of physicians. The Alliance may respond to budget cuts by reducing or eliminating coverage. The major provider of health services for the under- and un-insured is the ACMC. Unlike the community-based organizations, the ACMC is obligated to provide medical services regardless of budget cutbacks. The cutbacks faced by the community-based organizations will result in an increased service burden at ACMC. However, the ACMC itself is facing severe cutbacks. Major cuts to both inpatient and outpatient services have already been approved for the Fairmont facility. Substantial reductions and services are also expected at the ACMC itself which will further limit access to County health care services. CONCLUSION An estimated 44 million Americans are without health insurance in the United States. This issue needs to be addressed at both the national and state level and requires sufficient resources and adequate funding. However, the immediate day-to-day effects of the health care crisis remain with the county. 89 2002-2003 ALAMEDA COUNTY CIVIL GRAND JURY FINAL REPORT____ _______________________________________ Health Committee The increase in number of uninsured and underinsured, the state budget deficit, and lack of health care reform will put overwhelming pressure on local organizations such as the Alameda Alliance for Health and all of its subprograms. Reduction of MediCal enrollment and coverage, closure of the ACMC clinics and elimination of previously covered services does not reduce the needs of the people who will still seek health care, wait longer and have more critical health needs. These patients can rapidly overload the ER and this will impact the ability of the ACMC to respond to large-scale disasters, natural or otherwise. The burden will fall upon Alameda County, as the provider of last resort, which faces the problem of reduced funding and greater demand. The Grand Jury encourages the staff of the ACMC to continue addressing all issues associated with uninsured patients who use the emergency room as their primary source of medical care. The Grand Jury is impressed with the quality of the leadership of the organizations interviewed. Nevertheless, the widening gap between resources and need will have a negative impact on the health of all citizens of Alameda County.
Findings & Recommendations
15 findings
F1:
The 1999/2000 FCMAT report placed all key players on notice of impending financial disaster for the OUSD and without substantial spending cuts the system would have major deficits. The report was explicit that OUSD was experiencing declining enrollment, and OUSD needed to monitor enrollment closely. In addition, the report was clear that the district was overestimating its ADA percentage and as such, was further overestimating its revenues. Finally, FCMAT explicitly warned that if not careful, the special education subsidies would be in the tens of millions of dollars.
F2:
The ACOE was specifically on notice. They knew the OUSD had difficulty closing its books in 1999 for the 1998/1999 year. They gave a qualified approval to the OUSD 40 2002-2003 ALAMEDA COUNTY CIVIL GRAND JURY FINAL REPORT____________ _______________________________ Education Committee 1999/2000 first interim in December 1999, indicating their serious concern with district finances. The FCMAT report should have given them even greater concern. Finally, the ACOE was well aware of the enormous turnover in OUSD financial management with different financial leadership in each of the 1999/2000, 2000/2001, and 2001/2002 fiscal years. This turnover, in itself, should have triggered heightened oversight.
F3:
The OUSD Multi-Year Projections 2001-2006 report issued in early 2001 made clear the financial situation of OUSD needed immediate attention. The report did not have to be read carefully. The report was printed in color and projected deficits were displayed in red numbers and were clearly visible even for those unable or unwilling to study the details of the report. The report showed the likelihood of large deficits if appropriate actions were not taken.
F4:
The board delay in purchasing the new computer system cost the district a year in making the changeover. This meant the new system was not operational until July 2002, the beginning of the 2002/2003 year. Had the system been purchased more expeditiously, the fiscal crisis might have been realized a year sooner.
F5:
Grand Jury interviews indicated that the old computer system, however cumbersome, did provide relevant data. Rigorous analysis of the data from the old system would have produced useful results. The new system made seeing problems easier, but its absence cannot be seen as an acceptable excuse for OUSD fiscal mismanagement.
F6:
The teacher salary increase may have been necessary to retain teachers and to replace the 500 or so emergency credentialed teachers with fully credentialed teachers. The issue is not whether the teachers deserved the raise, or whether the raise was necessary to forestall a strike; rather, that paying for the $40+ million per year increase required substantial cuts in other parts of the system. These substantial cuts were not implemented by the board and superintendent. 41 2002-2003 ALAMEDA COUNTY CIVIL GRAND JURY FINAL REPORT____________ _______________________________ Education Committee
F7:
The separation of the various financial departments into isolated enclaves, with little information passed between them, was a recipe for disaster. This isolation was partly responsible for the use of budget estimates, rather than actual spending and revenue data, as the basis for financial reports. This seriously compromised both the internal OUSD control and external oversight systems. Data labeled as “actuals” must be the actual data and must be continually tested for what that partial year spending means for projecting the full year’s costs. The Grand Jury did not determine whether the false data occurred by intent or by negligence. It defies belief that neither OUSD nor ACOE discovered the problem.
F8:
The increased salaries allowed OUSD to replace emergency credentialed teachers with fully credentialed teachers. This reduced vacancies and also had the predictable impact of radically increasing the total salary bill. Somehow there was no budget for these additional costs.
F9:
Some of those interviewed pointed accusatory fingers at the Human Resources (HR) department for hiring people without budgeted positions being available. The Grand Jury found that HR was tasked with hiring new credentialed staff to replace those on emergency credentials. They were successful in doing so. The problem was that HR did not require each hire to be properly accounted for in all parts of the financial system or for those separate departments to even coordinate vacancies and hiring.
F10:
The school board is ultimately responsible for the OUSD. The board was on notice from both the FCMAT and MYP reports that finances were tight and major cuts were required. The board members should have asked more questions and demanded better answers. Had the board done even the most basic calculations, they would have seen that with salary increases of 24%, increases in special education encroachment, and declining 42 2002-2003 ALAMEDA COUNTY CIVIL GRAND JURY FINAL REPORT____________ _______________________________ Education Committee revenue, that the OUSD would not have been able to balance their budget. However, board members are, for the most part, not financial people. Without staff of their own to independently review district finances, it is not realistic to expect the board to do its own rigorous financial analysis. Nevertheless, the OUSD board could have required OUSD staff to provide simple spreadsheets showing how enrollment was meeting budget estimates, and whether salary increases were being offset by spending reductions.
F11:
The OUSD superintendent was able to take a dysfunctional district and institute important educational changes in a relatively short time. In addition, he constantly asked his financial staff whether the budgets were balanced and was repeatedly assured that everything was in order. These reassurances were all the more credible given the positive ACOE certifications and the KPMG audit. It can plausibly be argued that he did everything a superintendent could be expected to do without being his own chief financial officer. Nevertheless, the superintendent is the person ultimately responsible for the operation of the OUSD. When serious problems arise he must be held accountable.
F12:
It is not credible that OUSD first “discovered” the deficit problem when the new computer system was activated. More likely, the new system indicated the sheer magnitude of the deficit. The deputy superintendent was on notice from both the FCMAT and MYP reports of the precarious state of OUSD finances. Moreover, he was aware of the declining enrollment (and its financial costs) from his October 2001, attendance reports, which resulted in his declaring spending moratoriums in November
F13:
The Grand Jury found that there was a difference of opinion as to whether the generally applauded OUSD reforms could have taken place without budget deficits. Some argued that absent greatly increased teacher spending the reforms would not have taken place. The increase in teacher salaries resulted in more certified teachers being in the system. Others argued that had they known the true nature of the deficits, they could have acted sooner to reduce spending without seriously jeopardizing the reforms.
F14:
The Grand Jury learned that COEs are empowered to intervene much earlier and more aggressively than stated by the ACOE. Moreover, the Grand Jury was informed that the ACOE is considered to be in the bottom 25% of aggressiveness of COEs in the state. Under AB1200, the ACOE is clearly empowered to intervene whenever it suspects problems. The ACOE argument that they did everything they could under the law is not acceptable. The ACOE did not need the OUSD financial system on the ACOE computer to request detailed data. The ACOE was aware, and made OUSD explicitly aware, of the problems and impact of declining enrollment. They knew that OUSD was deficit spending. They could easily calculate (or require OUSD to calculate) the cost impacts of the salary increase. They were under no obligation to take the OUSD numbers at face value. Even assuming that OUSD was simply in error (and not deliberately falsifying its books), they had an obligation to help OUSD be clear where they stood financially. 44 2002-2003 ALAMEDA COUNTY CIVIL GRAND JURY FINAL REPORT____________ _______________________________ Education Committee ACOE gave a qualified certification for the 1999/2000 first interim report. They could have done the same in 2001/2002 when they strongly suspected OUSD problems. If the ACOE suspected OUSD financial data was incorrect, ACOE had an obligation to request detailed proof to the contrary. The Grand Jury learned that the previous deputy superintendent, while at the ACOE, would drop into district offices and demand to see actual data. In addition, he kept spreadsheets of 5 years’ history of critical budget and enrollment data. It is up to the school districts to satisfy the COE of their financial health. Without that, the COE can give them a qualified rating until they provide sufficient information to satisfy the COE. This is reflected in data available from the state of California, in records of discussions on AB1200, and the subsequent AB139, which clarifies and strengthens the role of the COE.
F15:
The real tragedy, and the primary failing in oversight, is that the 2001/2002 problems weren't caught sooner. Precarious school district finances can turn negative very quickly. Given the difficulty of reducing spending in the major spending category, teachers salaries, during a particular year, it is understandable that there was a large deficit in one school year. What is unconscionable is that the situation was allowed to roll over to the 2002/2003 year. It took much too long to identify the problems, and even longer to begin solving them. CONCLUSION The system for financing public school districts requires overhaul. Districts throughout the state and throughout Alameda County are in serious financial difficulty with many facing financial disaster. However, inadequate funding is not an excuse for failure to operate within those constraints. Similarly, it is not an excuse for those tasked with providing oversight, and who do not act proactively or aggressively until a crisis has gotten out of hand. 45 2002-2003 ALAMEDA COUNTY CIVIL GRAND JURY FINAL REPORT____________ _______________________________ Education Committee More specifically:
Additional Recommendations
2
Not linked to specific findings.
R1:
the current site sits on an active earthquake fault, 2) the current facility is seriously deteriorated, and 3) there had been debate as to whether its capacity is sufficient. For over a decade the need for a new facility has been recognized but there had been no definitive action taken by the Board of Supervisors except the initiation of an EPA report on four possible sites. Previous grand juries expressed serious concerns for the delays in building a new facility. The Board of Supervisors has approved the need for a new facility. Alameda County has been awarded a $33.2 million federal grant by the state Board of Corrections (BOC) to assist in financing this project. However, the grant is contingent on a start and completion date. The original start date was 2/28/02, with a completion date of 6/30/05. The start date was extended to January 2003. This date has passed. Alameda County asked for another extension date and received verbal approval. According to the Alameda County general services administrator, the completion date has been extended to June 2006. 71 2002-2003 ALAMEDA COUNTY CIVIL GRAND JURY FINAL REPORT_____ ______________________________________ Law & Justice Committee Three major issues contributed to the delay in building the new juvenile hall. The first was the selection of a building site and size. The site selected limits the size of the hall (number of beds). Four sites were evaluated: the county-owned property in the city of Dublin near the Santa Rita Jail; the Glen Dyer Detention Center site (North County Jail in Oakland); the Pardee/Swan Site, a 34-acre Port of Oakland owned property near the Oakland airport; and the existing San Leandro property site. The second issue that contributed to the delay dealt with construction costs. Preliminary estimates, including furnishings and fixtures, are estimated at close to $175 million for the entire complex, including the court and probation facilities. The cost to build on property not owned by the county, the Pardee/Swan site, if the property could be purchased from the Port of Oakland, increases building costs by more than $30 million. The third issue that contributed to the delayed decision revolves around the family of juvenile detainees. How far the family and friends may have to travel to visit or return home with juveniles who are released was a concern.
R03-11:
through 03-15 Alameda County Office of Education Recommendations 03-09 and 03-10 51 2002-2003 ALAMEDA COUNTY CIVIL GRAND JURY FINAL REPORT_____________________________________________________________ Education Committee HIRING PRACTICES AND STUDENT PROTECTION FROM SEXUAL ABUSE INTRODUCTION There were news reports of the arrest of a substitute teacher for molestation in San Leandro. The Grand Jury initiated an investigation into whether the hiring procedures of the various Alameda County school districts provide sufficient safeguards to protect students from sexual abuse. In particular, the Grand Jury was concerned about how school districts balanced the need to avoid hiring potential wrongdoers who had no criminal records or formal judgments against them with the need to protect the due process rights of such potential employees. Requests were made of each school district to provide information concerning their policies and procedures concerning hiring and for preventing and handling issues of alleged sexual abuse. The Grand Jury reviewed these policies and procedures and interviewed representatives of various school districts. HISTORY At the beginning of the Grand Jury term, the San Leandro Times newspaper reported on the arrest of a substitute teacher for molestation in San Leandro. According to this report, the person arrested had a past history of accusations and suspicious activity around young girls. He had been excused from substitute teaching duties at another San Leandro school for what the district considered to be “inappropriate games of leap-frog and tag.” Similar allegations had been levied against him while teaching in southern California. The article quoted the police to the effect that this person had moved around the country as a substitute teacher and that suspicious stories seem to follow him. None of the allegations culminated in arrest or conviction; and the district’s fingerprint background check found no information. 52 2002-2003 ALAMEDA COUNTY CIVIL GRAND JURY FINAL REPORT____________ _______________________________ Education Committee San Leandro’s Assistant Superintendent for Human Resources was reported to have said that the accused never would have been hired if his past had been known, but that they had no way of knowing he had been suspected of inappropriate activities in the past. In addition, he was allowed to continue substitute teaching in the district after the leap-frog allegations since he was not accused of molestation, just playing games that some schools considered inappropriate. Moreover, other schools in the district considered his “interactive style to be beneficial.” In response to questions as to what might be done, the official suggested that districts should set aside resources for doing more rigorous background checks for substitute teachers. He indicated that phone reference checks were done for full-time teachers, but not for substitutes. In interviews, the Grand Jury learned that the newspaper report of the facts of the case and the statements attributed to the assistant superintendent were accurate. The Grand Jury also learned that the district was now undertaking more rigorous background checks for substitute personnel. Policies and procedures documents from the various school districts showed that districts routinely conduct background checks of all persons considered for permanent employment. These include fingerprint checks for determining any history of illegal activity including any prior history of sexual abuse. The Grand Jury received conflicting information concerning the employment of temporary personnel. It appears that most districts provide detailed checks of substitute and temporary personnel, but in many cases it is possible for them to initiate employment prior to completion of all relevant background checks.