Santa Barbara County Grand Jury
2018-2019
From the annual report
The consolidated year-end volume. The individual investigations it contains are listed separately below.
📑 Year-End Report
The full consolidated volume; individual reports are listed below.
Individual reports (10)
Findings & Recommendations
6 findings
F1:
The Main Jail is outdated and in need of seismic and ADA compliance.
F2:
The Main Jail is overcrowded. This overcrowding situation may be partially alleviated by the opening of the Northern Branch Jail.
F3:
The Main Jail is understaffed.
F4:
There are no body scanners to detect dangerous contraband.
F5:
Surveillance camera positions do not provide complete coverage of inmate cell activity.
F6:
The inmate transportation fleet is old and unreliable.
Additional Recommendations
6
Not linked to specific findings.
R1:
That the Santa Barbara County Sheriff’s Department add an external security camera monitoring system.
R2:
That the Sheriff consider making space available for face-to-face personal visits at the Northern Branch Jail.
R3:
That the Santa Barbara County Board of Supervisors allocate sufficient funding to the Sheriff’s office specifically for the purpose of hiring additional custody deputies.
R4:
That the Santa Barbara County Board of Supervisors and the Sheriff’s Department purchase and install a body scanning system immediately to intercept contraband at the Main Jail.
R5:
That the Santa Barbara County Sheriff’s Department review camera coverage to make sure that each camera is providing the custody deputies full views of the cells.
R6:
That the Board of Supervisors and Sheriff consider funding for upgrade and replacement of the inmate transportation fleet within two years. 1.2 Santa Barbara County Northern Branch Jail The Northern Branch Jail in Santa Maria is being built to alleviate the overcrowding of the Main Jail as well as improving transportation efficiency. The Northern Branch Jail is an improvement in the County’s detention space, and the extra 376 beds should reduce the County’s current inmate overcrowding. A staff of 90 custody deputies will monitor the inmates. It will provide an environment that addresses safety, promotes ADA compliance, and also provides enhanced medical and mental health facilities. Construction of the new Jail was approved by the Board of Supervisors in June 2016. The Jail was originally scheduled to open in September 2018. At the time of this report the construction completion date was estimated to be May 2020, a 20-month delay. This significant delay was due to a combination of factors including a delay in the signing of the earth-moving contract, unusually wet weather, design and regulatory changes, the bankruptcy of the lead architectural firm, delays in contractor work execution, and quality deficiencies. Inmate occupancy must take place within 90 days of the facility opening. The facility is currently planned to accommodate 376 rated beds with a staff of 90 custody deputies. Once occupied, this additional inmate capacity should ease the Main Jail overcrowding problem. The construction costs for the Northern Branch Jail were originally budgeted at $67 million on March 31, 2016. Amoroso Construction was awarded the winning bid of $77,720,000 on April 7, 2016.1 In June 2016, the Board of Supervisors approved the current budget of $110,857,243, to be offset with $80.0 million from the State of California. Due to project delays, unanticipated change orders, and other issues, “the final total costs of the project are now estimated to increase from the original amount of $110.8 million to a total ranging between $119.0 million and $121.0 million, which is an increase of $8.2 million to $10.2 million or 7% to 9% increase in overall project costs.”2 1 Kitchell – Construction Management and Commissioning, Northern Branch Jail Project - Bid Package 1, April 7, 2016 2 Santa Barbara County Board of Supervisors Agenda, March 17, 2020, D1) Hearing - Consider recommendations regarding Northern Branch Jail (NBJ) Construction Costs, In May 2013, Rosser International, Inc. (Rosser) entered into a Professional Services Agreement with the County to provide architectural, engineering and related professional design services for the Northern Branch Jail Project. In June 2019, Rosser informed the County that it was going out of business, stopped working on the project, and ceased all performance of its contracted duties for the Northern Branch Jail Project. In July 2019, the County filed cost recovery litigation against Rosser to recover or mitigate the related added project costs. Overall, the Grand Jury found the facility to be impressive, with a modern architectural plan taking advantage of current technologies. The Northern Branch Jail is designed with thermal and recycled water efficiencies. While the new Jail has adequate backup plans in the event of power failures, the facility does not have a solar system that could provide longer-term coverage and cost savings. The building is designed to help normalize social relations by direct supervision. A custody deputy will be in the housing unit with the inmates. The deputy can model positive behavior and intervene quickly and effectively if there is trouble. The Jury noted that the exercise facilities for cell modules were limited in size. Considering the potentially long sentences for some inmates, these small enclosures are inadequate. The inmate entrance to the facility will have a body scanner system capability planned to reduce contraband. Personal visitations will be performed exclusively via video screens from booths. There will be larger rooms available for a family unification process planned to prepare inmates for reentry into society once sentences are completed. When inmate sentences are completed and they are released, there is no transportation available to a Santa Maria city center location, which is more than ten miles away. This is important considering the 24-hour release schedule and the distance from the Northern Branch Jail to the Santa Maria city center. The Sheriff’s Office liaison, County General Services managers, and escort custody deputies were enthusiastic, well-informed, courteous, professional and optimistic about the positive impact this new state-of-the-art facility will make for the County.
Findings & Recommendations
6 findings
F1:
Eighty-five percent of railroad-related deaths occurring in Santa Barbara County were pedestrian trespasser incidents that occurred in the High Fatality Zone One from Ortega Hill in Summerland to Milpas Street in Santa Barbara and High Fatality Zone Two from Patterson Avenue to Glen Annie Road in Goleta.
F2:
A sealed corridor has been used effectively to enhance railroad safety.
F3:
There is a need for increased security presence to reduce trespassing within the High Fatality Zones, and in other communities this has been achieved through Memoranda of Understanding between Union Pacific Railroad and local law enforcement.
F4:
Fencing along the railroad right-of-way in the High Fatality Zones is inadequate or nonexistent.
F5:
Overgrown foliage and trees provide a natural shelter for homeless encampments.
F6:
Video surveillance cameras provide increased observation of activity by pedestrian trespassers and homeless encampments within the Union Pacific Railroad right-of-way.
Additional Recommendations
7
Not linked to specific findings.
R1:
That the Cities of Santa Barbara and Goleta, the County of Santa Barbara and Santa Barbara County Association of Governments meet regularly with Union Pacific Railroad to create a safety plan to reduce trespasser deaths in High Fatality Zones.
R2:
That the Cities of Santa Barbara and Goleta, the County of Santa Barbara, and Santa Barbara County Association of Governments collaborate with Union Pacific Railroad to develop a sealed corridor from Ortega Hill in Summerland to Glen Annie Road in Goleta.
R3:
That the Santa Barbara County Sheriff and City of Santa Barbara Police Department negotiate Memoranda of Understanding with Union Pacific Railroad to provide enhanced security within their respective High Fatality Zones.
R4:
That the Cities of Santa Barbara and Goleta, the County of Santa Barbara, and Santa Barbara County Association of Governments collaborate with Union Pacific Railroad to repair and install fencing, to prevent easy access to the Union Pacific Railroad right-of-way in the High Fatality Zones.
R5:
That the County of Santa Barbara and the Cities of Santa Barbara and Goleta encourage Union Pacific Railroad to cut back or remove overgrown trees and foliage within the Union Pacific Railroad right-of- way in the High Fatality Zones.
R6a:
That the Cities of Santa Barbara and Goleta, the County of Santa Barbara, and Santa Barbara County Association of Governments encourage Union Pacific Railroad to install and monitor video surveillance cameras on poles every mile within the High Fatality Zone.
R6b:
That County of Santa Barbara and the Cities of Santa Barbara and Goleta, together with Union Pacific Railroad, establish a schedule to monitor the video surveillance cameras between 11 a.m. and 7 p.m.
Findings & Recommendations
9 findings
F1:
There are no Crisis Stabilization Units for children and youth in Santa Barbara County as an alternative to out-of-county hospitalizations.
F2:
There are no licensed Temporary Shelter Care Facilities for children and youth in Santa Barbara County as an alternative to out-of-county hospitalizations.
F3:
The crisis call-in phone service and mobile crisis staff of both the contracted provider SAFTY and the Department of Behavioral Wellness’ ACCESS 24/7 Mobile Crisis teams often do not respond to the scene of a crisis or return phone calls in a timely manner.
F4:
The SAFTY mobile crisis workers do not write 5585 holds in a timely manner because they lack authority to do so without first consulting a supervisor.
F5:
The Department of Behavioral Wellness does not keep readily accessible data on the numbers of children on 5585 holds hospitalized out of County, where they are sent, their length of stay in each facility, and the cost of their treatment.
F6:
The Children’s Triage Program staff interacts with children and youth in crisis and their families in the Emergency Rooms and works to ensure community re-integration and linkage to behavioral health services upon discharge from the ER or psychiatric hospitals.
F7:
On-line, comprehensive information on mental health services, community supports and resources for children and youth who are experiencing a crisis in Santa Barbara County is not readily available on a central website.
F8:
Wellpath medical staff and Sheriff custody staff responding to the “man down” announcement was unaware of the location of life-saving resuscitation equipment and that it was not functional.
F9:
The Jail is operating without National Commission on Correctional Heath Care (NCCHC) accreditation, contrary to the contract requirement.
Additional Recommendations
14
Not linked to specific findings.
R1:
That the Board of Supervisors direct the Department of Behavioral Wellness to pursue the establishment of a licensed Crisis Stabilization Unit that can accommodate adults, children and youth in Santa Maria.
R2:
That the Board of Supervisors direct the Department of Behavioral Wellness to explore partnerships with community agencies to sponsor and maintain licensed Temporary Shelter Care Facilities for children and youth in Santa Barbara County.
R3:
That the Sheriff require the current contract health care provider, Wellpath, to assure that its staff adhere to all policies, procedures, and contractual obligations regarding the assessment of the medical/mental health status of arrestees upon their arrival at the Jail.
R3a:
That the Board of Supervisors direct the Department of Behavioral Wellness to establish and implement measurable response times, and to track and evaluate the efficacy of their crisis response services.
R3b:
That the Board of Supervisors direct the Department of Behavioral Wellness to require its contracted partner SAFTY to respond in the field for face-to-face evaluations more quickly and frequently.
R4:
That the Board of Supervisors direct the Department of Behavioral Wellness to require the crisis response staff of their contracted partner, SAFTY, to receive more training to acquire the authority to write 5585 holds independently and in a timely manner.
R5:
That the Board of Supervisors direct the Department of Behavioral Wellness to design and implement a computerized record of the 5585 holds that are written, where the children are hospitalized out of County, their length of stay in each facility, and the cost of their treatment.
R6:
That the Sheriff require custody staff to receive continued training regarding policies and procedures to be followed in a “man down” situation, particularly to assure proper management and control of the scene and to release personnel no longer needed there.
R6a:
That the Board of Supervisors direct the Department of Behavioral Wellness to evaluate the efficacy of the new Crisis Triage Program by keeping statistics on the number of children served and process outcomes.
R6b:
That the Board of Supervisors direct the Department of Behavioral Wellness to continue to pursue the full implementation of the Children’s Triage Program in South County.
R6c:
That the Board of Supervisors direct the Department of Behavioral Wellness to integrate the funding of the Children’s Triage Program into the Department of Behavioral Wellness budget on an ongoing basis.
R7:
That the Board of Supervisors direct the Department of Behavioral Wellness to design, post and keep current an on-line dashboard that provides comprehensive contact information on mental health services and community resources for children and youth in all geographic areas of Santa Barbara County, and publicize this resource to the community at large.
R8:
That the Sheriff require Wellpath to inspect, repair and replace emergency life-saving equipment on a regular schedule; maintain a service log; and train custody staff regarding the location of life-saving equipment.
R9:
That the Board of Supervisors closely examine the provisions of the existing medical provider contract and enforce all of the current provider’s obligations, especially with regard to the continuing failure to obtain National Commission on Correctional Heath Care (NCCHC) accreditation for the Jail.
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Findings & Recommendations
9 findings
F1:
The current Contract does not fully address future water management problems such as will arise from climate and other rapid environmental changes.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
That the Directors of the Member Units and the Santa Barbara County Board of Supervisors, acting as Directors of the SBCWA, pursue the upcoming 2020 contract negotiations as an opportunity to create a completely new contract.
F2:
Public understanding and effective operation of the Cachuma Project would be enhanced if key terms in the Contract were defined and used more precisely.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
That the Directors of the Member Units and the Santa Barbara County Board of Supervisors, acting as Directors of the SBCWA, require that key terms in the new Contract are defined clearly and used in a consistent manner.
F3:
The roles and responsibilities of SBCWA and the Member Units are not clearly defined in the current Contract.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
That the Directors of the Member Units and the Santa Barbara County Board of Supervisors, acting as Directors of the SBCWA, ensure their roles and responsibilities are clearly defined in the new Contract.
F4:
The current Water Year, October 1 to September 30, makes diversion recommendations and decisions difficult because it comes just before the rainy season, when the quantity of water in Cachuma for the next few months is highly unpredictable.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4:
That the Directors of the Member Units and the Santa Barbara County Board of Supervisors, acting as Directors of the SBCWA, strongly urge in negotiations for the new Cachuma Project Contract that the Water Year should run from May 1 to April 30, or a similar period, to allow diversion requests to be made soon after the usual winter rain period.
F5:
Provisions in the 2020 Contract will need more frequent updating than those in previous Contracts due to rapid climate change altering the natural conditions affecting water supply.
Related Recommendations (1)
R5:
That the Directors of the Member Units and the Santa Barbara County Board of Supervisors, acting as Directors of the SBCWA, propose to the Bureau of Reclamation that the new Cachuma Project Contract require a meeting between them and the Bureau every five years, with a public agenda, to consider changes to Contract provisions which have become outdated.
F6:
Under the 1995 Contract, Article 9(g), the required five-year meetings cannot result in increased water diversion to Member Units.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6:
That the Directors of the Member Units and the Santa Barbara County Board of Supervisors, acting as Directors of the SBCWA, propose to the Bureau of Reclamation that the required five-year meetings allow changes to the operations of the new Contract, including increased diversions, provided they are consistent with Federal law, State law, and Project Water Rights, and do not negatively affect the environment or the groundwater quality downstream of Bradbury Dam.
F7:
Member Units and SBCWA have expressed support for formal, quantitative methods of decision-making under uncertainty which can identify sources of disagreement, and thus facilitate compromise solutions.
Related Recommendations (1)
R7:
That the Directors of the Member Units and the Santa Barbara County Board of Supervisors, acting as Directors of the SBCWA, establish a format for quantitative decision-making under uncertainty; and seek to narrow their differences on such components as probabilities of future rainfall patterns and criteria for desirable outcomes.
F8:
SBCWA and the Member Units agree that meetings of their technical staffs are valuable but disagree over the organizational concerns of past meetings, such as claims of infrequency, non-attendance, non- response and cancellation without notice.
Related Recommendations (1)
R8:
That each year the Directors of the Member Units and the Santa Barbara County Board of Supervisors, acting as Directors of the SBCWA, determine a schedule of multiple meetings of key technical staff to discuss Cachuma Project operations, including upcoming diversions, and to report major points of potential agreement or disagreement to their Boards.
F9:
The websites of the Member Units and SBCWA lack clarity and detail on the Cachuma Project.
Related Recommendations (1)
R9:
That the Directors of the Member Units and the Santa Barbara County Board of Supervisors, acting as Directors of the SBCWA, set up and maintain a specific website for detailed information on the Cachuma Project's history, structure, governance, and operations, with links to additional historical documents and records.
Findings & Recommendations
6 findings
F1:
Eighty-five percent of railroad-related deaths occurring in Santa Barbara County were pedestrian trespasser incidents that occurred in the High Fatality Zone One from Ortega Hill in Summerland to Milpas Street in Santa Barbara and High Fatality Zone Two from Patterson Avenue to Glen Annie Road in Goleta.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
That the Cities of Santa Barbara and Goleta, the County of Santa Barbara and Santa Barbara County Association of Governments meet regularly with Union Pacific Railroad to create a safety plan to reduce trespasser deaths in High Fatality Zones.
F2:
A sealed corridor has been used effectively to enhance railroad safety.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
That the Cities of Santa Barbara and Goleta, the County of Santa Barbara, and Santa Barbara County Association of Governments collaborate with Union Pacific Railroad to develop a sealed corridor from Ortega Hill in Summerland to Glen Annie Road in Goleta.
F3:
There is a need for increased security presence to reduce trespassing within the High Fatality Zones, and in other communities this has been achieved through Memoranda of Understanding between Union Pacific Railroad and local law enforcement.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
That the Santa Barbara County Sheriff and City of Santa Barbara Police Department negotiate Memoranda of Understanding with Union Pacific Railroad to provide enhanced security within their respective High Fatality Zones.
F4:
Fencing along the railroad right-of-way in the High Fatality Zones is inadequate or nonexistent.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4:
That the Cities of Santa Barbara and Goleta, the County of Santa Barbara, and Santa Barbara County Association of Governments collaborate with Union Pacific Railroad to repair and install fencing, to prevent easy access to the Union Pacific Railroad right-of-way in the High Fatality Zones. 8
F5:
Overgrown foliage and trees provide a natural shelter for homeless encampments.
Related Recommendations (1)
R5:
That the County of Santa Barbara and the Cities of Santa Barbara and Goleta encourage Union Pacific Railroad to cut back or remove overgrown trees and foliage within the Union Pacific Railroad right-of-way in the High Fatality Zones.
F6:
Video surveillance cameras provide increased observation of activity by pedestrian trespassers and homeless encampments within the Union Pacific Railroad right-of-way.
Related Recommendations (2)
R6a:
That the Cities of Santa Barbara and Goleta, the County of Santa Barbara, and Santa Barbara County Association of Governments encourage Union Pacific Railroad to install and monitor video surveillance cameras on poles every mile within the High Fatality Zone.
R6b:
That County of Santa Barbara and the Cities of Santa Barbara and Goleta, together with Union Pacific Railroad, establish a schedule to monitor the video surveillance cameras between 11 a.m. and 7 p.m.
Findings and recommendations not yet extracted.
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Findings & Recommendations
7 findings
F1:
There are no Crisis Stabilization Units for children and youth in Santa Barbara County as an alternative to out-of-county hospitalizations.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
That the Board of Supervisors direct the Department of Behavioral Wellness to pursue the establishment of a licensed Crisis Stabilization Unit that can accommodate adults, children and youth in Santa Maria. YouthWell Coalition, The Community Issue 1 2 https://youthmentalwellness.org 7
F2:
There are no licensed Temporary Shelter Care Facilities for children and youth in Santa Barbara County as an alternative to out-of-county hospitalizations.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
That the Board of Supervisors direct the Department of Behavioral Wellness to explore partnerships with community agencies to sponsor and maintain licensed Temporary Shelter Care Facilities for children and youth in Santa Barbara County.
F3:
The crisis call-in phone service and mobile crisis staff of both the contracted provider SAFTY and the Department of Behavioral Wellness’ ACCESS 24/7 Mobile Crisis teams often do not respond to the scene of a crisis or return phone calls in a timely manner.
Related Recommendations (2)
R3a:
That the Board of Supervisors direct the Department of Behavioral Wellness to establish and implement measurable response times, and to track and evaluate the efficacy of their crisis response services.
R3b:
That the Board of Supervisors direct the Department of Behavioral Wellness to require its contracted partner SAFTY to respond in the field for face-to-face evaluations more quickly and frequently.
F4:
The SAFTY mobile crisis workers do not write 5585 holds in a timely manner because they lack authority to do so without first consulting a supervisor.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4:
That the Board of Supervisors direct the Department of Behavioral Wellness to require the crisis response staff of their contracted partner, SAFTY, to receive more training to acquire the authority to write 5585 holds independently and in a timely manner.
F5:
The Department of Behavioral Wellness does not keep readily accessible data on the numbers of children on 5585 holds hospitalized out of County, where they are sent, their length of stay in each facility, and the cost of their treatment.
Related Recommendations (1)
R5:
That the Board of Supervisors direct the Department of Behavioral Wellness to design and implement a computerized record of the 5585 holds that are written, where the children are hospitalized out of County, their length of stay in each facility, and the cost of their treatment. 8
F6:
The Children’s Triage Program staff interacts with children and youth in crisis and their families in the Emergency Rooms and works to ensure community re-integration and linkage to behavioral health services upon discharge from the ER or psychiatric hospitals.
Related Recommendations (3)
R6a:
That the Board of Supervisors direct the Department of Behavioral Wellness to evaluate the efficacy of the new Crisis Triage Program by keeping statistics on the number of children served and process outcomes.
R6b:
That the Board of Supervisors direct the Department of Behavioral Wellness to continue to pursue the full implementation of the Children’s Triage Program in South County.
R6c:
That the Board of Supervisors direct the Department of Behavioral Wellness to integrate the funding of the Children’s Triage Program into the Department of Behavioral Wellness budget on an ongoing basis.
F7:
On-line, comprehensive information on mental health services, community supports and resources for children and youth who are experiencing a crisis in Santa Barbara County is not readily available on a central website.
Related Recommendations (1)
R7:
That the Board of Supervisors direct the Department of Behavioral Wellness to design, post and keep current an on-line dashboard that provides comprehensive contact information on mental health services and community resources for children and youth in all geographic areas of Santa Barbara County, and publicize this resource to the community at large.
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Findings & Recommendations
9 findings
F1:
One witness who was at the scene of AB’s arrest disclosed to the Jury information about AB that the Jury believes might have helped avoid AB’s death if Sheriff’s deputies or medical personnel had obtained it; however, Sheriff’s deputies did not interview this witness.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
That the Sheriff review and improve training for patrol deputies in responding to calls involving persons who appear to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol, or exhibiting symptoms of mental illness, including questioning persons at the scene who may have relevant information about the subject’s condition.
F2:
The transporting deputy radioed ahead to the Jail that AB was “combative,” without disclosing that AB had engaged in self-harming behavior in the patrol vehicle, which the Jury believes was relevant information for Jail personnel to have in determining whether to arrange an immediate psychiatric evaluation.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
That the Sheriff review and improve training for all deputies in recognizing and accurately communicating to Jail staff any self-harming behavior by detainees.
F3:
The Wellpath RN failed to follow established procedure requiring that a medical/mental health evaluation be conducted in a private interview room where the arrestee’s computerized records are available for immediate reference.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
That the Sheriff require the current contract health care provider, Wellpath, to assure that its staff adhere to all policies, procedures, and contractual obligations regarding the assessment of the medical/mental health status of arrestees upon their arrival at the Jail.
F4:
Custody deputies at booking failed to closely examine AB’s prior arrest records, which contained information that might have helped avoid AB’s death.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4:
That the Sheriff require custody staff to adhere to its booking policies and procedures, specifically informing themselves as to an arrestee’s prior arrest records at booking.
F5:
AB was placed in an observation cell monitored by a video camera that failed to show the portion of the cell where AB committed suicide.
Related Recommendations (1)
R5:
That the Sheriff either discontinue using Cell C-9 or improve the video equipment there to allow a complete view of the cell.
F6:
Sheriff’s custody staff and Wellpath staff failed to follow “man down” procedures regarding management and control of responding personnel.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6:
That the Sheriff require custody staff to receive continued training regarding policies and procedures to be followed in a “man down” situation, particularly to assure proper management and control of the scene and to release personnel no longer needed there.
F7:
Custody staff failed to properly handle and retain evidence for possible need in the event of further investigation and potential litigation.
Related Recommendations (1)
R7:
That the Sheriff require custody staff to properly handle and preserve evidence connected to incidents occurring at the Jail which later may be needed.
F8:
Wellpath medical staff and Sheriff custody staff responding to the “man down” announcement was unaware of the location of life-saving resuscitation equipment and that it was not functional.
Related Recommendations (1)
R8:
That the Sheriff require Wellpath to inspect, repair and replace emergency life-saving equipment on a regular schedule; maintain a service log; and train custody staff regarding the location of life- saving equipment.
F9:
The Jail is operating without National Commission on Correctional Heath Care (NCCHC) accreditation, contrary to the contract requirement.
Related Recommendations (1)
R9:
That the Board of Supervisors closely examine the provisions of the existing medical provider contract and enforce all of the current provider’s obligations, especially with regard to the continuing failure to obtain National Commission on Correctional Heath Care (NCCHC) accreditation for the Jail.
Findings & Recommendations
8 findings
F1:
The frequent turnover in the Superintendent position has created inefficiencies.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
That the Cuyama Joint Unified School District Board of Trustees, within six months, identify the reasons for frequent turnover at the Superintendent position and develop a corrective action plan.
F2:
The Board of Trustees has not kept the Board Policies and Administrative Regulations current.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
That the Board of Trustees, within six months, develop and adopt a plan to annually review and revise Board Policies and Administrative Regulations to ensure they are kept current.
F3:
The Business Office staff relies routinely on the County Education Office School Business Advisory Service staff to provide notice of key events and dates.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
That the Board of Trustees direct the Superintendent to ensure a district calendar, which includes required reports, budget, and payroll deadlines, is developed within 90 days and annually adopted by the Board.
F4:
Neither procedural guides nor cross-training for critical tasks exist in the District Business Office, creating disruptions when there are unexpected or extended absences.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4:
That the Board of Trustees direct the Superintendent to develop procedural guides and a training program for critical tasks in the District Business Office within 90 days.
F5:
The District Business Office staff requires ongoing training on the specialized Escape software program and day-to-day duties.
Related Recommendations (1)
R5:
That the Board of Trustees direct the Superintendent to develop and implement an ongoing training plan for each position within the District Business Office within six months.
F6:
The appropriate responsibilities of the District Business Office are not accurately reflected in the current job descriptions.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6:
That the Board of Trustees direct the Superintendent to evaluate the District Business Office positions and develop job descriptions for the staff within 30 days.
F7:
Due to a lack of oversight and timely correction, multiple negative audit report findings recurred in succeeding years.
Related Recommendations (1)
R7:
That the Board of Trustees and Superintendent ensure that negative findings identified in the audit report are corrected on a timely basis.
F8:
The District Business Office staff members have not received annual performance reports.
Related Recommendations (1)
R8:
That the Board of Trustees and Superintendent ensure the District Business Office staff receives annual performance reports that identify strengths, weaknesses and performance goals.
Findings & Recommendations
3 findings
F1:
Pat-down searches of arrestees have proven to be inadequate to intercept all of the contraband introduced into the Jail.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
That the Sheriff require all custody officers be trained specifically to pat-down arrestees more effectively at intake.
F2:
Currently there are no full-body x-ray scanners in use at the Main Jail to detect contraband secreted on the person of arrestees, inmates or visitors, and only one is planned to be purchased for use at the Northern Branch Jail to be opened later this year.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
That the Sheriff purchase one or more full body x-ray scanners to be used at the Main Jail, and one more full body x-ray scanners to be used at the Northern Branch Jail, in order to scan all arrestees and visitors.
F3:
There is only one drug-sniffing dog and he is used only periodically at the Main Jail to detect contraband.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
That the Sheriff purchase one more specially trained drug sniffing dog for posting at the Main Jail and one to be assigned to the Northern Branch Jail to assist in locating contraband at intake or elsewhere within these facilities. 4
* This report's PDF did not contain easily extractable text and required Optical Character Recognition (OCR) for analysis. There may be minor errors in the extracted findings and recommendations due to OCR limitations with scanned documents.