San Francisco County Grand Jury
2004-2005
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Findings & Recommendations
7 findings
F1:
There are a number of previously agreed-to-be-implemented CGJ recommendations that City agencies have not yet implemented. Required responses: Mayor's Office (60 days), and Office of the Controller (60 days)
Related Recommendations (4)
R1:
"Additional funds could be generated for enforcement by requiring annual renewal of permits and by inspection of existing billboard signs, with a yearly charge per sign. This would facilitate and pay for discovering sites without permits, illegally altered sites, and illegal new installations."32 Response (May 2002): "Your recommendations are very important to implementation of the March 2002 ballot measure banning all new general advertising billboard construction and the June 2001 statute strengthening code enforcement for illegal general advertising. My code enforcement staff is already working with the City Attorney and Board of Supervisors to draft such legislation. I understand there is similar legislation being developed in the City of Los Angeles."33 Status of Implementation (December 2004): Not implemented because there has been no legislation as yet presented to the Board of Supervisors.
R1e:
(June 2004): "Grievance forms should be placed by the inmate in a locked box or other secure location." Response (September 2004): None
R1f:
(June 2004): "A history of grievance against a deputy should be maintained and forwarded when the deputy moves to another facility." Response(September 2004): None
R1g:
(June 2004): "The grievance form should be simplified." Response(September 2004): None16 While we are not wed to the concept of form over substance, we are concerned by the frequency of non-compliance with the statutory mandates of Penal Code Section 933.05. To this end, it is up to each governmental respondent to insure that it is fully aware of its legal obligations and to discharge them in a responsible and meaningful way. In order to facilitate full compliance with Penal Code Section 933.05 governmental respondents may want to consider using a standardized protocol when responding to CGJ reports.17 2004/05 CGJ FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
F2:
After the first year's Controller's Report, there is no systemic follow-up that enables the public or City management to have a clear picture of the status of whether previously agreed-to-be- implemented CGJ recommendations have, in fact, been implemented. Some would argue that there already is a system in place and that is the "continuity function" of the Civil Grand Jury. Our experience has shown, however, that such a "system" is inadequate at best. It is unrealistic to expect the CGJ to monitor every recommendation that agencies have agreed to implement. Required responses: Mayor's Office (60 days), Office of the Controller (60 days), and Board of Supervisors (90 days)
Related Recommendations (2)
R2a:
"Assign a separate and distinct numerical designation to all existing, active, legal outdoor advertising sign permits (to distinguish them from all other sign permits) for entry into the computer system. Flag each for automatic periodic site reviews by CPD."34 30 San Francisco Budget Analyst Report "The Management Audit of the San Francisco Planning Department (June 2002) at p. 167. The backlog of code enforcement cases has risen from 735 in the spring of 2002 to 2,668 by Feb 2005. Office of the Controller, Financial Audits, "Board of Supervisors: Status of the Implementation of the Recommendations of the 2001-2002 San Francisco Civil Grand Jury" (July 10, 2003) at p.42. Id. at p 43. Ibid. Response (May 2002): "The Planning Department Information Services staff continues to work closely with the Department of Building Inspection staff to improve coordination of data and tracking permits." Status of Implementation (December 2004): Nothing has been or will be done until pending work to integrate Department of Building Inspection and Planning Permit Tracking systems is completed. No timeline for that to occur."35
R2b:
"Conduct a city-wide count and permit history of every existing billboard sign. Many of the originally grandfathered [sic] signs (prior to 1966) have no permits on file. Researching ownership (which may have changed repeatedly over time), checking the existence of permits or verifying legal status with other evidence, such as dated photos; and entering this information into the database, under the applicable numerical code, would allow staff a way to monitor continued use and to eliminate billboards without permits in a timely manner."36 Response (May 2002): "I strongly agree with the need for this inventory .The Code Enforcement staff is trying to design a survey in part using interns, not paid with City funds. Workload of the existing six-person code enforcement staff, which has one unfilled Planner/Code Enforcer position presently frozen, makes this a very challenging task. There is an increasing backlog of other types of planning code enforcement complaints."37 Status of Implementation (December 2004): Nothing has been done.
F3:
Code enforcement requires the integration of databases at least between Department of Building Inspection and the Planning Department. In addition, there must be a coordinated use of personnel resources between the two departments. This necessitates seamless software capability and a broad exchange of information. Billboard code enforcement will continue to be limited and violations will fall further behind, unless there is a marked improvement in the required information flow and technology integration.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
"The Planning Director should hire a temporary staff person ... with special expertise to conduct a city-wide survey of all extant billboards . . . to enter the information into the electronic database described in
F4:
DBI, working with Planning Department management, is spearheading an analysis of how all the contributing departments can coordinate their computer systems and information exchange to maximize their effectiveness. The analysis is an essential first step in elimination of a barrier impeding the involved departments' performances.
F5:
In the past three years, implementation of four of the seven agreed-upon
F6:
Lack of funding for the staff to carry out the work is an oft-repeated excuse for lack of action. Until budget constraints are loosened or the Planning Department identifies and procures a dedicated funding source to enable billboard code enforcement to pay for itself, increased staffing to reduce a buildup in sign code enforcement backlogs will remain minimal.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6a:
" [The latter being rejected by the respondent.]13 Examples of where no clear explanation of whether the recommendation will be implemented or not, and if not, why it is unwarranted or unreasonable. DEPARTMENT OF ELECTIONS Recommendation (June 2001): "The CGJ recommends that the Department of Elections review secrecy envelope provisions to ensure ballot privacy for the Eagle system ballots." Response (August 2001): "Each and every polling place is supplied with secrecy envelopes. Voters may keep their ballot in the envelope to maximize privacy until they enter the ballot in the Eagle. However, because the Eagle was new to voters and poll workers in the November and December elections, poll workers were instructed to have one of their colleagues stationed at the Eagle to assist voters and ensure the functioning of the machine. Poll workers are always instructed to ensure the greatest degree of privacy possible."14 OFFICE OF CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION Recommendation (June 2002): "Purchasing should receive a draft of all professional services contracts before they are sent to the supplier for signature. Earlier input should be sought from Purchasing on larger or unusual contracts." Response (May 2003): "One of the goals of the CGJ report is to increase efficiency and reduce inefficiency. Prior to your audit report published in April 2003, OCA has taken a lead role in oversight of the contracting process by issuing a Checklist for Professional Services Contracts, P-500, as well as a Checklist for Professional Services Contracts for Individual, P-501. These checklists were designed to lead the departments early in the process of drafting the contracts and lead the departments to comply with all City's rules and regulations. They include guidelines to comply with regulations implemented by Civil Service Commission, Human Rights Commission, City 13 Office of the Controller, Financial Audits, "Board of Supervisors: Status of the Implementation of the Recommendations of the 2002-2003 San Francisco Civil Grand Jury" (August 30, 2004) at pp. 112 and 110, respectively. Office of the Controller, Financial Audits, "Board of Supervisors: Status of the Implementation of the Recommendations of the 2000-2001 San Francisco Civil Grand Jury" (August 1, 2002) at p. 25. Attorney, and OCA itself. In essence, through this process, OCA has been involved in the early stages of preparing Professional Services contracts."15 Examples of where no response was provided OFFICE OF THE SHERIFF
F7:
The budget request for 2005/06, submitted by the Planning Department management, is inadequate for billboard enforcement or other code enforcement actions to reduce the current backlog for the coming year. At best, with only one additional FTE, the department might reduce the rate of growth of the list of still-to-be-acted-upon code complaints of all types. Required responses: Planning Department (1 through 7) (60 days)
Findings & Recommendations
6 findings
F1:
The City lacks systemic documentation to support its decisions to classify individual sole proprietor service vendors as independent contractors and to support its treatment of the individual as an independent contractor.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
The City should identify and adapt legal standards into a form that can then serve as documentation for the City Attorney's approval or disapproval of independent contractor status of the vendor. Completed forms such as any appended hereto as
F2:
Misclassification may subject the City to significant monetary liability.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
The language in Article 14 of the City grant agreement form G100 (see Appendix B) should be incorporated into City contract agreement form P 500 and P501.
F3:
The City Attorney's Office is currently the most knowledgeable agent in the City for making a determination as to whether a vendor should be an employee or an independent contractor.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
The City Attorney's Office should either approve or reject each contract for services of individual vendors based on the submitted documentation described in the first recommendation.
F4:
The Civil Service Commission has the authority to permit professional service vendors to be hired as employees outside the civil service system.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4:
The City should designate a department with expertise to formulate a method of monitoring the classification treatment of the sole proprietor vendor to insure that the contracting department has not, in practice, altered the terms and conditions under which contract services are being rendered. Possible tools for ongoing monitoring are continuing use by periodic re-submission of the initial form referenced in recommendation number 1, above, or a prospective written certification by departmental contract administrators that the monitoring department or the City Attorney will be notified if any of the responses given to the initial checklist change. All documentation to support an independent contractor determination should be permanently appended to each contract with a sole proprietor vendor and maintained by the Office of Contract Administration for the length of the longest statute of limitations.
F5:
Simple forms or checklists currently exist and have been used in other jurisdictions to document independent contractor status.
F12:
Persons employed in positions in any department for expert professional temporary services, when such positions are exempted from said classified civil service for a specified period of said temporary service by order of the civil service commission. However, we recommend that if the Civil Service Commission creates such a classification, it condition that any appointment to a position in such a class be approved by the Department of Human Resources lest agencies interpret the existence of such classification as a vehicle for avoiding the civil service process. The Civil Service Commission should also create an exempt classification for professional services positions where the services will be needed for a longer period of time that will mandate the payment of fringe benefits. The Commission has the authority exempt such positions under City Charter Section 10.104, subsection 18. However, in this instance we again recommend that if the Civil Service Commission creates such a classifications, it condition that any appointment to a position in the classification be approved by the Department of Human Resources. A practice of the City agencies and the Civil Service Commission for which we find no statutory, charter or code authority is the practice of agencies seeking approval and the Civil Service Commission approving or disapproving services of the City to be contracted out to vendors who are independent contractors. FINDINGS 1. The City lacks systemic documentation to support its decisions to classify individual sole proprietor service vendors as independent contractors and to support its treatment of the individual as an independent contractor.
Additional Recommendations
1
Not linked to specific findings.
R6:
If there is currently no civil service exempt classification in which a vendor whose classification is questionable can be hired as an employee, the Civil Service Commission should create such a classification. Appointment to such a classification should be approved by the Department of Human Resources. REQUIRED RESPONSES TO FINDINGS AND RE
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Findings & Recommendations
8 findings
F1:
The recent indictment of a prominent San Franciscan for alleged misuse of grant funds illustrates the potential for fraud and abuse of public funds in the awarding of grants. Ibid., 25 “From Hindering to Helping: Transforming the City’s Contracting Process,” Office of the Controller, January 26, 2004, . 11
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
The recent indictment of a prominent San Franciscan for alleged misuse of grant funds illustrates the potential for fraud and abuse of public funds in the awarding of grants. Ibid., 25 “From Hindering to Helping: Transforming the City’s Contracting Process,” Office of the Controller, January 26, 2004, . 11
F2:
There are no apparent legal or functional differences between contracts and grants.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
There are no apparent legal or functional differences between contracts and grants.
F3:
As contracting procedures have become more cumbersome, the granting mechanism for purchasing goods and services has been used increasingly.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
As contracting procedures have become more cumbersome, the granting mechanism for purchasing goods and services has been used increasingly.
F4:
There are no Citywide rules and regulations regarding the awarding of grants. Therefore, procedures vary from one City department to another.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4:
There are no Citywide rules and regulations regarding the awarding of grants. Therefore, procedures vary from one City department to another.
F5:
Grants are apparently being awarded to for-profit entities, in violation of existing policies regarding grants.
Related Recommendations (1)
R5:
Grants are apparently being awarded to for-profit entities, in violation of existing policies regarding grants.
F6:
The procedures being used to award grants do not ensure on a Citywide basis adequate competition amongst potential applicants because they do not require publication of opportunities to compete for grants. Inadequate competition can increase price unnecessarily.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6:
The procedures being used to award grants do not ensure on a Citywide basis adequate competition amongst potential applicants because they do not require publication of opportunities to compete for grants. Inadequate competition can increase price unnecessarily.
F7:
The procedures being used to select grantees from amongst applicants do not ensure on a Citywide basis that grantees are capable of performing the services being purchased, or that the grantee is the most competitive with respect to quality and price.
Related Recommendations (1)
R7:
The procedures being used to select grantees from amongst applicants do not ensure on a Citywide basis that grantees are capable of performing the services being purchased, or that the grantee is the most competitive with respect to quality and price.
F8:
The City’s conflict of interest law (Campaign and Government Conduct Code 3.2220), which prohibits City officials from contracting with the City, specifically exempts grantees from this prohibition.
Related Recommendations (1)
R8:
The City’s conflict of interest law (Campaign and Government Conduct Code 3.2220), which prohibits City officials from contracting with the City, specifically exempts grantees from this prohibition. Recommendations
Additional Recommendations
1
Not linked to specific findings.
R9:
The Ethics Commission should recommend an amendment to the voters that would remove an exemption for grants from Campaign and Government Conduct Code 3.2220 regarding conflict of interest of public employees and officials Required Responses (Please respond to those Findings and Recommendations within your jurisdiction.) Board of Supervisors – 90 days City Attorney – 60 days Controller’s Office – 60 days Ethics Commission – 60 days 13
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Findings & Recommendations
5 findings
F1:
Racial and gender preferences in City public contracting have been judicially declared to violate the Constitution of the State of California. 17 "Interim HRC Attachment 4A. Requirements for General Services Request for Proposals", Human Rights Commission, 12/1/04 18 Ibid., 4.03.B.1.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
The Director shall determine whether a proposer has met the post-award trainee requirements. The Director's decision shall be final. The HRC staff shall inform the awarding department of the proposers that have met the requirements and are eligible for contract close-out. v 09-02-04 CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO HRC ATTACHMENT 2 HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION Requirements for Architecture and Engineering Contracts Substitution or addition of subconsultants: HRC must be informed by the prime consultant of any subconsultant that is replaced or added during performance of the contract. All new subconsultants with contracts of $25,000 or more must submit HRC Form 5 (Architecture and Engineering Contracts Employment Affirmative Action Requirements and Non-Discrimination Provisions) within 15 days of award of the subcontract. B. Non-Compliance With Chapter 12B:
F2:
Forms being used by the City to establish eligibility for contracting with the City of San ٠ Francisco contain race and gender preferences in violation of the law.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
Forms being used by the City to establish eligibility for contracting with the City of San ٠ Francisco contain race and gender p
F3:
Chapter 6 of the City's Administrative Code encourages preferences to minorities and women in construction contracts in violation of the law.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
Chapter 6 of the City's Administrative Code encourages p
F4:
Continued violation of the law is unwarranted and exposes the City to legal and financial risks.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4:
Continued violation of the law is unwarranted and exposes the City to legal and financial risks. Recommendation The City should immediately eliminate explicit or implicit preference based on race, sex, color, ethnicity or national origin from City contracting rules, publications, policies and practices. Board of Supervisors - 90 days City Attorney - 60 days City Controller - 60 days Human Rights Commission - 60 days Mayor – 60 days
F6:
A summary of a job description and training for the trainee with the rate of pay (HRC recommends no less than MCO requirement) should be submitted to HRC for approval. The trainee's commitment does not require that he/she is used only on this project, but also on other projects under contract to the A/E firm, which is appropriate for the trainee's skill development.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6:
A summary of a job description and training for the trainee with the rate of pay (HRC recommends no less than MCO requirement) should be submitted to HRC for approval. The trainee's commitment does not require that he/she is used only on this project, but also on other projects under contract to the A/E firm, which is appropriate for the trainee's skill development.
Additional Recommendations
2
Not linked to specific findings.
R8:
A trainee is defined as a woman or minority person or person with a disability who: Will receive training in a technical (A&E related) field, e.g. drafting,
R10:
Where there are DBEs available for doing portions of the work normally performed by the proposer with its own staff, the proposer will be expected to make good faith efforts to make portions of such work available for DBEs. A DBE Prime poposer cannot count itself to meet the DBE subconsultant goal C. Substitution, removal or contract modification of DBE: No DBE subconsultant or other business listed on HRC Form 2A (DBE Subconsultant Participation) shall be substituted, removed from the contract or have its contract, purchase order or other form of agreement modified in any way without prior HRC approval. EMPLOYMENT NON-DISCRIMINATION PROVISIONS. PART IV. 4.01 GENERAL The provisions of this section shall constitute the consultant's and subconsultant's affirmative action in employment nondiscrimination obligations required by Chapter 12B of the Administrative Code as a condition of contract award. 4.02 NONDISCRIMINATION PROVISIONS A. Prior to the award of the contract, the consultant must agree that it does and will not, during the time of the contract or any contract amendment, discriminate in the provision of benefits between its employees with spouses and employees with domestic partners. B. The consultant and subconsultant on this contract will not discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because of race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, age, sex, sexual orientation or disability. This includes employment, upgrading, demotion or transfer, recruitment, layoff or termination, rates of pay or other forms of compensation and selection for training including apprenticeship. C. Trainee Requirements: The goal listed below are for hiring disadvantaged minorities, women, and
Findings & Recommendations
6 findings
F1:
Investigative resources of the EC do not appear to be adequate because they are primarily responding to complaints rather than initiating their own investigations. Furthermore, they are not able to complete investigations in a timely manner.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
Investigative resources of the Ethics Commission (EC) should be increased by some combination of available alternatives: increases in budget, decreases in mandated responsibilities, and/or delegation of existing investigative duties to other City departments within the limits of the law.
F2:
The EC has attempted to respond to the fact that it has inadequate resources by prioritizing complaints and closing investigations that are unlikely to be resolved 6
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
Department heads should be assessed penalties for their failure to comply with Statement of Incompatible Activities (SIA) requirements and deadlines. This is in keeping with the practices of assessing penalties for other non-compliant entities, such as lobbyists and candidates for public office, under the jurisdiction of the Ethics Commission.
F3:
There are no random audits of the content of SEIs. Therefore, the content of the SEIs is not questioned unless there is a specific complaint from the public.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
If the staff of the EC is expanded, random audits of SEIs required to be on file in City departments should be conducted.
F4:
If the staff of the EC is expanded, random audits of the content of those SEIs on file in the EC should be conducted.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4:
If the staff of the EC is expanded, random audits of the content of those SEIs on file in the EC should be conducted.
F5:
The Board of Supervisors must initiate an independent, rigorous, and ongoing evaluation of Campaign Finance Reform and the voluntary public campaign financing program.
Related Recommendations (1)
R5:
The Board of Supervisors must initiate an independent, rigorous, and ongoing evaluation of Campaign Finance Reform and the voluntary public campaign financing program.
F6:
The Ethics Commission should hire a well-qualified Education and Training Officer. GLOSSARY CFRO Campaign Finance Reform Ordinance CGJ 2004-2005 San Francisco Civil Grand Jury EC Ethics Commission FPPC Fair Political Practice Commission Proposition C passed 11/03; transferred the task of handling the whistleblower telephone hotline to the Controller’s Office Proposition E passed 11/03; revised and updated the City’s conflict of interest laws, requiring all City departments, boards, and commissions to develop statements identifying “incompatible activities.” Proposition G passed 11/97; Campaign Consultants Ordinance; mandated, expanded audits of financial statements filed by candidates and political committees. Proposition J passed 11/00; ‘the taxpayer protection amendment’ was intended to reduce the influence of gifts and prospective campaign contributions on the decisions of public officials. Proposition K passed 11/93; created the Ethics Commission, transferring ethics functions then divided among five city departments to a single Ethics Commission Proposition N passed 11/95; called for the enforcement and administration of the CFRO. Proposition O passed 11/00; amended the San Francisco Campaign Finance Reform Ordinance (CRFO), by providing for the limited public campaign financing of candidates for the Board of Supervisors. San Francisco City Charter The fundamental law of the City of San Francisco SEI Statement of Economic Interest; required by CA Codes, Gov’t. Code Section 87100 1 SIA Statement of Incompatible Activity; required by San Francisco Government Code Section 1126 Administration Code XIIB Section 16.535-539 Mandates electronic filing for certain campaign filing entities. State Proposition 208 went into effect 1/97; required the Ethics Commission to implement further campaign reform provisions to be in compliance. INTRODUCTION Eleven years ago, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors voted to place on the November 1993 ballot Proposition K, which would, through a charter amendment, create an Ethics Commission (EC). When arguing in favor of this proposition, the Board of Supervisors noted, “the people of San Francisco are in danger of losing faith in our city government. Every few weeks another scandal arises and public confidence sinks to new lows. We need an Ethics Commission to turn things around at City Hall. Proposition K will establish an independent body to clean up our city government.”1 “The Ethics Commission will: investigate and punish wrongdoing… establish tougher rules for city lobbyists… strengthen the city’s whistle blower program…draft stricter guidelines for city officials…educate and advise on ethics laws.”2 Prior to approval of Proposition K in November 1993, five city departments administered ethics functions: the Registrar of Voters (later known as the Department of Elections) administered campaign finance disclosure and audits; the Clerk of the Board of Supervisors handled lobbyist rules and regulations as well as conflict of interest reporting; the District Attorney and City Attorney gave advice and wrote opinions, dealt with complaint investigations and enforcement; the Mayor’s Office handled issues relating to improper government activities and the whistleblower program. Following the initial appointment of five commissioners (one each by the Mayor, Board of Supervisors, Controller, City Attorney, and District Attorney), the Ethics Commission opened its office in 1994 with interim and part-time staffing. Budgeting allowed for a permanent staff of four (executive director, administrative assistant, whistleblower-investigator/educator, and investigator/auditor) to be hired in the spring and summer of 1995. A pro bono consultant and student interns augmented the staff. It is worth noting that “…the total cost of ethics related functions administrated by the five City Departments is $481,438… $123,093 of ethics related functions will be transferred to the Ethics Commission… The available funding in the Ethics Commission budget to administer these functions is $97,868 or $25,225 less than is currently allocated… to the City departments to perform these functions.” 3 Over the years, newly passed state or local propositions and ordinances have added to the responsibilities shouldered by the EC. The 2004-2005 Civil Grand Jury (CGJ) believes that the EC was under-funded from its beginning, as evidenced by its inability to fulfill mandates and investigations, resulting in the need to triage tasks. Should they: • Focus on duties with seemingly greater importance and let the others remain undone, • Transfer some of their duties to another agency to execute, or • Request additional resources so that they can complete all of their mandates in a timely manner? 2 The voters demonstrated a commitment to the promulgation and enforcement of high ethical standards when they passed Proposition K. The measure of the EC’s importance is in our willingness to properly fund it, thereby allowing it to complete all mandates. The CGJ decided to examine the operations of the Ethics Commission. This report is the result of that examination and represents the first report ever issued by a civil grand jury on the state of the San Francisco Ethics Commission. CGJ inquiries focused on those areas that occupy most of the Ethics Commission staff’s time: • Complaints and Investigations, • Statement of Incompatible Activities/Statement of Economic Interest, • Lobbyists and Campaign Consultants, • Campaign Finance Reform. The CGJ identified several common threads that ran through each area of the investigation. These common threads were staffing and workload, training, and budgeting/funding. This report presupposes the Ethics Commission has central and crucial mandated duties. All other assignments, though important and necessary, are less central to the mission of the Ethics Commission and are transferable to other agencies. COMPLAINTS AND INVESTIGATIONS The duty and responsibility of the Ethics Commission (EC) to investigate allegations of violations of laws within its jurisdiction is defined by City Charter section C3.699-13. Charter and city ordinances within its jurisdiction are those relating to campaign finance, lobbying, conflicts of interest and governmental ethics. This Charter section also defines the investigative process and the penalties for violations that are substantiated by investigations. The investigative process and the procedures for filing complaints are described in detail on the EC website.4 3 Ethics Commission Status of Investigations, 1999-2004 % Increase 1999 Source of Investigation: 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 Total 2004 External Complaint 18 28 33 48 43 170 139% Initiated by Ethics Commission 1 0 1 2 3 7 Total Investigations 19 28 34 50 46 177 142% % of Total 1999- Status of Investigation*: 2004 Resolved 19 28 31 43 24 145 82% Pending 0 0 3 7 22 32 18% *as of November 16, 2004 Source: Ethics Commission Staff The volume of complaints that the EC has received has increased in the past five years from 18 in FY 1999-2000 to 43 in FY 2003-04. During this five-year period, only seven investigations were conducted on the EC’s initiative, rather than in response to complaints. These self-initiated investigations were only 4% of the total of 177 investigations during this period. Thirty-two of the 177 (18%) investigations initiated between FY 1999 and 2004 were still pending in November 2004. Three of the pending investigations were initiated in FY 2001-02 and 7 in FY 2002-03.5 These 10 investigations are in jeopardy of being invalidated by statutes of limitation. The following are indicators of inadequate investigative resources: • The number of complaints is increasing • The EC is initiating few investigations. Most investigations are instigated by complaints • The EC has been unable to complete all investigations in a timely manner because of inadequate staff resources The EC has only one investigator. However, this investigator is also responsible for two unrelated duties: the administration of both the Campaign Consultant and Lobbyist Ordinances, for which he responds to inquiries regarding the ordinances, prepares reports, maintains a database tracking system, and provides quarterly training to lobbyists.7 The EC investigator is responsible for all phases of the investigation, from the initiation to the resolution of the complaints. He may be required to participate in the closed hearings of the 4 complaint and he may be involved in negotiating a settlement when violations of law are substantiated.8 Many other City departments conduct investigations in the course of executing their responsibilities, e.g., City Attorney, Office of Citizen’s Complaints, Controller’s Office, etc. However, the duties of investigators in these departments are often confined to the investigative process only. The prosecutorial and settlement phases of investigations in those departments are often delegated to others with expertise in those areas.9 As an example, Proposition C, passed by the voters in November 2003, gave the Controller many new audit functions, including the creation of a whistleblower hotline. The whistleblower hotline was moved from the Ethics Commission to the Controller’s Office at the beginning of August 2004. The Controller’s Office forwards to the EC those complaints within their jurisdiction (campaign finance, conflicts of interest, lobbyists, campaign consultants, and other governmental ethics issues).10 Only 4 complaints to the whistleblower hotline were referred to the EC during the period August 2004 to February 2005. Although the whistleblower hotline has received a total of 144 complaints from August 2004 to February 2005 (including those referred to the Ethics Commission), the Controller’s Office estimates that only a third of those complaints are truly whistleblower complaints. Others are “political matters, grievance issues, or miscellaneous informational questions,” according to the Controller’s Office. The Controller’s Office also cautions that they anticipate many more complaints when they begin to advertise the existence of the hotline in March 2005. The Controller’s Office has hired two full-time investigators to investigate the complaints to the hotline. Unlike the new voter mandates to the EC, Proposition C provided the funding necessary to provide the new mandated services. We understand that there are two vacancies in the EC for two Assistant Investigators.11 These vacancies were created by reductions in the EC budget at a time when the number of complaints is increasing and the duties of the EC are expanding. For example, the Statements of Incompatible Activities (SIAs) are in the process of being completed and approved by the EC, as described in another section of this report. New complaints are likely to result when the SIAs are approved because they will establish many new prohibitions against actions by City employees and officials. The fact that the EC has inadequate resources to fulfill its responsibilities is documented in the EC’s annual report for FY 2003-04: “…the Commission remains severely constrained in its ability to process and finalize complaints because it has only one investigator whose time is also consumed by the administration of both the Campaign Consultant and Lobbyist Ordinances. Unless the Commission is able to achieve full funding for its enforcement program, the current backlog of complaints will likely increase.” The inadequacy of the EC budget has been reported in the press: 5 “A decade into its existence, the San Francisco Ethics Commission is entering a ‘downward spiral’ due to unfunded mandates and budget cuts, according to the agency’s annual report.”12 Bob Stern, President of the Los Angeles-based Center for Governmental Studies, recommends in the same article, that San Francisco “amend its charter to provide guaranteed funding for the Commission, as in LA.” 13 Mr. Stern concludes with the observation that the EC is responsible for investigating allegations of misconduct of the same City officials who now have authority over the funding of these investigations, “It’s the people they are monitoring who set their budgets, and that’s always a problem.”14 The new Executive Director of the EC, John St. Croix, has been creative in addressing these staffing issues. He has reviewed all pending investigations and recommended to the Commission that those cases no longer viable be closed. Complaints were, until recently, investigated on a first-in-first-out basis.15 The Executive Director has also recommended a policy to the EC to prioritize investigations to optimize the use of scarce investigative resources: “The Commission refined its guidelines for determining priority among complaints for purposes of timely action. Where a complaint alleges failure to report information, Commission investigative staff will now consider – among other things – the importance to the public of the omitted information. Where a complaint alleges other violations, investigators will consider – among other things – whether the respondent is a candidate in the current election.” 16 The cost of investigating complaints is often partially covered by the settlements that result from investigations. Revenues generated by settlements are deposited to the City’s general fund rather than directly credited to the budget of the EC as required by law.17 This ensures that investigations are initiated and pursued without regard to their potential to generate revenue. The City is essentially partially reimbursed for the increased expense of increasing investigative resources through the collection of fees, fines, and settlements. For example, a settlement of $100,000 was reached in Fall 2004 with PG&E for violations of the campaign ordinance. This is another justification for providing the EC with adequate staffing to conduct investigations. In conclusion, laws do not, in and of themselves, prevent their violation. If the EC does not have the ability to enforce the laws that have been created to protect the citizens of San Francisco from unethical conduct in political campaigns and amongst City employees and officials, the laws are far less effective. New laws should be accompanied by the funding to implement them. Without such funding, the public should conclude that the laws are unlikely to produce the desired outcome. Findings 1. Investigative resources of the EC do not appear to be adequate because they are primarily responding to complaints rather than initiating their own investigations. Furthermore, they are not able to complete investigations in a timely manner.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6:
The Ethics Commission should hire a well-qualified Education and Training Officer. GLOSSARY CFRO Campaign Finance Reform Ordinance CGJ 2004-2005 San Francisco Civil Grand Jury EC Ethics Commission FPPC Fair Political Practice Commission Proposition C passed 11/03; transferred the task of handling the whistleblower telephone hotline to the Controller’s Office Proposition E passed 11/03; revised and updated the City’s conflict of interest laws, requiring all City departments, boards, and commissions to develop statements identifying “incompatible activities.” Proposition G passed 11/97; Campaign Consultants Ordinance; mandated, expanded audits of financial statements filed by candidates and political committees. Proposition J passed 11/00; ‘the taxpayer protection amendment’ was intended to reduce the influence of gifts and prospective campaign contributions on the decisions of public officials. Proposition K passed 11/93; created the Ethics Commission, transferring ethics functions then divided among five city departments to a single Ethics Commission Proposition N passed 11/95; called for the enforcement and administration of the CFRO. Proposition O passed 11/00; amended the San Francisco Campaign Finance Reform Ordinance (CRFO), by providing for the limited public campaign financing of candidates for the Board of Supervisors. San Francisco City Charter The fundamental law of the City of San Francisco SEI Statement of Economic Interest; required by CA Codes, Gov’t. Code Section 87100 1 SIA Statement of Incompatible Activity; required by San Francisco Government Code Section 1126 Administration Code XIIB Section 16.535-539 Mandates electronic filing for certain campaign filing entities. State Proposition 208 went into effect 1/97; required the Ethics Commission to implement further campaign reform provisions to be in compliance. INTRODUCTION Eleven years ago, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors voted to place on the November 1993 ballot Proposition K, which would, through a charter amendment, create an Ethics Commission (EC). When arguing in favor of this proposition, the Board of Supervisors noted, “the people of San Francisco are in danger of losing faith in our city government. Every few weeks another scandal arises and public confidence sinks to new lows. We need an Ethics Commission to turn things around at City Hall. Proposition K will establish an independent body to clean up our city government.”1 “The Ethics Commission will: investigate and punish wrongdoing… establish tougher rules for city lobbyists… strengthen the city’s whistle blower program…draft stricter guidelines for city officials…educate and advise on ethics laws.”2 Prior to approval of Proposition K in November 1993, five city departments administered ethics functions: the Registrar of Voters (later known as the Department of Elections) administered campaign finance disclosure and audits; the Clerk of the Board of Supervisors handled lobbyist rules and regulations as well as conflict of interest reporting; the District Attorney and City Attorney gave advice and wrote opinions, dealt with complaint investigations and enforcement; the Mayor’s Office handled issues relating to improper government activities and the whistleblower program. Following the initial appointment of five commissioners (one each by the Mayor, Board of Supervisors, Controller, City Attorney, and District Attorney), the Ethics Commission opened its office in 1994 with interim and part-time staffing. Budgeting allowed for a permanent staff of four (executive director, administrative assistant, whistleblower-investigator/educator, and investigator/auditor) to be hired in the spring and summer of 1995. A pro bono consultant and student interns augmented the staff. It is worth noting that “…the total cost of ethics related functions administrated by the five City Departments is $481,438… $123,093 of ethics related functions will be transferred to the Ethics Commission… The available funding in the Ethics Commission budget to administer these functions is $97,868 or $25,225 less than is currently allocated… to the City departments to perform these functions.” 3 Over the years, newly passed state or local propositions and ordinances have added to the responsibilities shouldered by the EC. The 2004-2005 Civil Grand Jury (CGJ) believes that the EC was under-funded from its beginning, as evidenced by its inability to fulfill mandates and investigations, resulting in the need to triage tasks. Should they: • Focus on duties with seemingly greater importance and let the others remain undone, • Transfer some of their duties to another agency to execute, or • Request additional resources so that they can complete all of their mandates in a timely manner? 2 The voters demonstrated a commitment to the promulgation and enforcement of high ethical standards when they passed Proposition K. The measure of the EC’s importance is in our willingness to properly fund it, thereby allowing it to complete all mandates. The CGJ decided to examine the operations of the Ethics Commission. This report is the result of that examination and represents the first report ever issued by a civil grand jury on the state of the San Francisco Ethics Commission. CGJ inquiries focused on those areas that occupy most of the Ethics Commission staff’s time: • Complaints and Investigations, • Statement of Incompatible Activities/Statement of Economic Interest, • Lobbyists and Campaign Consultants, • Campaign Finance Reform. The CGJ identified several common threads that ran through each area of the investigation. These common threads were staffing and workload, training, and budgeting/funding. This report presupposes the Ethics Commission has central and crucial mandated duties. All other assignments, though important and necessary, are less central to the mission of the Ethics Commission and are transferable to other agencies. COMPLAINTS AND INVESTIGATIONS The duty and responsibility of the Ethics Commission (EC) to investigate allegations of violations of laws within its jurisdiction is defined by City Charter section C3.699-13. Charter and city ordinances within its jurisdiction are those relating to campaign finance, lobbying, conflicts of interest and governmental ethics. This Charter section also defines the investigative process and the penalties for violations that are substantiated by investigations. The investigative process and the procedures for filing complaints are described in detail on the EC website.4 3 Ethics Commission Status of Investigations, 1999-2004 % Increase 1999 Source of Investigation: 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 Total 2004 External Complaint 18 28 33 48 43 170 139% Initiated by Ethics Commission 1 0 1 2 3 7 Total Investigations 19 28 34 50 46 177 142% % of Total 1999- Status of Investigation*: 2004 Resolved 19 28 31 43 24 145 82% Pending 0 0 3 7 22 32 18% *as of November 16, 2004 Source: Ethics Commission Staff The volume of complaints that the EC has received has increased in the past five years from 18 in FY 1999-2000 to 43 in FY 2003-04. During this five-year period, only seven investigations were conducted on the EC’s initiative, rather than in response to complaints. These self-initiated investigations were only 4% of the total of 177 investigations during this period. Thirty-two of the 177 (18%) investigations initiated between FY 1999 and 2004 were still pending in November 2004. Three of the pending investigations were initiated in FY 2001-02 and 7 in FY 2002-03.5 These 10 investigations are in jeopardy of being invalidated by statutes of limitation. The following are indicators of inadequate investigative resources: • The number of complaints is increasing • The EC is initiating few investigations. Most investigations are instigated by complaints • The EC has been unable to complete all investigations in a timely manner because of inadequate staff resources The EC has only one investigator. However, this investigator is also responsible for two unrelated duties: the administration of both the Campaign Consultant and Lobbyist Ordinances, for which he responds to inquiries regarding the ordinances, prepares reports, maintains a database tracking system, and provides quarterly training to lobbyists.7 The EC investigator is responsible for all phases of the investigation, from the initiation to the resolution of the complaints. He may be required to participate in the closed hearings of the 4 complaint and he may be involved in negotiating a settlement when violations of law are substantiated.8 Many other City departments conduct investigations in the course of executing their responsibilities, e.g., City Attorney, Office of Citizen’s Complaints, Controller’s Office, etc. However, the duties of investigators in these departments are often confined to the investigative process only. The prosecutorial and settlement phases of investigations in those departments are often delegated to others with expertise in those areas.9 As an example, Proposition C, passed by the voters in November 2003, gave the Controller many new audit functions, including the creation of a whistleblower hotline. The whistleblower hotline was moved from the Ethics Commission to the Controller’s Office at the beginning of August 2004. The Controller’s Office forwards to the EC those complaints within their jurisdiction (campaign finance, conflicts of interest, lobbyists, campaign consultants, and other governmental ethics issues).10 Only 4 complaints to the whistleblower hotline were referred to the EC during the period August 2004 to February 2005. Although the whistleblower hotline has received a total of 144 complaints from August 2004 to February 2005 (including those referred to the Ethics Commission), the Controller’s Office estimates that only a third of those complaints are truly whistleblower complaints. Others are “political matters, grievance issues, or miscellaneous informational questions,” according to the Controller’s Office. The Controller’s Office also cautions that they anticipate many more complaints when they begin to advertise the existence of the hotline in March 2005. The Controller’s Office has hired two full-time investigators to investigate the complaints to the hotline. Unlike the new voter mandates to the EC, Proposition C provided the funding necessary to provide the new mandated services. We understand that there are two vacancies in the EC for two Assistant Investigators.11 These vacancies were created by reductions in the EC budget at a time when the number of complaints is increasing and the duties of the EC are expanding. For example, the Statements of Incompatible Activities (SIAs) are in the process of being completed and approved by the EC, as described in another section of this report. New complaints are likely to result when the SIAs are approved because they will establish many new prohibitions against actions by City employees and officials. The fact that the EC has inadequate resources to fulfill its responsibilities is documented in the EC’s annual report for FY 2003-04: “…the Commission remains severely constrained in its ability to process and finalize complaints because it has only one investigator whose time is also consumed by the administration of both the Campaign Consultant and Lobbyist Ordinances. Unless the Commission is able to achieve full funding for its enforcement program, the current backlog of complaints will likely increase.” The inadequacy of the EC budget has been reported in the press: 5 “A decade into its existence, the San Francisco Ethics Commission is entering a ‘downward spiral’ due to unfunded mandates and budget cuts, according to the agency’s annual report.”12 Bob Stern, President of the Los Angeles-based Center for Governmental Studies, recommends in the same article, that San Francisco “amend its charter to provide guaranteed funding for the Commission, as in LA.” 13 Mr. Stern concludes with the observation that the EC is responsible for investigating allegations of misconduct of the same City officials who now have authority over the funding of these investigations, “It’s the people they are monitoring who set their budgets, and that’s always a problem.”14 The new Executive Director of the EC, John St. Croix, has been creative in addressing these staffing issues. He has reviewed all pending investigations and recommended to the Commission that those cases no longer viable be closed. Complaints were, until recently, investigated on a first-in-first-out basis.15 The Executive Director has also recommended a policy to the EC to prioritize investigations to optimize the use of scarce investigative resources: “The Commission refined its guidelines for determining priority among complaints for purposes of timely action. Where a complaint alleges failure to report information, Commission investigative staff will now consider – among other things – the importance to the public of the omitted information. Where a complaint alleges other violations, investigators will consider – among other things – whether the respondent is a candidate in the current election.” 16 The cost of investigating complaints is often partially covered by the settlements that result from investigations. Revenues generated by settlements are deposited to the City’s general fund rather than directly credited to the budget of the EC as required by law.17 This ensures that investigations are initiated and pursued without regard to their potential to generate revenue. The City is essentially partially reimbursed for the increased expense of increasing investigative resources through the collection of fees, fines, and settlements. For example, a settlement of $100,000 was reached in Fall 2004 with PG&E for violations of the campaign ordinance. This is another justification for providing the EC with adequate staffing to conduct investigations. In conclusion, laws do not, in and of themselves, prevent their violation. If the EC does not have the ability to enforce the laws that have been created to protect the citizens of San Francisco from unethical conduct in political campaigns and amongst City employees and officials, the laws are far less effective. New laws should be accompanied by the funding to implement them. Without such funding, the public should conclude that the laws are unlikely to produce the desired outcome.
Additional Recommendations
14
Not linked to specific findings.
R7:
What ethical standards apply to the process of decision making and contracting? What are the standards of due consideration? What is fair treatment of petitioners? What is fair treatment of bidders for city contracts? What communication with bidders or vendors is permitted?
R8:
How can you use your power and position in other parts of your life? Benefiting your business or profession? Job seeking for yourself, for your family and friends? Favoring your charities, your associations, etc.? Using your title, using the city seal? Abrogating parking tickets, etc.? Using influence to get grants for favorite causes?
R9:
What gifts and freebies can you take? What are the requirements of California Fair Political Practices Commission (FPPC) standards? What actually compromises you? What appears to compromise you? What is the motive of others who are giving you gifts? What are the limits on seeking freebies and preferential treatment?
R10:
How can you help those who seek your assistance? Friends Community groups Other elected officials—I'll scratch your back; you scratch mine Building your own political IOUs
R11:
What is your proper relationship with city staff? With whom can you confer? What can you discuss with a staff person who is a personal friend? When can you make specific requests of staff? What important information should you share with staff? Are there different standards for meetings, conversations, correspondence, emails, etc.?
R12:
What information should you bring to your decisions? Should you rely totally on formal information and recommendations presented to you by staff? Can you investigate issues personally? What actions undermine city staff?
R13:
What is personal integrity in political life? Your commitment to work hard enough to do a quality job Your willingness to speak the truth even if it is uncomfortable Your ability to withstand pressures to influence your votes Your ability to resist temptation to take advantage of your position
R14:
How do you handle conflicts between your role as a council member and as member of a special commission? Differences between your position and that of your city Differences among the several cities you may represent
R15:
How do you deal with "friends of the city?" Former elected officials Former city officials and staff Prominent community members
R16:
How do you function as a minority or even a whistleblower? Should you join a voting bloc or remain independent? When should you voice dissent from a majority position? When should you be a whistleblower?
R17:
What level of respect and civility should exist among council members? What do respect and civility require toward colleagues, staff and the public, especially when offering criticism? Toward those you do not trust? What is your duty to respect the will of the council when you have lost on a particular issue? When should you seek outside information or expertise? How can trust be built and sustained?
R18:
How do you protect the confidentiality of information made available to you as a council member? Closed session confidentiality Personnel issues Contracting issues Trading and doing business based on insider information
R19:
How do you deal ethically with the press? Respecting the confidentiality of sessions and issues Keeping colleagues and staff informed Clearly label your views vs. the city's views Accurately characterizing your opponent's views
R20:
How can you ethically campaign while in office? Twisting arms with implied threats regarding current business? Making current decisions based on political contributions or support? Using insider information to favor your campaign? Using privileged access to city government and community to favor your campaign? Promoting initiatives solely to create a record for your campaign? Accurately representing your record and past role in government?” Endnotes 1 “Proponent’s Argument in Favor of Proposition K”, Nov. 2003 Voter Pamphlet, pg 104 2 “Proponent’s Argument in Favor of Proposition K”, Nov. 2003 Voter Pamphlet, pg 104 3 Budget Analyst Report to the Board of Supervisors dated 3-3-95, 4 http://www.sfgov.org/site/ethics_index.asp?id=13732 5 Data provided by EC staff, November 16, 2004 6 “Regulations for Investigations and Enforcement Proceedings”, XIIIF 7 Letter to CGJ from EC, October 5, 2004 8 Interview with EC Staff 9 Interview with EC Staff 10 Written documentation from Controller’s Office 11 EC letter to CGJ of October 5, 2004 12 “Budget trouble plagues Ethics Commission”, San Francisco Examiner, November 29, 2004 13 Ibid. Ibid. Interview with EC staff, 12/1/04 16 Annual Report of the Ethics Commission, FY 2003-04 17 San Francisco Ethics Commission Regulations for Investigations and Enforcement Proceedings, Section XII. C.1.c. City Charter, Ethics Commission Section C3.699-13: Investigations and Enforcement Proceedings 19 Ibid. Section 2.145 Lobbyist Ordinance 4.04 SF Campaign & Government Conduct Code 21 Policy and Procedure on Late Filing http://www.sfgov.org/site/ethics Executive Director's Report to Commission January 10, 2005 23 Executive Director’s Report to Commission February 14, 2005 24 The 2004 ranked-choice vote process has eliminated the need for run-off elections. See
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Findings & Recommendations
8 findings
F1:
San Francisco has made large investments of resources in providing alternatives to detaining youth in secure facilities, such as the creation of CARC and the funding of CBOs.
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R1:
San Francisco has made large investments of resources in providing alternatives to detaining youth in secure facilities, such as the creation of CARC and the funding of CBOs.
F2:
These investments have not resulted in a decrease in the rate of detention of arrested youth. 53 “Selling out kids. As Juvenile Probation Department melts down, ethical questions swirl,” Bay Guardian, August 25, 2004. 21
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R2:
These investments have not resulted in a decrease in the rate of detention of arrested youth. 53 “Selling out kids. As Juvenile Probation Department melts down, ethical questions swirl,” Bay Guardian, August 25, 2004. 21
F3:
Although, the Risk Assessment Instrument (RAI) indicates many times that youth need not be detained, probation officers (POs) often override the RAI in order to detain anyway. This is one of many indicators that the resistance of POs appears to be the chief obstacle to reducing the population of non-violent youth in secure detention, such as youth arrested for violating the terms of their probation.
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R3:
Although, the Risk Assessment Instrument (RAI) indicates many times that youth need not be detained, probation officers (POs) often override the RAI in order to detain anyway. This is one of many indicators that the resistance of POs appears to be the chief obstacle to reducing the population of non-violent youth in secure detention, such as youth arrested for violating the terms of their probation.
F4:
Lack of management controls at the JPD appears to be a leading factor in persistent resistance of POs to alternatives to detention. For example, supervisors are not reviewing the PO’s overrides of the RAI as required by JPD policy.
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R4:
Lack of management controls at the JPD appears to be a leading factor in persistent resistance of POs to alternatives to detention. For example, supervisors are not reviewing the PO’s overrides of the RAI as required by JPD policy.
F5:
Reduced hours and inconvenient location of the Community Assessment Referral Center (CARC) is apparently a factor in preventing police from referring all arrested youth first to the CARC for assessment as required by SFPD policy.
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R5:
Reduced hours and inconvenient location of the Community Assessment Referral Center (CARC) is apparently a factor in preventing police from referring all arrested youth first to the CARC for assessment as required by SFPD policy.
F6:
Police have been instructed to make initial contact with CARC regarding arrested youth by a Police Department Bulletin. However, these instructions are not in the Department’s General Orders, which is a higher level of authority that could increase compliance.
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R6:
Police have been instructed to make initial contact with CARC regarding arrested youth by a Police Department Bulletin. However, these instructions are not in the Department’s General Orders, which is a higher level of authority that could increase compliance.
F7:
The role of community-based programs (CBOs) in preventing detention is not clear. Some CBOs may be more effective than others in preventing detention.
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R7:
The role of community-based programs (CBOs) in preventing detention is not clear. Some CBOs may be more effective than others in preventing detention.
F8:
The Juvenile Probation Commission may not be providing the necessary leadership to achieve the objective of reducing detention.
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R8:
The Juvenile Probation Commission may not be providing the necessary leadership to achieve the objective of reducing detention. Recommendations
Additional Recommendations
1
Not linked to specific findings.
R9:
Appointees to the Juvenile Probation Commission should be knowledgeable about the issues that confront youth at-risk of detention and the organizations that serve them. They should devote the time and be willing to inform themselves of juvenile justice issues. Commissioners should not have any direct relationship with a CBO that may receive funding from the juvenile justice system. Commissioners should be evaluated according to these criteria and replaced when their terms expire if necessary. Required Responses (Please reply to those Findings and Recommendations that are within your jurisdiction.) Board of Supervisors – 90 days Juvenile Probation Commission – 60 days Juvenile Probation Department – 60 days Mayor – 60 days Mayor’s Office of Criminal Justice – 60 days Office of the Controller – 60 days Police Commission – 60 days SFPD – 60 days 23
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Findings & Recommendations
8 findings
F1:
San Francisco spends more per resident on police protection than other comparable jurisdictions in California. Likewise it has more officers per resident and per square mile of geographic area than these jurisdictions.
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R1:
San Francisco spends more per resident on police protection than other comparable jurisdictions in California. Likewise it has more officers per resident and per square mile of geographic area than these jurisdictions.
F2:
Top managerial staff of the SFPD are paid OT and accrue CT in lieu of OT payments, although federal labor law exempts such positions from OT and does not mandate CT. In contrast, most comparable jurisdictions do not pay OT/CT benefits to most of these positions, nor do other public safety departments in San Francisco.
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R2:
Top managerial staff of the SFPD are paid OT and accrue CT in lieu of OT payments, although federal labor law exempts such positions from OT and does not mandate CT. In contrast, most comparable jurisdictions do not pay OT/CT benefits to most of these positions, nor do other public safety departments in San Francisco.
F3:
The POA MOU sets no limit on the CT accrual of top managerial staff until 6/30/05. When the current MOU expires, top managerial staff will still have a CT limit that is 2.7 times greater than rank and file officers.
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R3:
The POA MOU sets no limit on the CT accrual of top managerial staff until 6/30/05. When the current MOU expires, top managerial staff will still have a CT limit that is 2.7 times greater than rank and file officers.
F4:
Top managerial staff of the SFPD are better compensated than comparable job titles in other City public safety departments.
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R4:
Top managerial staff of the SFPD are better compensated than comparable job titles in other City public safety departments.
F5:
All officers of the SFPD, including the top managerial staff, have received greater salary increases than other City employees in a time of budgetary constraint.
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R5:
All officers of the SFPD, including the top managerial staff, have received greater salary increases than other City employees in a time of budgetary constraint.
F6:
Seventeen officers below the rank of captain with CT balances of 480 hours or more on 7/2/04 were permitted to accrue more hours of CT during the six-month period ending 12/17/04, in violation of the CT cap established by the MOU.
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R6:
Seventeen officers below the rank of captain with CT balances of 480 hours or more on 7/2/04 were permitted to accrue more hours of CT during the six-month period ending 12/17/04, in violation of the CT cap established by the MOU.
F7:
The SFPD is assigning vehicles to high-ranking officers for transportation to and from their homes in excess of the number of vehicles allowed by the City’s Administrative Code in apparent violation of the City’s policies.
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R7:
The SFPD is assigning vehicles to high-ranking officers for transportation to and from their homes in excess of the number of vehicles allowed by the City’s Administrative Code in apparent violation of the City’s policies.
F8:
SFPD CT policies and practices are more generous than other City departments and other comparable jurisdictions. Although CT banks are being managed by the SFPD, they remain a large liability for the City.
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R8:
SFPD CT policies and practices are more generous than other City departments and other comparable jurisdictions. Although CT banks are being managed by the SFPD, they remain a large liability for the City. Recommendations
* This report's PDF did not contain easily extractable text and required Optical Character Recognition (OCR) for analysis. There may be minor errors in the extracted findings and recommendations due to OCR limitations with scanned documents.