San Francisco County Grand Jury
1997-1998
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Findings & Recommendations
240 findings
F1:
The Treasure Island development process is controlled entirely by the Mayor. The Board of the Authority and the staff all serve at his pleasure.
F2:
The Board of Supervisors could have given itself the power to appoint some or all of the Directors of TIDA, but gave that power exclusively to the Mayor.
F3:
It is sometimes difficult to get information about TI from TIDA (Mayor’s TI Project Office) staff, or, in some instances, to even reach a staff member.
F4:
Several high profile events have furthered the public perception that access to TI is restricted to those in favor with the Mayor and his staff, to the exclusion of the general public.5
F5:
There is no public oversight of TI development activities. Private users of TI facilities have been required to provide their own liability insurance. Treasure Island Report -
F6:
The passage of Proposition K is a clear indication that the public is dissatisfied with the Mayor’s level of control over TI and its development.
F7:
Even considering the dynamic nature of the implementation of the interim use plan, it is very difficult to determine the status or the specifics of the various components of the plan. This is true of the interim housing plan, the Fire Training facility, the Police Academy and the jail.
F8:
No life preservers are available for the 500 students currently enrolled at the Treasure Island Elementary School. These would be required in the event of a water evacuation from the island.
F9:
The Navy transferred jurisdiction over the Museum artifacts to the Airport Commission, apparently without consulting the museum’s volunteer staff.
Related Recommendations (5)
R1:
The Board of Supervisors should openly debate adoption of the provisions of Proposition K.
R3:
The District should study the structure, operation and cost of the District Board, including direct and indirect costs (e.g., staff and attorney time) of supporting the Board, and propose a size and structure that suits the District's current and planned future functions.
R9:
An adequate number of life preservers for the Treasure Island school children should be provided and stored either in a locker at the ferry pier or at the school. 10.The School District should report by September 1, 1998, on the provision of life preservers
R10:
The Department of Elections should better publicize the need for voters to change their addresses with the Registrar of Voters when moving. VOTER IDENTIFICATION At the November 1997 election, voters were requested to show their California Drivers License or other photo identification on a voluntary basis. At present the law allows the Department of Elections to request this information but does not require it. There is legislation pending in the State Legislature to require voters to present photo identification at the time of voting. (AB 2323)
R11:
By September 1, 1998, the School District should present a plan for a training exercise with students and teachers, to be held in September 1998, in the correct use of life preservers and emergency evacuation procedures.
F10:
Negotiations between TIDA and the Navy concerning the marina at Clipper Cove are at an apparent standstill waiting for the Navy to handle abandoned boats and evictions of marina tenants, who are delinquent in rent payments or whose leases have expired.
F11:
The marina has enormous revenue-generating potential and is languishing, producing no income. Treasure Island Report -
F12:
The islands have stunning views of the Bay and its bridges, the City and the hills of the North Bay. The buildings on TI are nondescript and do not capitalize on the views. The steep terrain and narrow streets of YBI limit access and the potential for new development. Chilly prevailing winds make appreciation of the views difficult.
F13:
TIDA has failed to make the public aware of the nature, or even the number, of proposals to develop the marina and other facilities on TI.
F14:
If any kind of competitive process is in use in the solicitation and evaluation of any such proposals, it has not been made public in an adequately informative way.
F15:
The appearance of news items garnered from sources other than TIDA regarding apparent favoritism contribute to the perception that the development of Treasure Island is a process closed to the public. Treasure Island Report -
F16:
Millions of dollars each year will be required just to maintain basic upkeep of the islands.
F17:
TIDA anticipates that a well financed private development plan will eventually be approved, and will provide the funds necessary to keep the islands going without tapping the General Fund of the City.
F18:
The City will, in the long term, need to continue to provide basic services such as police and fire protection.
F19:
Without major seismic renovations there are potential liability problems in the event of an earthquake. Insurance costs for institutional use could rise dramatically.
F20:
There is a new sewage treatment plant on TI, which is currently operating at 10% capacity.
F21:
The Fire Training School operates with gas-fueled jets, and poses no pollution problems within its immediate vicinity. - Treasure Island Report
F22:
DOD funding for environmental testing has been reduced, possibly compromising the likelihood of successfully resolving the complex existing environmental problems.
F23:
TIHDI is a large and inclusive association, and is an appropriate vehicle for fulfillment of the homeless services components of the Reuse Plan.
F24:
The City has formed a Local Board with specific oversight and advisory responsibilities concerning the City’s Continuum of Care for the Homeless plan. The Local Board will monitor funding and make recommendations to the Mayor and the Board of Supervisors in order to promote a unified strategy toward dealing with the problems of homelessness. Treasure Island Report -
F25:
Much of the existing housing stock needs to be brought into compliance with San Francisco building codes, and the issue of who will pay for improvements is continually being negotiated between the Navy and the city.
F26:
Buildings on the islands, and particularly the housing stock, is deteriorating rapidly as they remain empty. These buildings have languished virtually unattended since September 1997.
F27:
Unused plumbing is deteriorating along with the structures and the surrounding grounds. - Treasure Island Report
F28:
With petroleum derivatives slated for clean-up, the Navy had proposed restricting occupant use of the soil surrounding the housing for fruit and vegetable gardens.
F29:
The Navy is pursuing multi-phased approach to toxic clean-up and housing occupancy in order to begin making housing available at the earliest possible time.
F30:
TI has no basic amenities like public transportation, grocery or convenience stores and public toilets.
F31:
TI has no police or safety services adequate for general use by the public.
F32:
There are no picnicking, park or playground facilities for non-resident use. Treasure Island Report -
F33:
Access to TI and YBI is inadequate by land and water, and no adequate plan for providing or financing access has been presented to the public.
F34:
While the Reuse Plan proposes ferry service for TI, it gives no indication of how this would be funded.
F35:
The commuter ferries currently operating on the Bay are either subsidized by Bridge tolls or are quite expensive. - Treasure Island Report
F36:
Ferries to TI would require substantial subsidies to make them comparable to MUNI fares.
F37:
Subsidies for TI ferries are unlikely to be higher than those required for Alameda, Oakland and Vallejo ferries once ridership reaches 800 to 1000 passengers per day.
F38:
There is insufficient acceleration lane capacity on the ramps entering the Bay Bridge, and therefore limited capacity for motor vehicles on TI.
F39:
Existing ramps on and off the Bay Bridge do not meet current CalTrans standards.
F40:
The existing BART tube is 500 feet south of YBI and below the Bay bottom. It would be costly and very disruptive to service to create a stop on YBI or TI.
F41:
Many departments are not complying with the reporting requirements of Administrative Code Section 18.13.
F42:
Many departments maintain they were not aware of the existence of the Code Section.
F43:
The Budget Analyst does not monitor or demand compliance with the Code Section.
F44:
The Board of Supervisors does not monitor compliance with Code Section 18.13.
F45:
The Overtime report submitted to the CGJ by the Office of the Controller showed that thirty (30) departments were required to file the overtime report specified in Code Section 18.13. The Clerk of the Board of Supervisors and the Office of the Budget Analyst have confirmed to the CGJ that as of June 10, 1998, only one department has filed its required report which was due on May 1.
F46:
There is no provision in the Code Section for enforcement of the reporting requirement.
F47:
The Department of Human Resources is clearly understaffed and is therefore not able to fulfill its objectives and mandates.
F48:
Satellite personnel departments exist in departments such as the Municipal Railway and are mandated to facilitate and accomplish departmental hiring. These satellite departments are also understaffed and may have inexperienced personnel.
F49:
The hiring process required for all City employees, whether for a so-called provisional hire or for a Civil Service hire, is particularly cumbersome, duplicative and repetitive. (See APPENDIX G for outlines of mandated hiring procedures) Overtime Report -
F50:
Hiring is even more difficult because current lists of eligible candidates are not available for numerous City job classifications. Testing to determine eligible candidates and create official lists does not occur on a regular basis. As a result, departments are forced to resort to provisional hiring rather than permanent hiring. The provisional hire attrition rate is higher than the Civil Service hire attrition rate and overtime is consequently higher.
F51:
There is an excessive number of Civil Service employee categories.
F52:
Underestimating overtime budget requirements is not in the best interest of fiscal responsibility. The result is a ‘balanced’ budget that is, in fact, not balanced. It is a budget where all parties are aware that budget revisions and supplemental appropriations will be required. - Overtime Report
F53:
The “ salary savings” technique contributes to unrealistic budgeting appropriations. It contributes to understaffing, requires the juggling of funds from various accounts to overtime accounts and results in inefficient operations within the subject departments where it is mandated.
F54:
The budget review and oversight process is too compressed. The Budget Analyst is given too little time to allow for adequate review prior to the start of Finance Committee hearings.
F55:
Much of the budget process is concentrated in the Office of the Mayor. Formerly, individual departments drafted budgets, based on historical precedent, and incorporated anticipated future needs. Proposed budgets were then presented to the office of the Mayor for review and revision. Today, it appears the office of the Mayor informally controls individual departmental budget requests.
F56:
Departments have been advised by the Mayor’s office they should not formally submit to the Controller a budget that has not been agreed to by the Mayor’s office prior to its submission.
F57:
Two weeks is far too short a time to allow for adequate review and analysis of the budget by the Budget Analyst. The Finance Committee and the Board of Supervisors are therefore put in the position of approving a budget without adequate time or information from its own watchdog.
F58:
Workers’ Compensation and Disability costs to the City are excessive.
F59:
Most Citywide and departmental efforts are directed toward monitoring claimants after injuries have occurred, and those efforts are still inadequate.
F60:
There is inadequate emphasis on prevention of future Workers’ Compensation or Disability claims.
F61:
Over the years, union contracts have been negotiated with salary and work rules that impede efficient operation of City government, prevent modernization of operations, and decrease employee responsibility and accountability.
F62:
Contract provisions exist in many MOUs that foster and encourage overtime.
F63:
In a number of departments, representatives of senior management are not routinely part of the City’s MOU negotiating team. Professional negotiators cannot effectively represent the best interests of the City and its taxpayers without the direct input of department management. If not involved during the negotiating process, department managers may not feel accountable for the resulting MOUs.
F64:
Many senior department managers are former, or current, members of the same union that represents rank and file department employees and may have a personal interest in the final negotiated MOU. - Overtime Report
F65:
The MUNI overtime budget bears no resemblance to the actual expenditure for overtime.
F66:
Without accurate, separate tabulations of actual overtime expenses and salary premiums, it is difficult Overtime Report - to evaluate the true overtime costs of the Municipal Railway.
F67:
The Maintenance and Operations Divisions of MUNI account for approximately 90% of total MUNI employees and chronic understaffing in the Operations and Maintenance Divisions account for most of the overtime expenditures.
F68:
Certain non-transit operator employee categories in MUNI, which are covered under Administrative Code Section 18.13, are receiving overtime far in excess of the 16% allowable.
F69:
The existing MOU sanctions unscheduled absenteeism that contributes to excessive overtime.
F70:
The number of part-time employees allowed in MUNI is dictated by provisions of the existing MOU rather than by the efficient staffing requirements of MUNI.
F71:
In the Operations Division, and elsewhere within MUNI, hiring rates are not adequate to keep pace with normal attrition.
F72:
Cumbersome Civil Service and Provisional hiring requirements hamstring timely and efficient hiring of MUNI personnel.
F73:
MUNI’s current training capacity is inadequate both in the annual number of training programs scheduled and in the number of trainer’s available to conduct classes, and this results in fewer trained personnel than is required for an efficient operation.
F74:
Annual SFFD overtime budget requests are unrealistic and do not reflect anticipated and expected overtime expenditures. Because of historical under-staffing, unspent permanent budgeted salaries have provided one source of revenue to cover excessive overtime costs. With anticipated full staffing in the near term, this source of funds will no longer be available. Without realistic budgeting and funding, additional supplemental appropriations will be required to cover excess overtime costs.
F75:
The need for overtime costs in certain support areas appears questionable. Payroll clerks, for example, should be able to accomplish their job descriptions during regularly scheduled base-salary workweeks.
F76:
With regard to the SFFD Action Plan to Reduce Overtime Costs, dated October 24, 1997: a. While the increased accountability and oversight efforts described in the Action Plan deserve praise, there is inadequate emphasis on prevention - Overtime Report of future injuries to reduce workers’ compensation and disability claims. b. Departmental vacation scheduling practice is not cost-effective. c. Overtime in other than the suppression ranks (firefighters) has not been examined or addressed. The Action Plan did not address any plan to review staffing levels of any non-suppression section to determine optimum or adequate levels. It did not address any emphasis on hiring to fill vacancies in other than suppression areas, nor any plan for oversight in those areas.
F77:
As long as the Fire Department ignores specific directives from the Board of Supervisors, as in continuing to pay all firefighters overtime for holidays even when they don’t work, as was reported in the San Francisco Chronicle on March 5, 1998, there will be no improvement in or curtailing of overtime expenditures.
F78:
Annual SFPD overtime budget requests are unrealistic and do not reflect anticipated and expected overtime expenditures. Unexpended permanent salaries have provided one source of funds to cover excessive Overtime Report - overtime costs. With anticipated full staffing in the near term, this source of funds will no longer be available. Without realistic budgeting and funding, supplemental appropriations will be required in the future to cover excess overtime costs.
F79:
The Police Departmental overtime budget has not been increased substantially in at least the last three fiscal years, except by mid-year revisions. Meanwhile, police obligations have increased substantially with increasingly numerous special events.
F80:
The Charter provides that the Police Department is entitled to collect 100% reimbursement for the actual overtime cost of security and traffic control services provided for ‘for-profit’ special events. However, reimbursement of Police Department overtime costs for special events with general cultural or artistic merit is limited to $2500.00, and the Board of Supervisors can waive even that reimbursement.
F81:
Section 18.13 of the San Francisco Administrative Code limits permissible overtime hours a City employee may work in any fiscal year to 16% of the number of hours that the employee is regularly scheduled to work on a straight time basis. This provision is not applicable to the uniformed ranks of the Police Department.
F82:
Overtime is anticipated and budgeted for realistically. However, delays in the hiring process to fill budgeted positions contribute to the need for overtime. Overtime Report -
F83:
Unspent permanent salaries provide the source to fund excess overtime. The circular process goes from a vacant position directly to the need to schedule overtime personnel, to the subsequent need to use these funds to pay the overtime wages.
F84:
With regard to the overtime reporting obligations of the airport, under Administrative Code Section 18.13, there is clearly a conflict between the position the airport has taken and the interpretation of the reporting requirements by the Office of the Controller.
F85:
Although the airport greatly exceeded its overtime budget in 1996-97, it did not seek an additional budget appropriation as funds were used from unexpended salaries of vacant positions in the budget.
F86:
In its response to the Grand Jury questionnaire, the airport did not address what it might be doing to fill vacant positions, or any difficulties it might be encountering. The only reference to aggressive action to control overtime was: “ The Airport is in the process of implementing a compressed work week pilot program which may reduce the need for overtime work.”
F87:
Extraordinary individual overtime is excessive. Nowhere in the airport response was there any mention of specific actions to address either departmental or individual overtime abuses.
F88:
The airport is currently operating without external oversight of its overtime activities. Certain employees substantially increase their annual base salaries through the accumulation of extraordinary overtime hours and pay.
F89:
The Recreation and Park Department has recently tightened management control of overtime by requiring prior written authorization for overtime by the General - Overtime Report Manager. Failure to obtain such prior approval may result in disciplinary action.
F90:
Most employees are covered by union contracts (MOUs) that in some cases determine how overtime will be assigned. The option of assigning employees to a ten hour/four day workweek will require renegotiating MOU provisions since not all current contracts provide for straight time shifts of more than eight hours.
F91:
The Department has not yet evaluated the effectiveness of ten hour/four day shifts. In order to provide weekend gardener coverage, newly hired staff members can be required to work weekend shifts (Tuesday- Saturday or Wednesday-Sunday), which is expected to alleviate some use of overtime.
F92:
The required report to the Board of Supervisors on overtime for 1996-97 has not been submitted. In November 1997, the acting General Manager indicated the report would be submitted shortly.
F93:
Approximately 25% of filtration plant positions are vacant. Therefore, overtime is required to safely operate the facilities. Hiring delays are blamed for these vacancies.
Related Recommendations (33)
R34:
MUNI Management and the Mayor’s Office should make the use of part-time operators and greater flexibility in full-time shifts a priority in future contract negotiations.
R35:
MUNI Management and the Civil Service Commission should work together to streamline the existing hiring procedures including combining similar employment categories.
R36:
MUNI Retirement System should evaluate whether the “ last 12 months” basis for retirement benefits best serves the fiscal needs of the City.
R37:
The Training Department capacity should be enlarged to accommodate more scheduled classes, a larger number of trainers and, consequently, more students, until the available pool of operators is adequate to meet daily needs. The budget for the Training Department should Overtime Report - be adjusted to reflect its increased hiring requirements.
R38:
To expedite hiring, in-house Human Resources Division of MUNI should have authority independent of DHR procedures. FIRE DEPARTMENT For the fiscal year 1997-98, the San Francisco Fire Department (SFFD) is mandated to adequately staff 41 fire stations 24 hours per day, 7 days a week, with a staffing level of 296. In its response to the 1997-98 Grand Jury questionnaire on overtime, The SFFD stated that it began the 1996-97 fiscal year with 61 vacancies and a projected attrition rate of 3% or 45 full time equivalent positions. The Fire Department operated under a Consent Decree for some years. The Fire Department maintained that the Consent Decree hindered hiring. The stipulated Order Terminating the Consent Decree is now in place with a schedule to add 96 new fire fighters into the fire suppression ranks. The SFFD now states that with the graduation of all currently scheduled classes for new fire fighters, the Department will be closer to full staffing and the need for overtime will be greatly reduced. However, the Overtime Report shows the following overtime amounts for the San Francisco Fire Department: For Year: Original Revised Actual Budget Budget 1997-98 $3,686,040 $5,510,040 $6,574,217 (through 5/15/98) 1996-97 $3,298,541 $3,714,521 $5,105,091 1995-96 $3,251,590 $3,386,590 $2,859,984 - Overtime Report After it was disclosed that the SFFD had spent its entire annual overtime budget in the first three months of fiscal year 1997-98, the SFFD prepared an Action Plan to Reduce Overtime Costs, dated October 24, 1997. The Action Plan was presented to the Board of Supervisors as a condition of obtaining supplemental funding. The Action Plan suggested the following causes for excessive overtime: Vacant positions (backfilled at automatic time and a half); Disability leave (32.1% of total average absences 1996-97); Long term or frequent sick pay; Vacations (38.1% of total average absences 1996- 97); Use of compensatory time and military leave. A major emphasis in the Action Plan was on greater accountability and oversight of disability policies. Efforts to monitor those individuals who are out on workers’ compensation or disability were to be increased and the City Department verification unit would be utilized for that purpose. In addition, there would be greater use of a return to work policy through light duty assignments. The Action Plan also stressed the basic scheduling principle, which is, however, new to the Fire Department, of staggering or balancing vacation requests more evenly throughout the calendar year. The result of vacation balancing is to insure that summer months, for example, are not heavily impacted requiring excessive seasonal overtime. This would mean that in future years fewer vacations would be allowed in June, July, August and September, and more allowed in the months from October through May. Overtime Report - In its Action Plan, the SFFD also provided overtime figures by job classification title for the years 1994-95, 1995-96 and 1996-97. In virtually every classification, overtime has increased steadily from year to year. Several classifications stand out, however, for their questionable need for overtime. For example for the year 1996-97: JOB CLASSIFICATION OVERTIME PAID Payroll Clerk $51,922 Fire Safety Inspector II $46,566 Water System Supervisor $25,813 Utility Plumber $37,872
R39:
The Mayor, the Board of Supervisors and the SFFD should establish an overtime budget that reflects reality and adequately fund that budget. There should not be reliance on so-called “ salary savings” to cover excess overtime costs.
R40:
With respect to the SFFD Action Plan to Reduce Overtime Costs, dated October 24, 1997: a. The SFFD should aggressively and immediately implement those actions outlined in the SFFD Action Plan to Reduce Overtime Costs. b. The SFFD should, in addition, initiate a comprehensive plan to reduce and prevent future injuries. A plan should include: Overtime Report -
R41:
The SFFD should schedule vacations evenly throughout the year to promote cost efficient scheduling of employees and thereby reduce seasonal overtime.
R42:
The SFFD should analyze non-suppression areas to determine adequate staffing levels and institute oversight of overtime costs.
R43:
The Mayor and all other members of the City’s negotiating team should give the fiscal needs of the City the highest priority in developing a concrete and specific list of positions and priorities for future contract negotiations with SFFD employees. - Overtime Report POLICE DEPARTMENT In order to effectively and efficiently carry out its mission, Charter section 4.103 provides in part that, “ the police force shall at all times consist of not fewer than 1,971 full duty sworn officers. The staffing level of the Police Department shall be maintained with a minimum of 1,971 sworn officers thereafter…the Commission shall initiate an annual review to civilianize as many positions as possible to maximize police presence in this community…” (Charter ∋ 4.103) The Police Department is one of the City departments with high overtime expenditures. The Overtime Report shows the following overtime amounts for the San Francisco Police Department: For Year: Original Revised Actual Budget Budget 1997-98 $10,952,285 $14,321,352 $15,447,084 (through 5/15/98) 1996-97 $10,452,889 $13,968,680 $19,033,191 1995-96 $10,385,826 $13,280,210 $16,699,868 With approximately three more payroll periods remaining for FY 1997-1998, the department will again exceed its revised FY 1997-1998 over time budget of $14,321,352. As of 5/15/98, SFPD has already expended $15,447,084. That exceeds SFPD’s original budget for FY 1997-1998, by 41.04%, and its revised budget by 7.86%. Based on the current rate of expenditures, it can be anticipated that an additional $671,612 for each remaining payroll period will be expended for a total additional amount of $2,014,837 – if expenditures remain uniformly constant. These numbers Overtime Report - suggest the SFPD will end the current fiscal year with total overtime expenses of approximately $17,551,921 -- which will exceed the revised overtime budget by 22.56%. The SFPD maintains that one of its major causes of overtime is a result of Proposition 115 that passed in 1989, and mandates that one arresting officer needs to appear in court. Overtime occurs when an officer ‘stands-by’ for an appearance. The SFPD maintains that ‘stand-by’ time is excessive and desires more cooperation from the District Attorney and the Courts to expedite scheduling of officer court appearances and thereby reduce police overtime costs. Currently, a voluntary ten-hour/ four-day shift has been implemented in the investigative units. SFPD is currently studying the cost effectiveness and productivity of this program. In addition, overtime occurs because the police department provides crowd control and security for public events such as street fairs and cultural events. Historically, these services have been provided by police officers on an overtime basis and at an overtime pay scale. These events have proliferated over the years and today occur almost every week. It has been policy that the police department be reimbursed, in full, by the organizers of “ for-profit” events. For cultural, or non-profit events, the policy has been to reimburse the police department for a maximum of twenty-five hundred dollars, with the police department absorbing the remaining costs out of its own overtime budget. In addition, the Board of Supervisors has the prerogative to waive even the twenty-five hundred dollar reimbursement if it is determined that the event is in the best cultural interest of the City. - Overtime Report The Board of Supervisors’ policy, and its implementation, are sufficiently unclear as to result in increased police overtime costs, as occurred with last year’s “ Summer of Love” festival. These increased costs can be very substantial. Historically, the SFPD has relied on candidate testing and hiring occurring only once a year, in spite of normal year- round attrition. This has resulted in chronic understaffing because the SFPD has never attained a compliment of 1,971 full duty officers as required by the Charter. This understaffing results in higher overtime expenditures. In the absence of a current eligibility list, with an officer’s departure from the department, or with the addition of a budgeted position, in most cases positions can and will, in fact, remain vacant for more than one year. The SFPD has now implemented incremental hiring (with three academy classes currently in session) that should promote more even, adequate staffing year-round. It must be taken into account that the police Academy course lasts twenty-eight weeks and is followed by eighteen weeks field training and therefore it takes almost one full year to develop a new, fully trained police officer. In a further effort to control overtime costs, all District Stations have converted uniformed officer scheduling from the previously standard eight hour/five day workweek, to a more efficient and cost effective ten hour/four day workweek.
R44:
The police overtime budget should be increased to more accurately reflect the mandated responsibilities of the department that are steadily increasing with time.
R45:
Either the Police Department should be reimbursed for special services that require overtime or the overtime budget should reflect those known costs that will not be reimbursed. - Overtime Report
R46:
Adequate personnel resources should be provided for the testing and hiring unit to provide more frequent examinations in order to staff up to the mandated level of 1,971 officers.
R47:
The Chief of Police should continue collaboration with the District Attorney’s Office and the Public Defender’s Office, as appropriate, to implement a scheduling process for officer court appearances that will minimize those overtime costs associated with court appearances.
R48:
The Chief of Police or his designated representative should negotiate with the police officers’ bargaining entity in order to develop some flexibility in work schedules which reduces the requirement for overtime. Overtime Report - COMMUNITY HEALTH NETWORK (Department of Public Health) The Overtime Report shows the following overtime amounts for the San Francisco Community Health Network: For Year: Original Revised Actual Budget Budget 1997-98 $2,723,899 $2,723,899 $3,213,594 (through 5/15/98) 1996-97 $2,255,582 $2,923,407 $4,158,193 1995-96 NA NA NA As an acute care facility operating 24 hours per day, seven days a week, San Francisco General Hospital is required to maintain minimum staffing levels that have been determined through staffing models. Laguna Honda and Forensic Services also operate 24 hours per day, seven days a week, and must maintain adequate staffing. The Department of Public Health, in its response to the 1997-98 Grand Jury questionnaire on overtime, suggests overtime occurs as a result of:
R49:
The cumbersome hiring procedures that result in chronic delays in hiring and the budget process that mandates “ salary savings” should both be addressed by DPH and modified.
R50:
Overtime budgeting should be realistic and every attempt should be made by DPH to maintain adequate full-time staffing levels. Adequate, budgeted full- time permanent staffing will reduce overtime costs to the City and County. SAN FRANCISCO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT The Overtime Report shows the following overtime amounts for San Francisco International Airport: For Year: Original Revised Actual Budget Budget 1997-98 $1,372,976 $1,372,976 $1,509,503 (through 5/15/98) 1996-97 $1,290,326 $1,290,326 $2,291,660 1995-96 $1,393,459 $2,029,813 $2,561,791 The airport operates certain sections on a 24 hour per day, 7 day a week schedule and must maintain certain staffing levels to ensure safety. - Overtime Report The San Francisco International Airport, in its response to the CGJ questionnaire on overtime, suggests overtime can occur as a result of special events, last minute absences, emergencies and chronic understaffing in specific areas such as Airport Communication Dispatchers. The airport stated in its response to questions #15 and #16 of the overtime questionnaire (See
R51:
The Board of Supervisors should direct the City Attorney’s Office to render a decision regarding the - Overtime Report Airport’s obligations to report under Administrative Code Section 18.13.
R52:
If the City Attorney’s Office determines the Airport is required to file reports under Code Section 18.13, the Board of Supervisors should notify the Airport it is subject to the semi-annual reporting requirements of Administrative Code 18.13. The Airport should then file both current and delinquent reports within 45 days of said notification.
R53:
If the City Attorney determines the Airport is not obligated to report under the provisions of Administrative Code Section 18.13, the Board of Supervisors should amend the Code Section to include the Airport under its requirements.
R54:
The Airport Director should review staffing requirements to determine realistic optimum levels. The Airport should develop a plan to fill budgeted vacancies and implement aggressive hiring procedures to fill budgeted vacancies rather than relying on overtime paid from “ salary savings.”
R55:
The Airport Director should examine all procedures governing the monitoring of overtime accumulation and review and tighten procedures to achieve a permanent reduction in overtime expenditures. Overtime limitations should be enforced.
R56:
The Airport Director should institute procedures to carefully monitor individual overtime earners to significantly reduce excessive individual overtime. RECREATION AND PARK DEPARTMENT Overtime costs for the current year and for 1996-97, have significantly exceeded the budget for overtime. In 1995-96, overtime was less than the budgeted amount. Overtime can result from expected and unexpected events. The Department Overtime Report - needs to further evaluate the effectiveness of ten hour/four day shifts and weekend shifts (e.g., Tuesday-Saturday and Wednesday- Sunday) and, if necessary, incorporate them into MOUs. The level of overtime reimbursement for 3Com/Candlestick Park needs to be analyzed. The Overtime Report shows the following overtime amounts for the San Francisco Recreation and Park Department: For Year: Original Revised Actual Budget Budget 1997-98 $459,963 $421,871 $878,174 (through 5/15/98) 1996-97 $401,899 $401,899 $900,833 1995-96 $401,899 $471,499 $390,053 The Recreation and Park Department pays overtime for recurring and non-recurring events. Examples of recurring events include pre-event preparations at 3Com/Candlestick Park, weekend garbage pickups and volunteer programs in Golden Gate Park. Non-recurring events include damage caused by nature such as winter storms or a fire at Sierra Camp Mather. The Giants reimburse a portion of overtime for 3Com/Candlestick Park. Overtime above budgeted amounts was funded through "salary savings" from vacant positions. The Recreation and Park Department responded to the CGJ’s questionnaire. Copies of MOUs and numerous other documents were provided.
R57:
The Recreation and Park Department should continue to require prior approval by the General Manager for overtime.
R58:
The effectiveness of ten hour/four day shifts as well as weekend shifts (e.g., Tuesday- Saturday and Wednesday-Sunday) should be evaluated by the Department. If that scheduling is found to be effective in accomplishing the required work and reducing overtime it should be a priority to seek to include provisions authorizing such scheduling in MOUs.
R59:
The Director of the Recreation and Park Department should submit required overtime reports to the Board of Supervisors by the required deadline.
R60:
The Recreation and Park Department should evaluate whether the Giants and Forty-Niners are fully Overtime Report - reimbursing overtime costs incurred at 3Com/Candlestick Park. - Overtime Report PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION (PUC) – WATER DEPARTMENT The Water Department responded to the CGJ's questionnaire on overtime. Extensive exhibits and supplemental information were also provided. The Public Utilities Commission includes the following three operating groups:
R61:
Since emergencies occur every year, overtime based upon prior year's experience should be included in the budget. Non-emergency projects should be scheduled for completion during normal working hours.
R62:
The Department should consider additional alternative shift arrangements that cover weekends and evenings, since pollution control problems regularly occur outside the normal work week.
R63:
The Water Department staff should be trained in the new FAMIS system and be able to make the required reports on overtime to the Board of Supervisors.
R64:
The Water Department (PUC) management should be part of the team negotiating MOUs.
R65:
Operating and capital accounts should be audited regularly to prevent shifting of operating overtime expenses to capital accounts.
R66:
The Water Department (PUC) should overhaul Human Resources hiring practices so that vacant positions can be promptly filled.
F94:
No representatives of management are involved in union MOU negotiations.
Related Recommendations (33)
R34:
MUNI Management and the Mayor’s Office should make the use of part-time operators and greater flexibility in full-time shifts a priority in future contract negotiations.
R35:
MUNI Management and the Civil Service Commission should work together to streamline the existing hiring procedures including combining similar employment categories.
R36:
MUNI Retirement System should evaluate whether the “ last 12 months” basis for retirement benefits best serves the fiscal needs of the City.
R37:
The Training Department capacity should be enlarged to accommodate more scheduled classes, a larger number of trainers and, consequently, more students, until the available pool of operators is adequate to meet daily needs. The budget for the Training Department should Overtime Report - be adjusted to reflect its increased hiring requirements.
R38:
To expedite hiring, in-house Human Resources Division of MUNI should have authority independent of DHR procedures. FIRE DEPARTMENT For the fiscal year 1997-98, the San Francisco Fire Department (SFFD) is mandated to adequately staff 41 fire stations 24 hours per day, 7 days a week, with a staffing level of 296. In its response to the 1997-98 Grand Jury questionnaire on overtime, The SFFD stated that it began the 1996-97 fiscal year with 61 vacancies and a projected attrition rate of 3% or 45 full time equivalent positions. The Fire Department operated under a Consent Decree for some years. The Fire Department maintained that the Consent Decree hindered hiring. The stipulated Order Terminating the Consent Decree is now in place with a schedule to add 96 new fire fighters into the fire suppression ranks. The SFFD now states that with the graduation of all currently scheduled classes for new fire fighters, the Department will be closer to full staffing and the need for overtime will be greatly reduced. However, the Overtime Report shows the following overtime amounts for the San Francisco Fire Department: For Year: Original Revised Actual Budget Budget 1997-98 $3,686,040 $5,510,040 $6,574,217 (through 5/15/98) 1996-97 $3,298,541 $3,714,521 $5,105,091 1995-96 $3,251,590 $3,386,590 $2,859,984 - Overtime Report After it was disclosed that the SFFD had spent its entire annual overtime budget in the first three months of fiscal year 1997-98, the SFFD prepared an Action Plan to Reduce Overtime Costs, dated October 24, 1997. The Action Plan was presented to the Board of Supervisors as a condition of obtaining supplemental funding. The Action Plan suggested the following causes for excessive overtime: Vacant positions (backfilled at automatic time and a half); Disability leave (32.1% of total average absences 1996-97); Long term or frequent sick pay; Vacations (38.1% of total average absences 1996- 97); Use of compensatory time and military leave. A major emphasis in the Action Plan was on greater accountability and oversight of disability policies. Efforts to monitor those individuals who are out on workers’ compensation or disability were to be increased and the City Department verification unit would be utilized for that purpose. In addition, there would be greater use of a return to work policy through light duty assignments. The Action Plan also stressed the basic scheduling principle, which is, however, new to the Fire Department, of staggering or balancing vacation requests more evenly throughout the calendar year. The result of vacation balancing is to insure that summer months, for example, are not heavily impacted requiring excessive seasonal overtime. This would mean that in future years fewer vacations would be allowed in June, July, August and September, and more allowed in the months from October through May. Overtime Report - In its Action Plan, the SFFD also provided overtime figures by job classification title for the years 1994-95, 1995-96 and 1996-97. In virtually every classification, overtime has increased steadily from year to year. Several classifications stand out, however, for their questionable need for overtime. For example for the year 1996-97: JOB CLASSIFICATION OVERTIME PAID Payroll Clerk $51,922 Fire Safety Inspector II $46,566 Water System Supervisor $25,813 Utility Plumber $37,872
R39:
The Mayor, the Board of Supervisors and the SFFD should establish an overtime budget that reflects reality and adequately fund that budget. There should not be reliance on so-called “ salary savings” to cover excess overtime costs.
R40:
With respect to the SFFD Action Plan to Reduce Overtime Costs, dated October 24, 1997: a. The SFFD should aggressively and immediately implement those actions outlined in the SFFD Action Plan to Reduce Overtime Costs. b. The SFFD should, in addition, initiate a comprehensive plan to reduce and prevent future injuries. A plan should include: Overtime Report -
R41:
The SFFD should schedule vacations evenly throughout the year to promote cost efficient scheduling of employees and thereby reduce seasonal overtime.
R42:
The SFFD should analyze non-suppression areas to determine adequate staffing levels and institute oversight of overtime costs.
R43:
The Mayor and all other members of the City’s negotiating team should give the fiscal needs of the City the highest priority in developing a concrete and specific list of positions and priorities for future contract negotiations with SFFD employees. - Overtime Report POLICE DEPARTMENT In order to effectively and efficiently carry out its mission, Charter section 4.103 provides in part that, “ the police force shall at all times consist of not fewer than 1,971 full duty sworn officers. The staffing level of the Police Department shall be maintained with a minimum of 1,971 sworn officers thereafter…the Commission shall initiate an annual review to civilianize as many positions as possible to maximize police presence in this community…” (Charter ∋ 4.103) The Police Department is one of the City departments with high overtime expenditures. The Overtime Report shows the following overtime amounts for the San Francisco Police Department: For Year: Original Revised Actual Budget Budget 1997-98 $10,952,285 $14,321,352 $15,447,084 (through 5/15/98) 1996-97 $10,452,889 $13,968,680 $19,033,191 1995-96 $10,385,826 $13,280,210 $16,699,868 With approximately three more payroll periods remaining for FY 1997-1998, the department will again exceed its revised FY 1997-1998 over time budget of $14,321,352. As of 5/15/98, SFPD has already expended $15,447,084. That exceeds SFPD’s original budget for FY 1997-1998, by 41.04%, and its revised budget by 7.86%. Based on the current rate of expenditures, it can be anticipated that an additional $671,612 for each remaining payroll period will be expended for a total additional amount of $2,014,837 – if expenditures remain uniformly constant. These numbers Overtime Report - suggest the SFPD will end the current fiscal year with total overtime expenses of approximately $17,551,921 -- which will exceed the revised overtime budget by 22.56%. The SFPD maintains that one of its major causes of overtime is a result of Proposition 115 that passed in 1989, and mandates that one arresting officer needs to appear in court. Overtime occurs when an officer ‘stands-by’ for an appearance. The SFPD maintains that ‘stand-by’ time is excessive and desires more cooperation from the District Attorney and the Courts to expedite scheduling of officer court appearances and thereby reduce police overtime costs. Currently, a voluntary ten-hour/ four-day shift has been implemented in the investigative units. SFPD is currently studying the cost effectiveness and productivity of this program. In addition, overtime occurs because the police department provides crowd control and security for public events such as street fairs and cultural events. Historically, these services have been provided by police officers on an overtime basis and at an overtime pay scale. These events have proliferated over the years and today occur almost every week. It has been policy that the police department be reimbursed, in full, by the organizers of “ for-profit” events. For cultural, or non-profit events, the policy has been to reimburse the police department for a maximum of twenty-five hundred dollars, with the police department absorbing the remaining costs out of its own overtime budget. In addition, the Board of Supervisors has the prerogative to waive even the twenty-five hundred dollar reimbursement if it is determined that the event is in the best cultural interest of the City. - Overtime Report The Board of Supervisors’ policy, and its implementation, are sufficiently unclear as to result in increased police overtime costs, as occurred with last year’s “ Summer of Love” festival. These increased costs can be very substantial. Historically, the SFPD has relied on candidate testing and hiring occurring only once a year, in spite of normal year- round attrition. This has resulted in chronic understaffing because the SFPD has never attained a compliment of 1,971 full duty officers as required by the Charter. This understaffing results in higher overtime expenditures. In the absence of a current eligibility list, with an officer’s departure from the department, or with the addition of a budgeted position, in most cases positions can and will, in fact, remain vacant for more than one year. The SFPD has now implemented incremental hiring (with three academy classes currently in session) that should promote more even, adequate staffing year-round. It must be taken into account that the police Academy course lasts twenty-eight weeks and is followed by eighteen weeks field training and therefore it takes almost one full year to develop a new, fully trained police officer. In a further effort to control overtime costs, all District Stations have converted uniformed officer scheduling from the previously standard eight hour/five day workweek, to a more efficient and cost effective ten hour/four day workweek.
R44:
The police overtime budget should be increased to more accurately reflect the mandated responsibilities of the department that are steadily increasing with time.
R45:
Either the Police Department should be reimbursed for special services that require overtime or the overtime budget should reflect those known costs that will not be reimbursed. - Overtime Report
R46:
Adequate personnel resources should be provided for the testing and hiring unit to provide more frequent examinations in order to staff up to the mandated level of 1,971 officers.
R47:
The Chief of Police should continue collaboration with the District Attorney’s Office and the Public Defender’s Office, as appropriate, to implement a scheduling process for officer court appearances that will minimize those overtime costs associated with court appearances.
R48:
The Chief of Police or his designated representative should negotiate with the police officers’ bargaining entity in order to develop some flexibility in work schedules which reduces the requirement for overtime. Overtime Report - COMMUNITY HEALTH NETWORK (Department of Public Health) The Overtime Report shows the following overtime amounts for the San Francisco Community Health Network: For Year: Original Revised Actual Budget Budget 1997-98 $2,723,899 $2,723,899 $3,213,594 (through 5/15/98) 1996-97 $2,255,582 $2,923,407 $4,158,193 1995-96 NA NA NA As an acute care facility operating 24 hours per day, seven days a week, San Francisco General Hospital is required to maintain minimum staffing levels that have been determined through staffing models. Laguna Honda and Forensic Services also operate 24 hours per day, seven days a week, and must maintain adequate staffing. The Department of Public Health, in its response to the 1997-98 Grand Jury questionnaire on overtime, suggests overtime occurs as a result of:
R49:
The cumbersome hiring procedures that result in chronic delays in hiring and the budget process that mandates “ salary savings” should both be addressed by DPH and modified.
R50:
Overtime budgeting should be realistic and every attempt should be made by DPH to maintain adequate full-time staffing levels. Adequate, budgeted full- time permanent staffing will reduce overtime costs to the City and County. SAN FRANCISCO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT The Overtime Report shows the following overtime amounts for San Francisco International Airport: For Year: Original Revised Actual Budget Budget 1997-98 $1,372,976 $1,372,976 $1,509,503 (through 5/15/98) 1996-97 $1,290,326 $1,290,326 $2,291,660 1995-96 $1,393,459 $2,029,813 $2,561,791 The airport operates certain sections on a 24 hour per day, 7 day a week schedule and must maintain certain staffing levels to ensure safety. - Overtime Report The San Francisco International Airport, in its response to the CGJ questionnaire on overtime, suggests overtime can occur as a result of special events, last minute absences, emergencies and chronic understaffing in specific areas such as Airport Communication Dispatchers. The airport stated in its response to questions #15 and #16 of the overtime questionnaire (See
R51:
The Board of Supervisors should direct the City Attorney’s Office to render a decision regarding the - Overtime Report Airport’s obligations to report under Administrative Code Section 18.13.
R52:
If the City Attorney’s Office determines the Airport is required to file reports under Code Section 18.13, the Board of Supervisors should notify the Airport it is subject to the semi-annual reporting requirements of Administrative Code 18.13. The Airport should then file both current and delinquent reports within 45 days of said notification.
R53:
If the City Attorney determines the Airport is not obligated to report under the provisions of Administrative Code Section 18.13, the Board of Supervisors should amend the Code Section to include the Airport under its requirements.
R54:
The Airport Director should review staffing requirements to determine realistic optimum levels. The Airport should develop a plan to fill budgeted vacancies and implement aggressive hiring procedures to fill budgeted vacancies rather than relying on overtime paid from “ salary savings.”
R55:
The Airport Director should examine all procedures governing the monitoring of overtime accumulation and review and tighten procedures to achieve a permanent reduction in overtime expenditures. Overtime limitations should be enforced.
R56:
The Airport Director should institute procedures to carefully monitor individual overtime earners to significantly reduce excessive individual overtime. RECREATION AND PARK DEPARTMENT Overtime costs for the current year and for 1996-97, have significantly exceeded the budget for overtime. In 1995-96, overtime was less than the budgeted amount. Overtime can result from expected and unexpected events. The Department Overtime Report - needs to further evaluate the effectiveness of ten hour/four day shifts and weekend shifts (e.g., Tuesday-Saturday and Wednesday- Sunday) and, if necessary, incorporate them into MOUs. The level of overtime reimbursement for 3Com/Candlestick Park needs to be analyzed. The Overtime Report shows the following overtime amounts for the San Francisco Recreation and Park Department: For Year: Original Revised Actual Budget Budget 1997-98 $459,963 $421,871 $878,174 (through 5/15/98) 1996-97 $401,899 $401,899 $900,833 1995-96 $401,899 $471,499 $390,053 The Recreation and Park Department pays overtime for recurring and non-recurring events. Examples of recurring events include pre-event preparations at 3Com/Candlestick Park, weekend garbage pickups and volunteer programs in Golden Gate Park. Non-recurring events include damage caused by nature such as winter storms or a fire at Sierra Camp Mather. The Giants reimburse a portion of overtime for 3Com/Candlestick Park. Overtime above budgeted amounts was funded through "salary savings" from vacant positions. The Recreation and Park Department responded to the CGJ’s questionnaire. Copies of MOUs and numerous other documents were provided.
R57:
The Recreation and Park Department should continue to require prior approval by the General Manager for overtime.
R58:
The effectiveness of ten hour/four day shifts as well as weekend shifts (e.g., Tuesday- Saturday and Wednesday-Sunday) should be evaluated by the Department. If that scheduling is found to be effective in accomplishing the required work and reducing overtime it should be a priority to seek to include provisions authorizing such scheduling in MOUs.
R59:
The Director of the Recreation and Park Department should submit required overtime reports to the Board of Supervisors by the required deadline.
R60:
The Recreation and Park Department should evaluate whether the Giants and Forty-Niners are fully Overtime Report - reimbursing overtime costs incurred at 3Com/Candlestick Park. - Overtime Report PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION (PUC) – WATER DEPARTMENT The Water Department responded to the CGJ's questionnaire on overtime. Extensive exhibits and supplemental information were also provided. The Public Utilities Commission includes the following three operating groups:
R61:
Since emergencies occur every year, overtime based upon prior year's experience should be included in the budget. Non-emergency projects should be scheduled for completion during normal working hours.
R62:
The Department should consider additional alternative shift arrangements that cover weekends and evenings, since pollution control problems regularly occur outside the normal work week.
R63:
The Water Department staff should be trained in the new FAMIS system and be able to make the required reports on overtime to the Board of Supervisors.
R64:
The Water Department (PUC) management should be part of the team negotiating MOUs.
R65:
Operating and capital accounts should be audited regularly to prevent shifting of operating overtime expenses to capital accounts.
R66:
The Water Department (PUC) should overhaul Human Resources hiring practices so that vacant positions can be promptly filled.
F95:
The Human Resources staff of the Public Utilities Commission was reported to be under-funded and under- staffed. Difficulties were reported in changing from - Overtime Report the salary survey method of setting wage rates to the collective bargaining process which requires negotiating with unions. The existing staff may not have the skills and experience required for effective representation of the City’s interests in collective bargaining.
Related Recommendations (33)
R34:
MUNI Management and the Mayor’s Office should make the use of part-time operators and greater flexibility in full-time shifts a priority in future contract negotiations.
R35:
MUNI Management and the Civil Service Commission should work together to streamline the existing hiring procedures including combining similar employment categories.
R36:
MUNI Retirement System should evaluate whether the “ last 12 months” basis for retirement benefits best serves the fiscal needs of the City.
R37:
The Training Department capacity should be enlarged to accommodate more scheduled classes, a larger number of trainers and, consequently, more students, until the available pool of operators is adequate to meet daily needs. The budget for the Training Department should Overtime Report - be adjusted to reflect its increased hiring requirements.
R38:
To expedite hiring, in-house Human Resources Division of MUNI should have authority independent of DHR procedures. FIRE DEPARTMENT For the fiscal year 1997-98, the San Francisco Fire Department (SFFD) is mandated to adequately staff 41 fire stations 24 hours per day, 7 days a week, with a staffing level of 296. In its response to the 1997-98 Grand Jury questionnaire on overtime, The SFFD stated that it began the 1996-97 fiscal year with 61 vacancies and a projected attrition rate of 3% or 45 full time equivalent positions. The Fire Department operated under a Consent Decree for some years. The Fire Department maintained that the Consent Decree hindered hiring. The stipulated Order Terminating the Consent Decree is now in place with a schedule to add 96 new fire fighters into the fire suppression ranks. The SFFD now states that with the graduation of all currently scheduled classes for new fire fighters, the Department will be closer to full staffing and the need for overtime will be greatly reduced. However, the Overtime Report shows the following overtime amounts for the San Francisco Fire Department: For Year: Original Revised Actual Budget Budget 1997-98 $3,686,040 $5,510,040 $6,574,217 (through 5/15/98) 1996-97 $3,298,541 $3,714,521 $5,105,091 1995-96 $3,251,590 $3,386,590 $2,859,984 - Overtime Report After it was disclosed that the SFFD had spent its entire annual overtime budget in the first three months of fiscal year 1997-98, the SFFD prepared an Action Plan to Reduce Overtime Costs, dated October 24, 1997. The Action Plan was presented to the Board of Supervisors as a condition of obtaining supplemental funding. The Action Plan suggested the following causes for excessive overtime: Vacant positions (backfilled at automatic time and a half); Disability leave (32.1% of total average absences 1996-97); Long term or frequent sick pay; Vacations (38.1% of total average absences 1996- 97); Use of compensatory time and military leave. A major emphasis in the Action Plan was on greater accountability and oversight of disability policies. Efforts to monitor those individuals who are out on workers’ compensation or disability were to be increased and the City Department verification unit would be utilized for that purpose. In addition, there would be greater use of a return to work policy through light duty assignments. The Action Plan also stressed the basic scheduling principle, which is, however, new to the Fire Department, of staggering or balancing vacation requests more evenly throughout the calendar year. The result of vacation balancing is to insure that summer months, for example, are not heavily impacted requiring excessive seasonal overtime. This would mean that in future years fewer vacations would be allowed in June, July, August and September, and more allowed in the months from October through May. Overtime Report - In its Action Plan, the SFFD also provided overtime figures by job classification title for the years 1994-95, 1995-96 and 1996-97. In virtually every classification, overtime has increased steadily from year to year. Several classifications stand out, however, for their questionable need for overtime. For example for the year 1996-97: JOB CLASSIFICATION OVERTIME PAID Payroll Clerk $51,922 Fire Safety Inspector II $46,566 Water System Supervisor $25,813 Utility Plumber $37,872
R39:
The Mayor, the Board of Supervisors and the SFFD should establish an overtime budget that reflects reality and adequately fund that budget. There should not be reliance on so-called “ salary savings” to cover excess overtime costs.
R40:
With respect to the SFFD Action Plan to Reduce Overtime Costs, dated October 24, 1997: a. The SFFD should aggressively and immediately implement those actions outlined in the SFFD Action Plan to Reduce Overtime Costs. b. The SFFD should, in addition, initiate a comprehensive plan to reduce and prevent future injuries. A plan should include: Overtime Report -
R41:
The SFFD should schedule vacations evenly throughout the year to promote cost efficient scheduling of employees and thereby reduce seasonal overtime.
R42:
The SFFD should analyze non-suppression areas to determine adequate staffing levels and institute oversight of overtime costs.
R43:
The Mayor and all other members of the City’s negotiating team should give the fiscal needs of the City the highest priority in developing a concrete and specific list of positions and priorities for future contract negotiations with SFFD employees. - Overtime Report POLICE DEPARTMENT In order to effectively and efficiently carry out its mission, Charter section 4.103 provides in part that, “ the police force shall at all times consist of not fewer than 1,971 full duty sworn officers. The staffing level of the Police Department shall be maintained with a minimum of 1,971 sworn officers thereafter…the Commission shall initiate an annual review to civilianize as many positions as possible to maximize police presence in this community…” (Charter ∋ 4.103) The Police Department is one of the City departments with high overtime expenditures. The Overtime Report shows the following overtime amounts for the San Francisco Police Department: For Year: Original Revised Actual Budget Budget 1997-98 $10,952,285 $14,321,352 $15,447,084 (through 5/15/98) 1996-97 $10,452,889 $13,968,680 $19,033,191 1995-96 $10,385,826 $13,280,210 $16,699,868 With approximately three more payroll periods remaining for FY 1997-1998, the department will again exceed its revised FY 1997-1998 over time budget of $14,321,352. As of 5/15/98, SFPD has already expended $15,447,084. That exceeds SFPD’s original budget for FY 1997-1998, by 41.04%, and its revised budget by 7.86%. Based on the current rate of expenditures, it can be anticipated that an additional $671,612 for each remaining payroll period will be expended for a total additional amount of $2,014,837 – if expenditures remain uniformly constant. These numbers Overtime Report - suggest the SFPD will end the current fiscal year with total overtime expenses of approximately $17,551,921 -- which will exceed the revised overtime budget by 22.56%. The SFPD maintains that one of its major causes of overtime is a result of Proposition 115 that passed in 1989, and mandates that one arresting officer needs to appear in court. Overtime occurs when an officer ‘stands-by’ for an appearance. The SFPD maintains that ‘stand-by’ time is excessive and desires more cooperation from the District Attorney and the Courts to expedite scheduling of officer court appearances and thereby reduce police overtime costs. Currently, a voluntary ten-hour/ four-day shift has been implemented in the investigative units. SFPD is currently studying the cost effectiveness and productivity of this program. In addition, overtime occurs because the police department provides crowd control and security for public events such as street fairs and cultural events. Historically, these services have been provided by police officers on an overtime basis and at an overtime pay scale. These events have proliferated over the years and today occur almost every week. It has been policy that the police department be reimbursed, in full, by the organizers of “ for-profit” events. For cultural, or non-profit events, the policy has been to reimburse the police department for a maximum of twenty-five hundred dollars, with the police department absorbing the remaining costs out of its own overtime budget. In addition, the Board of Supervisors has the prerogative to waive even the twenty-five hundred dollar reimbursement if it is determined that the event is in the best cultural interest of the City. - Overtime Report The Board of Supervisors’ policy, and its implementation, are sufficiently unclear as to result in increased police overtime costs, as occurred with last year’s “ Summer of Love” festival. These increased costs can be very substantial. Historically, the SFPD has relied on candidate testing and hiring occurring only once a year, in spite of normal year- round attrition. This has resulted in chronic understaffing because the SFPD has never attained a compliment of 1,971 full duty officers as required by the Charter. This understaffing results in higher overtime expenditures. In the absence of a current eligibility list, with an officer’s departure from the department, or with the addition of a budgeted position, in most cases positions can and will, in fact, remain vacant for more than one year. The SFPD has now implemented incremental hiring (with three academy classes currently in session) that should promote more even, adequate staffing year-round. It must be taken into account that the police Academy course lasts twenty-eight weeks and is followed by eighteen weeks field training and therefore it takes almost one full year to develop a new, fully trained police officer. In a further effort to control overtime costs, all District Stations have converted uniformed officer scheduling from the previously standard eight hour/five day workweek, to a more efficient and cost effective ten hour/four day workweek.
R44:
The police overtime budget should be increased to more accurately reflect the mandated responsibilities of the department that are steadily increasing with time.
R45:
Either the Police Department should be reimbursed for special services that require overtime or the overtime budget should reflect those known costs that will not be reimbursed. - Overtime Report
R46:
Adequate personnel resources should be provided for the testing and hiring unit to provide more frequent examinations in order to staff up to the mandated level of 1,971 officers.
R47:
The Chief of Police should continue collaboration with the District Attorney’s Office and the Public Defender’s Office, as appropriate, to implement a scheduling process for officer court appearances that will minimize those overtime costs associated with court appearances.
R48:
The Chief of Police or his designated representative should negotiate with the police officers’ bargaining entity in order to develop some flexibility in work schedules which reduces the requirement for overtime. Overtime Report - COMMUNITY HEALTH NETWORK (Department of Public Health) The Overtime Report shows the following overtime amounts for the San Francisco Community Health Network: For Year: Original Revised Actual Budget Budget 1997-98 $2,723,899 $2,723,899 $3,213,594 (through 5/15/98) 1996-97 $2,255,582 $2,923,407 $4,158,193 1995-96 NA NA NA As an acute care facility operating 24 hours per day, seven days a week, San Francisco General Hospital is required to maintain minimum staffing levels that have been determined through staffing models. Laguna Honda and Forensic Services also operate 24 hours per day, seven days a week, and must maintain adequate staffing. The Department of Public Health, in its response to the 1997-98 Grand Jury questionnaire on overtime, suggests overtime occurs as a result of:
R49:
The cumbersome hiring procedures that result in chronic delays in hiring and the budget process that mandates “ salary savings” should both be addressed by DPH and modified.
R50:
Overtime budgeting should be realistic and every attempt should be made by DPH to maintain adequate full-time staffing levels. Adequate, budgeted full- time permanent staffing will reduce overtime costs to the City and County. SAN FRANCISCO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT The Overtime Report shows the following overtime amounts for San Francisco International Airport: For Year: Original Revised Actual Budget Budget 1997-98 $1,372,976 $1,372,976 $1,509,503 (through 5/15/98) 1996-97 $1,290,326 $1,290,326 $2,291,660 1995-96 $1,393,459 $2,029,813 $2,561,791 The airport operates certain sections on a 24 hour per day, 7 day a week schedule and must maintain certain staffing levels to ensure safety. - Overtime Report The San Francisco International Airport, in its response to the CGJ questionnaire on overtime, suggests overtime can occur as a result of special events, last minute absences, emergencies and chronic understaffing in specific areas such as Airport Communication Dispatchers. The airport stated in its response to questions #15 and #16 of the overtime questionnaire (See
R51:
The Board of Supervisors should direct the City Attorney’s Office to render a decision regarding the - Overtime Report Airport’s obligations to report under Administrative Code Section 18.13.
R52:
If the City Attorney’s Office determines the Airport is required to file reports under Code Section 18.13, the Board of Supervisors should notify the Airport it is subject to the semi-annual reporting requirements of Administrative Code 18.13. The Airport should then file both current and delinquent reports within 45 days of said notification.
R53:
If the City Attorney determines the Airport is not obligated to report under the provisions of Administrative Code Section 18.13, the Board of Supervisors should amend the Code Section to include the Airport under its requirements.
R54:
The Airport Director should review staffing requirements to determine realistic optimum levels. The Airport should develop a plan to fill budgeted vacancies and implement aggressive hiring procedures to fill budgeted vacancies rather than relying on overtime paid from “ salary savings.”
R55:
The Airport Director should examine all procedures governing the monitoring of overtime accumulation and review and tighten procedures to achieve a permanent reduction in overtime expenditures. Overtime limitations should be enforced.
R56:
The Airport Director should institute procedures to carefully monitor individual overtime earners to significantly reduce excessive individual overtime. RECREATION AND PARK DEPARTMENT Overtime costs for the current year and for 1996-97, have significantly exceeded the budget for overtime. In 1995-96, overtime was less than the budgeted amount. Overtime can result from expected and unexpected events. The Department Overtime Report - needs to further evaluate the effectiveness of ten hour/four day shifts and weekend shifts (e.g., Tuesday-Saturday and Wednesday- Sunday) and, if necessary, incorporate them into MOUs. The level of overtime reimbursement for 3Com/Candlestick Park needs to be analyzed. The Overtime Report shows the following overtime amounts for the San Francisco Recreation and Park Department: For Year: Original Revised Actual Budget Budget 1997-98 $459,963 $421,871 $878,174 (through 5/15/98) 1996-97 $401,899 $401,899 $900,833 1995-96 $401,899 $471,499 $390,053 The Recreation and Park Department pays overtime for recurring and non-recurring events. Examples of recurring events include pre-event preparations at 3Com/Candlestick Park, weekend garbage pickups and volunteer programs in Golden Gate Park. Non-recurring events include damage caused by nature such as winter storms or a fire at Sierra Camp Mather. The Giants reimburse a portion of overtime for 3Com/Candlestick Park. Overtime above budgeted amounts was funded through "salary savings" from vacant positions. The Recreation and Park Department responded to the CGJ’s questionnaire. Copies of MOUs and numerous other documents were provided.
R57:
The Recreation and Park Department should continue to require prior approval by the General Manager for overtime.
R58:
The effectiveness of ten hour/four day shifts as well as weekend shifts (e.g., Tuesday- Saturday and Wednesday-Sunday) should be evaluated by the Department. If that scheduling is found to be effective in accomplishing the required work and reducing overtime it should be a priority to seek to include provisions authorizing such scheduling in MOUs.
R59:
The Director of the Recreation and Park Department should submit required overtime reports to the Board of Supervisors by the required deadline.
R60:
The Recreation and Park Department should evaluate whether the Giants and Forty-Niners are fully Overtime Report - reimbursing overtime costs incurred at 3Com/Candlestick Park. - Overtime Report PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION (PUC) – WATER DEPARTMENT The Water Department responded to the CGJ's questionnaire on overtime. Extensive exhibits and supplemental information were also provided. The Public Utilities Commission includes the following three operating groups:
R61:
Since emergencies occur every year, overtime based upon prior year's experience should be included in the budget. Non-emergency projects should be scheduled for completion during normal working hours.
R62:
The Department should consider additional alternative shift arrangements that cover weekends and evenings, since pollution control problems regularly occur outside the normal work week.
R63:
The Water Department staff should be trained in the new FAMIS system and be able to make the required reports on overtime to the Board of Supervisors.
R64:
The Water Department (PUC) management should be part of the team negotiating MOUs.
R65:
Operating and capital accounts should be audited regularly to prevent shifting of operating overtime expenses to capital accounts.
R66:
The Water Department (PUC) should overhaul Human Resources hiring practices so that vacant positions can be promptly filled.
F96:
Since the Department routinely has capital expenditure construction projects underway it is able to shift some operating overtime expenses to capital expenditures. This can distort the reporting and accounting for operations and capital projects.
Related Recommendations (33)
R34:
MUNI Management and the Mayor’s Office should make the use of part-time operators and greater flexibility in full-time shifts a priority in future contract negotiations.
R35:
MUNI Management and the Civil Service Commission should work together to streamline the existing hiring procedures including combining similar employment categories.
R36:
MUNI Retirement System should evaluate whether the “ last 12 months” basis for retirement benefits best serves the fiscal needs of the City.
R37:
The Training Department capacity should be enlarged to accommodate more scheduled classes, a larger number of trainers and, consequently, more students, until the available pool of operators is adequate to meet daily needs. The budget for the Training Department should Overtime Report - be adjusted to reflect its increased hiring requirements.
R38:
To expedite hiring, in-house Human Resources Division of MUNI should have authority independent of DHR procedures. FIRE DEPARTMENT For the fiscal year 1997-98, the San Francisco Fire Department (SFFD) is mandated to adequately staff 41 fire stations 24 hours per day, 7 days a week, with a staffing level of 296. In its response to the 1997-98 Grand Jury questionnaire on overtime, The SFFD stated that it began the 1996-97 fiscal year with 61 vacancies and a projected attrition rate of 3% or 45 full time equivalent positions. The Fire Department operated under a Consent Decree for some years. The Fire Department maintained that the Consent Decree hindered hiring. The stipulated Order Terminating the Consent Decree is now in place with a schedule to add 96 new fire fighters into the fire suppression ranks. The SFFD now states that with the graduation of all currently scheduled classes for new fire fighters, the Department will be closer to full staffing and the need for overtime will be greatly reduced. However, the Overtime Report shows the following overtime amounts for the San Francisco Fire Department: For Year: Original Revised Actual Budget Budget 1997-98 $3,686,040 $5,510,040 $6,574,217 (through 5/15/98) 1996-97 $3,298,541 $3,714,521 $5,105,091 1995-96 $3,251,590 $3,386,590 $2,859,984 - Overtime Report After it was disclosed that the SFFD had spent its entire annual overtime budget in the first three months of fiscal year 1997-98, the SFFD prepared an Action Plan to Reduce Overtime Costs, dated October 24, 1997. The Action Plan was presented to the Board of Supervisors as a condition of obtaining supplemental funding. The Action Plan suggested the following causes for excessive overtime: Vacant positions (backfilled at automatic time and a half); Disability leave (32.1% of total average absences 1996-97); Long term or frequent sick pay; Vacations (38.1% of total average absences 1996- 97); Use of compensatory time and military leave. A major emphasis in the Action Plan was on greater accountability and oversight of disability policies. Efforts to monitor those individuals who are out on workers’ compensation or disability were to be increased and the City Department verification unit would be utilized for that purpose. In addition, there would be greater use of a return to work policy through light duty assignments. The Action Plan also stressed the basic scheduling principle, which is, however, new to the Fire Department, of staggering or balancing vacation requests more evenly throughout the calendar year. The result of vacation balancing is to insure that summer months, for example, are not heavily impacted requiring excessive seasonal overtime. This would mean that in future years fewer vacations would be allowed in June, July, August and September, and more allowed in the months from October through May. Overtime Report - In its Action Plan, the SFFD also provided overtime figures by job classification title for the years 1994-95, 1995-96 and 1996-97. In virtually every classification, overtime has increased steadily from year to year. Several classifications stand out, however, for their questionable need for overtime. For example for the year 1996-97: JOB CLASSIFICATION OVERTIME PAID Payroll Clerk $51,922 Fire Safety Inspector II $46,566 Water System Supervisor $25,813 Utility Plumber $37,872
R39:
The Mayor, the Board of Supervisors and the SFFD should establish an overtime budget that reflects reality and adequately fund that budget. There should not be reliance on so-called “ salary savings” to cover excess overtime costs.
R40:
With respect to the SFFD Action Plan to Reduce Overtime Costs, dated October 24, 1997: a. The SFFD should aggressively and immediately implement those actions outlined in the SFFD Action Plan to Reduce Overtime Costs. b. The SFFD should, in addition, initiate a comprehensive plan to reduce and prevent future injuries. A plan should include: Overtime Report -
R41:
The SFFD should schedule vacations evenly throughout the year to promote cost efficient scheduling of employees and thereby reduce seasonal overtime.
R42:
The SFFD should analyze non-suppression areas to determine adequate staffing levels and institute oversight of overtime costs.
R43:
The Mayor and all other members of the City’s negotiating team should give the fiscal needs of the City the highest priority in developing a concrete and specific list of positions and priorities for future contract negotiations with SFFD employees. - Overtime Report POLICE DEPARTMENT In order to effectively and efficiently carry out its mission, Charter section 4.103 provides in part that, “ the police force shall at all times consist of not fewer than 1,971 full duty sworn officers. The staffing level of the Police Department shall be maintained with a minimum of 1,971 sworn officers thereafter…the Commission shall initiate an annual review to civilianize as many positions as possible to maximize police presence in this community…” (Charter ∋ 4.103) The Police Department is one of the City departments with high overtime expenditures. The Overtime Report shows the following overtime amounts for the San Francisco Police Department: For Year: Original Revised Actual Budget Budget 1997-98 $10,952,285 $14,321,352 $15,447,084 (through 5/15/98) 1996-97 $10,452,889 $13,968,680 $19,033,191 1995-96 $10,385,826 $13,280,210 $16,699,868 With approximately three more payroll periods remaining for FY 1997-1998, the department will again exceed its revised FY 1997-1998 over time budget of $14,321,352. As of 5/15/98, SFPD has already expended $15,447,084. That exceeds SFPD’s original budget for FY 1997-1998, by 41.04%, and its revised budget by 7.86%. Based on the current rate of expenditures, it can be anticipated that an additional $671,612 for each remaining payroll period will be expended for a total additional amount of $2,014,837 – if expenditures remain uniformly constant. These numbers Overtime Report - suggest the SFPD will end the current fiscal year with total overtime expenses of approximately $17,551,921 -- which will exceed the revised overtime budget by 22.56%. The SFPD maintains that one of its major causes of overtime is a result of Proposition 115 that passed in 1989, and mandates that one arresting officer needs to appear in court. Overtime occurs when an officer ‘stands-by’ for an appearance. The SFPD maintains that ‘stand-by’ time is excessive and desires more cooperation from the District Attorney and the Courts to expedite scheduling of officer court appearances and thereby reduce police overtime costs. Currently, a voluntary ten-hour/ four-day shift has been implemented in the investigative units. SFPD is currently studying the cost effectiveness and productivity of this program. In addition, overtime occurs because the police department provides crowd control and security for public events such as street fairs and cultural events. Historically, these services have been provided by police officers on an overtime basis and at an overtime pay scale. These events have proliferated over the years and today occur almost every week. It has been policy that the police department be reimbursed, in full, by the organizers of “ for-profit” events. For cultural, or non-profit events, the policy has been to reimburse the police department for a maximum of twenty-five hundred dollars, with the police department absorbing the remaining costs out of its own overtime budget. In addition, the Board of Supervisors has the prerogative to waive even the twenty-five hundred dollar reimbursement if it is determined that the event is in the best cultural interest of the City. - Overtime Report The Board of Supervisors’ policy, and its implementation, are sufficiently unclear as to result in increased police overtime costs, as occurred with last year’s “ Summer of Love” festival. These increased costs can be very substantial. Historically, the SFPD has relied on candidate testing and hiring occurring only once a year, in spite of normal year- round attrition. This has resulted in chronic understaffing because the SFPD has never attained a compliment of 1,971 full duty officers as required by the Charter. This understaffing results in higher overtime expenditures. In the absence of a current eligibility list, with an officer’s departure from the department, or with the addition of a budgeted position, in most cases positions can and will, in fact, remain vacant for more than one year. The SFPD has now implemented incremental hiring (with three academy classes currently in session) that should promote more even, adequate staffing year-round. It must be taken into account that the police Academy course lasts twenty-eight weeks and is followed by eighteen weeks field training and therefore it takes almost one full year to develop a new, fully trained police officer. In a further effort to control overtime costs, all District Stations have converted uniformed officer scheduling from the previously standard eight hour/five day workweek, to a more efficient and cost effective ten hour/four day workweek.
R44:
The police overtime budget should be increased to more accurately reflect the mandated responsibilities of the department that are steadily increasing with time.
R45:
Either the Police Department should be reimbursed for special services that require overtime or the overtime budget should reflect those known costs that will not be reimbursed. - Overtime Report
R46:
Adequate personnel resources should be provided for the testing and hiring unit to provide more frequent examinations in order to staff up to the mandated level of 1,971 officers.
R47:
The Chief of Police should continue collaboration with the District Attorney’s Office and the Public Defender’s Office, as appropriate, to implement a scheduling process for officer court appearances that will minimize those overtime costs associated with court appearances.
R48:
The Chief of Police or his designated representative should negotiate with the police officers’ bargaining entity in order to develop some flexibility in work schedules which reduces the requirement for overtime. Overtime Report - COMMUNITY HEALTH NETWORK (Department of Public Health) The Overtime Report shows the following overtime amounts for the San Francisco Community Health Network: For Year: Original Revised Actual Budget Budget 1997-98 $2,723,899 $2,723,899 $3,213,594 (through 5/15/98) 1996-97 $2,255,582 $2,923,407 $4,158,193 1995-96 NA NA NA As an acute care facility operating 24 hours per day, seven days a week, San Francisco General Hospital is required to maintain minimum staffing levels that have been determined through staffing models. Laguna Honda and Forensic Services also operate 24 hours per day, seven days a week, and must maintain adequate staffing. The Department of Public Health, in its response to the 1997-98 Grand Jury questionnaire on overtime, suggests overtime occurs as a result of:
R49:
The cumbersome hiring procedures that result in chronic delays in hiring and the budget process that mandates “ salary savings” should both be addressed by DPH and modified.
R50:
Overtime budgeting should be realistic and every attempt should be made by DPH to maintain adequate full-time staffing levels. Adequate, budgeted full- time permanent staffing will reduce overtime costs to the City and County. SAN FRANCISCO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT The Overtime Report shows the following overtime amounts for San Francisco International Airport: For Year: Original Revised Actual Budget Budget 1997-98 $1,372,976 $1,372,976 $1,509,503 (through 5/15/98) 1996-97 $1,290,326 $1,290,326 $2,291,660 1995-96 $1,393,459 $2,029,813 $2,561,791 The airport operates certain sections on a 24 hour per day, 7 day a week schedule and must maintain certain staffing levels to ensure safety. - Overtime Report The San Francisco International Airport, in its response to the CGJ questionnaire on overtime, suggests overtime can occur as a result of special events, last minute absences, emergencies and chronic understaffing in specific areas such as Airport Communication Dispatchers. The airport stated in its response to questions #15 and #16 of the overtime questionnaire (See
R51:
The Board of Supervisors should direct the City Attorney’s Office to render a decision regarding the - Overtime Report Airport’s obligations to report under Administrative Code Section 18.13.
R52:
If the City Attorney’s Office determines the Airport is required to file reports under Code Section 18.13, the Board of Supervisors should notify the Airport it is subject to the semi-annual reporting requirements of Administrative Code 18.13. The Airport should then file both current and delinquent reports within 45 days of said notification.
R53:
If the City Attorney determines the Airport is not obligated to report under the provisions of Administrative Code Section 18.13, the Board of Supervisors should amend the Code Section to include the Airport under its requirements.
R54:
The Airport Director should review staffing requirements to determine realistic optimum levels. The Airport should develop a plan to fill budgeted vacancies and implement aggressive hiring procedures to fill budgeted vacancies rather than relying on overtime paid from “ salary savings.”
R55:
The Airport Director should examine all procedures governing the monitoring of overtime accumulation and review and tighten procedures to achieve a permanent reduction in overtime expenditures. Overtime limitations should be enforced.
R56:
The Airport Director should institute procedures to carefully monitor individual overtime earners to significantly reduce excessive individual overtime. RECREATION AND PARK DEPARTMENT Overtime costs for the current year and for 1996-97, have significantly exceeded the budget for overtime. In 1995-96, overtime was less than the budgeted amount. Overtime can result from expected and unexpected events. The Department Overtime Report - needs to further evaluate the effectiveness of ten hour/four day shifts and weekend shifts (e.g., Tuesday-Saturday and Wednesday- Sunday) and, if necessary, incorporate them into MOUs. The level of overtime reimbursement for 3Com/Candlestick Park needs to be analyzed. The Overtime Report shows the following overtime amounts for the San Francisco Recreation and Park Department: For Year: Original Revised Actual Budget Budget 1997-98 $459,963 $421,871 $878,174 (through 5/15/98) 1996-97 $401,899 $401,899 $900,833 1995-96 $401,899 $471,499 $390,053 The Recreation and Park Department pays overtime for recurring and non-recurring events. Examples of recurring events include pre-event preparations at 3Com/Candlestick Park, weekend garbage pickups and volunteer programs in Golden Gate Park. Non-recurring events include damage caused by nature such as winter storms or a fire at Sierra Camp Mather. The Giants reimburse a portion of overtime for 3Com/Candlestick Park. Overtime above budgeted amounts was funded through "salary savings" from vacant positions. The Recreation and Park Department responded to the CGJ’s questionnaire. Copies of MOUs and numerous other documents were provided.
R57:
The Recreation and Park Department should continue to require prior approval by the General Manager for overtime.
R58:
The effectiveness of ten hour/four day shifts as well as weekend shifts (e.g., Tuesday- Saturday and Wednesday-Sunday) should be evaluated by the Department. If that scheduling is found to be effective in accomplishing the required work and reducing overtime it should be a priority to seek to include provisions authorizing such scheduling in MOUs.
R59:
The Director of the Recreation and Park Department should submit required overtime reports to the Board of Supervisors by the required deadline.
R60:
The Recreation and Park Department should evaluate whether the Giants and Forty-Niners are fully Overtime Report - reimbursing overtime costs incurred at 3Com/Candlestick Park. - Overtime Report PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION (PUC) – WATER DEPARTMENT The Water Department responded to the CGJ's questionnaire on overtime. Extensive exhibits and supplemental information were also provided. The Public Utilities Commission includes the following three operating groups:
R61:
Since emergencies occur every year, overtime based upon prior year's experience should be included in the budget. Non-emergency projects should be scheduled for completion during normal working hours.
R62:
The Department should consider additional alternative shift arrangements that cover weekends and evenings, since pollution control problems regularly occur outside the normal work week.
R63:
The Water Department staff should be trained in the new FAMIS system and be able to make the required reports on overtime to the Board of Supervisors.
R64:
The Water Department (PUC) management should be part of the team negotiating MOUs.
R65:
Operating and capital accounts should be audited regularly to prevent shifting of operating overtime expenses to capital accounts.
R66:
The Water Department (PUC) should overhaul Human Resources hiring practices so that vacant positions can be promptly filled.
F97:
The Mayor’s Office on Homelessness re-invents itself with the appointment of each Coordinator. Since Mayor Feinstein, the City has employed at least five different Mayor’s Homeless Coordinators. While allowing for differences in philosophies and program approaches to solving the homeless problem by different mayoral administrations, the Office suffers from a lack of historical continuity and organizational structure.
Related Recommendations (28)
R2:
The Citizens Advisory Committee should be appointed by the Board of Supervisors rather than TIDA, and its role clearly defined by the Board.
R4:
The Citizens Advisory Committee should have unfettered access to the Directors and staff of the Authority, to all of their records, and should have unfettered physical access to the islands.
R5:
The Board of Supervisors and TIDA should consult the Citizens Advisory Committee on matters affecting the public interest.
R6:
The Board of Supervisors should play an active role in the oversight of the plans for Treasure Island, and should take seriously their role, albeit a limited one, in approving and disapproving the Mayor’s appointees to TIDA.
R7:
TIDA should improve its communications with the press and the public, in order to make the process truly accessible and responsive to public needs, which in turn would reduce the widespread perception that the planning process is closed. TIDA’s philosophy in disseminating - Treasure Island Report information should be proactive rather than reactive and funding should be committed to this effort. INTERIM AND LONG TERM USE TI is still owned by the Navy. The Navy and the Department of Defense (DOD), its parent agency, remain actively involved in the islands, negotiating with TIDA under a Cooperative Agreement to implement the Reuse Plan. Development plans are proceeding along two parallel tracks extending over a 35 year period: interim reuse and long term conveyance. The Defense Authorization Act provides that once DOD property is transferred at below market price, the local government and DOD generally will share in any net proceeds ultimately generated from subsequent sales or leasings of the property for a period of 15 years after conveyance by the federal government. The objective of the Interim Use Phase of development (1997 through 2001) is to generate revenue to offset the cost of City services. During this period, the city leases TI from the Navy, and can sublease facilities on the islands. The long term objectives involve negotiating the transfer of the islands from the Navy with a redevelopment plan consistent with the Reuse Plan approved by the Board of Supervisors and the Mayor. Interim Use The complex nature of the land uses planned for Treasure Island and Yerba Buena Island are discussed in the Reuse Plan and the two volumes of Existing Conditions. An important aspect of the plan is the encouragement of early civilian uses through leasing of existing facilities to defray operating costs, and to promote the transformation to visitor-oriented and recreational uses while marketing and financing efforts are underway for longer term development. Treasure Island Report - Some early revenue-producing interim uses are already in place. Some are in active development, and others are planned, but not yet underway. There are commercial uses, public uses and nonprofit uses. Some uses are likely to remain in place over the long term, while others may be replaced when large scale development begins. • The leasing of hangar structures for film production has been in place since the Navy’s time, and is ongoing. • The development of recreational playing fields is planned. At present, these facilities are leased on an occasional basis. • Operation and possible expansion of the marina at Clipper Cove is planned, but not yet underway. The Navy maintains control of the marina. (Discussion of long term marina development and recent press coverage appears later in this report.) • The leasing of small structures for restaurant and retail use is planned for the future. • The federal Job Corps center is in place, and is discussed further later in this report. • The conversion of the Navy brig to a jail for use by CCSF is underway. • Plans for leasing of the state-of-the-art Firefighters Training school by the San Francisco Fire Department are underway. • The use of athletic and other facilities as a Police Academy training site is planned for the near future. • The Treasure Island Elementary School is being operated by the San Francisco Unified School District, and presently has a census of approximately 500 children. Students are bused to the school from four different inner city areas. Parents have commented favorably on having their children in such a nice environment. - Treasure Island Report • It is planned that nonprofit organizations will lease some of the existing housing on both TI and YBI. This is discussed further below. • The Treasure Island Museum, which operated during the Navy’s tenure, is slated for continued operation. The artifacts from the museum are stored on TI, and are expected to be returned to their display location in the Administration Building following a planned $1.5 million seismic retrofit of that structure.
R8:
TIDA should try to dispel the perception of disarray by making the progress of its planning clear to the public.
R12:
TIDA should report publicly on the Navy’s plans to collect delinquent rent from marina tenants, and plans for repossession of boats and eviction of delinquent boat owners, so that the marina can become a revenue-producing facility. Long Term Development and the Marina The key to long term development of TI is finding a developer to finance, construct and run commercial enterprises on the islands. The marina at Clipper Cove is the focal point of development proposals. TIDA has received a number proposals for leasing of the marina. A June 11, 1998, article in the San Francisco Examiner (attached as Appendix I) reported that political supporters - Treasure Island Report of the Mayor have submitted a proposal to TIDA for long term development of the marina, with a view to eventual development of residential and commercial facilities throughout the islands. The article raised familiar questions about conflicts of interest and competitive bidding, and quoted the Chairperson of TIDA as saying that they had received three such proposals and their only consideration is finding the developer who can do the best job of running the marina.
R13:
TIDA should publicize its criteria for a competitive process for development proposals.
R14:
TIDA should apply the presently governing regulations regarding conflicts of interest and competitive processes in soliciting proposals for development.
R15:
TIDA should take an aggressive role in publicizing and explaining its activities, particularly those which will have a long term impact on TI, and therefore are of great interest to the people of San Francisco.
R16:
The City Attorney should monitor TIDA’s compliance with the required competitive process. FINANCING It is estimated that $200 million will be needed to build the required infrastructure on TI and YBI, including seismic remediation. The city has committed that no general fund money will be used to support TI. It is anticipated that an eventual large scale development will provide the bulk of the needed income. In the interim, federal, state and/or bridge toll subsidies will be required. Federal and state grants have funded the $6 million budget for the islands through June 1998. An annual budget will be submitted to the City thereafter by TIDA. The proposed budget for Fiscal Year 1998-1999 anticipates that the majority of the $6,125,000 total will still come from the Navy ($4 million). (The proposed budget is attached as
R17:
TIDA should balance its interest in finding a qualified developer for TI with an equal commitment to a process which is open and responsive to the needs of the citizens of San Francisco.
R18:
TIDA should clarify, with specificity, its financing plans for TI over the course of the Interim Use period.
R19:
The San Francisco Police Department (SFPD), the San Francisco Fire Department (SFFD) and MUNI should determine what the cost of necessary police, fire and public transportation services will be in order to make the islands accessible to the public
R20:
TIDA should detail the anticipated sources of funds needed to provide those services, and the projected timetable for their implementation. ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES The development of TI is subject to the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). CEQA provides that before Treasure Island Report - a legislative body can take any action which will have an environmental impact it must complete environmental studies. These studies are known as Environmental Impact Reports (EIR). In the case of TI, the Reuse Plan is the “ scoping document” for the EIR, which is scheduled for completion during the coming winter. What this means is that the EIR will be based on what is presented in the Reuse Plan. An approval issued based on the Reuse Plan might lose its viability if the Reuse Plan is substantially altered. DOD funding for environmental testing, including toxic pollutants, petroleum derivatives, lead abatement and asbestos removal, has been reduced. Concerns have been expressed that funding is inadequate, and the combination of toxic and seismic concerns may reduce the likelihood that the Reuse Plan will be able to be implemented. Certain structures built by the Navy which would not be permitted under the Tidelands Trust will be allowed, under the terms of AB 699, to continue to be used for their remaining useful life. These include housing units, the fire-fighter training facility and the brig.
R21:
City officials and TIDA should encourage our Congressional delegation to insist DOD provide funding for environmental testing which could reduce problems in future development. JOB CORPS Ownership of a large section in the center of TI, including a ball field, has been transferred from the DOD to the Department of Labor for a Job Corps center. The center is two to three years away from completion. The Job Corps is intended to serve economically eligible young people, between the ages of 16 and 24, who have financial and home deficiencies. Its mission is to create a residential setting and provide vocational training. Academics are taught for remediation in pursuit of GEDs and high school diplomas. Training in social skills, such as dealing with society at large and coping with job situations and coworkers, is also provided. There are now approximately 200 young people at the center, with a projected total of 850 -- 600 residential slots and an additional 250 for local residents. The Job Corps program is not intended to serve young people with serious criminal or psychological problems. TIDA, which emphatically wanted the San Francisco residents’ component included in the center’s programs, continues to work with the Job Corps to ensure that the center’s development of its Treasure Island Report - facilities will not inhibit future development of other uses of TI. THE HOMELESS ON TREASURE ISLAND The Community Redevelopment and Homeless Assistance Act of 1994 requires that the Reuse Plan incorporate an agreement regarding the homeless. It is this requirement that necessitated approval of the Reuse Plan by HUD. The homeless component was developed through negotiation with Treasure Island Homeless Development Initiative (TIHDI, pronounced “ tie-dye” ), an association which was formed in June of 1994, and is composed of 24 non-profit homeless and social services organizations. TIHDI received initial funding from the City and from the Evelyn and Walter Haas Foundation. TIHDI is fiscally sponsored by Tenants and Owners Development Corporation (TODCO), whose Executive Vice President and Director of Project Design is the Vice Chairperson of TIDA. There are four parts to the agreement6 between TIDA7 and TIHDI incorporated into the Reuse Plan: 1) Up to 375 of the approximately 1000 housing units on TI and YBI will be used as housing for the homeless. The vast majority of these units will be subject to being bought out by an eventual developer. CCSF will retain site control, either through ownership or leasehold control, and TIHDI must have adequate resources to provide basic services to the proposed residents. 2) Service contracts for TI will be made available to the homeless community. At present, two TIHDI member organizations, Rubicon and Toolworks, have contracts to 6 This agreement cannot become final until the EIR is complete and CEQA approval is given. TIDA functions for CCSF as the LRA (Local Reuse Authority). - Treasure Island Report provide janitorial and groundskeeping services. An additional contract for deconstruction services is contemplated by the agreement. 3) Economic development opportunities will also be available to allow the homeless service agencies, and their constituents, to run three facilities on TI. These are anticipated to consist of the Fogwatch Restaurant, the Nimitz Conference Center and a store located in the former PX. Again, TIHDI or its component organizations will have to demonstrate their ability to manage these facilities. 4) TIHDI, or its member organizations, will have the opportunity to create a job broker program. As new enterprises open on TI, employers will apply to this homeless job broker program as the first source for a percentage of new workers. Those workers will have to have adequate qualifications for the jobs available.
R22:
TIDA and TIHDI should use the forum provided by the Local Board as an avenue to achieving the high level of cooperation needed to create housing and services for the homeless on TI. INTERIM HOUSING Three hundred housing units on TI are expected to be occupied in October or November of 1998 under an interim housing plan. TIDA has contracted with the John Stewart Company to rehabilitate and manage these units. Rentals to a consortium of Universities for graduate student housing has been discussed, and is apparently still under consideration. This interim plan is intended to preserve the housing stock which deteriorates rapidly with lack of use, and to provide an income stream in the short term.
R23:
TIDA should move as rapidly as possible to have the buildings on TI occupied in order to stop their further deterioration. PUBLIC USE Uncontrolled public access is now permitted on Yerba Buena Island and on the causeway between the islands. Public access is not permitted beyond the guardhouse at the entrance to Treasure Island. When housing is occupied and the Police Academy, firefighter training facility and jail are operating, it should be feasible for TI to be open to the public with adequate police services in place.
R24:
The Recreation and Park Department and TIDA should develop park and playground facilities in order to make public access to the islands meaningful.
R25:
CCSF and TIDA should make early provision of basic services a priority so that TI may be opened to public use at the earliest possible time. ACCESS On and off ramps from the Bay Bridge do not meet current CalTrans standards. Assessment of the access was conducted by the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency, and included in Existing Conditions. Ferry service is anticipated in the Reuse Plan. Pier 12 on the east side of TI, and Pier 1, a fixed concrete pier which is in good condition on the southeast corner of TI, are the only sites with utilities now in place for a ferry landing. Currently a float is used at Pier 1 to accommodate the ferry. A protective breakwater would appear to be needed to utilize the west side Pier 23, which is a fishing pier.
R26:
TIDA should develop a plan for financing adequate ferry service to TI.
R27:
TIDA should develop a plan for increasing motor vehicle access, and for the financing of that access. Replacement of the on and off ramps with new structures meeting CalTrans specifications should be included.
R28:
TIDA should explore, with appropriate State agencies, the use of a portion of Bay Bridge tolls to subsidize ferry service and/or improve access for cars and buses, or to replace access ramps.
R29:
TIDA should further explore all possible avenues of subsidy from federal, state and regional sources for improved access to the islands.
R30:
The City and TIDA should explore whether rail or light rail access is feasible. Treasure Island Report -
R31:
The City and TIDA should provide regular bus service to TI.
R32:
TIDA should explore with CalTrans and the Metropolitan Transportation Commission the impact of new bridge construction on TI and YBI.
R33:
TIDA should consider whether improved access is an appropriate use of its Tax Increment Bond authority. CONCLUSION Treasure Island and Yerba Buena Island have enormous potential to enrich the lives of the people of San Francisco and the Bay Area, and the tourists who form the backbone of our local economy. Control over the development of the islands lies almost exclusively with the Mayor of San Francisco. Increased public input and oversight is needed. Careful controls on conflicts of interest and competitive processes for leases are also needed, as is improved communication with the public by the Treasure Island Development Authority. While a well financed developer will be needed to realize the islands’ potential, the priority of developing the islands for the benefit of the citizenry must be maintained.
F98:
Each new coordinator under the direction of the Mayor often defines his/her job without the benefit of files and records of his/her predecessors.
Related Recommendations (28)
R2:
The Citizens Advisory Committee should be appointed by the Board of Supervisors rather than TIDA, and its role clearly defined by the Board.
R4:
The Citizens Advisory Committee should have unfettered access to the Directors and staff of the Authority, to all of their records, and should have unfettered physical access to the islands.
R5:
The Board of Supervisors and TIDA should consult the Citizens Advisory Committee on matters affecting the public interest.
R6:
The Board of Supervisors should play an active role in the oversight of the plans for Treasure Island, and should take seriously their role, albeit a limited one, in approving and disapproving the Mayor’s appointees to TIDA.
R7:
TIDA should improve its communications with the press and the public, in order to make the process truly accessible and responsive to public needs, which in turn would reduce the widespread perception that the planning process is closed. TIDA’s philosophy in disseminating - Treasure Island Report information should be proactive rather than reactive and funding should be committed to this effort. INTERIM AND LONG TERM USE TI is still owned by the Navy. The Navy and the Department of Defense (DOD), its parent agency, remain actively involved in the islands, negotiating with TIDA under a Cooperative Agreement to implement the Reuse Plan. Development plans are proceeding along two parallel tracks extending over a 35 year period: interim reuse and long term conveyance. The Defense Authorization Act provides that once DOD property is transferred at below market price, the local government and DOD generally will share in any net proceeds ultimately generated from subsequent sales or leasings of the property for a period of 15 years after conveyance by the federal government. The objective of the Interim Use Phase of development (1997 through 2001) is to generate revenue to offset the cost of City services. During this period, the city leases TI from the Navy, and can sublease facilities on the islands. The long term objectives involve negotiating the transfer of the islands from the Navy with a redevelopment plan consistent with the Reuse Plan approved by the Board of Supervisors and the Mayor. Interim Use The complex nature of the land uses planned for Treasure Island and Yerba Buena Island are discussed in the Reuse Plan and the two volumes of Existing Conditions. An important aspect of the plan is the encouragement of early civilian uses through leasing of existing facilities to defray operating costs, and to promote the transformation to visitor-oriented and recreational uses while marketing and financing efforts are underway for longer term development. Treasure Island Report - Some early revenue-producing interim uses are already in place. Some are in active development, and others are planned, but not yet underway. There are commercial uses, public uses and nonprofit uses. Some uses are likely to remain in place over the long term, while others may be replaced when large scale development begins. • The leasing of hangar structures for film production has been in place since the Navy’s time, and is ongoing. • The development of recreational playing fields is planned. At present, these facilities are leased on an occasional basis. • Operation and possible expansion of the marina at Clipper Cove is planned, but not yet underway. The Navy maintains control of the marina. (Discussion of long term marina development and recent press coverage appears later in this report.) • The leasing of small structures for restaurant and retail use is planned for the future. • The federal Job Corps center is in place, and is discussed further later in this report. • The conversion of the Navy brig to a jail for use by CCSF is underway. • Plans for leasing of the state-of-the-art Firefighters Training school by the San Francisco Fire Department are underway. • The use of athletic and other facilities as a Police Academy training site is planned for the near future. • The Treasure Island Elementary School is being operated by the San Francisco Unified School District, and presently has a census of approximately 500 children. Students are bused to the school from four different inner city areas. Parents have commented favorably on having their children in such a nice environment. - Treasure Island Report • It is planned that nonprofit organizations will lease some of the existing housing on both TI and YBI. This is discussed further below. • The Treasure Island Museum, which operated during the Navy’s tenure, is slated for continued operation. The artifacts from the museum are stored on TI, and are expected to be returned to their display location in the Administration Building following a planned $1.5 million seismic retrofit of that structure.
R8:
TIDA should try to dispel the perception of disarray by making the progress of its planning clear to the public.
R12:
TIDA should report publicly on the Navy’s plans to collect delinquent rent from marina tenants, and plans for repossession of boats and eviction of delinquent boat owners, so that the marina can become a revenue-producing facility. Long Term Development and the Marina The key to long term development of TI is finding a developer to finance, construct and run commercial enterprises on the islands. The marina at Clipper Cove is the focal point of development proposals. TIDA has received a number proposals for leasing of the marina. A June 11, 1998, article in the San Francisco Examiner (attached as Appendix I) reported that political supporters - Treasure Island Report of the Mayor have submitted a proposal to TIDA for long term development of the marina, with a view to eventual development of residential and commercial facilities throughout the islands. The article raised familiar questions about conflicts of interest and competitive bidding, and quoted the Chairperson of TIDA as saying that they had received three such proposals and their only consideration is finding the developer who can do the best job of running the marina.
R13:
TIDA should publicize its criteria for a competitive process for development proposals.
R14:
TIDA should apply the presently governing regulations regarding conflicts of interest and competitive processes in soliciting proposals for development.
R15:
TIDA should take an aggressive role in publicizing and explaining its activities, particularly those which will have a long term impact on TI, and therefore are of great interest to the people of San Francisco.
R16:
The City Attorney should monitor TIDA’s compliance with the required competitive process. FINANCING It is estimated that $200 million will be needed to build the required infrastructure on TI and YBI, including seismic remediation. The city has committed that no general fund money will be used to support TI. It is anticipated that an eventual large scale development will provide the bulk of the needed income. In the interim, federal, state and/or bridge toll subsidies will be required. Federal and state grants have funded the $6 million budget for the islands through June 1998. An annual budget will be submitted to the City thereafter by TIDA. The proposed budget for Fiscal Year 1998-1999 anticipates that the majority of the $6,125,000 total will still come from the Navy ($4 million). (The proposed budget is attached as
R17:
TIDA should balance its interest in finding a qualified developer for TI with an equal commitment to a process which is open and responsive to the needs of the citizens of San Francisco.
R18:
TIDA should clarify, with specificity, its financing plans for TI over the course of the Interim Use period.
R19:
The San Francisco Police Department (SFPD), the San Francisco Fire Department (SFFD) and MUNI should determine what the cost of necessary police, fire and public transportation services will be in order to make the islands accessible to the public
R20:
TIDA should detail the anticipated sources of funds needed to provide those services, and the projected timetable for their implementation. ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES The development of TI is subject to the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). CEQA provides that before Treasure Island Report - a legislative body can take any action which will have an environmental impact it must complete environmental studies. These studies are known as Environmental Impact Reports (EIR). In the case of TI, the Reuse Plan is the “ scoping document” for the EIR, which is scheduled for completion during the coming winter. What this means is that the EIR will be based on what is presented in the Reuse Plan. An approval issued based on the Reuse Plan might lose its viability if the Reuse Plan is substantially altered. DOD funding for environmental testing, including toxic pollutants, petroleum derivatives, lead abatement and asbestos removal, has been reduced. Concerns have been expressed that funding is inadequate, and the combination of toxic and seismic concerns may reduce the likelihood that the Reuse Plan will be able to be implemented. Certain structures built by the Navy which would not be permitted under the Tidelands Trust will be allowed, under the terms of AB 699, to continue to be used for their remaining useful life. These include housing units, the fire-fighter training facility and the brig.
R21:
City officials and TIDA should encourage our Congressional delegation to insist DOD provide funding for environmental testing which could reduce problems in future development. JOB CORPS Ownership of a large section in the center of TI, including a ball field, has been transferred from the DOD to the Department of Labor for a Job Corps center. The center is two to three years away from completion. The Job Corps is intended to serve economically eligible young people, between the ages of 16 and 24, who have financial and home deficiencies. Its mission is to create a residential setting and provide vocational training. Academics are taught for remediation in pursuit of GEDs and high school diplomas. Training in social skills, such as dealing with society at large and coping with job situations and coworkers, is also provided. There are now approximately 200 young people at the center, with a projected total of 850 -- 600 residential slots and an additional 250 for local residents. The Job Corps program is not intended to serve young people with serious criminal or psychological problems. TIDA, which emphatically wanted the San Francisco residents’ component included in the center’s programs, continues to work with the Job Corps to ensure that the center’s development of its Treasure Island Report - facilities will not inhibit future development of other uses of TI. THE HOMELESS ON TREASURE ISLAND The Community Redevelopment and Homeless Assistance Act of 1994 requires that the Reuse Plan incorporate an agreement regarding the homeless. It is this requirement that necessitated approval of the Reuse Plan by HUD. The homeless component was developed through negotiation with Treasure Island Homeless Development Initiative (TIHDI, pronounced “ tie-dye” ), an association which was formed in June of 1994, and is composed of 24 non-profit homeless and social services organizations. TIHDI received initial funding from the City and from the Evelyn and Walter Haas Foundation. TIHDI is fiscally sponsored by Tenants and Owners Development Corporation (TODCO), whose Executive Vice President and Director of Project Design is the Vice Chairperson of TIDA. There are four parts to the agreement6 between TIDA7 and TIHDI incorporated into the Reuse Plan: 1) Up to 375 of the approximately 1000 housing units on TI and YBI will be used as housing for the homeless. The vast majority of these units will be subject to being bought out by an eventual developer. CCSF will retain site control, either through ownership or leasehold control, and TIHDI must have adequate resources to provide basic services to the proposed residents. 2) Service contracts for TI will be made available to the homeless community. At present, two TIHDI member organizations, Rubicon and Toolworks, have contracts to 6 This agreement cannot become final until the EIR is complete and CEQA approval is given. TIDA functions for CCSF as the LRA (Local Reuse Authority). - Treasure Island Report provide janitorial and groundskeeping services. An additional contract for deconstruction services is contemplated by the agreement. 3) Economic development opportunities will also be available to allow the homeless service agencies, and their constituents, to run three facilities on TI. These are anticipated to consist of the Fogwatch Restaurant, the Nimitz Conference Center and a store located in the former PX. Again, TIHDI or its component organizations will have to demonstrate their ability to manage these facilities. 4) TIHDI, or its member organizations, will have the opportunity to create a job broker program. As new enterprises open on TI, employers will apply to this homeless job broker program as the first source for a percentage of new workers. Those workers will have to have adequate qualifications for the jobs available.
R22:
TIDA and TIHDI should use the forum provided by the Local Board as an avenue to achieving the high level of cooperation needed to create housing and services for the homeless on TI. INTERIM HOUSING Three hundred housing units on TI are expected to be occupied in October or November of 1998 under an interim housing plan. TIDA has contracted with the John Stewart Company to rehabilitate and manage these units. Rentals to a consortium of Universities for graduate student housing has been discussed, and is apparently still under consideration. This interim plan is intended to preserve the housing stock which deteriorates rapidly with lack of use, and to provide an income stream in the short term.
R23:
TIDA should move as rapidly as possible to have the buildings on TI occupied in order to stop their further deterioration. PUBLIC USE Uncontrolled public access is now permitted on Yerba Buena Island and on the causeway between the islands. Public access is not permitted beyond the guardhouse at the entrance to Treasure Island. When housing is occupied and the Police Academy, firefighter training facility and jail are operating, it should be feasible for TI to be open to the public with adequate police services in place.
R24:
The Recreation and Park Department and TIDA should develop park and playground facilities in order to make public access to the islands meaningful.
R25:
CCSF and TIDA should make early provision of basic services a priority so that TI may be opened to public use at the earliest possible time. ACCESS On and off ramps from the Bay Bridge do not meet current CalTrans standards. Assessment of the access was conducted by the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency, and included in Existing Conditions. Ferry service is anticipated in the Reuse Plan. Pier 12 on the east side of TI, and Pier 1, a fixed concrete pier which is in good condition on the southeast corner of TI, are the only sites with utilities now in place for a ferry landing. Currently a float is used at Pier 1 to accommodate the ferry. A protective breakwater would appear to be needed to utilize the west side Pier 23, which is a fishing pier.
R26:
TIDA should develop a plan for financing adequate ferry service to TI.
R27:
TIDA should develop a plan for increasing motor vehicle access, and for the financing of that access. Replacement of the on and off ramps with new structures meeting CalTrans specifications should be included.
R28:
TIDA should explore, with appropriate State agencies, the use of a portion of Bay Bridge tolls to subsidize ferry service and/or improve access for cars and buses, or to replace access ramps.
R29:
TIDA should further explore all possible avenues of subsidy from federal, state and regional sources for improved access to the islands.
R30:
The City and TIDA should explore whether rail or light rail access is feasible. Treasure Island Report -
R31:
The City and TIDA should provide regular bus service to TI.
R32:
TIDA should explore with CalTrans and the Metropolitan Transportation Commission the impact of new bridge construction on TI and YBI.
R33:
TIDA should consider whether improved access is an appropriate use of its Tax Increment Bond authority. CONCLUSION Treasure Island and Yerba Buena Island have enormous potential to enrich the lives of the people of San Francisco and the Bay Area, and the tourists who form the backbone of our local economy. Control over the development of the islands lies almost exclusively with the Mayor of San Francisco. Increased public input and oversight is needed. Careful controls on conflicts of interest and competitive processes for leases are also needed, as is improved communication with the public by the Treasure Island Development Authority. While a well financed developer will be needed to realize the islands’ potential, the priority of developing the islands for the benefit of the citizenry must be maintained.
F99:
Staff is often on loan from other City departments and the Coordinator serves at the pleasure of the Mayor. Staffing levels are low, given the magnitude of the problem and responsibilities.
Related Recommendations (28)
R2:
The Citizens Advisory Committee should be appointed by the Board of Supervisors rather than TIDA, and its role clearly defined by the Board.
R4:
The Citizens Advisory Committee should have unfettered access to the Directors and staff of the Authority, to all of their records, and should have unfettered physical access to the islands.
R5:
The Board of Supervisors and TIDA should consult the Citizens Advisory Committee on matters affecting the public interest.
R6:
The Board of Supervisors should play an active role in the oversight of the plans for Treasure Island, and should take seriously their role, albeit a limited one, in approving and disapproving the Mayor’s appointees to TIDA.
R7:
TIDA should improve its communications with the press and the public, in order to make the process truly accessible and responsive to public needs, which in turn would reduce the widespread perception that the planning process is closed. TIDA’s philosophy in disseminating - Treasure Island Report information should be proactive rather than reactive and funding should be committed to this effort. INTERIM AND LONG TERM USE TI is still owned by the Navy. The Navy and the Department of Defense (DOD), its parent agency, remain actively involved in the islands, negotiating with TIDA under a Cooperative Agreement to implement the Reuse Plan. Development plans are proceeding along two parallel tracks extending over a 35 year period: interim reuse and long term conveyance. The Defense Authorization Act provides that once DOD property is transferred at below market price, the local government and DOD generally will share in any net proceeds ultimately generated from subsequent sales or leasings of the property for a period of 15 years after conveyance by the federal government. The objective of the Interim Use Phase of development (1997 through 2001) is to generate revenue to offset the cost of City services. During this period, the city leases TI from the Navy, and can sublease facilities on the islands. The long term objectives involve negotiating the transfer of the islands from the Navy with a redevelopment plan consistent with the Reuse Plan approved by the Board of Supervisors and the Mayor. Interim Use The complex nature of the land uses planned for Treasure Island and Yerba Buena Island are discussed in the Reuse Plan and the two volumes of Existing Conditions. An important aspect of the plan is the encouragement of early civilian uses through leasing of existing facilities to defray operating costs, and to promote the transformation to visitor-oriented and recreational uses while marketing and financing efforts are underway for longer term development. Treasure Island Report - Some early revenue-producing interim uses are already in place. Some are in active development, and others are planned, but not yet underway. There are commercial uses, public uses and nonprofit uses. Some uses are likely to remain in place over the long term, while others may be replaced when large scale development begins. • The leasing of hangar structures for film production has been in place since the Navy’s time, and is ongoing. • The development of recreational playing fields is planned. At present, these facilities are leased on an occasional basis. • Operation and possible expansion of the marina at Clipper Cove is planned, but not yet underway. The Navy maintains control of the marina. (Discussion of long term marina development and recent press coverage appears later in this report.) • The leasing of small structures for restaurant and retail use is planned for the future. • The federal Job Corps center is in place, and is discussed further later in this report. • The conversion of the Navy brig to a jail for use by CCSF is underway. • Plans for leasing of the state-of-the-art Firefighters Training school by the San Francisco Fire Department are underway. • The use of athletic and other facilities as a Police Academy training site is planned for the near future. • The Treasure Island Elementary School is being operated by the San Francisco Unified School District, and presently has a census of approximately 500 children. Students are bused to the school from four different inner city areas. Parents have commented favorably on having their children in such a nice environment. - Treasure Island Report • It is planned that nonprofit organizations will lease some of the existing housing on both TI and YBI. This is discussed further below. • The Treasure Island Museum, which operated during the Navy’s tenure, is slated for continued operation. The artifacts from the museum are stored on TI, and are expected to be returned to their display location in the Administration Building following a planned $1.5 million seismic retrofit of that structure.
R8:
TIDA should try to dispel the perception of disarray by making the progress of its planning clear to the public.
R12:
TIDA should report publicly on the Navy’s plans to collect delinquent rent from marina tenants, and plans for repossession of boats and eviction of delinquent boat owners, so that the marina can become a revenue-producing facility. Long Term Development and the Marina The key to long term development of TI is finding a developer to finance, construct and run commercial enterprises on the islands. The marina at Clipper Cove is the focal point of development proposals. TIDA has received a number proposals for leasing of the marina. A June 11, 1998, article in the San Francisco Examiner (attached as Appendix I) reported that political supporters - Treasure Island Report of the Mayor have submitted a proposal to TIDA for long term development of the marina, with a view to eventual development of residential and commercial facilities throughout the islands. The article raised familiar questions about conflicts of interest and competitive bidding, and quoted the Chairperson of TIDA as saying that they had received three such proposals and their only consideration is finding the developer who can do the best job of running the marina.
R13:
TIDA should publicize its criteria for a competitive process for development proposals.
R14:
TIDA should apply the presently governing regulations regarding conflicts of interest and competitive processes in soliciting proposals for development.
R15:
TIDA should take an aggressive role in publicizing and explaining its activities, particularly those which will have a long term impact on TI, and therefore are of great interest to the people of San Francisco.
R16:
The City Attorney should monitor TIDA’s compliance with the required competitive process. FINANCING It is estimated that $200 million will be needed to build the required infrastructure on TI and YBI, including seismic remediation. The city has committed that no general fund money will be used to support TI. It is anticipated that an eventual large scale development will provide the bulk of the needed income. In the interim, federal, state and/or bridge toll subsidies will be required. Federal and state grants have funded the $6 million budget for the islands through June 1998. An annual budget will be submitted to the City thereafter by TIDA. The proposed budget for Fiscal Year 1998-1999 anticipates that the majority of the $6,125,000 total will still come from the Navy ($4 million). (The proposed budget is attached as
R17:
TIDA should balance its interest in finding a qualified developer for TI with an equal commitment to a process which is open and responsive to the needs of the citizens of San Francisco.
R18:
TIDA should clarify, with specificity, its financing plans for TI over the course of the Interim Use period.
R19:
The San Francisco Police Department (SFPD), the San Francisco Fire Department (SFFD) and MUNI should determine what the cost of necessary police, fire and public transportation services will be in order to make the islands accessible to the public
R20:
TIDA should detail the anticipated sources of funds needed to provide those services, and the projected timetable for their implementation. ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES The development of TI is subject to the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). CEQA provides that before Treasure Island Report - a legislative body can take any action which will have an environmental impact it must complete environmental studies. These studies are known as Environmental Impact Reports (EIR). In the case of TI, the Reuse Plan is the “ scoping document” for the EIR, which is scheduled for completion during the coming winter. What this means is that the EIR will be based on what is presented in the Reuse Plan. An approval issued based on the Reuse Plan might lose its viability if the Reuse Plan is substantially altered. DOD funding for environmental testing, including toxic pollutants, petroleum derivatives, lead abatement and asbestos removal, has been reduced. Concerns have been expressed that funding is inadequate, and the combination of toxic and seismic concerns may reduce the likelihood that the Reuse Plan will be able to be implemented. Certain structures built by the Navy which would not be permitted under the Tidelands Trust will be allowed, under the terms of AB 699, to continue to be used for their remaining useful life. These include housing units, the fire-fighter training facility and the brig.
R21:
City officials and TIDA should encourage our Congressional delegation to insist DOD provide funding for environmental testing which could reduce problems in future development. JOB CORPS Ownership of a large section in the center of TI, including a ball field, has been transferred from the DOD to the Department of Labor for a Job Corps center. The center is two to three years away from completion. The Job Corps is intended to serve economically eligible young people, between the ages of 16 and 24, who have financial and home deficiencies. Its mission is to create a residential setting and provide vocational training. Academics are taught for remediation in pursuit of GEDs and high school diplomas. Training in social skills, such as dealing with society at large and coping with job situations and coworkers, is also provided. There are now approximately 200 young people at the center, with a projected total of 850 -- 600 residential slots and an additional 250 for local residents. The Job Corps program is not intended to serve young people with serious criminal or psychological problems. TIDA, which emphatically wanted the San Francisco residents’ component included in the center’s programs, continues to work with the Job Corps to ensure that the center’s development of its Treasure Island Report - facilities will not inhibit future development of other uses of TI. THE HOMELESS ON TREASURE ISLAND The Community Redevelopment and Homeless Assistance Act of 1994 requires that the Reuse Plan incorporate an agreement regarding the homeless. It is this requirement that necessitated approval of the Reuse Plan by HUD. The homeless component was developed through negotiation with Treasure Island Homeless Development Initiative (TIHDI, pronounced “ tie-dye” ), an association which was formed in June of 1994, and is composed of 24 non-profit homeless and social services organizations. TIHDI received initial funding from the City and from the Evelyn and Walter Haas Foundation. TIHDI is fiscally sponsored by Tenants and Owners Development Corporation (TODCO), whose Executive Vice President and Director of Project Design is the Vice Chairperson of TIDA. There are four parts to the agreement6 between TIDA7 and TIHDI incorporated into the Reuse Plan: 1) Up to 375 of the approximately 1000 housing units on TI and YBI will be used as housing for the homeless. The vast majority of these units will be subject to being bought out by an eventual developer. CCSF will retain site control, either through ownership or leasehold control, and TIHDI must have adequate resources to provide basic services to the proposed residents. 2) Service contracts for TI will be made available to the homeless community. At present, two TIHDI member organizations, Rubicon and Toolworks, have contracts to 6 This agreement cannot become final until the EIR is complete and CEQA approval is given. TIDA functions for CCSF as the LRA (Local Reuse Authority). - Treasure Island Report provide janitorial and groundskeeping services. An additional contract for deconstruction services is contemplated by the agreement. 3) Economic development opportunities will also be available to allow the homeless service agencies, and their constituents, to run three facilities on TI. These are anticipated to consist of the Fogwatch Restaurant, the Nimitz Conference Center and a store located in the former PX. Again, TIHDI or its component organizations will have to demonstrate their ability to manage these facilities. 4) TIHDI, or its member organizations, will have the opportunity to create a job broker program. As new enterprises open on TI, employers will apply to this homeless job broker program as the first source for a percentage of new workers. Those workers will have to have adequate qualifications for the jobs available.
R22:
TIDA and TIHDI should use the forum provided by the Local Board as an avenue to achieving the high level of cooperation needed to create housing and services for the homeless on TI. INTERIM HOUSING Three hundred housing units on TI are expected to be occupied in October or November of 1998 under an interim housing plan. TIDA has contracted with the John Stewart Company to rehabilitate and manage these units. Rentals to a consortium of Universities for graduate student housing has been discussed, and is apparently still under consideration. This interim plan is intended to preserve the housing stock which deteriorates rapidly with lack of use, and to provide an income stream in the short term.
R23:
TIDA should move as rapidly as possible to have the buildings on TI occupied in order to stop their further deterioration. PUBLIC USE Uncontrolled public access is now permitted on Yerba Buena Island and on the causeway between the islands. Public access is not permitted beyond the guardhouse at the entrance to Treasure Island. When housing is occupied and the Police Academy, firefighter training facility and jail are operating, it should be feasible for TI to be open to the public with adequate police services in place.
R24:
The Recreation and Park Department and TIDA should develop park and playground facilities in order to make public access to the islands meaningful.
R25:
CCSF and TIDA should make early provision of basic services a priority so that TI may be opened to public use at the earliest possible time. ACCESS On and off ramps from the Bay Bridge do not meet current CalTrans standards. Assessment of the access was conducted by the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency, and included in Existing Conditions. Ferry service is anticipated in the Reuse Plan. Pier 12 on the east side of TI, and Pier 1, a fixed concrete pier which is in good condition on the southeast corner of TI, are the only sites with utilities now in place for a ferry landing. Currently a float is used at Pier 1 to accommodate the ferry. A protective breakwater would appear to be needed to utilize the west side Pier 23, which is a fishing pier.
R26:
TIDA should develop a plan for financing adequate ferry service to TI.
R27:
TIDA should develop a plan for increasing motor vehicle access, and for the financing of that access. Replacement of the on and off ramps with new structures meeting CalTrans specifications should be included.
R28:
TIDA should explore, with appropriate State agencies, the use of a portion of Bay Bridge tolls to subsidize ferry service and/or improve access for cars and buses, or to replace access ramps.
R29:
TIDA should further explore all possible avenues of subsidy from federal, state and regional sources for improved access to the islands.
R30:
The City and TIDA should explore whether rail or light rail access is feasible. Treasure Island Report -
R31:
The City and TIDA should provide regular bus service to TI.
R32:
TIDA should explore with CalTrans and the Metropolitan Transportation Commission the impact of new bridge construction on TI and YBI.
R33:
TIDA should consider whether improved access is an appropriate use of its Tax Increment Bond authority. CONCLUSION Treasure Island and Yerba Buena Island have enormous potential to enrich the lives of the people of San Francisco and the Bay Area, and the tourists who form the backbone of our local economy. Control over the development of the islands lies almost exclusively with the Mayor of San Francisco. Increased public input and oversight is needed. Careful controls on conflicts of interest and competitive processes for leases are also needed, as is improved communication with the public by the Treasure Island Development Authority. While a well financed developer will be needed to realize the islands’ potential, the priority of developing the islands for the benefit of the citizenry must be maintained.
F100:
The broad mission of the Office on Homelessness involves a complex and varied range of specific tasks and responsibilities which overwhelm the small staff, especially in light of the uncertain status of the office.
F101:
According to the Continuum of Care, City and nonprofit agencies will retain authority over homeless funds that come directly to their agencies.
F102:
The Local Board can only recommend and advise.
F103:
The Local Board also monitors the implementation of the Continuum of Care.
F104:
Large business, labor and philanthropic seats on the Local Board are among the most difficult seats to fill. As of May 15, 1998, these seats had not been appointed by the Board of Supervisors.
F105:
The role of the Mayor’s Homeless Coordinator has not been defined.
F106:
The Office of the Mayor’s Homeless Coordinator is not adequately staffed.
F107:
The Local Board has a high representation of advocates, homeless and service providers.
F108:
At community meetings, a minimal number of members of the Local Board is present.
F109:
The Continuum of Care plan was drafted in 1995-1996 and has not been updated.
F110:
The training for Inspectors is well presented. – Department of Elections
F111:
The poll worker manual is well organized and can easily be referenced.
F112:
Training is available but not mandatory for Clerks.
F113:
Clerks are paid less than the minimum wage.
F114:
There is disarray and confusion at some polling places.
F115:
There are irregularities in the conduct of the vote.
F116:
Proper decorum for voting is not always present.
F117:
The paper ballots are inefficient, time consuming, and outmoded.
F118:
The Department of Health has been delinquent in reporting deaths;
F119:
The Election Department has been delinquent in pursuing this information.
F120:
The Department of Elections has no way of knowing how many voters have moved without changing their addresses.
F121:
The requirement to show photo identification at the time of voting would decrease the opportunity for voter fraud. – Department of Elections
F122:
Compensation payable to District Board members is in line with compensation payable to directors of other Bay Area transportation districts.
F123:
The direct cost to the District to support the Board is not excessive. The CGJ did not examine indirect costs, such as the cost of staff time, to support the Board and its bi-monthly meetings and five committees. appointment to the board San Francisco has nine representatives to the District Board. Eight of San Francisco's representatives are appointed by the Board of Supervisors, and the ninth member is appointed by the Mayor. Supervisor Appointees Four of the eight appointees by the Supervisors must be elected members of the Board of Supervisors. By tradition the Supervisors with the most seniority have the first option to be appointed to the District and the four most senior Supervisors usually take the appointments. Because of term limits on supervisorial terms, it is unlikely that a Golden Gate Bridge District - Supervisor will have a term on the District Board of more than six years. Of the current Supervisor appointees to the District Board, none has served longer than two years. General Public Appointees The Board of Supervisors also appoints four District Board members from the general public, using a process that is similar to the process for other appointments made by the Board of Supervisors. The Rules Committee nominates candidates from file of prospects for presentation to the whole Board of Supervisors. The nominated individual(s) may make a presentation to the Board and answer questions. After consideration, the Board votes on the appointment. If the incumbent on the District Board desires to remain in office, the incumbent usually is reappointed. The same individuals have been reappointed year after year. One appointee has served on the Board for 36 years, two others for 15 or more years, and the fourth for six years. The Mayor's Appointee The Mayor's office uses a similar process to fill positions. When a position becomes available, names on file are reviewed to select a candidate. With respect to the District Board, the incumbent typically is reappointed. The Mayor's current appointee has served on the District Board for two years, appointed after the death of his predecessor. Appointments by the Supervisors and the Mayor are part of the political process. Individuals and interest groups lobby for appointment, and appointments are made to forge or reward political relationships. Many appointees to the District Board have labor union affiliations and generally do not come to the Board with experience in transportation issues. The CGJ looked at attendance records, committee participation and years on the Board. Members who have the - Golden Gate Bridge District most longevity on the Board and who were appointed from the general public have been among the most committed, assuming officer or committee chair positions, and attending as many as 80 meetings a year in addition to two or three transportation conferences. This compares to typically fewer than 35 meetings and no conferences by supervisor Board members. The CGJ, however, did not study member voting records, and no attempt was made to evaluate the influence or effectiveness of the San Francisco delegation. FINDINGS
F124:
Although there may be benefits to San Francisco in being represented by individuals with a long history on the District Board, continual re-appointment of incumbents who have served fifteen or more years perpetuates political anachronisms. Indeed, all five current District Board members appointed from the general public are white males, as all San Francisco appointees from the general public have been since the inception of the District.
F125:
Short tenure and frequent turnover among the Supervisor District Board members limit their influence on the Board. For example, it is difficult for Supervisor District Board members to become president of the District Board because assumption of that office requires a two-year commitment after progressing through the officer ranks.
F126:
The Supervisor District Board members are representative of a diverse range of the City's population groups.
F127:
Although there may be benefits to San Francisco in being represented by individuals with a long history on the District Board, continual re-appointment of incumbents who have served fifteen or more years perpetuates political anachronisms. Indeed, all five current District Board members appointed from the general public are white males, as all San Francisco appointees from the general public have been since the inception of the District.
F128:
Short tenure and frequent turnover among the Supervisor District Board members limit their influence on the Board. For example, it is difficult for Supervisor District Board members to become president of the District Board because assumption of that office requires a two-year commitment after progressing through the officer ranks.
F129:
The Supervisor District Board members are representative of a diverse range of the City's population groups.
F130:
San Francisco continues to have a strong interest in District operations. District policies in all areas-- Golden Gate Bridge District - Bridge tolls, commuter lanes, transit fares, bus routes, and bus and ferry schedules--influence commuter patterns, which in turn affect City traffic.
F131:
San Francisco's interest is not necessarily at odds with the other constituent counties. The District's efforts to promote transit usage and reduce Bridge traffic are beneficial to the City.
F132:
Many of the historical reasons for the current structure and county composition of the Board no longer exist. However, any structural changes in the Board would require an amendment to state law.
F133:
The District may not need a 19-member board to run effectively. A smaller board could be an effective and more efficient decision-making body. Further, reducing the Board to 9 or 11 members could save the District as much as $75,000 -$85,000 per year.
F134:
Scheduling less frequent meetings on fewer days would reduce the direct, and possibly indirect, cost of Board meetings, and allow members with other time commitments to attend more meetings.
F135:
The voters of San Francisco have twice rejected proposals to issue bonds to build a facility to replace Jail #3.
F136:
Because of the physical condition of Jail #3, and the consent decree of July 1997, the City is now taking steps to prepare to enter into an agreement with a private development team to design, build and finance a new jail to replace Jail #3, which new jail will be leased by the City. The Mayor and the Sheriff are complimented for this innovative approach in meeting the requirements of the District Court.
F137:
A number of public interest groups have questioned the need to build a replacement jail because of the declining number of inmates who are incarcerated by the County and the declining number of males aged 15 through 29 who are residents in San Francisco. Males aged 15 through 29 are at the greatest risk of being incarcerated. These public interest groups suggest that in 1998 the number of such males in the county is 57,173 and that the number will decline to 50,722 by the year 2001 (a decline of 11%). The statistics to substantiate this calculation are found in Appendix A.
F138:
The Sheriff’s Department stated that the highest number of prisoners normally occurs during the winter months and submitted historical statistics as to the number of prisoners (see Appendix A). These figures from the - Follow-Up Report Sheriff’s Department are summarized as follows: Average Daily Prisoners During Winter Months of October, November, December, and January: 1993 – 2213; 1994 – 1986; 1995 – 1932; 1996 – 2066; 1997 – 1889. This represents a five year decline of 15%.
F139:
Jail #3 currently has an average of 430 – 450 prisoners. Prior to the Consent Decree, the average number of prisoners in Jail #3 was about 750.
F140:
The City jail facilities will shortly be increased by using a Treasure Island facility that will accommodate 140 prisoners.
F141:
Because of the trend of declining inmates and the increase in facilities, a question is posed as to whether a new facility is needed to house inmates presently in Jail #3.
F142:
Jail #7 is the new San Bruno facility and it has no food or laundry capability and relies on those services being provided by Jail #3.
F143:
The City is taking preliminary steps to enter into a lease of a facility to replace Jail #3.
F144:
The Juvenile Probation Department’s response to the 1996- 97 report of the Civil Grand Jury was, for the most part, an acknowledgment of the problems pointed out in the report with a point-by-point agreement with many suggestions and an explanation why others were not feasible for financial or other reasons. - Follow-Up Report
F145:
With the adoption of a new Juvenile Justice Plan and the arrival of a new Chief Probation Officer, the Department is again requested to review and respond to various suggestions contained in the 1996-1997 CGJ report.
F146:
Unfortunately, the response of the Acting Chief Probation Officer chose to center on alleged inaccuracies in the 1996-97 CGJ report and ignored requests for corrective action. For example, the CGJ report states “ There are no smoke detectors inside the individual cells where the youth sleep and spend part of their day” . The Department response is: “ There is a smoke detector in each housing room.” This is misleading and a non sequitur. A housing room is a large area consisting of numerous cells and common open space, whereas a cell is a small cubicle in which children can be, and are, locked at times. There are no smoke detectors inside the individual cells.
F147:
The PUC is now a comprehensive grouping of water related enterprises which include CWE. Focus and accountability have been enhanced by this organizational change.
F148:
Each enterprise within the PUC is a separate entity with its own accounting for revenues and expenses.
F149:
As promised in responses to prior Civil Grand Jury
F150:
Equipment inventory auditing: During transfer to the PUC, physical assets were reviewed and allocated between DPW and Clean Water. As promised in responses to prior Civil Grand Jury recommendations, PUC documents all large purchases and conducts annual physical audits of equipment inventory.
F151:
Clean Water is scheduled to be the first Enterprise in the PUC to implement a new inventory tracking system; the implementation is planned for the fall of 1998. Once CMMS is installed, the department will be able to track - Follow-Up Report all of its assets, keep maintenance records of all assets and develop a replacement plan for all large assets. Capital assets will be depreciated through the Fixed Asset System.
F152:
Budget instructions generally limit conference attendance to two employees and encourage on-site training. This appears to be cost effective.
F153:
The CGJ found no comprehensive long term plans to improve the city’s aging sewer infrastructure.
F154:
There are growing demands for water supplied by PUC.
F155:
Given past history, there is a probability of a future drought in Northern California. Any such drought will affect water supplies available to the PUC. This makes long-term planning critical.
F156:
There was a slow response by the City Attorney’s office to the Sea Cliff disaster in December 1995. Details are spelled out in the report pertaining to Management of City Claims.
F157:
In 1997, there was at least a six month period when no ombudsman contract was in place.
F158:
The Department of Human Services is pursuing innovative strategies to reduce the high incidence of youth dependency in San Francisco and to achieve family reunification. Follow-Up Report -
F159:
DPH has reduced paperwork and redundant processing procedures, developed workload standards for staff, and attempted to standardize the annual contract review and monitoring process.
F160:
The department continues its program planning and implementation of managed care using pro bono assistance by individuals from the business and academic communities who have HMO problem solving expertise. Follow-Up Report -
F161:
All core public health functions have been centralized into one division which has an increased focus on health prevention and promotion of health prevention activities.
F162:
No audit of DPH in its entirety, by an independent public accounting firm, has been requested or authorized by the Mayor or by the Board of Supervisors or by the Controller.
F163:
DPH has not actively pursued the retention of an independent public accounting firm to audit the entire department.
F164:
As DPH is the protector and promoter of the public health, it is essential that all DPH programs be evaluated for cost effectiveness, financial planning and economic soundness.
F165:
KPMG Peat Marwick LLP reviewed Laguna Honda Hospital during 1996-1997 and their comments were reiterated by current federal and state reviews of this hospital. KPMG Peat Marwick: Management Letter (dated April 11, 1997) is attached as Appendix A to this report. The federal and state review also commented on San Francisco General Hospital.
F166:
The operators of four nonprofit garages manage these garages on a month-to-month basis on terms that were negotiated 29 to 39 years ago.
F167:
The operator of the fifth nonprofit garage operates on terms negotiated in 1957. The Parking and Traffic Commission recently voted to continue this agreement until July 1, 1999.
F168:
Month-to-month operating agreements on parking garages based on the original terms does not give the City modern operating practices and rates.
F169:
The failure to obtain competitive bids at the time agreements expire does not give the City the best possible returns. Follow-Up Report -
F170:
DPT argues that current staff of one contract administrator does not enable it to take all the steps necessary to bid and award new garage management contracts.
F171:
Nonprofit owned garages are not required to competitively bid their management agreements.
F172:
DPT claim that electronic locks on meter heads will reduce theft and cost of repair of broken meter heads.
F173:
The City Controller and many departments monitor cash receipts by comparing current receipts with prior period. If there is a discrepancy, then action is to occur.
F174:
The Port of San Francisco: In July 1997 the Senior Management Assistant at the Port had access to cash collected from some parking lots operated by the Port of San Francisco. The management of the Port of San Francisco discerned a reduction in income, which suggested the possibility of misuse of parking funds, and Follow-Up Report - took action to control the problem. The Senior Management Assistant was arrested for taking the key to the collection box and removing the funds from the collection container. Subsequently, the Port instituted what appears to be acceptable cash receipt handling procedures.
F175:
An unauthorized bank account was opened at the Fire Department credit union.
F176:
The City of San Francisco does not require Surety Bonds (fidelity bonds) on its employees who handle cash. Typically, an insurer does a detailed background investigation of those who are to be bonded. If there is a theft, the insurer indemnifies the insured pursuant to the terms of the fidelity (surety) bond.
F177:
The above illustrations of improper cash handling might well be indicative of how other departments in the city handle cash.
F178:
Notices of Claims are to be presented by the City Attorney.
F179:
The contractors who constructed the sewers at Sea Cliff were not formally notified of claims by the City until a cross complaint to pending litigation was filed by the City Attorney in December 1996.
F180:
Notice of claims as a result of the Sea Cliff disaster was not given earlier (to either the contractor or to the performance bonding company) because the responsible attorney was on leave of absence from the Office of the City Attorney.
F181:
The Public Utility Commission did not follow-up with the City Attorney to insure that notice was given to those potentially liable to the Public Utilities Commission as a result of the Sea Cliff disaster.
F182:
In October 1997, thefts from parking meters were discovered by the Department of Parking and Traffic.
F183:
As to claims for the theft of collections under the Parking Meter collection contract, a letter confirming earlier verbal notice was submitted by the City Attorney on November 4, 1997, which letter was addressed to the contractor.
F184:
As to claims against the insurance company that bonded the employees of the parking meter collection contractor, no notice has been given by the City of a possible claim as a result of the alleged theft.
F185:
Neither the Department of Parking and Traffic nor the Department of Real Estate followed up with the Office of the City Attorney to request timely presentation of a claim against the fidelity bonding company as a result of the alleged theft.
F186:
As reported by the 1996-1997 CGJ, the Sheriff’s Department and the City Attorney did not give timely notice (of potential claims) to the construction contractor of Jail #7. - Follow-Up Report
F187:
City departments investigated by the CGJ are not structured so that one position is assigned responsibility for submitting claims to the City Attorney and then monitoring the actions of the City Attorney. Follow-Up Report -
F188:
The voters of San Francisco have twice rejected proposals to issue bonds to build a facility to replace Jail #3.
F189:
Because of the physical condition of Jail #3, and the consent decree of July 1997, the City is now taking steps to prepare to enter into an agreement with a private development team to design, build and finance a new jail to replace Jail #3, which new jail will be leased by the City. The Mayor and the Sheriff are complimented for this innovative approach in meeting the requirements of the District Court.
F190:
A number of public interest groups have questioned the need to build a replacement jail because of the declining number of inmates who are incarcerated by the County and the declining number of males aged 15 through 29 who are residents in San Francisco. Males aged 15 through 29 are at the greatest risk of being incarcerated. These public interest groups suggest that in 1998 the number of such males in the county is 57,173 and that the number will decline to 50,722 by the year 2001 (a decline of 11%). The statistics to substantiate this calculation are found in Appendix A.
F191:
The Sheriff’s Department stated that the highest number of prisoners normally occurs during the winter months and submitted historical statistics as to the number of prisoners (see Appendix A). These figures from the Sheriff’s Department - 49 Sheriff’s Department are summarized as follows: Average Daily Prisoners During Winter Months of October, November, December, and January: 1993 – 2213; 1994 – 1986; 1995 – 1932; 1996 – 2066; 1997 – 1889. This represents a five year decline of 15%.
F192:
Jail #3 currently has an average of 430 – 450 prisoners. Prior to the Consent Decree, the average number of prisoners in Jail #3 was about 750.
F193:
The City jail facilities will shortly be increased by using a Treasure Island facility that will accommodate 140 prisoners.
F194:
Because of the trend of declining inmates and the increase in facilities, a question is posed as to whether a new facility is needed to house inmates presently in Jail #3.
F195:
Jail #7 is the new San Bruno facility and it has no food or laundry capability and relies on those services being provided by Jail #3.
F196:
The City is taking preliminary steps to enter into a lease of a facility to replace Jail #3.
F197:
The Juvenile Probation Department’s response to the 1996- 97 report of the Civil Grand Jury was, for the most part, an acknowledgment of the problems pointed out in the report with a point-by-point agreement with many suggestions and an explanation why others were not feasible for financial or other reasons.
F198:
With the adoption of a new Juvenile Justice Plan and the arrival of a new Chief Probation Officer, the Department Juvenile Justice System - is again requested to review and respond to various suggestions contained in the 1996-1997 CGJ report.
F199:
Unfortunately, the response of the Acting Chief Probation Officer chose to center on alleged inaccuracies in the 1996-97 CGJ report and ignored requests for corrective action. For example, the CGJ report states “ There are no smoke detectors inside the individual cells where the youth sleep and spend part of their day” . The Department response is: “ There is a smoke detector in each housing room.” This is misleading and a non sequitur. A housing room is a large area consisting of numerous cells and common open space, whereas a cell is a small cubicle in which children can be, and are, locked at times. There are no smoke detectors inside the individual cells.
F200:
The PUC is now a comprehensive grouping of water related enterprises which include CWE. Focus and accountability have been enhanced by this organizational change.
F201:
Each enterprise within the PUC is a separate entity with its own accounting for revenues and expenses.
F202:
As promised in responses to prior Civil Grand Jury
F203:
Equipment inventory auditing: During transfer to the PUC, physical assets were reviewed and allocated between DPW and Clean Water. As promised in responses to prior Civil Grand Jury recommendations, PUC documents all large purchases and conducts annual physical audits of equipment inventory.
F204:
Clean Water is scheduled to be the first Enterprise in the PUC to implement a new inventory tracking system; the implementation is planned for the fall of 1998. Once CMMS is installed, the department will be able to track Public Utilities Commission - all of its assets, keep maintenance records of all assets and develop a replacement plan for all large assets. Capital assets will be depreciated through the Fixed Asset System.
F205:
Budget instructions generally limit conference attendance to two employees and encourage on-site training. This appears to be cost effective.
F206:
The CGJ found no comprehensive long term plans to improve the city’s aging sewer infrastructure.
F207:
There are growing demands for water supplied by PUC.
F208:
Given past history, there is a probability of a future drought in Northern California. Any such drought will affect water supplies available to the PUC. This makes long-term planning critical.
F209:
There was a slow response by the City Attorney’s office to the Sea Cliff disaster in December 1995. Details are spelled out in the report pertaining to Management of City Claims.
F210:
In 1997, there was at least a six month period when no ombudsman contract was in place.
F211:
The Department of Human Services is pursuing innovative strategies to reduce the high incidence of youth dependency in San Francisco and to achieve family reunification. - Foster Care in San Francisco
F212:
DPH has reduced paperwork and redundant processing procedures, developed workload standards for staff, and attempted to standardize the annual contract review and monitoring process.
F213:
The department continues its program planning and implementation of managed care using pro bono assistance by individuals from the business and academic communities who have HMO problem solving expertise. - Department of Public Health
F214:
All core public health functions have been centralized into one division which has an increased focus on health prevention and promotion of health prevention activities.
F215:
No audit of DPH in its entirety, by an independent public accounting firm, has been requested or authorized by the Mayor or by the Board of Supervisors or by the Controller.
F216:
DPH has not actively pursued the retention of an independent public accounting firm to audit the entire department.
F217:
As DPH is the protector and promoter of the public health, it is essential that all DPH programs be evaluated for cost effectiveness, financial planning and economic soundness.
F218:
KPMG Peat Marwick LLP reviewed Laguna Honda Hospital during 1996-1997 and their comments were reiterated by current federal and state reviews of this hospital. KPMG Peat Marwick: Management Letter (dated April 11, 1997) is attached as Appendix A to this report. The federal and state review also commented on San Francisco General Hospital.
F219:
The operators of four nonprofit garages manage these garages on a month-to-month basis on terms that were negotiated 29 to 39 years ago.
F220:
The operator of the fifth nonprofit garage operates on terms negotiated in 1957. The Parking and Traffic Commission recently voted to continue this agreement until July 1, 1999.
F221:
Month-to-month operating agreements on parking garages based on the original terms does not give the City modern operating practices and rates.
F222:
The failure to obtain competitive bids at the time agreements expire does not give the City the best possible returns. - Department of Parking and Traffic
F223:
DPT argues that current staff of one contract administrator does not enable it to take all the steps necessary to bid and award new garage management contracts.
F224:
Nonprofit owned garages are not required to competitively bid their management agreements.
F225:
DPT claim that electronic locks on meter heads will reduce theft and cost of repair of broken meter heads.
F226:
The City Controller and many departments monitor cash receipts by comparing current receipts with prior period. If there is a discrepancy, then action is to occur.
F227:
The Port of San Francisco: In July 1997 the Senior Management Assistant at the Port had access to cash collected from some parking lots operated by the Port of San Francisco. The management of the Port of San Francisco discerned a reduction in income, which suggested the possibility of misuse of parking funds, and Cash Handling - took action to control the problem. The Senior Management Assistant was arrested for taking the key to the collection box and removing the funds from the collection container. Subsequently, the Port instituted what appears to be acceptable cash receipt handling procedures.
F228:
An unauthorized bank account was opened at the Fire Department credit union.
F229:
The City of San Francisco does not require Surety Bonds (fidelity bonds) on its employees who handle cash. Typically, an insurer does a detailed background investigation of those who are to be bonded. If there is a theft, the insurer indemnifies the insured pursuant to the terms of the fidelity (surety) bond.
F230:
The above illustrations of improper cash handling might well be indicative of how other departments in the city handle cash.
F231:
Notices of Claims are to be presented by the City Attorney. - Cash Handling
F232:
The contractors who constructed the sewers at Sea Cliff were not formally notified of claims by the City until a cross complaint to pending litigation was filed by the City Attorney in December 1996.
F233:
Notice of claims as a result of the Sea Cliff disaster was not given earlier (to either the contractor or to the performance bonding company) because the responsible attorney was on leave of absence from the Office of the City Attorney.
F234:
The Public Utility Commission did not follow-up with the City Attorney to insure that notice was given to those potentially liable to the Public Utilities Commission as a result of the Sea Cliff disaster.
F235:
In October 1997, thefts from parking meters were discovered by the Department of Parking and Traffic.
F236:
As to claims for the theft of collections under the Parking Meter collection contract, a letter confirming earlier verbal notice was submitted by the City Attorney on November 4, 1997, which letter was addressed to the contractor.
F237:
As to claims against the insurance company that bonded the employees of the parking meter collection contractor, no notice has been given by the City of a possible claim as a result of the alleged theft.
F238:
Neither the Department of Parking and Traffic nor the Department of Real Estate followed up with the Office of the City Attorney to request timely presentation of a claim against the fidelity bonding company as a result of the alleged theft.
F239:
As reported by the 1996-1997 CGJ, the Sheriff’s Department and the City Attorney did not give timely notice (of potential claims) to the construction contractor of Jail #7.
F240:
City departments investigated by the CGJ are not structured so that one position is assigned Cash Handling - responsibility for submitting claims to the City Attorney and then monitoring the actions of the City Attorney. - Cash Handling