Riverside County Grand Jury

1999-2000

11 reports

Findings & Recommendations 8 findings
F1: According to the County Superintendent of Schools, the projected county growth rate is 5% annually. This means 16,000 additional students each year, and a new school will be needed every month.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1: Implement year-round schools, where practicable, thereby gaining 20% more classrooms.
F2: Visitations with all of the Riverside County School District Superintendents found similar problems confronting each district as follows: a. Not enough classrooms. b. Class sizes are too large. c. Insufficient parent involvement. d. Enrollment growing faster than schools can be built. e. Shortage and lack of counselors and nurses.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2: Increase staffing of counselors and nurses at all school levels.
F3: Heavy backpacks are becoming more common as schools eliminate student lockers. Students have no place to store books and supplies and must carry these items throughout the day. This has created back problems for students.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3: Furnish all students with a copy of their classroom text book for home study. Additional copies of the text can be maintained in the class room for student use.
F4: The Perris Union High School District Trustees requested that the Riverside County Superintendent of Schools develop a unification study during May 1995. This study encompasses unification of the Perris Union High School District and its four feeder elementary districts of Perris, Menifee, Romoland and Nuview. The Fiscal Crisis and Management Assistance Team’s study delineated the fiscal ramifications of unification on each district involved in any proposed reorganization. The team was also requested to report on the feasibility of proceeding with unification. The conclusion of this costly fiscal report was that unification was a viable recommendation.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4: Conduct a study regarding unification in the Perris Valley area.
F5: Unification, for improving high school and feeder school matriculation, was discussed with several district superintendents and is thought inevitable. Indebtedness of individual districts would make this a difficult task at the local school board level. The time and energy required to create an integrated design and plan would be costly.
Related Recommendations (1)
R5: Transfer all remedial studies to adult education and away from the community colleges.
F6: The lack of recent studies on recommended unification denies the electorate the proper course of action to take regarding unification. Although the responsibility for school district organization is delegated to the County Committee of School District Organization, unification must have support of the electorate.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6: Exclude from the dropout rate all college students seeking specific educational improvement, or certification, and not a degree.
F7: A comprehensive curriculum in higher education was discussed with the Community College Presidents, Provosts and Superintendents. All campuses have remedial "basic skill courses." Community colleges are spending thousands of dollars hiring additional teachers, increasing classes, tutoring, counseling, adding learning technology, computers and software to bring students up to college-level. However, a large percentage of students enrolled in basic skills English and Math courses do not finish them. Only 20% complete a higher level course at a later time (The 2000 Little Hoover Report on California Community Colleges).
F8: Community college "high dropout rate" is sometimes attributed to socioeconomic conditions. Approximately 60% of these students are not seeking a degree, but are pursuing specific educational improvement for advancement in their careers and will dropout when they have achieved that level.
Findings & Recommendations 8 findings
F1: According to the County Superintendent of Schools, the projected county growth rate is 5% annually. This means 16,000 additional students each year, and a new school will be needed every month.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1: Implement year-round schools, where practicable, thereby gaining 20% more classrooms.
F2: Visitations with all of the Riverside County School District Superintendents found similar problems confronting each district as follows: a. Not enough classrooms. b. Class sizes are too large. c. Insufficient parent involvement. d. Enrollment growing faster than schools can be built. e. Shortage and lack of counselors and nurses.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2: Increase staffing of counselors and nurses at all school levels.
F3: Heavy backpacks are becoming more common as schools eliminate student lockers. Students have no place to store books and supplies and must carry these items throughout the day. This has created back problems for students.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3: Furnish all students with a copy of their classroom text book for home study. Additional copies of the text can be maintained in the class room for student use.
F4: The Perris Union High School District Trustees requested that the Riverside County Superintendent of Schools develop a unification study during May 1995. This study encompasses unification of the Perris Union High School District and its four feeder elementary districts of Perris, Menifee, Romoland and Nuview. The Fiscal Crisis and Management Assistance Team’s study delineated the fiscal ramifications of unification on each district involved in any proposed reorganization. The team was also requested to report on the feasibility of proceeding with unification. The conclusion of this costly fiscal report was that unification was a viable recommendation.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4: Conduct a study regarding unification in the Perris Valley area.
F5: Unification, for improving high school and feeder school matriculation, was discussed with several district superintendents and is thought inevitable. Indebtedness of individual districts would make this a difficult task at the local school board level. The time and energy required to create an integrated design and plan would be costly.
Related Recommendations (1)
R5: Transfer all remedial studies to adult education and away from the community colleges.
F6: The lack of recent studies on recommended unification denies the electorate the proper course of action to take regarding unification. Although the responsibility for school district organization is delegated to the County Committee of School District Organization, unification must have support of the electorate.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6: Exclude from the dropout rate all college students seeking specific educational improvement, or certification, and not a degree.
F7: A comprehensive curriculum in higher education was discussed with the Community College Presidents, Provosts and Superintendents. All campuses have remedial "basic skill courses." Community colleges are spending thousands of dollars hiring additional teachers, increasing classes, tutoring, counseling, adding learning technology, computers and software to bring students up to college-level. However, a large percentage of students enrolled in basic skills English and Math courses do not finish them. Only 20% complete a higher level course at a later time (The 2000 Little Hoover Report on California Community Colleges).
F8: Community college "high dropout rate" is sometimes attributed to socioeconomic conditions. Approximately 60% of these students are not seeking a degree, but are pursuing specific educational improvement for advancement in their careers and will dropout when they have achieved that level.
Findings & Recommendations 28 findings
F1: There appears to be a reluctance on the part of some management staff to openly, objectively and seriously consider positive suggestions for improvement within the department.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2: Establish an autonomous Children’s Services Citizen’s Oversight Commission to be responsible for overseeing the compliance of Child Protective Services. County Board of Supervisors, Director of the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services, and Assistant Director, Child Protective Services
F2: As a result of the 1996 Child Welfare League of America report, CPS established a committee and several task forces to oversee the implementation of the CWLA
F3: There appears to be a serious lack of administrative leadership regarding the oversight of uniform implementation and enforcement of policy, procedures and standards of practice. This has resulted in recurring incidences of some social workers: a. Engaging in inconsistent work practices. b. Failure to fully and appropriately assess the child’s individual medical, psychological, developmental and educational needs. c. Not visiting children in a timely and appropriate manner creating a potentially dangerous situation for the child. d. Delegating visitation responsibilities to newly assigned workers unfamiliar with the case.
Related Recommendations (4)
R2: Establish an autonomous Children’s Services Citizen’s Oversight Commission to be responsible for overseeing the compliance of Child Protective Services. County Board of Supervisors, Director of the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services, and Assistant Director, Child Protective Services
R3: Establish a 24-hour, 7-day a week Multi-Disciplinary Central Receiving Assessment Facility.
R8: Mandate uniform application and compliance of the Practice Handbook/Policies and Procedures Manual throughout each region.
R11: Collaborate with local law enforcement agencies to develop a joint response protocol.
F4: The administration has engaged in an aggressive public relations campaign in attempts to change the community’s negative perception of the agency. Staff is excessively involved in community organizations, limiting their time to focus on their primary responsibilities.
F5: Under the Administrative/Support Services division of DPSS, the department presently has two separate programs designed to respond to complaints and investigate employee misconduct. However, Child Protective Services’ complaint procedures are ambiguous, and on occasion discourage the complainant in addressing his/her concern.
F6: The six regional offices operate as autonomous units (i.e. fiefdoms) resulting in limited interregional cooperation of personnel, assets, and equipment, adversely affecting the children and their families.
F7: In 1996, CWLA recommended at least 40 hours of in-service and competency-based training annually for each Child and Family Services social worker. Such training has not been fully implemented as a result of which: a. A number of management, supervisory staff and social workers are not being updated on changes in legislation that directly effect policy and procedure. b. Staff and social workers encounter difficulty in determining whether a child should or should not be removed from foster or adoptive homes for immediate and imminent danger.
F8: According to the Riverside County DPSS Policy Manual-Social Services grievance reviews (31-414) grievances may not be granted if the child is removed for imminent danger, thereby circumventing the individuals right to appeal.
F9: Policy disparities still exist among a number of supervisors regarding approval of overtime as noted in the 1997-98 Grand Jury report, resulting in resentment between units and co-workers.
Related Recommendations (2)
R1: Establish a time limit to implement necessary corrective measures and conduct a review to evaluate the progress.
R8: Mandate uniform application and compliance of the Practice Handbook/Policies and Procedures Manual throughout each region.
F10: The lack of a comprehensive structured pay scale, based on job classification, education, performance and length of employment, is creating a great deal of frustration and animosity between co-workers, adversely impacting retention and morale.
F11: In some cases, social workers with repeated and documented performance problems remain employed.
F12: On occasion, some supervisors approve court reports of social workers without either reviewing, or adequately verifying evidence or documentation, within the case file to ensure accuracy.
Related Recommendations (1)
R9: Conduct a review of existing case files of each child to ensure proper and appropriate case management.
F13: Excessive caseloads have been used as a means of rationalizing the agency’s need for additional staff. Due to the compartmentalization of the agency’s programs, the 4,052 dependent children have been reported as approximately 9,000 cases.
Related Recommendations (1)
R12: Address compartmentalization by implementing a policy of cross training staff to perform duties of other programs and blend units conducting similar functions.
F14: Staff performs singular functions. The department does not extrapolate duplicate children enrolled in multiple programs. Dependent children are being counted on multiple social workers caseloads.
Related Recommendations (1)
R12: Address compartmentalization by implementing a policy of cross training staff to perform duties of other programs and blend units conducting similar functions.
F15: The shortage of staff is exacerbated by excessive allocation of personnel for nonfunded and discretionary programs.
Related Recommendations (1)
R7: Focus assets and personnel to ensure compliance and quality of service delivery of mandated programs, prior to the implementation of discretionary programs.
F16: As of March 2000, the agency had approximately 340 case carrying workers. Twenty-two positions remain vacant. Of the 69 additional positions recently allocated by the Board of Supervisors, only 30 were assigned by DPSS as case carrying positions.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6: Re-evaluate employee allocations, and make adjustments based on caseload.
F17: Due to unexplained employee allocation, in some regions there are significant disparities between caseloads and social workers.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6: Re-evaluate employee allocations, and make adjustments based on caseload.
F18: The transfer of foster care licensing from CPS to CCL in 1994 has resulted in many positive changes, improving the quality and level of supervision of foster homes, as well as uniform compliance with state regulations.
F19: Some social workers are experiencing difficulty utilizing the CWS/CMS system to facilitate proper movement and placement of children. This has resulted in: a. Failure to timely update status of capacity, vacancies and placement holds. b. On several occasions, children being placed or remaining in shelter or foster homes where other dependent children have been removed for abuse or serious licensing violations and deficiencies. c. On occasion, children sleeping, or waiting in agency offices and vehicles, while social workers search for available beds. d. Emergency response workers and law enforcement officers arriving with a child at inappropriate or unavailable shelter or foster homes.
F20: Too often, adoptable children languish unnecessarily in foster care, waiting years after parental rights have been terminated. Adoptions facilitated through private agencies are generally completed within six months from placement.
Related Recommendations (1)
R5: Contract with non-profit Foster Family Agencies to: a. Facilitate difficult placements. b. Assist in managing caseloads. c. Assist in facilitating adoptions to reduce the growing backlog of children in permanent placement and adoption programs.
F21: Approximately 50% of dependent children are placed with a relative within a reasonable amount of time. Regardless of the increase in kinship care there is a dangerous shortage of available and appropriate foster homes.
Related Recommendations (1)
R5: Contract with non-profit Foster Family Agencies to: a. Facilitate difficult placements. b. Assist in managing caseloads. c. Assist in facilitating adoptions to reduce the growing backlog of children in permanent placement and adoption programs.
F22: There has been a drastic decline in licensed foster homes. In 1994, there were 804 licensed foster homes in Riverside County. As of May 2000, there were only 584 licensed foster homes available.
F23: There is an alarming trend of foster care providers exiting the county system to become FFA foster homes. This is primarily due to the condescending attitude some social workers display in their interaction with foster parents and overall lack of support.
F24: There are 1,512 beds available for approximately 2,000 children in out-of-home, nonrelative placement.
F25: The lack of a sufficient number of appropriate foster homes has too often resulted in: a. Children being placed in the first available bed rather than in an appropriate placement. b. Children being placed in shelter or foster homes that meet minimal state standards, but may be of questionable quality. c. Children being placed with newly licensed, licensed pending or inappropriate foster parents who are poorly trained to deal with highly dysfunctional children. d. Children moved from foster home to foster home creating psychological trauma and attachment disorders (Foster Care Drift). e. Separating siblings and placing children in homes in extreme geographical locations. f. Placing children in homes with distinct cultural and language barriers.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4: Amend department policy #31-400 E to facilitate placement with private foster family agencies.
F26: The departments policy regarding the criteria for deciding whether an investigated emergency response case is substantiated, unsubstantiated or unfounded is not clearly defined. This practice has led to some social workers classifying abuse investigations as inconclusive when facts may meet the criteria of an unfounded disposition. As a result, an individual may become suspect and reported to the state Department of Justice.
Related Recommendations (1)
R10: Develop mandated guidelines specifically addressing removals and definition of immediate and imminent danger.
F27: There appears to be instances of a lack of objectivity in justifying the child’s removal and continuing dependency.
Related Recommendations (1)
R9: Conduct a review of existing case files of each child to ensure proper and appropriate case management.
F28: This investigation revealed that a lack of adequate funding is not a contributing factor in any of the significant factors mentioned. The Grand Jury is neither suggesting nor implying that all management and staff in the employ of CPS is derelict in their job performances. However, the findings outlined in this report are of serious concern and warrant prompt and reasonable attention.
Findings & Recommendations 3 findings
F1: The General Manager is using a personal phone for water district business, which is listed under the General Manager’s name. There is no phone, or listing, for the water district.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1: The County Executive Officer contact GTE to have an official telephone line installed and listed in the telephone directory.
F2: GTE has been contacted many times over the past years to install an additional telephone line to provide direct service to the district, as well as listing the water district in the telephone directory.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2: The County Assessor immediately change the mailing address of the water district: From: Pinyon Pines County Water District Pinyon Pines 63 Mountain Center, CA 92361 To: Pinyon Pines County Water District 62011 Stonecrest #63 Mountain Center, CA 92561
F3: The mailing address for the district was changed around 1997. The Assessor’s Office has continually neglected to change the address, after numerous written and oral requests. This has resulted in the water district’s mail being "returned to sender."
Findings & Recommendations 3 findings
F1: The General Manager is using a personal phone for water district business, which is listed under the General Manager’s name. There is no phone, or listing, for the water district.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1: The County Executive Officer contact GTE to have an official telephone line installed and listed in the telephone directory.
F2: GTE has been contacted many times over the past years to install an additional telephone line to provide direct service to the district, as well as listing the water district in the telephone directory.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2: The County Assessor immediately change the mailing address of the water district: From: Pinyon Pines County Water District Pinyon Pines 63 Mountain Center, CA 92361 To: Pinyon Pines County Water District 62011 Stonecrest #63 Mountain Center, CA 92561
F3: The mailing address for the district was changed around 1997. The Assessor’s Office has continually neglected to change the address, after numerous written and oral requests. This has resulted in the water district’s mail being "returned to sender."
Findings & Recommendations 8 findings
F1: The population growth of Riverside County which is expected to almost double by the year 2020, will result in the steady and rapid reduction of available land suitable for land application of sewage biosolids, indicating the importance of having at least one composting facility in the county. Without a sewage/biosolid composting facility, the sludge would have to be shipped great distances for disposal and/or processing and would greatly increase the sewer costs to Riverside County residents.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1: Conduct a study to establish the feasibility of permitting a second biosolids facility in eastern Riverside County.
F2: There are no incinerator operations in Riverside County, and the cost to incinerate waste is approximately $50 per ton, as compared to the approximate $25 per ton charged for composting by the biosolids company in Riverside County.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2: Assure the continued operation of the present composting facility.
F3: Due to the nature of the biosolids composting activity, it is known that the process generates a strong and often objectionable odor. The intensity of the odor may vary to a great degree and is quite dependent on temperature, wind and humidity. The odor is more intense when the windrows are turned, but dissipates within approximately one hour. The closer one is to the facility, the stronger the odor. To allow the windrows to cure, composting material must be turned every three days and temperatures deep within the windrows checked frequently. Fans are used to circulate the air, and water is sprayed while the windrows are being turned which helps to lower the intensity of the odor. A number of biosolid facilities in the United States is using enclosed facilities to eliminate unpleasant odors to the surrounding area.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3: Allocate funds to the Environmental Health Department to study new technology for scientific devices that can be used for monitoring of odors of a biosolids plant.
F4: The composting facility has been incurring odor complaints from encroaching housing tracts within the 2 ½ mile radius. Odor zones are identified in the CUP. Intense odors are in a 3/4 mile radius; occasional odors are expected in a 2 ½ mile radius of the composting site. There are 7,000 people living within a 3 mile radius of the facility. During an 18 month period of citizen complaints monitored, 43% of the complaints were made from the same 11 phone numbers which is not representative of the entire area. The most important criteria for determining facility odor compliance is by citizen complaints which are easily manipulated. The majority of complaints are regarding the odor, or the visual appearance of the site.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4: Board of Supervisors and Environmental Health Department immediately work together with the biosolids company to take steps to enclose the most malodorous portions of the composting facility.
F5: The five-member Citizens Oversight Committee only represents Supervisorial Districts One and Two. The meetings of the Citizens Oversight Committee are attended by a very small group, which does not represent the county at large, consequently, the original unbiased intent of the purposes and mission statement of the Citizens Oversight Committee are not being followed.
Related Recommendations (1)
R5: Continue to obtain signatures on all complaints as required by the CUP.
F6: The county Environmental Health Department monitors the odors as required by the CUP and responds to citizen complaints. Twenty-Five monitoring stations have been established by the Environmental Health Department. A LEA inspector is available for inspection 24 hours a day. The daily monitoring of the odors are done by smell alone. The same degree of odor intensity as measured by different people solely using their olfactory sense, the nose, leads to a great variance of reported intensity. To achieve an accurate picture of odor intensity, use of an appropriate scientific instrument, or instruments, would be warranted.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6: Expand the Citizens Oversight Committee to include seven voting members with representation from each Supervisorial District.
F7: Over 40 years of rigorous scientific study and research has never found any health related impacts from biosolids. "Many public health specialists, scientists, and engineers in North America and Europe believe that properly operated composting and co- composting operations present little health risk to normal compost facility employees and present negligible risk, or no risk, to nearby residences. Millner et al. (1977), Clark et al. (1983), Epstein & Epstein (1985), Boutin et al. (1987), Maritato et al. (1992), Diaz et al. (1992)" in the California State Water Resources Control Board report on General Waste Discharge Requirements of Biosolids Land Application, Draft Statewide Program EIR, June 28, 1999. No one working at the Riverside County composting facility has found it necessary to use a respirator.
Related Recommendations (1)
R7: Instruct the Citizens Oversight Committee to present unbiased information to the public at large and in their reports to the Board of Supervisors.
F8: After touring the 25 inspection stations and talking to some of the residents in the Temescal/El Cerrito area, the Grand Jury determined that visibility of the site was very minimal and not objectionable. Scarring done by grading on the adjacent hills is often mistaken for the actual composting facility. The residents reported they were aware of occasional odors but did not feel it affected their quality of life.
Related Recommendations (1)
R8: Initiate research in conjunction with the California Integrated Waste Management Board to establish standardized technological expertise and guidelines in odor measurement and mitigation measures.
Findings & Recommendations 8 findings
F1: The population growth of Riverside County which is expected to almost double by the year 2020, will result in the steady and rapid reduction of available land suitable for land application of sewage biosolids, indicating the importance of having at least one composting facility in the county. Without a sewage/biosolid composting facility, the sludge would have to be shipped great distances for disposal and/or processing and would greatly increase the sewer costs to Riverside County residents.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1: Conduct a study to establish the feasibility of permitting a second biosolids facility in eastern Riverside County.
F2: There are no incinerator operations in Riverside County, and the cost to incinerate waste is approximately $50 per ton, as compared to the approximate $25 per ton charged for composting by the biosolids company in Riverside County.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2: Assure the continued operation of the present composting facility.
F3: Due to the nature of the biosolids composting activity, it is known that the process generates a strong and often objectionable odor. The intensity of the odor may vary to a great degree and is quite dependent on temperature, wind and humidity. The odor is more intense when the windrows are turned, but dissipates within approximately one hour. The closer one is to the facility, the stronger the odor. To allow the windrows to cure, composting material must be turned every three days and temperatures deep within the windrows checked frequently. Fans are used to circulate the air, and water is sprayed while the windrows are being turned which helps to lower the intensity of the odor. A number of biosolid facilities in the United States is using enclosed facilities to eliminate unpleasant odors to the surrounding area.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3: Allocate funds to the Environmental Health Department to study new technology for scientific devices that can be used for monitoring of odors of a biosolids plant.
F4: The composting facility has been incurring odor complaints from encroaching housing tracts within the 2 ½ mile radius. Odor zones are identified in the CUP. Intense odors are in a 3/4 mile radius; occasional odors are expected in a 2 ½ mile radius of the composting site. There are 7,000 people living within a 3 mile radius of the facility. During an 18 month period of citizen complaints monitored, 43% of the complaints were made from the same 11 phone numbers which is not representative of the entire area. The most important criteria for determining facility odor compliance is by citizen complaints which are easily manipulated. The majority of complaints are regarding the odor, or the visual appearance of the site.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4: Board of Supervisors and Environmental Health Department immediately work together with the biosolids company to take steps to enclose the most malodorous portions of the composting facility.
F5: The five-member Citizens Oversight Committee only represents Supervisorial Districts One and Two. The meetings of the Citizens Oversight Committee are attended by a very small group, which does not represent the county at large, consequently, the original unbiased intent of the purposes and mission statement of the Citizens Oversight Committee are not being followed.
Related Recommendations (1)
R5: Continue to obtain signatures on all complaints as required by the CUP.
F6: The county Environmental Health Department monitors the odors as required by the CUP and responds to citizen complaints. Twenty-Five monitoring stations have been established by the Environmental Health Department. A LEA inspector is available for inspection 24 hours a day. The daily monitoring of the odors are done by smell alone. The same degree of odor intensity as measured by different people solely using their olfactory sense, the nose, leads to a great variance of reported intensity. To achieve an accurate picture of odor intensity, use of an appropriate scientific instrument, or instruments, would be warranted.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6: Expand the Citizens Oversight Committee to include seven voting members with representation from each Supervisorial District.
F7: Over 40 years of rigorous scientific study and research has never found any health related impacts from biosolids. "Many public health specialists, scientists, and engineers in North America and Europe believe that properly operated composting and co- composting operations present little health risk to normal compost facility employees and present negligible risk, or no risk, to nearby residences. Millner et al. (1977), Clark et al. (1983), Epstein & Epstein (1985), Boutin et al. (1987), Maritato et al. (1992), Diaz et al. (1992)" in the California State Water Resources Control Board report on General Waste Discharge Requirements of Biosolids Land Application, Draft Statewide Program EIR, June 28, 1999. No one working at the Riverside County composting facility has found it necessary to use a respirator.
Related Recommendations (1)
R7: Instruct the Citizens Oversight Committee to present unbiased information to the public at large and in their reports to the Board of Supervisors.
F8: After touring the 25 inspection stations and talking to some of the residents in the Temescal/El Cerrito area, the Grand Jury determined that visibility of the site was very minimal and not objectionable. Scarring done by grading on the adjacent hills is often mistaken for the actual composting facility. The residents reported they were aware of occasional odors but did not feel it affected their quality of life.
Related Recommendations (1)
R8: Initiate research in conjunction with the California Integrated Waste Management Board to establish standardized technological expertise and guidelines in odor measurement and mitigation measures.
Findings & Recommendations 5 findings
F1: Presently, there are thirteen (13) Sheriff Deputies assigned to the Southwest Station, which covers approximately 300 square miles.
F2: The population in this area is estimated at 38,000 with an expected growth of about 65,000 in the next four years.
F3: There are only two units on patrol at any one time.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1: Take steps to increase the number of deputies in the Southwest area over the next two years, creating the recommended ratio of one deputy per 1,000 population.
F4: The Riverside County Sheriff has established a policy of having one deputy on duty for every 1,000 population.
F5: Presently, the ratio in the Southwest area is approximately one deputy to every 3,000 people.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1: Take steps to increase the number of deputies in the Southwest area over the next two years, creating the recommended ratio of one deputy per 1,000 population.
Findings & Recommendations 5 findings
F1: Presently, there are thirteen (13) Sheriff Deputies assigned to the Southwest Station, which covers approximately 300 square miles.
F2: The population in this area is estimated at 38,000 with an expected growth of about 65,000 in the next four years.
F3: There are only two units on patrol at any one time.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1: Take steps to increase the number of deputies in the Southwest area over the next two years, creating the recommended ratio of one deputy per 1,000 population.
F4: The Riverside County Sheriff has established a policy of having one deputy on duty for every 1,000 population.
F5: Presently, the ratio in the Southwest area is approximately one deputy to every 3,000 people.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1: Take steps to increase the number of deputies in the Southwest area over the next two years, creating the recommended ratio of one deputy per 1,000 population.
Findings & Recommendations 34 findings
F1: The department has a serious need for attention to its physical infrastructure. It has outgrown the Orange Street "Headquarters," that has caused the department to become fragmented into four separate facilities around the city. This is a major contributing factor to the breakdown of interaction, cooperation and communication between divisions.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1: The city should build a new police headquarters which will be large enough to house all divisions of the department. Such a facility should be planned to keep up with the projected growth of the city.
F2: There is a dangerous shortage of patrol officers, which is affecting the safety and security of the community. In 1992, the population was 238,100, and there were 147 officers allocated for patrol services. In 2000, the population is in excess of 262,000, and there are only 135 officers allocated for patrol services. While the population has increased by 24,000, the police coverage has been decreasing.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2: Develop and strictly adhere to a minimum staffing level in compliance with recommended safety standards (approximately 15 patrol units per shift) to ensure adequate officer and civilian safety.
F3: There are more than 335 sworn officers in the department, of those 135 allocated positions for patrol, only 109 are actually assigned to patrol duties. As a result, there have been several occasions where only 8-10 patrol cars (or less) have been assigned to cover the five districts in the city. Arrests will pull a unit out of service for long periods of time. Major incidents often pull several units out of service, reducing adequate back up capabilities and delayed responses to calls for service. Officers are continuously concerned about each other’s safety in addition to the safety of the community. (Note: During the preparation of this report, the department allocated overtime hours to increase patrol levels.)
Related Recommendations (1)
R3: (A) Take immediate steps to see that more sworn personnel are returned to patrol duties. (B) City budgetary funding allocations for patrol officers should be adjusted to keep in line with nationally recognized minimum safety standards and the city’s growth.
F4: Many sworn officers have been assigned to duties that could be accomplished by non- sworn personnel.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4: Review all programs and assignments to determine which duties can be accomplished by non-sworn personnel, and return sworn officers to more productive and cost effective uses.
F5: The department offers only the minimum amount of training required by the State’s Peace Officer Standard of Training (P.O.S.T.). Officers who wish to attend specialized schools to improve their proficiency, or advance their careers, must do so at their own expense and often on their own time. Officers are extremely concerned that the severe lack of training is affecting the quality of law enforcement in the city. Additionally, the lack of continual and on-going training is resulting in new officers developing unsafe or dangerous habits, adversely affecting their performance and the overall safety of the community.
Related Recommendations (1)
R5: Allocate sufficient funding specifically for specialized schools and training, and encourage officers to share training information upon their return.
F6: In mid-1998, the position of "Training Sergeant" was eliminated, which ended the daily roll call training sessions. Officers felt that those 15 minutes of daily training were extremely beneficial , particularly when covering possible scenarios and critical situations. Officers are mindful that they must rely on their training and instinct, especially when caught in unexpected or extremely unusual incidents where "split- second" decision making is required.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6: Provide funding to expand training at all levels. A training unit needs to be established to develop, oversee and conduct a comprehensive, ongoing training program and to document efficient training. The training of officers in scenarios and critical situations is essential and must be improved.
F7: Uninvolved patrol officers are not being briefed following Officer Involved Shootings and are not taught which tactics are acceptable or overly dangerous.
Related Recommendations (1)
R7: Conduct post-incident briefings on all Officer Involved Shootings. This will provide valuable ongoing training, which may prevent repeated errors.
F8: Currently, there is no established written promotion policy which provides a set of prerequisites needed for qualified officers to obtain advancement. Professional law enforcement management demands that promotions be made in an orderly process. Former chiefs have made promotions arbitrarily, which appears to have caused a critical weakness in the management structure. Many officers believe there is no incentive to advance their careers, because several qualified officers have been passed over for promotions as many as twenty times without explanation.
Related Recommendations (1)
R8: Direct that a formal written promotion policy (which provides the necessary prerequisites for each rank) be established immediately. All law enforcement promotions should be made in a non-discriminatory and professionally established method. Appointments should be made from the top three qualified individuals on the "promotion list." This list should be updated annually. Persons in the top three positions should not be passed-over more than three times, without receiving written notice as to the reason they were not promoted, to allow them to improve their career performance.
F9: Officers are not allowed to see promotion lists, candidate qualifications or rankings.
Related Recommendations (1)
R9: The department should post qualifications, scores and ranking for all promotion applicants.
F10: Command and management oral examinations for promotion are conducted by non- law enforcement personnel in the Human Resources Department at the city manager’s office.
Related Recommendations (1)
R10: (A) All oral examinations of law enforcement personnel should be conducted by individuals qualified to appraise the level of professional prerequisites suitable to the level of promotion. (B) Decisions regarding law enforcement personnel hiring and promotions should be made through the police department’s personnel department and not through the City Manager’s Human Resources Department.
F11: Unlike most large law enforcement agencies, there is currently no established discipline matrix. Such a matrix specifically states appropriate punishments for specific policy and procedure violations. Such a matrix would also establish fair and consistent punishments in a progressive manner. The chief of police has been the sole decision making authority on discipline and levels of punishment issued. Captains have neither been part of the discipline process on a regular basis, nor are they allowed access to Internal Affairs information when they are asked for recommendations. As a result, in the summer of 1999, a squad of officers was terminated in connection with a very high profile OIS incident. These terminations severely affected the overall morale in the department, as well as daily functions of the department’s patrol operations. Activity has been limited to only low risk situations and emergency calls for service. The department records and testimony show: A) Monthly Statistics have documented a substantial decrease in pro-active police work. B) Traffic stops and pedestrian checks have plummeted. C) Officers are not investigating suspicious or possible criminal activity in order to avoid "use of force" confrontations. D) Following the termination, most of the SWAT, Defensive Tactics and Field Training Officer teams offered their resignations to the department. These were not accepted, but many of the officers have requested to be rotated off these duty assignments. E) At least sixteen senior officers have submitted their resumes to other law enforcement agencies. A number of "Lateral Transfers" (resignations) have already occurred, exacerbating an already dangerously low staffing level.
Related Recommendations (1)
R11: (A) Immediately develop and institute a comprehensive, written discipline matrix policy, which provides for prompt, fair, progressive, unbiased and consistent discipline. Such a policy will assure that all officers have full disclosure of expectations and consequences for violations of policies and procedures. (B) Develop a "discipline review panel" drawn from within the chain of command to ensure fair and equitable disciplinary actions. This "discipline review panel" should eliminate, or greatly reduce the perception and the possibility of arbitrary or biased discipline.
F12: An "Early Warning" disciplinary program has been instituted, which attempts to discover whether an officer is developing a problematic pattern. The current department citizen complaint form is not being used in compliance with state law. Complainants are not required to sign complaints under penalty of perjury. Anonymous and "third party" complaints are routinely accepted for investigation, which could lead to frivolous charges. Under the current atmosphere, this could unjustly target officers for discipline. Officers now feel that they are "guilty until proven innocent."
Related Recommendations (1)
R12: Require that all complaints against officers comply with policies set forth by state law. Anonymous complaints are easily contrived and impossible to disprove.
F13: There is evidence of "reverse" racial bias regarding discipline. Some minority officers have violated department policies with impunity. The absence of uniform disciplinary actions is common knowledge among the officers and has also had a "poisonous" effect on morale.
Related Recommendations (1)
R13: Strict compliance with an established discipline matrix is necessary to assure all employees are treated fairly and equitably, regardless of race, ethnicity, personal relationships or beliefs. The discipline of officers should be based on factual violations and in a consistent manner.
F14: There is no evidence to support allegations of "rampant racism," "racist activity" or "racial animus" in the department’s operations. There is no credible corroborating evidence that officers are taught "racial profiling" by Field Training Officers.
Related Recommendations (1)
R14: Publicly address racial or "racist" allegations against the department promptly. All such allegations should receive priority investigation by the department’s Internal Affairs Unit.
F15: There was a severe lack of communication between the former chief of police and the command staff. Captains have not been included in the policy or decision making processes. Also, the department’s financial officer was often excluded from command meetings. There has been an apparent prejudice against civilians attending policy meetings.
Related Recommendations (1)
R15: The captains and finance officer should always be part of the decision and policy making process. More authority must be delegated to the command staff and management to achieve the decentralized level management needed for Community- Based Policing.
F16: Officers are unsure what is expected of them, because there has been a poor line of communication vertically and horizontally. Rumors are allowed to circulate, without being addressed and controlled.
Related Recommendations (1)
R16: Develop and establish open and clear communication channels and procedures from command staff to subordinates. Establish a rumor control center to defuse groundless rumors, which are detrimental to morale.
F17: Communication and processing of information through all management levels is extremely slow. This has resulted in lengthy delays of reports, Internal Affairs investigations, disciplinary and management actions.
Related Recommendations (1)
R17: Evaluate the current communication problems that exist and implement procedures which will improve inner-departmental performance.
F18: Watch 1 (graveyard shifts) traditionally receives a higher degree of criminal activity than Watch 2 (day shifts). Watch 1 is primarily staffed with the department’s newest and least experienced officers, which creates a dangerous potential for high risk incidents. The city has recently promoted a number of patrol officers to the rank of detective and are considering the scheduling of these officers on Watch 1, to provide more experience.
Related Recommendations (1)
R18: (A) The department must develop a method of rotating temporary squads of senior officers onto Watch 1, to urgently improve training and skill levels of newer officers, and reduce the danger of "high risk" incidents. (B) The senior officers should receive increased compensations, during their temporary rotation schedule. (C) Recently promoted detectives should be assigned to the seriously understaffed Investigations Division.
F19: A recent department analysis of "Part 1" (major) crimes statistics (see chart below) for 1998/99 revealed significant increases over 1974 levels. Many of the current "Part 1" crimes received little or no attention in 1974 (e.g. sexual assaults, child/elder abuse, domestic violence, and economic crimes). This study also revealed a serious shortage of trained detectives: A) In 1974, there were twenty-three detectives assigned to investigations. Twenty-five years later, in 1999, there were thirty-three detectives assigned to this division. B) Increased awareness and reporting requirements for crimes such as domestic violence, child and elder abuse, sexual assaults and Internet crimes have significantly added to detective caseloads. (From 1988 to 1998, domestic violence cases alone have increased 185%.) C) A single case consists of the following: 1) Reading the report, 2) completing the investigation, 3) writing the supplemental report, 4) filing the complaint with the District Attorney’s office (in other counties this function is performed by the D.A.’s office) 5) and testifying in court. It is impossible for the current staffing of detectives to handle the present caseloads adequately (see chart below). Overall, only a few hours can be allocated for many cases and in most cases, only minutes can be allowed. Consequently, most of the cases in priority status 4 and 5 get the least amount of attention. CASE ASSIGNMENT BY PRIORITY STATUS July ‘98 - June ‘99 . UNIT 1 2 3 4 5 Crime Index TOTALS Persons 244 54 228 228 3538 4337 Robbery 253 378 41 15 195 882 Sex.Assault 55 110 52 41 210 468 Child Abuse 119 162 71 120 297 769 Dom. Viol. 467 205 186 91 950 1899 Economic 134 138 21 82 565 940 Auto Theft 181 48 9 13 1877 2128 Property 916 204 282 405 8740 10547 Prioritized by custody and amount of information D) The department lacks the ability and manpower to handle the growing number of "high tech" crimes on the Internet. These crimes are primarily focused in areas of fraud and child exploitation. E) As of February of 2000, there are 511 registered sex offenders residing in the City of Riverside. Five are considered "high risk" and 451 are considered "serious risks." Fifty- five are classified as "other." There are also approximately 100 "unregistered" or "unaccounted for" offenders. The majority of these offenders are pedophiles (child predators). There is an insufficient number of detectives to adequately supervise their activities. F) White collar crimes (including organized crimes, drug dealing, and juvenile activity) are increasing. These cases are extremely time consuming and require large amounts of documentation. With increased use of the Internet and advanced technical skills, juvenile fraud and embezzlement arrests are rapidly increasing nationwide. The department totally lacks the training and manpower to handle such cases. G) A number of variable factors is also placing an even greater strain on the existing investigation staff. Among these variables are: population growth, increased service calls, increased filings from an increasingly pro-active patrol division, task force commitments, and pretrial responsibilities. H) A number of officers have been transferred from the patrol division to investigations, to assist in the workload without promotions to detective. However, this does not resolve the problem and seriously depletes the number of officers available to patrol the city.
Related Recommendations (1)
R19: Priority should be placed on the recruitment of new personnel, so that more qualified officers can be advanced to the detective rank and increase the investigation staff. The Investigation Division should be increased as rapidly as possible. A) Additional specialized training should be provided to all investigators, ensuring they are adequately prepared to investigate the increasing number of "high tech" crimes. B) Civilian technicians should be employed to perform specialized tasks, which will free existing detectives to handle cases more efficiently. C) Most registered sex offenders should be considered "high risk," given their propensity for criminal activity. Therefore, qualified civilian, or sworn personnel, should be appointed immediately to oversee the activities of these individuals.
F20: The department’s new Records Management System (RMS) has been routed through the city manager’s office. The RMS is connected to all public safety systems, which is likely to cause overloads and lengthy "down times." This routing also will allow some unauthorized civilians to have unrestricted access to confidential police files, which is in violation of state and federal regulations. Additionally, this 1.34 million- dollar software purchase did not include the "perpetual rights" use authority from the supplier, placing the department and city in a state of future financial uncertainty.
Related Recommendations (1)
R20: The computerized RMS program must be proprietary and a stand-alone operating system to the department. Outside access to police files and records, by unauthorized personnel, must be prohibited. The city should demand that the "perpetual rights" authority to the purchased software be turned-over by the supplier.
F21: There is a major concern by rank and file officers regarding the qualifications and/or competency level of some supervisors/managers. The majority of the concerns expressed were that they are risking their careers on arbitrary or "unqualified" evaluations from inexperienced managers.
Related Recommendations (1)
R21: Institute an anonymous up line evaluation form, similar to those used in other departments. This evaluation form will assist commanders in recognizing possible weaknesses in supervision/management. This information can be used to develop supplemental training in those areas.
F22: Lieutenants serve as "watch commanders" on a rotating basis. This causes a lack of consistency regarding policy and procedure interpretations at the lieutenant level. Sergeants are being held accountable to five individuals’ opinions and interpretations, which is causing a high degree of frustration, disharmony and disorganization within the department.
Related Recommendations (1)
R22: (A) Assign senior sergeants on each shift to serve as "watch commander," using a literal interpretation of the department’s policy and procedures. (B) Policy interpretation should be clarified and resolved by the division commander.
F23: Sergeants are inundated with paper work, which is preventing them from properly performing their field functions of training, supervision and mentoring the officers under their supervision.
Related Recommendations (1)
R23: (A) Define specific paperwork obligations of lieutenants and sergeants, consistent with their responsibilities. (B) Expand the stenographer pool, so that sergeants’ skills can be better used at supervising and training.
F24: Sergeants are not currently in control of the Field Training Officer Program, which prevents them from adequately overseeing daily training of new officers.
Related Recommendations (1)
R24: Sergeants should organize and supervise the Field Training Officer Program, conducting monthly meetings to discuss progress of officers-in-training. Based on these meetings, regular reports should be provided to the management staff.
F25: Sergeants are not being supported by administration regarding disciplinary evaluations and actions for poor performance or improper behavior. On occasion, sergeants have been instructed to change personnel investigation reports to justify disciplinary actions against officers.
Related Recommendations (1)
R25: (A) Management needs to give high regard to sergeants’ comments, or recommendations, in areas of officer performance, or behavior. (B) Management should only override sergeants’ findings on disciplinary suggestions, with proper supplemental
F26: Employee evaluations are habitually late.
Related Recommendations (1)
R26: Employee evaluations must be brought up-to-date and properly maintained on a regular basis, as prescribed by law.
F27: Salaries and benefits are not competitive with surrounding agencies of similar size. This has been a detrimental factor in attracting experienced officers to make lateral transfers to RPD, as well as recruitment of new officers.
Related Recommendations (1)
R27: (A) Conduct a realistic "parity study," to reevaluate the salary and benefit structure. (B) Make necessary adjustments to bring compensation into a competitive range, so as to attract the needed manpower. (C) Increase the funding for a more aggressive recruitment program to attract experienced officers from other agencies, as well as new recruits.
F28: Most field officers believe they do not have adequate equipment and supplies necessary to perform their duties in a timely manner. The lack of essential equipment often ties-up officers at calls longer than necessary.
Related Recommendations (1)
R28: (A) Provide photo cameras, additional film, print kits and new technology in non- lethal devises and weapons, for each patrol vehicle. (B) Supervision/management should develop a more comprehensive list of needed equipment and submit it to command.
F29: Vehicles are not equipped with audio or video recording devices, which would properly document all incidents and help avoid legal risks and frivolous complaints against officers.
Related Recommendations (1)
R29: Install video cameras and audio/video recorders in each patrol vehicle to instantly provide irrefutable documentation of all incidents.
F30: The department does not have a logistics control. Consequently, a number of weapons, radios and miscellaneous equipment have vanished.
Related Recommendations (1)
R30: Require an inventory be conducted to locate missing equipment, and establish a centralized logistics control system. Designate a logistics control supervisor at each of the department’s four locations, who would report to one specific command officer.
F31: The RPD is currently a "reactive" rather than a "pro-active" police force. The department lacks the essential prerequisites which will prevent the city from successfully implementing an effective program of Problem Oriented Policing and Community-Based Policing. Specifically: A) A strong fundamental (apprehension and suppression) police "core." B) A high degree of decentralized management, which does not currently exist. C) Highly specialized areas of training for officers. This does not currently exist. D) These programs require that a large contingency fund be available. This does not currently exist.
Related Recommendations (1)
R31: (A) The city should reevaluate its stated commitment toward Community-Based Policing policy, and allocate sufficient funding to accomplish the necessary prerequisites. (B) Management of the department must undergo a radical change in the policy and procedures to accommodate the decentralized form of management needed to make such programs successful.
F32: During the preparation of this report, the Chief of Police resigned and has been replaced with an interim department head. The interim Chief will serve until the city completes its search for a permanent replacement.
Related Recommendations (1)
R32: The interim chief should make no major policy decisions which would affect the power and authority of the new permanent replacement for the department.
F33: There is a number of discussions being conducted regarding Citizen/Community Review panels, which would be intended to oversee the department. There are at least six independent agencies which currently oversee the department (including the Riverside County Grand Jury). The department appears to have a good record of self- policing and disciplining errant officers (with a few noted exceptions), despite the inequities in punishments issued.
Related Recommendations (1)
R33: Oversight by "citizens" unfamiliar with the law enforcement profession, or their procedures, would be redundant, unproductive and detrimental to the quality of law enforcement. Additionally, such a "committee" would produce an unnecessary financial expense and bureaucracy within the city.
F34: Police academies teach police officers to use a "three-shot scenario" whenever they are required to use lethal "use of force." They are, to discharge their weapons three times (two toward the chest and once toward the head) then withdraw to reassess the threat, and fire again ifnecessary. The appearance of "Excessive Force" is based on the number of officers involved.
Related Recommendations (1)
R34: The "three-shot scenario" training should be explained to the public-at-large, so that claims of "Excessive Use of Force" can be placed in proper perspective.
Additional Recommendations 1

Not linked to specific findings.

R35: Amend the City Charter so that the chief of police is placed directly under contract to the city and given full budgetary authority over the department. This would expedite the Community-Based Policing policy and ensure quality law enforcement for the city.
Findings & Recommendations 35 findings
F1: The department has a serious need for attention to its physical infrastructure. It has outgrown the Orange Street "Headquarters," that has caused the department to become fragmented into four separate facilities around the city. This is a major contributing factor to the breakdown of interaction, cooperation and communication between divisions.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1: The city should build a new police headquarters which will be large enough to house all divisions of the department. Such a facility should be planned to keep up with the projected growth of the city.
F2: There is a dangerous shortage of patrol officers, which is affecting the safety and security of the community. In 1992, the population was 238,100, and there were 147 officers allocated for patrol services. In 2000, the population is in excess of 262,000, and there are only 135 officers allocated for patrol services. While the population has increased by 24,000, the police coverage has been decreasing.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2: Develop and strictly adhere to a minimum staffing level in compliance with recommended safety standards (approximately 15 patrol units per shift) to ensure adequate officer and civilian safety.
F3: There are more than 335 sworn officers in the department, of those 135 allocated positions for patrol, only 109 are actually assigned to patrol duties. As a result, there have been several occasions where only 8-10 patrol cars (or less) have been assigned to cover the five districts in the city. Arrests will pull a unit out of service for long periods of time. Major incidents often pull several units out of service, reducing adequate back up capabilities and delayed responses to calls for service. Officers are continuously concerned about each other’s safety in addition to the safety of the community. (Note: During the preparation of this report, the department allocated overtime hours to increase patrol levels.)
Related Recommendations (1)
R3: (A) Take immediate steps to see that more sworn personnel are returned to patrol duties. (B) City budgetary funding allocations for patrol officers should be adjusted to keep in line with nationally recognized minimum safety standards and the city’s growth.
F4: Many sworn officers have been assigned to duties that could be accomplished by non- sworn personnel.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4: Review all programs and assignments to determine which duties can be accomplished by non-sworn personnel, and return sworn officers to more productive and cost effective uses.
F5: The department offers only the minimum amount of training required by the State’s Peace Officer Standard of Training (P.O.S.T.). Officers who wish to attend specialized schools to improve their proficiency, or advance their careers, must do so at their own expense and often on their own time. Officers are extremely concerned that the severe lack of training is affecting the quality of law enforcement in the city. Additionally, the lack of continual and on-going training is resulting in new officers developing unsafe or dangerous habits, adversely affecting their performance and the overall safety of the community.
Related Recommendations (1)
R5: Allocate sufficient funding specifically for specialized schools and training, and encourage officers to share training information upon their return.
F6: In mid-1998, the position of "Training Sergeant" was eliminated, which ended the daily roll call training sessions. Officers felt that those 15 minutes of daily training were extremely beneficial , particularly when covering possible scenarios and critical situations. Officers are mindful that they must rely on their training and instinct, especially when caught in unexpected or extremely unusual incidents where "split- second" decision making is required.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6: Provide funding to expand training at all levels. A training unit needs to be established to develop, oversee and conduct a comprehensive, ongoing training program and to document efficient training. The training of officers in scenarios and critical situations is essential and must be improved.
F7: Uninvolved patrol officers are not being briefed following Officer Involved Shootings and are not taught which tactics are acceptable or overly dangerous.
Related Recommendations (1)
R7: Conduct post-incident briefings on all Officer Involved Shootings. This will provide valuable ongoing training, which may prevent repeated errors.
F8: Currently, there is no established written promotion policy which provides a set of prerequisites needed for qualified officers to obtain advancement. Professional law enforcement management demands that promotions be made in an orderly process. Former chiefs have made promotions arbitrarily, which appears to have caused a critical weakness in the management structure. Many officers believe there is no incentive to advance their careers, because several qualified officers have been passed over for promotions as many as twenty times without explanation.
Related Recommendations (1)
R8: Direct that a formal written promotion policy (which provides the necessary prerequisites for each rank) be established immediately. All law enforcement promotions should be made in a non-discriminatory and professionally established method. Appointments should be made from the top three qualified individuals on the "promotion list." This list should be updated annually. Persons in the top three positions should not be passed-over more than three times, without receiving written notice as to the reason they were not promoted, to allow them to improve their career performance.
F9: Officers are not allowed to see promotion lists, candidate qualifications or rankings.
Related Recommendations (1)
R9: The department should post qualifications, scores and ranking for all promotion applicants.
F10: Command and management oral examinations for promotion are conducted by non- law enforcement personnel in the Human Resources Department at the city manager’s office.
Related Recommendations (1)
R10: (A) All oral examinations of law enforcement personnel should be conducted by individuals qualified to appraise the level of professional prerequisites suitable to the level of promotion. (B) Decisions regarding law enforcement personnel hiring and promotions should be made through the police department’s personnel department and not through the City Manager’s Human Resources Department.
F11: Unlike most large law enforcement agencies, there is currently no established discipline matrix. Such a matrix specifically states appropriate punishments for specific policy and procedure violations. Such a matrix would also establish fair and consistent punishments in a progressive manner. The chief of police has been the sole decision making authority on discipline and levels of punishment issued. Captains have neither been part of the discipline process on a regular basis, nor are they allowed access to Internal Affairs information when they are asked for recommendations. As a result, in the summer of 1999, a squad of officers was terminated in connection with a very high profile OIS incident. These terminations severely affected the overall morale in the department, as well as daily functions of the department’s patrol operations. Activity has been limited to only low risk situations and emergency calls for service. The department records and testimony show: A) Monthly Statistics have documented a substantial decrease in pro-active police work. B) Traffic stops and pedestrian checks have plummeted. C) Officers are not investigating suspicious or possible criminal activity in order to avoid "use of force" confrontations. D) Following the termination, most of the SWAT, Defensive Tactics and Field Training Officer teams offered their resignations to the department. These were not accepted, but many of the officers have requested to be rotated off these duty assignments. E) At least sixteen senior officers have submitted their resumes to other law enforcement agencies. A number of "Lateral Transfers" (resignations) have already occurred, exacerbating an already dangerously low staffing level.
Related Recommendations (1)
R11: (A) Immediately develop and institute a comprehensive, written discipline matrix policy, which provides for prompt, fair, progressive, unbiased and consistent discipline. Such a policy will assure that all officers have full disclosure of expectations and consequences for violations of policies and procedures. (B) Develop a "discipline review panel" drawn from within the chain of command to ensure fair and equitable disciplinary actions. This "discipline review panel" should eliminate, or greatly reduce the perception and the possibility of arbitrary or biased discipline.
F12: An "Early Warning" disciplinary program has been instituted, which attempts to discover whether an officer is developing a problematic pattern. The current department citizen complaint form is not being used in compliance with state law. Complainants are not required to sign complaints under penalty of perjury. Anonymous and "third party" complaints are routinely accepted for investigation, which could lead to frivolous charges. Under the current atmosphere, this could unjustly target officers for discipline. Officers now feel that they are "guilty until proven innocent."
Related Recommendations (1)
R12: Require that all complaints against officers comply with policies set forth by state law. Anonymous complaints are easily contrived and impossible to disprove.
F13: There is evidence of "reverse" racial bias regarding discipline. Some minority officers have violated department policies with impunity. The absence of uniform disciplinary actions is common knowledge among the officers and has also had a "poisonous" effect on morale.
Related Recommendations (1)
R13: Strict compliance with an established discipline matrix is necessary to assure all employees are treated fairly and equitably, regardless of race, ethnicity, personal relationships or beliefs. The discipline of officers should be based on factual violations and in a consistent manner.
F14: There is no evidence to support allegations of "rampant racism," "racist activity" or "racial animus" in the department’s operations. There is no credible corroborating evidence that officers are taught "racial profiling" by Field Training Officers.
Related Recommendations (1)
R14: Publicly address racial or "racist" allegations against the department promptly. All such allegations should receive priority investigation by the department’s Internal Affairs Unit.
F15: There was a severe lack of communication between the former chief of police and the command staff. Captains have not been included in the policy or decision making processes. Also, the department’s financial officer was often excluded from command meetings. There has been an apparent prejudice against civilians attending policy meetings.
Related Recommendations (1)
R15: The captains and finance officer should always be part of the decision and policy making process. More authority must be delegated to the command staff and management to achieve the decentralized level management needed for Community- Based Policing.
F16: Officers are unsure what is expected of them, because there has been a poor line of communication vertically and horizontally. Rumors are allowed to circulate, without being addressed and controlled.
Related Recommendations (1)
R16: Develop and establish open and clear communication channels and procedures from command staff to subordinates. Establish a rumor control center to defuse groundless rumors, which are detrimental to morale.
F17: Communication and processing of information through all management levels is extremely slow. This has resulted in lengthy delays of reports, Internal Affairs investigations, disciplinary and management actions.
Related Recommendations (1)
R17: Evaluate the current communication problems that exist and implement procedures which will improve inner-departmental performance.
F18: Watch 1 (graveyard shifts) traditionally receives a higher degree of criminal activity than Watch 2 (day shifts). Watch 1 is primarily staffed with the department’s newest and least experienced officers, which creates a dangerous potential for high risk incidents. The city has recently promoted a number of patrol officers to the rank of detective and are considering the scheduling of these officers on Watch 1, to provide more experience.
Related Recommendations (1)
R18: (A) The department must develop a method of rotating temporary squads of senior officers onto Watch 1, to urgently improve training and skill levels of newer officers, and reduce the danger of "high risk" incidents. (B) The senior officers should receive increased compensations, during their temporary rotation schedule. (C) Recently promoted detectives should be assigned to the seriously understaffed Investigations Division.
F19: A recent department analysis of "Part 1" (major) crimes statistics (see chart below) for 1998/99 revealed significant increases over 1974 levels. Many of the current "Part 1" crimes received little or no attention in 1974 (e.g. sexual assaults, child/elder abuse, domestic violence, and economic crimes). This study also revealed a serious shortage of trained detectives: A) In 1974, there were twenty-three detectives assigned to investigations. Twenty-five years later, in 1999, there were thirty-three detectives assigned to this division. B) Increased awareness and reporting requirements for crimes such as domestic violence, child and elder abuse, sexual assaults and Internet crimes have significantly added to detective caseloads. (From 1988 to 1998, domestic violence cases alone have increased 185%.) C) A single case consists of the following: 1) Reading the report, 2) completing the investigation, 3) writing the supplemental report, 4) filing the complaint with the District Attorney’s office (in other counties this function is performed by the D.A.’s office) 5) and testifying in court. It is impossible for the current staffing of detectives to handle the present caseloads adequately (see chart below). Overall, only a few hours can be allocated for many cases and in most cases, only minutes can be allowed. Consequently, most of the cases in priority status 4 and 5 get the least amount of attention. CASE ASSIGNMENT BY PRIORITY STATUS July ‘98 - June ‘99 . UNIT 1 2 3 4 5 Crime Index TOTALS Persons 244 54 228 228 3538 4337 Robbery 253 378 41 15 195 882 Sex.Assault 55 110 52 41 210 468 Child Abuse 119 162 71 120 297 769 Dom. Viol. 467 205 186 91 950 1899 Economic 134 138 21 82 565 940 Auto Theft 181 48 9 13 1877 2128 Property 916 204 282 405 8740 10547 Prioritized by custody and amount of information D) The department lacks the ability and manpower to handle the growing number of "high tech" crimes on the Internet. These crimes are primarily focused in areas of fraud and child exploitation. E) As of February of 2000, there are 511 registered sex offenders residing in the City of Riverside. Five are considered "high risk" and 451 are considered "serious risks." Fifty- five are classified as "other." There are also approximately 100 "unregistered" or "unaccounted for" offenders. The majority of these offenders are pedophiles (child predators). There is an insufficient number of detectives to adequately supervise their activities. F) White collar crimes (including organized crimes, drug dealing, and juvenile activity) are increasing. These cases are extremely time consuming and require large amounts of documentation. With increased use of the Internet and advanced technical skills, juvenile fraud and embezzlement arrests are rapidly increasing nationwide. The department totally lacks the training and manpower to handle such cases. G) A number of variable factors is also placing an even greater strain on the existing investigation staff. Among these variables are: population growth, increased service calls, increased filings from an increasingly pro-active patrol division, task force commitments, and pretrial responsibilities. H) A number of officers have been transferred from the patrol division to investigations, to assist in the workload without promotions to detective. However, this does not resolve the problem and seriously depletes the number of officers available to patrol the city.
Related Recommendations (1)
R19: Priority should be placed on the recruitment of new personnel, so that more qualified officers can be advanced to the detective rank and increase the investigation staff. The Investigation Division should be increased as rapidly as possible. A) Additional specialized training should be provided to all investigators, ensuring they are adequately prepared to investigate the increasing number of "high tech" crimes. B) Civilian technicians should be employed to perform specialized tasks, which will free existing detectives to handle cases more efficiently. C) Most registered sex offenders should be considered "high risk," given their propensity for criminal activity. Therefore, qualified civilian, or sworn personnel, should be appointed immediately to oversee the activities of these individuals.
F20: The department’s new Records Management System (RMS) has been routed through the city manager’s office. The RMS is connected to all public safety systems, which is likely to cause overloads and lengthy "down times." This routing also will allow some unauthorized civilians to have unrestricted access to confidential police files, which is in violation of state and federal regulations. Additionally, this 1.34 million- dollar software purchase did not include the "perpetual rights" use authority from the supplier, placing the department and city in a state of future financial uncertainty.
Related Recommendations (1)
R20: The computerized RMS program must be proprietary and a stand-alone operating system to the department. Outside access to police files and records, by unauthorized personnel, must be prohibited. The city should demand that the "perpetual rights" authority to the purchased software be turned-over by the supplier.
F21: There is a major concern by rank and file officers regarding the qualifications and/or competency level of some supervisors/managers. The majority of the concerns expressed were that they are risking their careers on arbitrary or "unqualified" evaluations from inexperienced managers.
Related Recommendations (1)
R21: Institute an anonymous up line evaluation form, similar to those used in other departments. This evaluation form will assist commanders in recognizing possible weaknesses in supervision/management. This information can be used to develop supplemental training in those areas.
F22: Lieutenants serve as "watch commanders" on a rotating basis. This causes a lack of consistency regarding policy and procedure interpretations at the lieutenant level. Sergeants are being held accountable to five individuals’ opinions and interpretations, which is causing a high degree of frustration, disharmony and disorganization within the department.
Related Recommendations (1)
R22: (A) Assign senior sergeants on each shift to serve as "watch commander," using a literal interpretation of the department’s policy and procedures. (B) Policy interpretation should be clarified and resolved by the division commander.
F23: Sergeants are inundated with paper work, which is preventing them from properly performing their field functions of training, supervision and mentoring the officers under their supervision.
Related Recommendations (1)
R23: (A) Define specific paperwork obligations of lieutenants and sergeants, consistent with their responsibilities. (B) Expand the stenographer pool, so that sergeants’ skills can be better used at supervising and training.
F24: Sergeants are not currently in control of the Field Training Officer Program, which prevents them from adequately overseeing daily training of new officers.
Related Recommendations (1)
R24: Sergeants should organize and supervise the Field Training Officer Program, conducting monthly meetings to discuss progress of officers-in-training. Based on these meetings, regular reports should be provided to the management staff.
F25: Sergeants are not being supported by administration regarding disciplinary evaluations and actions for poor performance or improper behavior. On occasion, sergeants have been instructed to change personnel investigation reports to justify disciplinary actions against officers.
Related Recommendations (1)
R25: (A) Management needs to give high regard to sergeants’ comments, or recommendations, in areas of officer performance, or behavior. (B) Management should only override sergeants’ findings on disciplinary suggestions, with proper supplemental
F26: Employee evaluations are habitually late.
Related Recommendations (1)
R26: Employee evaluations must be brought up-to-date and properly maintained on a regular basis, as prescribed by law.
F27: Salaries and benefits are not competitive with surrounding agencies of similar size. This has been a detrimental factor in attracting experienced officers to make lateral transfers to RPD, as well as recruitment of new officers.
Related Recommendations (1)
R27: (A) Conduct a realistic "parity study," to reevaluate the salary and benefit structure. (B) Make necessary adjustments to bring compensation into a competitive range, so as to attract the needed manpower. (C) Increase the funding for a more aggressive recruitment program to attract experienced officers from other agencies, as well as new recruits.
F28: Most field officers believe they do not have adequate equipment and supplies necessary to perform their duties in a timely manner. The lack of essential equipment often ties-up officers at calls longer than necessary.
Related Recommendations (1)
R28: (A) Provide photo cameras, additional film, print kits and new technology in non- lethal devises and weapons, for each patrol vehicle. (B) Supervision/management should develop a more comprehensive list of needed equipment and submit it to command.
F29: Vehicles are not equipped with audio or video recording devices, which would properly document all incidents and help avoid legal risks and frivolous complaints against officers.
Related Recommendations (1)
R29: Install video cameras and audio/video recorders in each patrol vehicle to instantly provide irrefutable documentation of all incidents.
F30: The department does not have a logistics control. Consequently, a number of weapons, radios and miscellaneous equipment have vanished.
Related Recommendations (1)
R30: Require an inventory be conducted to locate missing equipment, and establish a centralized logistics control system. Designate a logistics control supervisor at each of the department’s four locations, who would report to one specific command officer.
F31: The RPD is currently a "reactive" rather than a "pro-active" police force. The department lacks the essential prerequisites which will prevent the city from successfully implementing an effective program of Problem Oriented Policing and Community-Based Policing. Specifically: A) A strong fundamental (apprehension and suppression) police "core." B) A high degree of decentralized management, which does not currently exist. C) Highly specialized areas of training for officers. This does not currently exist. D) These programs require that a large contingency fund be available. This does not currently exist.
Related Recommendations (1)
R31: (A) The city should reevaluate its stated commitment toward Community-Based Policing policy, and allocate sufficient funding to accomplish the necessary prerequisites. (B) Management of the department must undergo a radical change in the policy and procedures to accommodate the decentralized form of management needed to make such programs successful.
F32: During the preparation of this report, the Chief of Police resigned and has been replaced with an interim department head. The interim Chief will serve until the city completes its search for a permanent replacement.
Related Recommendations (1)
R32: The interim chief should make no major policy decisions which would affect the power and authority of the new permanent replacement for the department.
F33: There is a number of discussions being conducted regarding Citizen/Community Review panels, which would be intended to oversee the department. There are at least six independent agencies which currently oversee the department (including the Riverside County Grand Jury). The department appears to have a good record of self- policing and disciplining errant officers (with a few noted exceptions), despite the inequities in punishments issued.
Related Recommendations (1)
R33: Oversight by "citizens" unfamiliar with the law enforcement profession, or their procedures, would be redundant, unproductive and detrimental to the quality of law enforcement. Additionally, such a "committee" would produce an unnecessary financial expense and bureaucracy within the city.
F34: Police academies teach police officers to use a "three-shot scenario" whenever they are required to use lethal "use of force." They are, to discharge their weapons three times (two toward the chest and once toward the head) then withdraw to reassess the threat, and fire again ifnecessary. The appearance of "Excessive Force" is based on the number of officers involved.
Related Recommendations (1)
R34: The "three-shot scenario" training should be explained to the public-at-large, so that claims of "Excessive Use of Force" can be placed in proper perspective.
F35: Amend the City Charter so that the chief of police is placed directly under contract to the city and given full budgetary authority over the department. This would expedite the Community-Based Policing policy and ensure quality law enforcement for the city.
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Related Recommendations (1)
R35: Amend the City Charter so that the chief of police is placed directly under contract to the city and given full budgetary authority over the department. This would expedite the Community-Based Policing policy and ensure quality law enforcement for the city.

Additional documents

Documents found alongside this year's reports — not grand jury reports or responses.