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⚠️ Este contenido ha sido traducido automáticamente. El texto original en inglés es la versión oficial. La traducción puede contener errores.
Findings 12 findings
F1
The staff of the Main Jail was negligent in allowing inmate mail drops to remain unsecured and at risk of being accessed by other inmates. The Grand Jury was advised that a total of 16 mail drops needed to be made secure.
F2
Jail floor officers did not notify maintenance personnel of defective slots so repairs could be made in a timely manner.
F3
Jail staff, in responding to inmate complaints of mail not received or delayed mail delivery, instructed inmates to review the rules regarding correspondence in the Inmate Handbook.
F4
Neither the County nor the City has effectively integrated the participation of private industry in homeland security.
F5
No substantial effort has been undertaken to educate and train the public at large on how to respond to a weapon of mass destruction event.
F6
A standard operational plan for law enforcement, fire suppression, and emergency medical services that prescribes the roles and responsibilities of responders to a weapon of mass destruction event is still under development.
F7
The County is significantly short of the federal benchmark for “surge capacity” hospital beds and may not have adequate treatment capability in the event of a large scale medical emergency.
F8
There is no written plan for transporting emergency medical supplies which have arrived at a location designated by the State from national repositories to the sites where they are needed.
F9
The City has recently acquired a “reverse 9-1-1” automatic telephone warning system as a means of instant communication with residents of the regional urban area, concerning imminent danger arising from a weapon of mass destruction event, along with appropriate directives and instructions. The County has not yet demonstrated a similar capability for the non urban area of the County.
F10
The compatibility of communication technology between law enforcement, fire suppression, and emergency medical, and other related services has been extended to a wide array of state and local agencies in the region. Almost all agencies that need to communicate during an emergency have adopted a common system. However, adjustments to the antennas in Walnut Grove are needed to improve portable coverage for the Galt/Isleton area which is not fully aligned with SRRCS.
F11
No substantial effort has been undertaken to assess the capability of mobilizing the region’s public employees as disaster service workers. Sacramento County Grand Jury June 30, 2005
F12
July 16, 2003 memo from Kronick to the Council regarding newly adopted legislation on how to disclose conflict of interest issues at a public meeting
Recommendations 12
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R1Unsecured mail drops should be repaired promptly as promised by the Main Jail authorities.
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R2Main Jail staff should develop a procedure to ensure that mail- related deficiencies as noted in this report are promptly reported and repaired.
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R3Once a criteria for payment under a contract is established (such as a fee for documented service to individual clients), the County should not modify its approach and utilize a different method of payment (such as reimbursement for expenses incurred) for any payments made for past performance.
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R4The County or City should take immediate steps to include and coordinate the services of private industry, against which a weapon of mass destruction attack is likely to be directed, in plans for prevention and response to such an event.
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R5The Sacramento County Board of Supervisors must demonstrate a strong policy objective to educate and train the public at large on how to respond to a weapon of mass destruction event in a manner which contributes to rather than impairs the effectiveness of the operational plan. II. RESPONSE CAPABILITY
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R6The County Emergency Operations Office and the Sacramento Regional Office of Homeland Security should in collaboration complete the development of a standard operational plan for law enforcement, fire suppression, and 83
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R7The County Health Officer should determine the adequacy of the County’s existing “surge capacity” hospital beds and develop a plan to provide adequate facilities for a large scale event.
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R8The County Health Officer should formalize a written plan with the Sacramento Regional Office of Homeland Security and with the California Highway Patrol to reach an accord on how emergency medical supplies will be transported when they arrive here from a national repository.
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R9The City must complete the installation of an automatic telephone warning system and extend its capability to cell phones and voice-over-Internet- Protocol as the technology becomes available. The County must assure that the system is operable throughout the operational area.
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R10The current common communications system should be made fully operational, and the County should make the necessary adjustments to the antennas in Walnut Grove to improve portable coverage for the Galt/Isleton area, and continue to seek full alignment of that area with SRRCS.
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R11The County’s operational plan should identify how public employees could serve as disaster service workers in accordance with the existing legal framework. A process should be established to rapidly mobilize these workers during an emergency.
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R12July 16, 2003 memo from Kronick to the Council regarding newly adopted legislation on how to disclose conflict of interest issues at a public meeting