Kern County Grand Jury • 2022-2023

California Attorney General

Published: May 26, 2022 28 pages
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Findings and Recommendations 8 findings

F1
Antiquated software and dissimilar databases severely hamper the ability of KCSO to fulfill the Stipulated Judgment requirements.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1
No later than December 30, 2022, funding levels should be increased for the KCSO to allow for investment in technology and data upgrades. (Findings F1, F2, F3, F5)
F2
Data is not able to be leveraged as a management and monitoring tool by KCSO due to software age or reliance on paper systems, and its inability to be able to be linked together.
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R2
No later than November 1, 2022, KCSO should recommend to the Board of Supervisors a ballot measure to increase the County sales tax by one percent from 7.25% to 8.25% to fund the modernization and maintenance of KCSO technology and computer software systems, to adequately staff vacant positions and to increase the scale and scope of recruitment for KCSO. (Findings F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, F6) 10 https://www.koat.com/article/doj-settlement-agreement-with-the-city-enters-7th-year-dollar20-million/35421909 11 https://oaktalk.com/2018/03/23/a-guide-to-the-negotiated-settlement-agreement-nsa-the-cost/
F3
The KCSO website needs to be modernized and updated with publically available data on use of force incidents.
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R3
No later than November 1, 2022, KCSO should recommend to the Board of Supervisors that a general tax be levied to fund general government purposes, which goes into the Kern County’s general fund to be approved by voters. (Findings F1, F2, F3, F4, F5,
F4
Staffing levels are at an all-time low, and the KCSO is strained by a lack of qualified candidates to fill vacancies. Positions remain vacant placing a burden on the existing workforce.
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R4
No later than November 1, 2022, KCSO should recommend to the Board of Supervisors to commission an independent cost-benefit analysis of the digitization of the computer systems, in which the cost to all stakeholders, in property tax revenues, is considered. (Findings F1, F2, F3, F5)
F5
The KCSO is responsible for an area nearly the size of New Hampshire. They need more funds to be able to comply with the terms of the Stipulated Judgment and to effectively enforce the law.
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R5
No later than November 1, 2022, the KCSO’s CAC should abide by the Brown Act (regardless of whether they are a Brown Act body), California’s Political Reform Act, set up a public website publishing meetings, agendas, and minutes for the public and set up an open, accountable process to allow community members/groups to have a seat. (Finding F8)
F6
Recruitment is not wide or nimble enough to bring in adequate candidates to fulfill vacant positions at the KCSO. Recruitment at present is insufficient and utilizes outdated methods to meet the needs of the County.
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R6
No later than November 1, 2022, a working committee should be set up to achieve closer cooperation between KCSO and KCHR for hiring and promotion needs to be achieved. (Findings F4, F5, F6, F7)
F7
The lack of communication and cooperation between KCHR and KCSO hampers hiring and promotion needs/requirements.
Related Recommendations (1)
R7
No later than November 1, 2022, KCSO should recommend to the Board of Supervisors to commission an independent study of the KCSO and KCHR hiring and recruitment program. This study should determine whether the program comports with those in other counties and with best practices, recommend revisions to the program, including the Peace Officers Standard and Training requirements, to be in compliance with Stipulated Judgment requirements for Diversity, Equity and Inclusion. (Findings F4,
F8
The Sheriff’s Community Advisory Council plays a large role in shaping public policy and practices for KCSO, and how it enforces the law based upon the requirements in the Stipulated Judgment. However, the lack of openness, posted agendas, bylaws and minutes, and the appointed, non-elected nature of the group, raises concerns over how representative of Kern County they are and is contrary to their stated purpose. COMMENTS: Since the inception of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, the Special Litigation Section of the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division has completed at least 50 investigations of police departments alleged to have engaged in a pattern or practice of misconduct.5 When a pattern or practice of misconduct is found, formal legal means are sought to remedy the illegal activity. The United States Department of Justice (USDOJ) has negotiated settlement agreements to remedy several categories of systematic police misconduct. The police use of excessive force is by far the most common violation.6 Though the content of each agreement is tailored to the specific pattern or practice of abuse, the USDOJ relies on a core set of reform mechanisms to affect department wide change. In each case, the settlement agreement uses aggressive timelines and a court appointed independent monitor to implement changes to police departments. These reforms can change the process of hiring, promoting, policing, and effect perception and legitimacy of the departments in the eyes of the community, watchdog groups and the media, as well as possible improved relationships between state and local political government branches. These efforts helped restore accountability and confidence in police while improving public and officer safety. This has been especially helpful among communities of color, where generations of unlawful and unconstitutional policing have devastated police-community relations. However, the Trump administration broke this long-standing precedent. It did not enter into a single court-supervised agreement nor open any formal pattern or practice investigations.7 It is argued8 that states should empower their own attorneys general to investigate the pattern or practice of police misconduct and pursue court-enforceable police reform agreements when necessary. California’s Attorney General explicitly stating, “as a result of the Trump Administration abandoning its role,”9 has been quick to take up the baton and has concluded negotiated Settlement Agreements with both KCSO and the Bakersfield Police Department. In California, negotiated settlements and Stipulated Judgment plans often stretch years longer than anticipated, and are increasingly perceived as a “cottage industry” harming police morale and frustrating community residents. Monitoring teams — usually composed of former police officials, lawyers, academics, and police-reform consultants — have typically billed local taxpayers between $1 million and $2 million per year. Some consultants have served on oversight teams in more than one city at 5 (Alabaster, AL; Austin, TX; Bakersfield, CA; Beacon, NY; Cincinnati, OH; Cleveland, OH; Columbus, OH; Detroit, MI; Easton, Penn; Inglewood, CA, Los Angeles, CA; Orange County, FL; Miami, FL; Mt. Prospect, IL; Pittsburg, PA; Portland, ME; Prince George’s County, MD; Schenectady, NY; State of New Jersey, Steubenville, OH; U.S. Virgin Islands; Villa Rica, GA; Warren, OH, Washington, DC and Yonkers, NY from a database found here: https://www.justice.gov/crt/special-litigation- section-cases-and-matters/download#police (visited 3/1/22)) 6 In each case, police departments facing suit chose to avoid formal litigation by signing negotiated settlements in the form of a consent decree, Memorandum of Agreement or Stipulated Judgments https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/ripa/interactive-guide-crd.pdf (Visited 3/3/22) 7 https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1109681/download (Visited 3/10/22) 8 https://www.americanprogress.org/article/expanding-authority-state-attorneys-general-combat-police-misconduct/ accessed 3/1/22 9 The California Attorney General also sent a letter — in support of a broader effort by state attorneys general — urging Congress to expand the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 to give state attorneys general clear statutory authority under federal law to investigate and resolve patterns or practices of unconstitutional policing https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-becerra-announces-major-settlement-reform-wide- range-practices; and https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-becerra-calls-broad-police-reforms- and-proactive-efforts accessed 3/3/22 the same time, drawing criticism over conflicts of interest and with little accountability to the public. The Albuquerque Police Department, for instance, has been drawn into several extensions and has paid over $20 million to their monitoring team. The listed office has no signage, is located inside a city-owned senior center, and is not accessible to the public, with public officials being warned by the courts not to interfere.10 The Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department (LASD) - Antelope Valley Judgment has been in place since 2015. Local taxpayers are paying about $1.459 million per year to court monitors. Some of the same Monitors who are overseeing the KCSO Stipulated Judgment, also oversee the LASD Judgment. The City of Oakland's Negotiated Settlement Agreement dates from January 22, 2003, when the City of Oakland and the Oakland Police Department entered into an agreement resolving allegations of police misconduct raised by private plaintiffs in the civil lawsuit, Delphine Allen, et al., v. City of Oakland, et al. Oversight was supposed to end in 2008. Oakland’s local taxpayers have spent $30 million between 2003 and 2015 with ongoing costs totaling $1.555 million per year.11 In 2021/2022 alone, the total cost to Kern County and Bakersfield City residents will be in excess of $2.9 million. The relationship between the Monitors and the County is productive and amicable. With all of the parties working to effect the changes necessary for the Stipulated Judgment requirements to be met, there remain nationwide issues regarding the use and implementation of the Stipulated Judgment, negotiated settlements, and independent court monitors. The appearance of conflicts of interest by double dipping into the administration of multiple Stipulated Judgment agreements is not prohibited. Monitoring is a public service and should encourage the use of alternative fee structures, flat rate billing, pro-bono fees, etc. However, this is not done. Monitors have no term limits, Stipulated Judgments are not designed with partial compliance, and sustainability terms are not built in.
Related Recommendations (1)
R8
No later than November 1, 2022, KCSO should continue to publish data, including use of force, publicizing CAC’s minutes and agenda, as well as other community events, on KCSO’s website. (Findings F1, F2, F3, F8) NOTES: • The Kern County Sheriff’s Office, the Board of Supervisors and Kern County Human Resources should post a copy of this report where it will be available for public review. • Persons wishing to receive an email notification of newly released reports may sign up at: www.kerncounty.com/grandjury • Present and past Kern County Grand Jury Final Reports and Responses can be accessed on the Kern County Grand Jury website: www.kerncounty.com/grandjury RESPONSE DEADLINES: RESPONSES ARE REQUIRED PURSUANT TO CAL. PENAL CODE § 933 (C) AND 933.05 WITHIN 60 DAYS FROM THE KERN COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE: • PRESIDING JUDGE KERN COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT 1415 TRUXTUN AVENUE, SUITE 212 BAKERSFIELD, CA 93301 • TRUXTUN AVENUE, SUITE 600 BAKERSFIELD, CA 93301 Reports issued by the Grand Jury do not identify individuals interviewed. Cal. Penal Code § 929 requires that reports of the Grand Jury not contain the name of any person or facts leading to the identity of any person who provides information to the Grand Jury. BIBLIOGRAPHY: • Julian A. Cook, Police Culture in the Twenty-First Century: A Critique of the President's Task Force's Final Report , 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 105 (2016), https://cops.usdoj.gov/RIC/Publications/cops-p341-pub.pdf • Blair, Graeme et al. “Community policing does not build citizen trust in police or reduce crime in the Global South.” Science (New York, N.Y.) vol. 374,6571 (2021): eabd3446. doi:10.1126/science.abd3446 • Kuo, Shih-Ya, and Yuan-Chin Shih. “An Evaluation of a Community-Oriented Policing Program in Taiwan.” International journal of offender therapy and comparative criminology vol. 62,7 (2018): 2016-2044. doi:10.1177/0306624X17703719 • Peyton, Kyle et al. “A field experiment on community policing and police legitimacy.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America vol. 116,40 (2019): 19894-19898. doi:10.1073/pnas.1910157116 • Tyler, Tom R et al. “The Impact of Psychological Science on Policing in the United States: Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and Effective Law Enforcement.” Psychological science in the public interest : a journal of the American Psychological Society vol. 16,3 (2015): 75-109. doi:10.1177/1529100615617791 • Watson, Amy C, and Beth Angell. “Applying procedural justice theory to law enforcement's response to persons with mental illness.” Psychiatric services (Washington, D.C.) vol. 58,6 (2007): 787-93. doi:10.1176/ps.2007.58.6.787 • Rogers, Michael S et al. “Effectiveness of Police Crisis Intervention Training Programs.” The journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law vol. 47,4 (2019): 414-421. doi:10.29158/JAAPL.003863-19 • Compton, Michael T et al. “The police-based crisis intervention team (CIT) model: II. Effects on level of force and resolution, referral, and arrest.” Psychiatric services (Washington, D.C.) vol. 65,4 (2014): 523-9. doi:10.1176/appi.ps.201300108 • The Guardian produced a 6 part report based upon high use of force per capita numbers https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/dec/01/the-county-kern- county-deadliest-police-killings • https://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/white-collar-crime-anti-corruption- fraud/1117386/doj-announces-new-rules-for-federal-monitors-of-governmental- entities • https://clearinghouse.net/case/14150/ • https://www.cacities.org/Resources-Documents/Member- Engagement/Professional-Departments/City-Attorneys/Library/2014/Police-Civil- Liability-Paper-FINAL.aspx • https://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/apdforward/pages/45/attachments/original /1421111159/CNA.pdf?1421111159 • https://www.cabq.gov/police/documents-related-to-apds-settlement-agreement • https://www.winston.com/en/thought-leadership/doj-announces-new-rules-for- federal-monitors-of-governmental- entities.html?utm_source=Mondaq&utm_medium=syndication&utm_campaign= LinkedIn-integration - _ftn2 • https://www.justice.gov/ag/page/file/1432236/download • https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/237957.pdf • https://lasd.org/antelopevalleycomplianceunit/ - bios • https://www.koat.com/article/doj-settlement-agreement-with-the-city-enters-7th- year-dollar20-million/35421909 • https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles/163811.pdf • https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao-wdwa/legacy/2012/07/27/SPD Settlement Agreement.pdf • http://www.fergusoncity.com/DocumentCenter/View/2019/Police- Foundation?bidId • https://oag.ca.gov/sites/default/files/Complaint Filed.pdf • https://oag.ca.gov/sites/default/files/Judgment.pdf • https://kcsomonitoring.info/ • https://spa.sdsu.edu/documents/Implementation_of_PAttern.pdf • https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/ripa/study-glaser.pdf • https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/police-reform-monitors-face-new-budget- limits-under-garland-doj/ar-AAOoOmf?li=BBnb7Kz • https://www.kernsheriff.org/Policies_Document/Department/Final_Proposed_Stip ulated_Judgment_Fully_Executed.pdf • https://oaktalk.com/2018/03/23/a-guide-to-the-negotiated-settlement-agreement- nsa-the-cost/

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