Issue | Background | Findings | Conclusions | Recommendations | Responses | Attachments Summary of The San Mateo/Estero

Has installed new hardware for the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system and is upgrading the software. Employee training on the new system is underway. The new system is capable of monitoring plant operations and performing trending analysis.

Has rewritten 15 of 30 standard operating procedures (SOPs) and expects to complete the balance by the end of 2006. The plant operators are required to adhere to the SOPs.

Is developing a formal plan to monitor and improve plant performance.

Has recently updated the written job descriptions for each position.

Is developing a plan to encourage plant operators to take additional training courses and to obtain higher ratings.

Has reassigned responsibility for preventive maintenance; work that was formerly done by the maintenance staff is now done by the operating staff. SMDPW has implemented automated tracking of maintenance work orders, and the computer system will soon start generating preventative maintenance work orders.

Has formalized shift-to-shift communication; shift supervisors meet for 20 minutes at shift change. Additionally, SMPWD has implemented monthly informational meetings which have considerably improved communication.

Has digitized all relevant documents (e.g., monthly reports, lab results, SOPs, etc.) and made the reports available online. 3

Will address operational responsibility for the Dale Avenue Pump Station after construction of the two new digesters is completed in Spring 2007.

Has hired a consultant to address the 20-year plan for capital improvements; however, a replacement schedule for existing capital equipment does not yet exist. SMDPW is preparing a list of critical equipment. The MWH report also recommended that plant security be improved. Specifically, the report recommended “additional access controls and signage around the front gate of the WWTP in order to control access to the facility and assist visitors in finding the main office. Perimeter fencing should also be reviewed and repaired on a routine basis to minimize unauthorized access to the facility.” SMDPW has not implemented this

The attitude of those responsible for the operation of the plant is “we don’t have a security problem, nothing has ever happened.”

The main gate is normally open during the day and signs instruct visitors to check in at the office. The route to the office is tortuous and not well marked.

The Grand Jury was told that plant security will be evaluated when the current construction projects are completed.

SMDWP stated that closed circuit TV is one of the techniques that will be considered to improve perimeter security.

The Grand Jury observed that two of the three gates in the perimeter fence are substantially compromised. There is a 10-inch gap below one gate and an 11-inch gap in the fencing at the other; a child or an adult could easily enter the plant at either location.

The Grand Jury visited one other wastewater treatment plant in the County and found that facility to be far more secure than the San Mateo/EMID plant. To wit, in the other treatment plant: o The main entrance gate is kept closed. An intercom at the gate allows the visitor to contact the office, after which the gate may be opened remotely. o The perimeter fencing is secure and properly maintained. o The facility is protected by an alarm system at night. o Plant operators appreciate the need for a secure environment and appear to actively monitor the facility. 4 o The operators of this facility plan to add closed circuit TV surveillance to their SCADA system. The Grand Jury evaluated the WWTP Emergency Response Plan and the Contingency Plan. For the purposes of this evaluation, credit was given if either of these plans addressed the required critical elements. The score awarded to the combined plans is 8 out of a possible 22. The evaluation criteria and the areas in which the plans are deficient are detailed in Appendices A and B. Conclusions San Mateo DPW has adopted, implemented, or is in the process of implementing, many of the recommendations in the MWH report. San Mateo DPW has not made plant security a high priority issue and significant deficiencies are evident. While the current construction project complicates the perimeter security problem, it does not lessen the need for improved security. The purpose of the fencing is to keep unauthorized persons from entering the facility. This is especially important during a construction project where persons could be injured on the property. The current state of disrepair of the perimeter fencing allows unauthorized access to the property which creates a potential danger to the public and liability exposure to the JPA. The WWTP Emergency Response Plan is deficient. Each of the following sections of the plan needs improvement: Purpose and Scope, Staff Roles and Responsibilities, Evacuation Procedures and Post-Emergency Plans. The Plan also fails to address the following five elements required in a comprehensive plan: SEMS/ICS Compliance, Decision Making Guidelines, Personnel Training Plan, Test & Update Training Plan and Plans for Coordinating with other Agencies.