Santa Clara County Grand Jury
• 2006-2007
2006-2007 Santa Clara County Civil Grand Jury Report Security Leaks at Water Treatment Plants
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⚠️ Este contenido ha sido traducido automáticamente. El texto original en inglés es la versión oficial. La traducción puede contener errores.
Findings and Recommendations 6 findings
F1
The District has identified areas of vulnerability to terrorism and vandalism at its plants and has developed a long-range Plan to address these vulnerabilities.
No recommendations for this finding
F2
The timeline for resolving all of the identified areas of vulnerability is four years.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2
The timeline for implementing the Water Treatment Plants Security Improvement Plan should be shortened to a maximum of two years.
F3
The District’s 2006/2007 Capital Improvement Program priority score for resolving all of the identified areas of vulnerability is a score of 57 out of a maximum priority score of 100, based upon a risk-assessment analysis conducted by the District.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3
The priority score for implementing the Water Treatment Plants Security Improvement Plan should be substantially raised.
F4
The District does not have a rapid response plan for surprise incursions into their plants other than calling 911.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4
The District should coordinate with all local law enforcement agencies to develop a rapid response plan to plant incursions.
F5
There are no written agreements between the District, the San Jose Police Department, and the Los Gatos Police Department for a priority response to a 911 call from any of the District’s plants.
Related Recommendations (1)
R5
The Santa Clara Valley Water District should enter into written agreements with the San Jose Police Department and the Los Gatos Police Department that will provide the highest priority response to a 911 call from any of the District’s water treatment plants.
F6
Security guards are generally on duty during the weekdays for eight hours and are posted in fixed positions. They do not patrol the perimeter of the plants as specified in the District’s procedures. Night and weekend security for the plants is delegated to the control room operators at each plant as a secondary responsibility. 5
Related Recommendations (1)
R6
The District should immediately increase the number of security guards at each plant. The security guards should be present 24 hours per day, 7 days per week at all plants, as specified in the District’s procedures. The guards’ duties should include patrolling the perimeter of the plants, as specified in the District’s procedures. 6
Conclusions 1
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CL1 Page 4Although the District has addressed terrorist threats to the plants by preparing action plans and security improvement plans, the plans do not address those attempted acts of vandalism and terrorism that may occur without warning. At night and on weekends, the security of the perimeter of the plants and the main building depends upon the plant operators and local law enforcement. Without adequate perimeter breach detection equipment, unauthorized persons entering a plant’s area undetected could cause major damage to the plant before local law enforcement could respond. There is 4 a need for an increased number of security personnel patrolling each plant on an around-the-clock basis. The Grand Jury finds that leaving the plants vulnerable for four more years to vandalism or a terrorist attack that may occur without warning is too long. As pointed out in a news report by television station KPIX Channel 5 on May 8, 2007, during their “Eyewitness News” 5 p.m. newscast, the DHS is aware that there are unknown, small, independent cells of terrorists living in American cities. The same news report stated that, because of the size and independence of these small groups, they are capable of quick action that may occur without the DHS being alerted. The Grand Jury also finds that given the nature of the threats, the identification of the plants as Key Assets, and the status of the current security measures, the CIP priority score is too low in addressing the potential threats.
No Responses Found 3
Government entities assigned to respond to this report. No response documents have been linked in our database.