The 2007-2008 Civil Grand Jury for the City and County of San Francisco Accountability in San Francisco Government*

The Mayor's Office and the Board should establish a process to track, read, and analyze reports required to be filed by City Commissions and Departments. Required Responses: Mayor, Board of Supervisors, Controller, Budget Analyst 2. The Board should require the Director of COIT to appear semi-annually to address the status of information technologies throughout City government, particularly updating its progress on implementing the recommendations made in the Budget Analyst's Management Audit. Required Response: Board of Supervisors 3. The Board and the Mayor's Office should standardize the contents of annual reports and other Departmental reports to assure there are objective measures of performance, such as highlights of the three most important concerns addressed in the report with brief status updates and any proposed budget changes. Required Responses: Mayor, Board of Supervisors В. Operational Oversight: Controller's Office 4. An independent third-party with municipal finance background, such as the Board's Budget Analyst, should conduct post-enactment analysis to determine if the Controller's statements in the Voter Information Pamphlet on the fiscal impact of ballot measures, as well as Controller reports on proposed legislation, were accurate and report the same to the Board. Required Responses: Mayor, Board of Supervisors, Controller, Budget Analyst C. Fiscal Controls and Accountability The Controller's Office should not rely only on the Departments' self reported results, but should conduct its own on site analysis of the various City Departments to determine whether the financial and management recommendations made by it and the Budget Analyst are being implemented. Required Response: Controller 6. The Controller's Office should adhere to its statutory duties to give impartial analysis concerning proposed legislation or propositions and refrain from making any recommendations in favor or opposing proposed legislation or propositions. Required Response: Controller 7. In implementing these recommendations, the Controller's Office should urge the elimination of those activities that do not enhance the City's fiscal controls. Required Response: Controller D. Fiscal Controls and Accountability Fiscal Controls and Accountability: Bond Financed Construction 8. The Citizen' General Obligation Bonds Oversight Committee should appear regularly before the Board to report on the bonds it oversees including highlights of successes and challenges. Required Responses: Board of Supervisors, Controller, Citizens' General Obligation Bond Oversight Committee 9. The Mayor's Office and the Board should take whatever steps are necessary to authorize the Bond Oversight Committee to evaluate any bond measure before it is placed on the ballot to assure that proper plans, escalation factors, milestones, damages clauses and the like are in place to deliver the project on time and within the budget the voters are being asked to approve. Required Responses: Mayor, Board of Supervisors, Citizens' General Obligation Bond Oversight Committee 10. The Mayor's Office and the Board should require that any bond measure placed on the ballot provide specific objectives of what is to be constructed and the estimated total budget for all costs of construction so the public has quantifiable measures of successes and challenges. Required Responses: Mayor, Board of Supervisors D. Forthright Disclosure of Successes and Challenges 11. The City should make it a high priority to insure that all the information posted on the City's official website accurately discloses successes as well as challenges in a manner that is fully and easily accessible to the citizens. Required Responses: Mayor, Department of Public Health, Library Commission, Department of Telecommunications and Information Services 12. Each entry in the Mayor's Accountability Index should be revised to add challenges to the goals stated and indicate, as appropriate, when a goal's priority has changed or been abandoned. Required Responses: Mayor, Department of Telecommunications and Information Services E. Transparency 13. The City's website should support the goal of open and transparent government by improving the website's search capabilities to make results easy to locate and by highlighting search terms or key words in such results. Required Responses: Mayor, Department of Telecommunications and Information Services 14. The City should post on its home web page the link for email and telephone contact information for all City employees. Required Responses: Mayor, Department of Telecommunications and Information Services VI. CONCLUSION The ultimate response to the lack of accountability and oversight is for the voters to demand better governance from our City officials. In the meantime, there are no standard operating procedures to hold departments and commissions accountable and, by extension, no accountability by the Board of Supervisors or the Mayor's Office. The disarray in the Committee on Information Technology should be corrected, but there seems to be no urgency to push for it. Insofar as the Department of Public Works is concerned, there must be a higher level of accountability for its supervision than is currently being enforced. In all instances voters are left holding the financial bag and burden. We hope the recommendations here will improve accountability and oversight in San Francisco Government. * AND INFORMATION SERVICES OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE THE BUDGET ANALYST LIBRARY COMMISSION CITIZENS' GENERAL OBLIGATION BOND DEPARTMENT OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH THE OFFICE OF THE CONTROLLER THE MAYOR RESPONSE REQUIRED IN 60 DAYS BOARD OF SUPERVISORS RESPONSE REQUIRED IN 90 DAYS RECOMMENDATION × × × × \vdash CHART OF REQUIRED RESPONSES × 2 × × ယ × × × × 4 × ű VII. × 6 × 7 × × 00 × × × × 9 × × 10 × × × × 11 × × _ VIII. TABLE OF REFERENCES 1. The 2007-2008 Civil Grand Jury's report on the issue of the creation of the Office of Special Events "How Many Agencies Does It Take for San Francisco To Throw A Party?" is located at http://www.sfgov.org/site/uploadedfiles/courts/07- 08 civil grand jury report.pdf.

Implementation of Civil Grand Jury Recommendations It is a usual practice for the Civil Grand Jury to track City departments' implementation of prior Juries' recommendations. This Jury's follow-up began with the Controller's Office, because the City's Administrative Code Chapter 2, Article II, Sec. 2.10, mandates that the Controller prepare reports on the status of the implementation of Civil Grand Jury fiscal recommendations. Controller's reports tracking implementation of recommendations from 2003-2004, 2004-2005, and 2005-2006 Civil Grand Jury Reports are available on-line. However, the status of each department's implementation of accepted recommendations is entirely self-reported and the Controller does not undertake any follow up measures to determine whether the recommendations have in fact been implemented. Neither the Controller's Office nor the Board's Budget Analyst track budget requests for inclusion of Jury recommendations that have financial impact. The Controller does follow up on its own audit recommendations to City departments via letters issued at 6, 12 and 18 months respectively. The Jury found, however, that no on-site investigation or audit is done by the Controller to verify the implementation of its recommendations. If the Controller and Budget Analyst do not track budget requests concerning Jury recommendations, the Jury wondered if the Mayor or the Board monitored this directly. Last fall, the Government Oversight Committee of the Board held hearings on September 10 and 24, 2007, during which departments were called upon to respond to recommendations contained in the 2007 Jury reports. The departments that appeared at the hearings, either agreed to address the recommendations in their fiscal year 2009 budgets or to implement select recommendation of the 2007 Jury. Between September 18 and October 2, 2007 the Board passed seven resolutions concerning select recommendations of the 2007 Jury. The Mayor subsequently signified his support and approval by signing all seven resolutions. The Jury understands that the Mayor also committed to have departments address those 2007 Jury recommendations with financial impacts in their 2009 budget requests. While the above events gave promise of greater attention to Grand Jury recommendations, there is scant evidence of actual follow-through by the Mayor or the Board. In the fiscal year 2009 budget instructions, the Mayor's Office failed to mention the 2007 Jury or its recommendations. The Jury does not yet know whether the Board or its Budget and Finance Committee will track departments' responses to the 2007 Jury recommendations in the budget process, because the budgets have not been reviewed as of the date of this report. Given the information available to it, the Jury must conclude that even though the Mayor and the Board committed to acting upon worthwhile Jury recommendations, they have not demonstrated commitment to a process that ensures follow through by City departments. В. Fiscal Controls and Accountability The Controller's Office 1. Article III, Sec. 3.105 of the City Charter created the Controller's Office and charged it as follows: The Controller shall prepare an impartial financial analysis of each City and County ballot measure which shall include the amount of any increase or decrease in the cost of government of the City and County and its effect upon the cost of government. Such analysis shall be issued in sufficient time to permit inclusion in the voters' pamphlet . . . The Controller shall issue from time to time such periodic or special financial reports as may be requested by the Mayor or Board of Supervisors. Further, the Controller's Office is empowered to audit the operational results and financial efficiency and effectiveness of City departments.5 The Jury's inquiry into the Controller's Office's fulfillment of these two responsibilities yielded two examples giving rise to concern. Accuracy of the Controller's Statements in the Voter Information a. Pamphlet Regarding the Fiscal Impact of Proposed Initiatives Financial impact analyses of ballot propositions provided by the Controller in the Voter Information Pamphlets are of particular significance, because many voters weigh the fiscal consequences of a proposition in deciding their vote. These analyses are prepared by the Controller and are based on a number of factors. However, the Jury determined that these projections are not subjected to a post-enactment analysis either by the Controller's Office or by the Board's Budget Analyst in the years after an election to establish whether those projections proved accurate, too high, or too low. By extension, no reporting is done to tell the public how much voters are paying for what was promised. Failing to test the accuracy of these financial projections leaves the Controller's Office unaccountable for its recommendations. The Jury is aware that companies in the business of making cost projections routinely test these projections by examining actual costs after the fact. By examining actual results, the business 5 Chapter 2A, Article I, 2A20 of the City's Administrative Code. is able to identify elements of its predictive model that can be fine-tuned, producing a higher level of confidence in future predictions. The Jury recognizes that the Controller is not sufficiently staffed to allow it to perform post-enactment reviews of every new ordinance or proposition. However, the Jury believes that the Controller should annually test the accuracy of its financial impact analyses on at least a representative sample. If the financial impact varied from the prediction, the Controller should then consider whether its methodology could be improved to produce a more accurate prediction of the financial impact of future ballot measures. b. Failure to Respond In at least one instance, the Jury determined that the Controller failed to respond to specific questions posed by a Supervisor concerning the fiscal impact of proposed legislation. The Supervisor wanted to introduce legislation to establish an Office of Special Events, which could in some instances duplicate the responsibilities of the existing Entertainment Commission. To that end, the Board asked the Controller the following questions: "What are the cost - benefits of annual City events such as Fleet Week, Halloween, neighborhood street fairs, Gay Pride, Lunar New Year and others? What are the cost expenditures of such City departments as the Entertainment Commission, Office of Protocol, Mayor's Special Events Staff, San Francisco Police Department, Recreation, and Park Department, Port of San Francisco and others? What would be the cost impact of creating a dedicated Special Events office....comparable to the Special Events Offices in Chicago, Boston, New York City, Houston, and other cities?"6 In its joint Special Report dated October 20, 2007, the Controller and Office of Legislative Analysis recommended creation of the Office of Special Events, but specifically failed to answer any of the Supervisor's questions as posed in the request. The Controller's Office also did not address whether the proposed legislation would result in any increase or decrease in the cost of government or what would be the cost for staff increases and other recommendations involving expenditures. The Jury believes that the Controller should not endorse any proposed legislation, but should focus on its charge to provide impartial financial analysis, and in this case address the Supervisor's specific questions. 6 "Establishing an Office of Special Events in San Francisco" joint report by the Controller and Legislative Analyst. For PDF file, please refer to: http://www.sfgov.org/site/controller_index.asp?id=1362. C. Fiscal Controls and Accountability 1. Bond Financed Construction The City contemplates rebuilding San Francisco General Hospital with bond financing. In the November 2008 election, San Francisco citizens will be asked to approve a bond measure for expenditures totally more than $850 Million, the largest bond proposal in the City's history. With this large-scale proposed renovation of yet another health care facility pending, the Jury wondered what lessons could be learned from two outstanding general obligation bond projects: the Branch Library Improvement Project (the "BLIP") and the renovation of Laguna Honda Hospital. What was discovered, in each case, was lack of sufficient funding upfront to produce the facilities the public expected and the continuing escalation of costs for both projects. BLIP's funding shortfall is being solved via revenue bonds, while the Laguna Honda project has been scaled back and additional funding sources remain unresolved. These facts raised the question for the Jury of whether the Department of Public Works (the "DPW") is exercising appropriate oversight in supervising these bond-financed construction projects. The Jury focused on DPW because: San Francisco Administrative Code, Article 11 Section 2A.190 directs the DPW to administer all capital improvement and construction projects, except projects solely under the Airport, Port, Public Utilities, Recreation and Parks, and the Public Transportation Commissions. Furthermore the Director of DPW is responsible for plans, estimates. and construction administration services required by the City, except for departments as noted above. Under Memoranda of Understanding ("MOU") with the Library Commission for the BLIP and with the Department of Public Health (the "DPH") for the new facilities at Laguna Honda Hospital, DPW was contractually retained to perform these duties and is compensated from the projects' budgets.7 Both the BLIP and Laguna Honda projects are subject oversight by the Citizens' General Obligation Bond Oversight Committee (the "Bond Oversight Committee").8 7 "Laguna Honda Hospital Replacement Program Status Report Presented to the Citizens General Obligation Bond Oversight Committee" dated December 31, 2007 and "San Francisco Public Library and Department of Public Works: Strengthened program Management Required for Branch Library Improvement Program to Avoid Further Budget Increases," report by the Office of the Controller dated September 27, 2007, located at: http://www.sfgov.org/site/uploadedfiles/controller/reports/Final%20BLIP%20Report gse.pdf. It should be noted that in the legislation creating the Bond Oversight Committee, the committee "has no power to approve bond proposals prior to voter approval. " Article 5, Sec. 5.31 of the City's Administrative Code. This is significant in that this oversight body cannot use its experience to improve future bond projects, such as the proposed rebuilding of San Francisco General Hospital.

Laguna Honda According to the minutes of its December 6, 2007 quarterly meeting, the Bond Oversight Committee acknowledged that the $482 Million budgeted and funded in 2000 for new residential care facilities at Laguna Honda Hospital had come up short. The funds were sufficient to cover only 780 beds, not the planned for 1,200 beds. DPW is now overseeing completion of facilities for 780 beds at a minimum expected cost of $482.84 Million.17 This equates to a 20% increase in overall costs from the original budget with a 35% reduction in the number of beds. The original estimated cost per bed, with 1,200 beds, was $401,667; the currently projected cost per bed, with 780 beds, is $619,026. This means that not only does the project yield fewer than the projected beds, but the cost of those beds that will be constructed will be at 54% over the original projected cost. Construction of facilities for the remaining 420 beds has not been undertaken and funding for this phase of construction remains unresolved, but the current estimate for the total cost of constructing all 1,200 beds today is $719.3 Million or 67% higher than the original budget. 18 16 Library Audit, Appendix A located at http://www.sfgov.org/site/uploadedfiles/controller/reports/Final%20BLIP%20Report_gse.pdf together with the information found on the SF Library Newslink at http://sfpl.org/news/blip/improvementprogram.htm. Executive Summary, "Funding," Laguna Honda Hospital Replacement Program Report covering the period 10/07 to 12/07, located at http:"www.sfdph.org/comupg/lhhr/statrpts.asp. Minutes of the December 6, 2007, Bond Oversight Committee located at http://www.sfgov.org/site/uploadedfiles/controller/CGOBOC/minutes/Minutes 12-6-07.pdf. LAGUNA HONDA FINANCIAL STATISTICS Original Budget Beds Budgeted Estimated Cost per Bed $482.84 Million 1,200 $401,667 Total Expected Actual Cost Beds Actually Funded Projected Cost per Bed $482.84 Million 780 $619,026 Beds Promised Beds Built Beds Lost 1,200 780 420 Percentage Change = 35% loss of beds Original Estimated New Projected Increased Cost per Bed Cost per Bed Cost per Bed $401,667 $619,026 $217,340 Percentage Change = 54% increase per bed Total approved budget for 1200 Beds* $611.0 Million Total expected cost for 1200 Beds** $719.3 Million Expected cost per bed for 1200 $599,423 * The approved budget is the amount approved by the Board for 1200 beds ** The expected cost the project managers' cost estimate to build the 1200 beds today. DPW indicated it used an escalation factor of $2.88 Million on the original budget of $482.84 Million. This equates to an escalation factor of less than 1% on the original Laguna Honda project.19 Although the approved budget (as opposed to the expected actual cost) was increased from $401 Million to nearly $611 Million for the entire 1,200 bed project, by the time of the Bond Oversight Committee meeting in December 2007, the escalation factor was never increased; in ٠, . Gaant chart attached to December 31, 2007, Status Report to the Bond Oversight Committee (not available on- line). fact, it was decreased to offset increases in Architectural and Engineering Fees. By the Bond Oversight Committee's own calculations, the escalation factors alone could well increase construction costs between 21% and 52%, but it could go as high as 69% over the baseline budget for them.20 In its January 2008 transmittal to the Mayor and the Board of its 2007 Annual Report, the Bond Oversight Committee expressed its deep concern with the soaring costs and escalation factors for both the branch library improvements and Laguna Honda Hospital. It should be noted that in the legislation creating the Bond Oversight Committee, the committee "has no power to approve bond proposals prior to voter approval."21 This is significant in that this oversight body cannot use its experience to improve future bond projects, such as the proposed renovations to San Francisco General Hospital. D. Transparency and Forthright Disclosure of Successes and Challenges The Jury examined a variety of sources to gauge the level of disclosure by City Hall of successes and challenges in both the Laguna Honda Hospital construction and the branch libraries' renovations (BLIP). The Jury began with a press release dated January 19, 2005, where the Mayor's Office announced the creation of an "Accountability Index, (Index)" serving as a "comprehensive summary and current status of the administration's policy pledges."22 The press release goes on to say, "[The Index] identifies 327 policy promises, of which 54% are done and ongoing, meaning a policy has been created and is being implemented, 42% [are] in progress, and 4% have been reconsidered, having proven unworkable. Updated on a weekly basis, the Index is a working document that the Mayor uses to manage departments and to measure results. . . Mayor Newsom, who reviews an updated Index on a regular basis, called it "an essential tool for accountability and management - one that ensures transparency." The Mayor continued saying, "It's not enough to say we are going to do something - we need to measure results and hold ourselves accountable to the outcome. That's the only we can know if a policy is working – or not."23 October, November, December 2007 Laguna Honda Hospital Replacement Program Status Report's Executive Summary located at http://www.sfdph.org/dph/comupg/aboutdph/lhhr/statrpts.asp. Article 5, Sec. 5.31 of the City's Administrative Code. Although set forth in nine broad categories, entries on this Index, which the Mayor depends on to monitor City departments and commissions, are not in alphabetical order and all entries on a particular subject are not grouped together; in fact, the ordering of entries within the broad categories appears to be random. See http://www.sfgov.org/site/mayor index.asp?id=27047. 23 "Mayor Newsom Releases Comprehensive Index of Administration's Policy Pledges," news release dated January 19, 2007 located at: http://www.sfgov.org/site/mayor_page.asp?id=37126. The Jury examined the Index's disclosure of successes and challenges based on the facts known about the Laguna Honda Hospital and BLIP. The Index says the following about rebuilding Laguna Honda: "The City is in the process of constructing a new campus on the Laguna Honda Hospital site, which will provide a complete continuum of long-term healthcare services. This facility, by design, encourages rehabilitation and independent living while setting the standard for enhancement of the quality of life. The first phase of the new construction began in mid-2005. The first two buildings, comprised of 360 beds, is [sic] expected to be completed in early 2009 and ready for residents in late 2009. The third building, comprised of 420 beds, is expected to be completed in early 2010 and ready for residents in late 2010. A proposal has been made to improve the timing of the third building to allow all three buildings to be complete and ready for residents in late 2009. The proposal calls for a reduction in census and closure and demolition of an existing building (Claredon Hall) 1 year ahead of schedule. Decision pending budget initiative approval."24 The June 20, 2006 Laguna Honda Hospital Replacement Report, with lengthy lists of accomplishments, makes scant mention of the fact that the project is over budget. The report only mentions cost overruns in its recap of events in 2004. Construction for 420 beds is on hold, indefinitely. If ever built, it is unclear how they will be funded.25 Neither of these public statements discuss nor reveal the budget issues surrounding the "420" beds. They are silent on the glaring reality that a budget that was to create 1200 beds has fallen short by 420 beds. These statements are also a striking contrast to those in a recent Mayoral news report, where he expressed apparent outrage over the status of the Laguna Honda project. Perhaps his stern statements stem from an awareness of the upcoming November 2008 election and the need for voter approval of the record setting bond proposal that is essential for the San Francisco General Hospital project. In this recent news report, the Mayor is quoted as saying, "The goal, Newsom said, was to avoid a situation similar to a bond measure for Laguna Honda Hospital nine years ago. Voters at the time approved a $299 million bond to rebuild the hospital, but the cost has more than doubled. The hospital is expected to be complete next year. Newsom said that the detailed San Francisco General plan makes the cost of the project clear, right from the start. "We have a lot of angry people that don't trust us" after Laguna Honda, Newsom said. "Now we're asking them for close to a billion dollars [for SF General]."26 24 Mayor's Accountability Index, located at http://www.sfgov.org/site/uploadedfiles/mayor/PolicyFinance/2007AccountabilityIndex.pdf. June 20, 2006, Report to the Health Commission on the Laguna Honda Replacement Project Located at: www.sfdph.org/dph/files/lhhrdocs/pubrpt/Rpt2HlthComm06202006.pdf. SF General Hospital Renovation Plan Unveiled," SF Chronicle, page B-1, April 2, 2008 located at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi- bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2008/04/02/BABJVU5UG.DTL&hw=General+Hospital&sn=004&sc=523. The Jury is skeptical that key lessons have been learned. Fiscal responsibility demands that City officials assume stewardship of bond funds and major capital projects. The Board, in asking the voters' to undertake the tax burden to rebuild San Francisco General Hospital, should at a minimum ensure that realistic cost escalation factors have been applied, that critical assessments of soft costs has been made, and that a full disclosure of the project's scope is provided. It is unfortunate that the Bond Oversight Committee's expertise cannot be employed in advance of the bonds being issued. The February 25, 2008 Index has this to say about the branch library renovations: The renovation of the Excelsior Branch Library was completed in July 2005. The new Mission Bay Branch Library opened July 8, 2006 making this library the first new branch library in the city in 40 years. The West Portal Branch Library reopened on February 10, 2007 after extensive renovation. The Sunset Branch Library reopened in March 2007. The Western Addition Branch Library closed for renovation on August 19, 2006 with opening expected Spring 2008. The Glen Park Branch Library construction bid has been awarded and completion of the interior is proceeding with its scheduled completion date slated for Fall 2007. Groundbreaking for the new Portola Branch Library occurred in July 2007. Completion of the Marina Branch Library Aug 4, 2007. Additional funds totaling $4 million dollars to augment the Branch Library Improvement Program (BLIP) were included as part of the FY06/07 Library Budget. Another $2 million added for FY07-08. On Feb 2, 2008, the Western Addition Branch had its Grand Reopening. Ingleside Branch ground breaking will occur on 2/15. Noe Valley Branch will reopen on 3/15. Bernal Heights and Eureka Branches will close in February and March 2008 for remodeling."27 The Executive Summary of the 2009 Capital Plan for the City reports on the library renovation project, as follows: "Branch Library Improvement Program (BLIP). Proposition F approved by voters in November 2007 extended the Library Preservation Fund and enabled the Library to issue revenue bonds against this revenue source. A $45 million revenue bond along with some other sources will complete the $188 million Branch Library Improvement Program (BLIP). The BLIP replaces rental facilities and provides structural upgrades, better disability access, program improvements and some deferred maintenance to the City's 24 Branch libraries and the Support Services center."28 In each of these three instances, the positive progress is not appropriately tempered by disclosure of the difficulties encountered. Mayor's Accountability Index, supra. Executive Summary of FY 2009-20018 Capital Plan located at http://www.sfgov.org/site/cpp_index.asp?id=39210. E. Transparency The Jury relied on the City's website, www.sfgov.org, to conduct some of its research, much as an ordinary citizen would. The City's website provides public relations material, publicizes events, and supplies general information about City departments and commissions, as well as access to a large number of minutes, reports, agenda and similar documents. As noted by the Commission on Information Technology, the Mayor's Office has stressed that it wants all departments and commissions to be linked through the City's website and all associated sites should have the same appearance and navigation capabilities.29 These goals have largely been met. However, the City's website is not without significant limitations. One cannot readily find contact information on city employees on the City's site. A search for the contact information for the head of a department yields miscellaneous minutes, agendas and reports naming this person, but the dates are not in chronological order, there is no contact information readily apparent and the document titles do not identify the topic or its relevance; more often, the results indicate the department or commission that produced the information.30 The City's website does not organize information in a useful way. For example, search results often cannot be isolated by topic. A frustrating search for the aforementioned Controller's audit of the branch library program could not be found through the main website or on the Controller's site.31 When sorted by relevance, entries are in random order, while results sorted by date are not reliably listed in either ascending or descending date order. One single document is listed more than a dozen times as a search result without highlighting the relevant key words or search terms; it is impossible to tell how the document might be relevant. Finally, the documents retrieved do not highlight key words or search terms and are not described with sufficient information in the titles to easily identify what has been found. As an example, a search for the Controller's audit of the Library Bonds produces many entries concerning the Board or the Bond Oversight Committee, but nothing easily identified as relating to this audit. December 18, 2007, minutes of the meeting of COIT located at http://www.sfgov.org/site/coit page.asp?id=73911. See, generally, http://www.sfgov.org main page. Searches were conducted on the City's site, Controller's site, the "reports" link on the Controller's site and all reports on that link using "all words" searches of the following: 2007 library bonds audit, library bonds, branch library bonds, 2007 audits and branch library audit. If you know the report was prepared by the City Services Auditor, you can find it under "reports" by its title alone. IV. FINDINGS A. Operational Oversight: Commissions and Departments 1. The handling of required annual reports by the Mayor and the Board does not provide effective oversight of City Commissions and Departments.

There are no adverse consequences to the departments and commissions which fail to submit reports.

A lack of oversight and accountability resulted in the Committee on Information Technology not meeting its mandate to be the information technology hub for the City.

This lack of oversight and accountability also leaves the Committee on Information Technology without policy guidance on the priorities for implementing the 29 recommendations made by the Board's Budget Analyst.

The City's executive and legislative branches fail to hold departments accountable for fulfilling the recommendations of the Civil Grand Jury or for implementing recommendations of audits conducted by the Controller and the Budget Analyst.

Unless the departments' budgets are scrutinized regarding the implementation of recommendations, the City may be deprived of valuable correctives that would save the City money. В. Fiscal Controls and Accountability: Controller's Office 9. In what may be an isolated incident, the Controller's Office failed to respond to a Supervisor's specific questions concerning proposed legislation.

Minutes of the May 31, 2007, meeting of the Citizens General Obligation Bond Oversight Committee located at: http://www.sfgov.org/site/uploadedfiles/controller/CGOBOC/minutes/Approved Minutes 53107.pdf. Ι 10. Branch Library Improvement Program Report located at http://sfpl.org/news/blip/improvementprogram.htm.

Recommending the adoption of this proposed legislation without answering these questions seems to demonstrate a cavalier attitude toward the interests of the citizens of the City.

There is no evidence that anyone compares the predicted fiscal impact of ballot measures (as stated in the Voter Information Pamphlet) and proposed legislation with the costs actually incurred after the measures are enacted.

The public is aware of and relies upon these projections regarding fiscal impact to be reasonably accurate with the costs of implementation at or near the projections.

Without testing the accuracy of financial projections of proposed legislation and ballot measures, the City lacks a complete financial picture of its affairs and, therefore, does not have complete fiscal control. C. Fiscal Controls and Accountability: Bond Financed Construction 14. The promises made to voters in the original bond proposals for reconstruction of Laguna Honda Hospital and for the Branch Library Improvement Projects far exceeded what could actually be constructed with the bond proceeds.

Executive Summary, "Funding," Laguna Honda Hospital Replacement Program Report covering the period 10/07 to 12/07, located at http://www.sfdph.org/comupg/lhhr/statrpts.asp.

In each case, these two projects have been marred by the failure to apply appropriate escalation factors to their construction budgets resulting in cost overruns from 37% to 45% or more from the original budgets.

The inadequate forecasting of costs in a timely manner created problems that were only compounded by global markets.

The Mayor's Office, the Library Commission, the Bond Oversight Committee, and DPW all knew or should have known that escalation calculations were inadequate for both projects.

The reduction or elimination of damages clauses undercuts the City's ability to enforce its construction contracts. D. Forthright Disclosure of Successes and Challenges 19. The Mayor's Accountability Index, "an essential tool for accountability and management - one that ensures transparency," per the press release of the Mayor's Office, is not forthright in describing the financial and operational challenges of the Laguna Honda Hospital and Branch Library Improvement projects.

With respect to the branch library renovations, the Mayor's Accountability Index discloses general fund moneys provided to the project, but fails to provide complete and accurate information on all the funds advanced to this project, such as State funds and funds raised by the Friends of the Library... E. Transparency 21. The City's website is not delivering on the stated objective of the Mayor's Office to have the workings of our City be open and transparent. V.

December 18, 2007, minutes of the meeting of COIT located at http://www.sfgov.org/site/coit_page.asp?id=73911.