Cherm Orange Countysheriff's Department Sheriff-coroner Don Barnes Office of the Sheriff July 15, 2019 Honorable Kirk*

Lack of coordination among the involved agencies caused Emergency Public Information sent out about evacuations during the Canyon 2 fire to be inconsistent, and confused residents. Response: Agrees with finding. Fast moving emergency events, such as wildland fires, are extremely difficult to manage given the rapid development, cascading impacts, and the various information barriers and sources. These emergencies always suffer from an information vacuum and the demand from the public is for instantaneous information. Information is never complete or linear for the Incident Commanders on scene, especially when the impact area cannot be fully seen. Additionally, there are major challenges associated with multiple information sources including general network and news media as well as social media distributing information in the early stages of an emergency. Some of this information may not have been validated by those sources. Public safety agencies have a responsibility to only release truthful, accurate and validated information. Public safety agencies also have a responsibility to work together to address mid-emergency information problems and address them so that the community will receive clear, factual, and detailed information. Ultimately it must be noted that community members did take action based on first responders' direction to evacuate and no lives were lost in either the Canyon II or Holy Fires.

Some emergency management personnel, tasked with creating and disseminating Emergency Public Information, in a rapidly-evolving, multijurisdictional emergency did not fully understand their roles and responsibilities. Response: Disagrees with finding. For the Orange County Sheriff's Department and the Orange County Emergency Operations Center, fully trained and experienced Public Information Officers were placed in corresponding roles and they worked to resolve the inevitable information issues that arise during any emergency event.

No training standards for Public Information Officers exist and there are no formal written protocols for issuance of mass notification, including required training on the use of mass notification systems. Response: Disagrees with finding. This finding blends two issues and each will be taken separately. Public Information Officer (PIO) training standards do exist through organizations such as the National Wildfire Coordination Group (NWCG), California Peace Officers and Standards Training (POST), California Specialized Training Institute (CSTI) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency Emergency Management Institute (FEMA EMI). It is expected that all field PIOs assigned to a wildland fire incident possess the certifications and qualifications to fill this role according to the NWCG. In an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) environment, it is up to each jurisdiction to ensure properly trained individuals fill roles for their jurisdiction. In Orange County, only seasoned and EOC Trained PIOs are able to fill this role. In the County of Orange, Public Information Officers are end users to Alert and Warning mass notification systems and instead manage social media, media interviews, and information releases. These are coordinated with mass notification system launches of AlertOC messages and the Wireless Emergency Alert system (WEA). AlertOC and WEA messages are launched by separate, fully trained emergency response personnel. The AlertOC system is used in conjunction with the existing Memorandum of Understanding which includes protocols for system use. The WEA system is bound by system requirements for the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS).

The County's vendor for the AlertOC mass notification system had not updated its GIS mapping software, so some residents in newer neighborhoods did not receive an AlertOC message during the Holy Jim fire. Response: Disagrees with the finding. A mapping problem with the Everbridge emergency notification system was identified on June 5, 2018 following the Aliso Fire which caused newly built structures to not receive alerts. At that time, the County immediately notified the software vendor and requested resolution of the issue. The identified issue of the Everbridge software pointing to an out of date geocoder was resolved post-Aliso fire and before Holy Fire. Records show that the issue was resolved on June 25, 2018.

The lack of a standardized written protocol for Alerts and Warnings decreases the ability of the County and its Operational Area jurisdictions to speak with one voice when it comes to alerting the public during emergencies. Response: Partially agrees with finding. Alert and Warning is the responsibility of each local government jurisdiction, falling mainly to law enforcement personnel. Both the Canyon II and Holy Wildland fires were multijurisdictional and managed through Unified Command. Alert and Warning can be one voice when operating effectively, and must be coordinated with all responding agencies with jurisdiction over the land and population. Each agency retains responsibility for its own population and if information or alert and warning efforts are falling short, then response agencies should engage in fixing this issue. The County of Orange and Orange County Operational Area are currently engaged in producing the Alert and Warning Plan which will expand upon previous hazard specific alert and warning efforts such as those included in the Tsunami Annex, various Post Fire Debris Flow Plans, and the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Plan.

The outdated hotline telephone technology at the County Emergency Operations Center cannot track caller metrics, so staffing decisions are made based on observing the length of time between incoming phone calls. Response: Partially agrees with finding The County Emergency Operations Center employs the WebEOC system to assist Public Information Hotline staff in tracking calls into the Hotline with call type, caller location, and issue resolution. Additionally County Telephone Services has the capability of measuring call volume, dropped calls, and similar information. Augmentation of the hotline system is welcome if additional funding can be assigned.

During the Canyon 2 fire, procedures allowing some hotline workers to pass road closures were ineffective, which led to a shortage of operators during the first day of the fire. Response: Disagrees with finding. For the County Emergency Operations Center (EOC), personnel safety is an extremely high priority. During the Canyon II Fire, California Highway Patrol field resources closed access to the Emergency Operations Center on Santiago Canyon Road for all responders for a time when it was unsafe to travel on this road. Fire directly impacted Santiago Canyon Road, burning telephone poles and forcing the de-energization of the local Southern California Edison circuit. Responding Public Information Hotline staff were stopped from proceeding into a hazardous area, which maintained their safety and stopped the creation of additional rescue situations for public safety responders. When it was safe to proceed, staff were admitted through the road closure and were able to access the EOC. All EOC response personnel are trained that they must have a County Identification Badge to be granted access to the EOC, and even then will be granted admittance only when safe. The County Public Information Hotline shares information with 211OC to ensure there is a hotline redundancy. Additionally, the Sheriff's Department and Fire Authority Dispatch Centers also continue answering emergency calls throughout any ongoing incident.

Some hotline operators are not current on the use of the software for logging incoming phone calls, thus decreasing their efficiency. Response: Partially agrees with finding The County of Orange trains Emergency Operations Center responders on the WebEOC Hotline Board to track calls in advance of an emergency, but not all responders are available at the time of an emergency. Thus, some qualified, professional emergency response personnel are called into service and "just in time training" takes place. Hotline call takers are supported by experienced supervisors. When there is a deficit of trained hotline call takers, the first resource that is drawn upon is the Orange County Sheriff's Department professional staff. These staff members regularly work in a stressful environment, are able to handle life safety emergency information, and readily adapt to the WebEOC system. Other jurisdictional public information hotlines may not employ the WebEOC Hotline board and this may be an area for growth.

The County and interviewed cities do not seek sufficient public feedback of the perceptions of effectiveness of the Emergency Public Information. Response: Disagrees with finding. The County of Orange has historically gathered community feedback through post emergency town hall meetings, community member emails, phone calls into County agencies, as well as social media channels. These feedback options are ongoing and Orange County Sheriff's Department representatives are responsive to community member contacts by working to resolve issues rapidly. Survey instruments will be reviewed as a possible tool following major emergency responses.

The lack of standardized emergency management terminology among the various jurisdictions within Orange County causes delays and confusion in the dissemination of Emergency Public Information. Response: Partially agrees with finding The issue of standard terminology creating a barrier in the dissemination of emergency public information is an issue that involves a local, state and federal solution. While the County of Orange and Orange County Operational Area jurisdictions have met and agreed upon common terminology for the Evacuation Annex to the Orange County and Operational Area Emergency Operations Plan, both the Canyon II and Holy Fires involved agencies at the state and federal level which created complexities because those agencies were unfamiliar with the Orange County plans. The County of Orange will continue to voice the need for common terminology and work to address these issues mid-incident for clarity for the community.

Orange County jurisdictions and the California Highway Patrol lack a joint plan for evacuation routes, thus evacuations can be chaotic, creating increased potential for danger to residents. Response: Agrees with finding Representatives with the California Highway Patrol (CHP) will be added to working group distribution lists to include the Evacuation Working Group, the Annual County of Orange Unified Command Meeting and other emergency response plans which necessitate coordination with CHP. Additionally jurisdictions will be encouraged to coordinate with neighboring jurisdictions and include the CHP in their plans.