Alameda County Grand Jury • 2019-2020

Castlemont High School: Cheating Its Students

Published: June 15, 2020 114 pages Consolidated Report
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Findings 28 findings

20-1 Page 1
Oakland Unified School District’s public comments regarding Castlemont High School's misuse of APEX and other grade recovery programs misled the public about the severe academic and ethical breakdowns that occurred at the school.
20-2 Page 1
Oakland Unified School District’s weak internal policies, inadequate training, and lack of oversight enabled some Castlemont High School teachers of onsite make-up courses and credit recovery tutorials to run roughshod over academic integrity and best practices.
20-3 Page 1
Oakland Unified School District’s policies on administration of APEX Learning online credit recovery courses were inadequate to ensure consistent and appropriate application of APEX and allowed abuse by a small number of teachers and counselors at Castlemont High School.
20-4 Page 1
APEX teachers received little or no training in the proper use and administration of APEX courses and of the grading of students in those courses.
20-5 Page 1
Extraordinarily high truancy rates at Castlemont High School and insufficient administrator intervention made it impossible for habitually truant students to receive the required educational experience.
20-6 Page 1
Some long-standing OUSD students arrive at Castlemont High School unprepared for high school level work due to being repeatedly promoted in earlier grades without meeting the district’s requirements for promotion. 29 2019―2020 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report
20-7 Page 1
The friction between AHS’s responsibility for operational control and Alameda County’s health service mandate and allegiance to other constituencies continues to frustrate both parties, exacerbate their mutual distrust, and interfere with their ability to communicate and implement long-lasting solutions to AHS’s financial crises.
20-8 Page 1
AHS’s narrow focus on a balanced operating budget and EBIDA does not adequately represent the actual financial position of AHS.
20-9 Page 1
Even with transparent and efficient management, an average annual EBIDA Margin of 3% to 5% is not sufficient for AHS to pay off its outstanding debt and buffer against any future financial crises.
20-10 Page 1
AHS and Alameda County do not agree on whether AHS can establish a cash reserve to pay prioryear liabilities. The lack of a cash reserve exacerbates the long-term financial stability of AHS and its ability to comply with the Permanent Agreement, leading to further distrust between AHS and Alameda County.
20-11 Page 1
AHS does not provide its financial reports to county supervisors and staff sufficiently in advance of regularly scheduled meetings between the parties to allow county supervisors and staff time to familiarize themselves with those reports prior to being presented by AHS. 52 2019―2020 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report
20-12 Page 1
AHS and Alameda County acknowledge the need for flexibility in the use of Measure A funds to take advantage of matching-fund opportunities. However, they often disagree on how AHS should specifically allocate Measure A funds to support its operations. This disagreement magnifies and exacerbates the distrust between AHS and Alameda County.
20-13 Page 1
Political pressure from some Alameda County supervisors has interfered with AHS operations and efforts to control costs.
20-14 Page 1
Negotiating separate contracts with 18 different labor unions is both time consuming and expensive for AHS and limits AHS’s negotiating flexibility. AHS’s negotiations with labor have been further compromised by public support of negotiating labor unions from some county supervisors.
20-15 Page 1
AHS and Alameda County agree that the governance structure of AHS is problematic and needs to be revisited and strengthened in order for the parties to better understand and respect each other’s governance and operational roles.
20-16 Page 1
Oakland’s communications center fails to meet the CalOES Standard of answering 95% of all emergency calls within 15 seconds, jeopardizing public safety. Finding-20-17: The communications center continues to operate under-staffed and has not conducted a dispatcher recruitment since June 2018, placing an unacceptable burden on dispatchers working excessive overtime hours.
20-18 Page 1
The amount of overtime paid to dispatchers in 2019 reached $2 million. This amount of money could be used to fund up to 15 permanent dispatcher positions.
20-19 Page 1
Delays in completing the new CAD project are due, in part, to lack of available staff dedicated to provide project management and comprehensive configuration input to the vendor.
20-20 Page 1
The responsibilities to manage Public Records Acts requests and staff the Oakland Police Department’s complaint line creates an unacceptable burden on an understaffed communications center and diverts staff away from answering emergency calls.
20-21 Page 1
The communications center’s failure to establish a call-answering policy or standard contributes to a lack of accountability to the Oakland community. 67 2019―2020 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report
20-22 Page 1
The communications center’s recorded messages that callers are greeted with when call takers are busy unnecessarily increases the number of abandoned calls.
20-23 Page 1
Hiring of communications center staff has lagged because of an overly complicated hiring process.
20-24 Page 1
The recruitment of dispatchers is set as an unacceptably low priority by OPD.
20-25 Page 1
GSA has a culture of poor communication with its client departments which contributes to unnecessary delays and increased project costs.
20-26 Page 1
Poorly developed and disseminated Capital Program and procurement procedures result in inconsistent project management within GSA. 96 2019―2020 Alameda County Grand Jury Final Report
20-27 Page 1
GSA’s redefinition of professional requirements for project managers and its inability to sufficiently staff project manager positions contribute to poor control over the delivery of capital projects.
20-28 Page 1
GSA’s failure to update as-needed professional contracts results in unnecessary bidding which contributes to unwarranted delays in project delivery.
20-29 Page 1
Alameda County’s failure to prioritize long-range planning and site safety assessments has set county government capital construction on a rudderless course oftentimes guided by litigation and emergency needs.

Recommendations 27

Conclusions 13