Touch-screen Voting the Future or Failure?

The steps required to convert a touch-screen to perform the function of a PCM to create Voter Access Cards.

Procedures should be added to the training to convert touch-screens to be used as a back up of the PCM. This would give one more safeguard against a problem such as the one that occurred in March. Late in the pre-election process, the Secretary of State requested that paper ballots be available for voters not wanting to use the touch-screens. With the complexity and number of versions of ballots6 involved, it was not physically possible to get enough 6 Each voting district has its unique ballot with eleven different options based on party and non-partisan voters. Additionally ballots were available in, English, Spanish, and Tagalog. The total number of different ballots required would have been as high as 25,000-30,000. – 2004 (filed May 27, 2004) 11 ballots printed and distributed to the precincts. The ROV had all versions of the paper ballots available at their office. The Grand Jury believes many of the problems were partially attributable to the extremely short timeframe for the ROV to prepare for the March election. With more time to work with for the November election, the ROV should re-examine all of the processes, procedures, training, and documentation for the new voting systems. They should evaluate what worked and, if possible, improve on those items. They should take a “clean sheet of paper” approach to any part of the implementation that needs to be significantly changed. As a result of our observations, the Grand Jury concluded that San Diego County’s initial use of the touch-screen voting was a qualified success and that the integrity of the election process was maintained. We find no reason that the equipment, with the implementation of the recommendations below, should not be used in future elections. Facts

Many precincts did not open on time because of a problem with the Precinct Control Module.

There were no reported voting irregularities associated with the touch-screen voting equipment.

The hot-line set up by the ROV was overloaded with calls early on Election Day.

The initial tally of 2,821 absentee paper ballots was incorrect and the subsequent vote certification had to be amended.

The decision to purchase the equipment was made in December 2003. The equipment arrived in January 2004, was distributed beginning in February and used for the election on March 2, 2004. Findings

A number of voters were either completely or partially disenfranchised as a result of the late opening of some precincts.

The short time frame from approval-to-receipt-to-distribution-to-implementation of the new voting technology significantly impacted the implementation process.

Outside activities such as lawsuits, media distraction, Secretary of State rulings often diverted attention and effort from the immediate task of implementing the new voting system. 12 – 2004 (filed May 27, 2004)

Recruiting of System Inspectors needs to be enhanced to do a better evaluation of their PC literacy and comfort with technology.

The training and support materials for poll workers, troubleshooters, and troubleshooter supervisors were of generally poor quality.

The classes for poll workers, troubleshooters, and troubleshooter supervisors were of generally poor quality.

The way the ROV implemented the new voting system made it impossible to be “hacked” from the outside. There was no external access to the PCMs or touch- screens.

The current method of insuring the security of the PCMs by sealing the case in which they are stored contributed to the battery discharge issue.

The access security to the supervisor software on the touch-screens is unacceptable as currently implemented by the vendor.

The design of the door securing the ballot memory card on the touch-screen unity requires breaking the door seal to turn on the machine. This means the ballot memory card is not secured by a seal during the Election Day.

The lack of a voter verifiable paper trail makes it difficult to convince the public of the integrity of the new voting technology.

A voter verifiable paper trail would be a significant tool in auditing the results of electronic vote tabulation.

A voter verifiable paper trail could be a valuable tool in a recount of close elections.

The timeframe of the March 2004 Primary Election did not allow for distributing appropriate paper ballots to each precinct.

A number of voters were either completely or partially disenfranchised as a result of the late opening of some precincts.

The short time frame from approval-to-receipt-to-distribution-to-implementation of the new voting technology significantly impacted the implementation process.

Outside activities such as lawsuits, media distraction, Secretary of State rulings often diverted attention and effort from the immediate task of implementing the new voting system. 12 – 2004 (filed May 27, 2004)

Recruiting of System Inspectors needs to be enhanced to do a better evaluation of their PC literacy and comfort with technology.

The training and support materials for poll workers, troubleshooters, and troubleshooter supervisors were of generally poor quality.

The classes for poll workers, troubleshooters, and troubleshooter supervisors were of generally poor quality.

The way the ROV implemented the new voting system made it impossible to be “hacked” from the outside. There was no external access to the PCMs or touch- screens.

The current method of insuring the security of the PCMs by sealing the case in which they are stored contributed to the battery discharge issue.

The access security to the supervisor software on the touch-screens is unacceptable as currently implemented by the vendor.

The design of the door securing the ballot memory card on the touch-screen unity requires breaking the door seal to turn on the machine. This means the ballot memory card is not secured by a seal during the Election Day.

The lack of a voter verifiable paper trail makes it difficult to convince the public of the integrity of the new voting technology.

A voter verifiable paper trail would be a significant tool in auditing the results of electronic vote tabulation.

A voter verifiable paper trail could be a valuable tool in a recount of close elections.

The timeframe of the March 2004 Primary Election did not allow for distributing appropriate paper ballots to each precinct.