⚠️ Translation Notice: This content has been automatically translated. The original English text is the official version. Translation may contain errors.
⚠️ Este contenido ha sido traducido automáticamente. El texto original en inglés es la versión oficial. La traducción puede contener errores.
Findings 10 findings
F1
Page 29
The sally port at the Truckee Jail increases safety for the public during the transfer of prisoners from secure vehicles into the secure jail.
F2
Page 29
The absence of a sally port at the Truckee Courthouse increases the risk to the public, law enforcement, and the prisoners at this location during the transfer of prisoners from secure vehicles into the secure courthouse.
F3
Page 29
The absence of a sally port at the Truckee Courthouse, in immediate proximity to a public parking area, County offices, and the Truckee Library, creates an increased risk to the public, law enforcement, and the prisoners at this location.
F4
Page 30
The addition of a sally port to the prisoner entrance at the Truckee Courthouse would increase safety for the public, prisoners, and citizens of Truckee.
F5
Page 45
In most schools, emergency secure communication is somewhat lacking or does not exist between front office and teacher.
F6
Page 45
Some very good efforts have been made to secure classrooms. However, not all classrooms have inside locks or window coverings to prevent observation from the outside. Camera systems are not always present or are inconsistent.
F7
Page 45
Resource Officers are minimal, part time, or non-existent in our schools. Emphasis is placed on the two principal high schools where sworn officers are present.
F8
Page 45
Teacher training on safety and security is mostly confined to “scheduled collaboration” sessions as part of imparting weekly notices, alerts, and business topics. This does not provide enough opportunity to thoroughly instruct the teachers on responsibilities, alternatives, and appropriate methods of dealing with an extreme emergency.
F9
Page 45
Evacuation alarms result in teachers assembling the students outside of the school building in locations that are potentially exposed to possible danger.
F10
Page 97
Nevada City School of the Arts’ financial statements should reflect their Net Pension Liability.
Recommendations 8
-
R1Page 30Request funding from Nevada County Board of Supervisors to install a sally port at the Truckee Courthouse. The Nevada County Board of Supervisors should:
-
R2Page 30Provide funding to install a sally port at the prisoner entrance to the Truckee Courthouse.
-
R3Page 46The Nevada County Superintendent of Schools should develop the means to train teachers in uniform safety and security protocols and include the exercise and use of the “ALICE” standard in each of the schools. Additionally, each school district’s board should direct and fund the deployment of this training and exercise.
-
R4Page 46The Nevada County Superintendent of Schools should coordinate with districts and schools to establish a standard means of secure communication between the front office and the teachers, regardless of their location.
-
R5Page 46Each district and school should conduct a thorough physical evaluation of classroom security and visibility including inside door locks, appropriate shading, and camera systems. Each school should be required to be in conformance with the physical demands and characteristics of a comprehensive school safety plan.
-
R6Page 46The Nevada County Superintendent of Schools, school districts, and local law enforcement should collaborate on the use and deployment of Resource Officers that encompass all of our schools.
-
R7Page 46A working group of the Nevada County Superintendent of Schools, the Nevada County Sheriff’s Office, the Grass Valley Police Department, the Nevada City Police Department, Nevada County Behavioral Health (especially concerning behavior of the assailant), and school administration and staff should be created to develop a model program for all schools to utilize when examining and creating their own outside assembly and accounting program.
-
R8Page 46Following the creation of a model program for outside assembly and accounting, each school district should direct their schools to exercise this model and, in conjunction with local law enforcement, develop and incorporate the site-specific procedures necessary to conduct a safe and secure school evacuation.
Conclusions 1
-
CL1 Page 44There is no absolute means to prevent a crisis from happening within our County. As citizens and residents and students we can only trust that those who are charged with the primary responsibilities of protecting and caring for us are properly trained and motivated to do their very best. This trust, however, comes with an obligation on the part of all citizens to periodically review the safeguards that exist for our benefit. Toward this end, the Jury researched the wide range of laws, policies, procedures, and protocols that are in place to protect us. Further, the Jury considered a significant cross-section of leaders, agencies, and individuals who are entrusted with our children’s safety. Additionally, we inspected and observed a cross-section of school facilities within our County which we rely upon to shelter and protect our students. To document our conclusions from this effort, the Jury compiled observations that span a wide range of topics in support of the following Findings and Recommendations. They are meant to alert the citizens of the County to situations that need to be pursued. It is up to each of us to do our part and to see to it that the responsible individuals and agencies review and enact the changes. We cannot absolutely prevent a crisis! However, we can improve upon our chances to avoid the unthinkable. Our schools are in relatively good shape. They could be better! In a recent article from a local newspaper7, an official of the NCSOS responsible for ensuring a safe climate within County schools declared, “The number one deterrent to school violence is relationship.” We ask that we all work together to become an ever-increasing part of that relationship. 7 https://www.theunion.com/news/local-news/in-wake-of-shootings-schools-evolve-to-keep-students-safe/
Observations 4
-
OB1 Page 41Our questions and observations were specific as to regulations, but general enough to reflect the unique characteristics of the individual schools. Our collective observations are: All schools had an annually updated comprehensive school safety plan in accordance with California Education Code, Section 32280-32289. All schools showed a realistic and forthright effort to deploy and execute their safety plan. This observation was clearly stimulated by the recent tragedy in Florida. Teacher training on safety and security was observed to be mostly confined to “scheduled collaboration” sessions as part of imparting weekly notices, alerts, and business topics. This did not appear to provide enough opportunity to thoroughly instruct the teachers on 1 www.npr.org/sections/ed/2018/03/07/590877717/expert
-
OB2 Page 37responsibilities, alternatives, and appropriate methods of dealing with an extreme emergency. Notifications to parents and guardians were consistent among the schools. All schools use a telephone-centered message system and some sort of group email. However, the emergence of social media has completely changed the communication dynamics and, instead of fostering communication, has increased the sense of panic and confusion in students, teachers, and parents and guardians. Some noted concerns were: a. There were reports of Facebook posts regarding a lockdown at a school which preceded the actual lockdown. There was virtually no information regarding what had prompted the lockdown in the Facebook post and this caused an enormous digital outcry among the students from inside the school as well as from parents and guardians outside the school. b. Messages between the parents and guardians, others, and the students in a recent lockdown drill caused flashing of cellphone screens to be observed in darkened corridors and immediately disclosed to the person portraying a shooter the location of hidden students in lockdown. c. Social media chatter among students was continuous. d. During recent lockdowns, rumors on social media to and from students exponentially increased while teachers and others school administrators were cut off from legitimate ongoing information or silent because of efforts by the school to prevent incomplete information from being released prematurely. Complete information always lagged behind rumors. e. Student attention is critically diffused. Safety training of teachers and administrators was an ongoing activity, some more seriously conducted than others, and was not consistent throughout all schools. While most had conducted recent active shooter or civilian response drills, some schools, especially those of earlier grades, chose to minimize potential trauma and emphasized response through discussion and simple examples as opposed to a lockdown and active shooter drills. Younger children were therefore protected from excessive and unnecessary trauma. This was an enhancement of state regulations and not in conflict with the Education Code or state law. Most schools were aware of the “ALICE” standard (Alert, Lockdown, Inform, Counter, Evacuate)2. However, the exercise was inconsistently practiced. 2 https://www.alicetraining.com/
-
OB3 Page 43 Some programs, like “Run. Hide. Fight.”3 have been taught by the Grass Valley Police Department. As a result of the shootings in Las Vegas, Nevada, and the fire alarm activation by the shooter in Florida, there was a growing concern about the manner in which students and staff members were instructed to evacuate school facilities. Assembling in large groups outside could have unintended consequences and provide a potential target of opportunity. The Jury could not find evidence of a collective effort within the County to attempt to develop a means to overcome this concern. This item is one where urgent attention is demanded. Questions concerning signs of mental instability garnered a significant response. Teachers knew their students. They saw their students daily and if negative changes were observed, they were in the most advantageous position to take action and address the issue with the help of site staff or County Behavioral Health. In most serious or emergency cases, school representatives were very complementary of the services of County Behavioral Health. In addition, the “Handle with Care” program4 allows law enforcement and Health officials to alert schools of traumatic events involving students offsite. This provides the insight and the methods to the school staff to intercede and prevent possible behavioral escalation. The schools visited by the Jury had no effective means to physically secure the outside perimeter of their school grounds but research indicates that most schools would not become safer merely because of perimeter fences, extensive camera systems, or walls. Research has also shown that excessive “hardening” of schools jeopardizes the learning environment and undermines the trust between students and faculty. Having multiple means of evacuation reduces the bottleneck of forcing students through known fixed gateways and structures. For more information on concerns of “hardening” schools, the Jury suggests a recent interview on National Public Radio5. This interview points out that “… safety is a product of relationships.” This is especially true among young adults where the preponderance of occurrence of violence happens. In our quest for safety, we should not turn our schools into prisons. The University of Virginia in February, 2018 engaged an “Interdisciplinary Group on Preventing School and Community Violence” (also called the “Youth Violence Project”)6. Consisting of 22 noted academicians from universities throughout the United States, the group crafted a series of recommendations aimed at “… changing the national mindset and policy from reaction to prevention.” The results of this engagement have been endorsed by over 75 national organizations, including medical, law enforcement, legal, and social services organizations. 3 https://www.ready.gov/active-shooter 4 handlewithcare.com 5 http://wbaa.org/post/after-parkland-dont-turn-our-schools-prisons-says-education-activist#stream/0 6 https://curry.virginia.edu/prevent-gun-violence
-
OB4 Page 44 Throughout all interview sessions, one consistent issue emerged: a need to establish a presence at each school of some form of Resource Officer. Only a few of our 42 schools have assigned representatives of law enforcement. The teachers were sensitive to the presence of erratic behavior and responded accordingly. There was instruction given to these teachers on what constitutes erratic behavior with the singular direction of reporting it to the front office. While teachers were clearly the figure of authority in each classroom as it relates to education, as a body they were not trained in depth to recognize evolving mental conditions or to know the appropriate response necessary to defuse erratic behavior. When questioned about possibly arming teachers, an immediate consensus emerged that the proposal is inappropriate. Concerns were voiced that arming teachers may become more of the problem than the solution. As it stands, any effort to allow an armed civilian on campus must be preceded by legislative changes from the California Legislature.
No Responses Found 2
Government entities assigned to respond to this report. No response documents have been linked in our database.
Nevada County Board of Supervisors
Elected County Office
Nevada County Sheriff
Elected County Office