See Dick. See Jane. See Dick and Jane Go to School. Are They Safe?*

A SCOE Fingerprint Technician compares a picture I.D. to the applicant but has not been trained in how to detect a fraudulent I.D. Requests to local law enforcement for training have not been successful.

A SCOE Fingerprint Technician does not actually ask applicants how long they have lived in California. Three signs in that office tell the applicant to say if they have lived in California for less than six (6) months.

The LiveScan request form also does not ask about length of residence in California. Of the 36 district employment application forms sent in with surveys, only 10 included a question about length of time in California. One district reported that the DOJ knows how long someone has lived in California and the DOJ is responsible.

The SCOE Fingerprint processing fee, charged to school districts, is the highest fee in the county. The SCOE fee of $28-34 is high compared to fees as low as $18 for AmeriPrints and $20 for the Sebastopol Police Dept.

A SCOE Fingerprint technician was asked to prepare a draft document of a Volunteers Guideline and did so utilizing San Diego County guideline already in place. This draft was sent out to school districts sometime in December, 2006.

On surveys, some districts (13 out of 40) included on their surveys a reference to the length of time applicant has lived in California as a determination of whether FBI response is required. Of the 36 districts that sent in copies of their employment applications, only 10 included a question of the length of time applicant has lived in California.

On surveys, not one district responded with the law requiring an FBI response if a person has lived in California less than seven years, more than one year, and has a sex offense conviction on record.

On surveys, almost all (36 out of 40) districts knew of a contract with the DOJ for notification of any subsequent arrests. In interviews, the jury learned that school officials have widely different understandings of this process, including how the information should be sent and received, and what the district should do after receiving such a notice. One district had never even heard of an electronic response from the DOJ.

According to the surveys, some districts fingerprint all volunteers, some print some volunteers, and some do not print any volunteers. From interviews the jury learned that factors in this decision include whether the volunteer is a parent, a parent of a child in the school where they are volunteering, the frequency and/or the duration of the volunteer's service.

Whether or not a volunteer has been printed and is therefore eligible to be alone with a student is not general knowledge at the school site. Usually the principal and/or school office staff, and sometimes the teachers know. Only one district, which prints some but not all, responded that they assume all volunteers are not printed.

School districts also have very different practices about fingerprinting requirements for contractors including vendors, assemblies, construction, etc.

All school districts interviewed were emphatic that school personnel are empowered to ask strangers on campus who they are and what they are doing.

Districts depend to a large extent on volunteers, vendors, private contractors, etc. to not be alone with students at any time. Common terms are "line of sight" and "under direct supervision." The meaning of these terms varies with some districts using them to describe the volunteer as being kept in line of sight and others using them to describe the students as always in line of sight. Because we were not able to speak directly with volunteers, the grand jury investigation does not know what an individual volunteer understands this to mean.

On surveys, eight (8) out of 40 districts reported that they would allow a newly hired employee to begin work before all pre-employment requirements were completed, under certain circumstances such as: the district had unofficial copies of credential; if the new employee would be under direct supervision of another district employee; if the new employee would not have contact with students; • if the work would be done when students are not present (i.e. summer). This is • prohibited under law.

The DOJ does not provide clearances. The DOJ provides Criminal Offender Record Information (CORI), responses based on prints provided. It is up to the hiring agency to clear or not. Many districts refer to the report from the DOJ as the "clearance" and say this means that the employee is cleared to go to work. The DOJ prefers that agencies use the word "response" when referring to the information they send.

Although the Ed Code requires that the DOJ respond within 72 hours, often a DOJ response is received within hours. Others may take in excess of 30 days. Reasons for delays vary and can be due to unclear prints, missing court dispositions, or because the response requires manual handling.

A DOJ response will never include criminal activity from outside the state of California. The DOJ used to combine criminal activity from outside California on the DOJ response but that stopped in early 1980's. Most districts that the jury spoke with about the 12-month rule they follow for requesting FBI responses, indicated that they were told that DOJ would have all criminal activity on an individual once they had lived in California for at least 12 months. In other words, that criminal activity outside of California would have caught up with them by the time they had lived here for a year.

The DOJ does not know how long someone has lived in California.

The DOJ does not automatically launch an FBI response. According to the DOJ, school districts must know when to request an FBI response in addition to the DOJ response. More than one district reported to the jury that it is their understanding that it is up to the DOJ to decide whether or not to launch an FBI response.

Although Ed Code Section 45125 requires an FBI response for persons who have lived in California for more than one year but not more than seven (7) years and who have a sex offense conviction, the DOJ was unable to explain how this Ed Code section could be followed. When asked how a school district would know this in order to request the FBI response, the DOJ responded that the school district must determine this. It is not up to the DOJ. The jury found that districts are not aware of this requirement.

If the DOJ is unable to get a disposition from the court on an arrest, it is suppressed. There are many reasons why a disposition may be unavailable including that there is still action pending. For older arrests, court records may have been purged. The DOJ has no control over this. It is frustrating for them as well. The need to contact courts for dispositions is often the reason for a 30 day delay.

The DOJ reports that applicants can often speed up the delay process by contacting the court directly and requesting the information be forwarded to the DOJ. In order for the DOJ to use this information, it must come from the courts, not from the applicant.

The DOJ processes subsequent arrest data from law enforcement agencies daily, Monday through Friday. Subsequent arrest notifications are on those individuals whose prints have already been processed.

When the subsequent arrest is of an individual linked to a retainable agency (e.g. school district), the DOJ notifies the retainable agency immediately. Notification is done via electronic notice to the DOJ's secured website or by U.S. mail. The DOJ never telephones an agency although the Ed Code allows for it. One district reported that all of their subsequent arrest notifications came via fax. Over half of the districts the jury interviewed reported that the notices come to them via the U.S. Mail.

California is a closed state, meaning it has a privacy clause which protects against the irresponsible dissemination of criminal history information. Florida is an open state meaning that criminal history is openly available to anyone, at any time, for any reason. There is no federal level privacy clause. The closed state status adds to the complexity of the entire fingerprint response process.

Agencies with electronic mail code must check the DOJ's secured website in order to receive notification of subsequent arrests. Agencies like school districts must have a process in place to check for these notices on regular basis. Some districts have a practice in place that provides for daily access to the website. Some check weekly and others are not even aware of the website. It varies from district to district with some having only one employee authorized to check the website. Some districts reported that when the authorized person is out of office, even for vacation, there is no provision for checking the DOJ website for notices of subsequent arrest.

There is no follow up process on notices of subsequent arrest to make sure that they have been received. The DOJ does not require agencies to confirm receipt nor does the DOJ send a second notice. If sent via U.S. Mail, it is not certified or registered. Nothing further is sent from the DOJ once the subsequent arrest notice is sent. The DOJ assumes that if it is sent, it is received. Districts responded that they do not in fact have assurance that all notices sent by the DOJ have actually been received.

One district reported that the DOJ denied the district's request for a listing of those individuals for whom the DOJ had that district as the retainable district. The DOJ responded that they could not provide that information.

A subsequent arrest occurring outside of California would not generate a notice to school districts. Arrests must be in California for the DOJ to be notified.

California law provides for a no-cost DOJ response for certain non-profits for them to process their volunteers. Public school districts are excluded and must pay the DOJ fee of $32 for their volunteers.

Although LiveScan has been used since 1998, the DOJ still receives some hard cards. The DOJ scans these prints. Old hard card submissions get U.S. mail notices of subsequent arrests. LiveScan submissions would trigger electronic notifications of subsequent arrests.

The DOJ maintains that school districts cannot request an FBI response on certificated, credentialed individuals. FBI responses on these individuals only go to the Commission on Teacher Credentialing as part of the credentialing process. Yet districts routinely reported on the surveys that they request an FBI response for certificated employees based on time lived in California. Of the 19 districts interviewed, 5 districts reported that they never request an FBI response on any employees and 6 other districts reported that they didn't know if or when an FBI response is required.

Separate agencies, such as the Commission on Teacher Credentialing and any public school district, are prohibited by law from sharing criminal activity information (CORI) with each other.

Based on interviews with school district officials, it is commonly believed that criminal history from the FBI database is combined into the DOJ California database by the time an individual has lived in California for 12 months. One district specifies a 24 month period and one district specifies a 6 month period. One district specifies an FBI response if applicant has ever lived outside California. The understanding is that when the district requests a DOJ response and the individual has been in California for a year or longer, it is expected (erroneously) that the DOJ response will include all criminal activity whether it was in California or somewhere else.

Many districts (13 out of 18 interviewed) sponsor after school athletic programs. Of those 13, only 8 require fingerprinting for all adult volunteers participating in after school athletic programs.

Most districts (15 out of 18 interviewed) allow overnight field trips with adult chaperones/adult participation. Of those 15, only 5 require fingerprinting for all adult volunteers participating on overnight field trips.

Most districts (16 of the 18 interviewed) allow parent driven field trips. Of those 16, only 1 requires fingerprinting for all adult volunteers participating in parent driven field trips.

No district currently requires fingerprinting employees of field trip destinations.

Two districts that the jury interviewed require employee applicants to pay the cost of their own fingerprinting and the DOJ response. One district requires that volunteers bear this cost. In other districts, these costs are borne by the school districts budgets.

Districts reports of what the fees are vary but range as follows: cost to roll prints via LiveScan: $18 - $32; DOJ response: $32-50; FBI response: $0-56. However, the DOJ reported that their fee is always $32 and that the FBI fee is always $24. An FBI response is always run through the DOJ. SCOE reported that their fee ranges $28-32 and most districts indicated that they pay SCOE a fee of $28, with the higher fee due when an FBI response is also requested. Districts using AmeriPrints pay $18 for that same service. The Sebastopol Police Department charges $20.

Most schools require visitors and/or volunteers to sign in at the school office. Many issue badges or stickers. Some collect these at the end of the visit when visitor or volunteer signs out. Some schools escort visitors while they are on campus, but usually only for the first time. Vendors, service, or repair people, while they are on campus, may be placed under supervision of a school employee

A few school districts maintain databases that record which volunteers have been fingerprinted and are therefore allowed to be alone with students.

Some districts rely on the SCOE to notify them of criminal activity including subsequent arrests of district employees.

The SCOE is the responsible agency for certificated substitutes (substitute teachers) throughout the county as far as fingerprinting and credential verification. This is allowed under the Ed Code as it eliminates the need for an individual substitute teacher to have to undergo a fingerprinting process for each individual school district.

One district reported hearing that the SCOE may offer a program of reduced fee (1/2 off) for districts to have their volunteers printed on certain days.

Of the 18 school districts the jury interviewed, 5 reported that they had used the SCOE template mailed to them in November 2006 to complete the survey they returned to the grand jury.

Of the forty (40) surveys sent to private schools in the county, the jury received twenty (20) back. They showed that all but one school require a fingerprinting background check of all new employees.

Many private schools use the SCOE department for their fingerprinting requirements.

Not one of these 20 private schools ever allows an employee to work before all pre- employment requirements are met.

Fourteen (14) of the 20 private schools require fingerprinting of at least some of their school volunteers, six (6) of whom require printing of adults involved in field trips.

Three (3) private schools reported that they require their vendors to be printed. Conclusions School districts in Sonoma County appear to have implemented, for the most part, the education code with regard to background responses prior to employment. The authenticity of each district's separate response to the grand jury survey may have been compromised however by the mailing sent out by the SCOE which included language for answers to questions posed in the survey. School districts paid out at least $60,000 in 05-06 for fingerprinting, DOJ and FBI fees, and budgets for 2006-07 are in excess of $65,000. It appears that some districts may be requesting FBI responses based on length of time living in California but without regard to whether the individual is credentialed or not. Others are not aware of any requirements at all to do an FBI level search. All districts were asked to indicate any other safeguards they may use. No school district reported that they accessed the Megan's Law website or in any way used this website as a resource for determining whether an individual who is not being fingerprinted should be allowed to volunteer around children. No district responded that they contact local law enforcement or the Sonoma County court system to check on prospective volunteers, although the Sheriff's Office and court records are both available with information at no cost. An individual without any prior criminal activity is allowed to work and/or volunteer in our schools. This supports the purpose and expense of a background check to the extent of what it can tell us about an individual. The sad truth is that individuals arrested for molesting children may have been given access to them because they had no prior criminal activity. Even the most assiduously applied fingerprint policy would not have eliminated them. An individual with prior criminal activity that does not preclude their being hired may be cleared to work in our schools. This provision starts to muddy the waters a bit as it leaves it up to the school district to interpret the severity of the offenses, how old the offenses are, how many, etc, and it also assumes that the offenses have not been suppressed by the DOJ. Common responses from school districts indicate that criminal records are mostly "just DUIs" and one district reports that DUIs are not the district's business. The jury thinks they are of interest. The Ed Code includes a provision that an individual with prior criminal activity that would preclude their being employed (even a violent or serious felony) shall not be denied employment if the person has obtained a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon. Although no one we spoke with had ever seen such a certificate, this provision of law seems not to be in the best interest of our children. The Ed Code also provides that an individual convicted of a serious felony that is not also a violent felony shall not be denied employment if that person can prove to the sentencing court of that offense that he or she has been rehabilitated for the purposes of school employment for at least one year. Here again, this provision of law appears to give the applicant more consideration and protection than it does our children. Given these existing laws and statutes, a school district is very dependent on our judicial system to adequately identify and successfully prosecute individuals in order that criminal activity may be disclosed. Schools and school districts have a difficult challenge in exercising their protective oversight responsibilities. Circumstances, such as the following, can occur. Even in the high profile arrest of John Mark Karr in connection with the molestation and murder of young JonBenet Ramsey in Colorado, his lack of recorded criminal activity had allowed him to obtain a substitute teachers credential and thereby access to many young students in our county. An article appearing in the local Press Democrat issue of February 5, 2007 detailed how • a man, convicted of two felony sexual batteries involving a 3 yr old, and listed on California's sex offender registry, obtained a ruling from a Los Angeles Superior Court commissioner giving him permission to volunteer in an elementary school. The school allowed him to be in the classroom. The school thought they were doing the right thing. And yes, he is a parent, often excluded from fingerprint process. In the Press Democrat issue of March 3, 2007 it was reported that the mayor of Los • Angeles, who had endorsed legislation (AB 1804) while he was an assemblyman, was taking issue with that same legislation when applied to him. AB 1804 requires volunteers who want to mentor students to undergo fingerprinting, an FBI check, a TB check, and an interview with the school principal. Now wanting to mentor someone himself, he was frustrated by these same requirements not being waived for him. He lashed out at the school district saying "It's another example of a school district that does everything it can to refuse the assistance it needs to make our schools good." He likened it to "losing the forest for the trees." School districts rely heavily on volunteers. Parents and non parents whether they are in the classroom, out on the playing fields, helping in the libraries, or chaperoning special events contribute to the richness of the education and the educational experiences we want for our children. They are not the mainstay of the educational program, and certainly the educational program would continue even if all volunteers were banned tomorrow. However, with a general ban on volunteers not desirable or very likely to happen, school districts must continue to accept responsibility for those adults they allow to have access to our children. This responsibility should not include confidential lists of volunteer names and addresses. Trustworthy adults volunteering in our schools do not have an entitlement to confidentiality. How does such confidentiality serve our children? In addition, schools must ensure that their prevailing culture allows for students to question adult behavior when it "feels wrong." Schools must ensure that all reports of questionable adult behavior are taken seriously and that those who report it are not harassed because of it. When students who are harassed, taunted, teased, or ostracized for having "told" on someone, this retaliatory behavior must be addressed and not left to simply die out. In today's society there are great ranges of thinking on what is acceptable behavior. It is incumbent on our public agencies, especially those who serve our children, to always strive for a balance so that one extreme is not catered to at the expense of the other extreme. It is difficult to avoid stepping on toes in today's world. Clear cut policies and consistent follow through are key contributors to making sure that everyone knows what will not be tolerated and the consequences if it happens. Adults (parents and non-parents alike), who are unwilling to undergo a background check and/or read and sign a code of conduct with regard to acceptable behavior around young children which includes immediate consequences, if broken, should not be allowed access to our children. Maybe years ago, but not today. Everyone needs to be vigilant and aware in order that children are not victimized. No one should worry that their concern will be ridiculed or that they will suffer retaliation if they bring it forward. The appearance of being tolerant is not more important than our children's safety and well-being. Commendations The grand jury commends school districts that have taken steps to more adequately assure the safety and well-being of their students by instituting fingerprinting requirements for their adult volunteers, especially those involved with athletic programs, overnight field trips, and parent driven field trips. The grand jury commends SCOE for preparing the draft of the Volunteer Guideline in that it offers good suggestions and valuable information such as how to access the California Megan's Law Sex Offender Locator site where one can search by name for a specific volunteer. The grand jury commends the effort being made by the SCOE to provide low-cost fingerprinting clinics for school volunteers. The grand jury commends those who spoke with the jury who were not defensive, who were willing to step forward, who were not locked into their bureaucracy, and who spoke honestly and courageously to help make our schools a safer place to educate our society's greatest asset.