Alameda County Grand Jury • 2018-2019

Alameda City Council Interference

Published: June 11, 2019 148 pages Consolidated Report
Ver PDF original

Findings 34 findings

19-1 Page 1
The city of Alameda’s failure to provide councilmembers with adequate training upon first being elected to council as well as annual training on governance helped contribute to inappropriate interference in the fire chief hiring process.
19-2 Page 1
The city of Alameda’s charter fails to provide enforcement mechanisms when councilmembers and staff violate provisions of the charter, creating uncertainty when such violations occur.
19-3 Page 1
Councilmembers who were the obvious subjects of the independent investigation were allowed to participate in the editing of the outside investigator’s report, damaging the “independence” of the analysis.
19-4 Page 1
In violation of the city’s charter they had sworn to uphold, two councilmembers did interfere with the city manager’s ability to conduct an open and transparent recruitment for a new fire chief.
19-5 Page 1
The Oakland Unified School District consistently spends near or below the median of the 37district sample on the needs of students (teachers’ salaries, local administration, classroom support, books and materials and pupil services). It spends above and sometimes far above the median on non-classroom administrative, central office staff, contractors and consultants.
19-6 Page 1
The Oakland Unified School District’s financial problems result from a combination of spending priorities skewed toward non-classroom staff and activities plus poor enforcement of competitive bidding requirements, expensive contracting policies, poor financial discipline and poor business practices.
19-7 Page 1
The Oakland Unified School District’s Facilities Department does not follow best practices in developing and managing its operating budgets.
19-8 Page 1
The Oakland Unified School District’s Facilities Department staff frequently ignored direct orders from superiors, often going over their manager’s heads.
19-9 Page 1
The Oakland Unified School District’s Facilities Department has not provided appropriate leadership in managing the capital program for the district. Approved project costs and schedules have not been controlled, required bidding was often avoided through exceptions, and the district’s use of the lease-leaseback method has not demonstrated cost savings or resulted in speedy completion of projects.
19-10 Page 1
The Oakland Unified School District’s 50% local business utilization policy adds significant cost to projects.
19-11 Page 1
The Oakland Unified School District has been using Measure J bond funds to pay rent (now over $12.5 million) for their administration offices at 1000 Broadway. There is no approved plan to relocate the district’s central administrative offices to a permanent location, raising serious legal questions about its continued use of bond funds to pay rent at 1000 Broadway.
19-12 Page 1
The Oakland Unified School District’s culture is broken. It has been described as a district of exceptions with an attitude of “what’s in it for me?” These attitudes harm the district whether it is displayed as favoritism, nepotism, or disregard for board policies. Employees trying to change this culture and move the district forward are sidelined and sometimes forced to leave because the proposed changes “aren’t the way it’s done at OUSD.”
19-13 Page 1
The Oakland Unified School District’s Board policies are out-of-date.
19-14 Page 1
The Oakland Unified School District’s Board meetings and meeting processes create extraordinary burdens for Board members, the district’s management and staff, and the public. Excessively long meetings fail to focus the Board on its priorities and details, which results in a lack of actionable decisions on key issues.
19-15 Page 1
The Oakland Unified School District Board has failed in its responsibilities to serve the students of Oakland. Collectively, the Board has not provided leadership and strategic direction to correct the severe financial problems facing the district.
19-16 Page 1
Mismanagement of the review process by the Alameda County Board of Supervisors resulted in the loss of essential regional emergency preparedness training, leaving county residents less safe.
19-17 Page 1
The Board of Supervisors failed to provide clear and complete guidelines to the ad hoc committee, particularly in regard to making
19-18 Page 1
The Board of Supervisors failed to ensure that the ad hoc committee worked with the Alameda County Sheriff’s Office to assure a successful grant application.
19-19 Page 1
The Board of Supervisors selected members to the ad hoc committee that virtually guaranteed partisan advocacy and predictable intractability.
19-20 Page 1
The Board of Supervisors failed to involve county administrative staff for counsel and oversight, a practice routine for important votes involving grants, liability and expenditures.
19-21 Page 1
The ad hoc committee failed to make available to the public materials under consideration at its meetings in a timely manner.
19-22 Page 1
Although most independent living home operators are well intentioned and do their best to provide a safe and secure living environment for their tenants, profits are so low in this industry that the money needed for repairs, capital investments and suitable client services often does not exist.
19-23 Page 1
Existing programs – Healthy Homes Department, Independent Living Association, Group Living Facilities Working Group – have laid the groundwork for a comprehensive approach to addressing independent living issues, but a lack of resources, coordination and focal leadership has limited their effectiveness.
19-24 Page 1
There is a need for a searchable web-based database containing information about the location and quality of independent living homes in Alameda County. The database would allow investigators to systematically document complaints and conditions and would assist social workers and consumers to make appropriate placements.
19-25 Page 1
The service area of the Group Living Facilities Working Group and the Group Living Strike Team is limited in geographic scope to unincorporated areas of Alameda County. Furthermore, the Strike Team is ad hoc and dependent on interpersonal relationships between individual agency staff.
19-26 Page 1
The Department of Children and Family Services has not recruited and retained an adequate number of approved foster homes within Alameda County.
19-27 Page 1
An excessive percentage (more than half) of Alameda County’s foster care placements are made to homes located outside of Alameda County, despite evidence that out-of-county placements are generally not in the best interests of foster children.
19-28 Page 1
Average caseloads for Department of Family and Child Services emergency response and family maintenance child welfare social workers are too high, which is not conducive to the delivery of high-quality services to Alameda County’s foster children.
19-29 Page 1
The Department of Children and Family Services has not been timely in its implementation of the Child and Family Team concept that is a central element of California’s Continuum of Care Reform legislation.
19-30 Page 1
BART’s police department staffing has been insufficient to meet crime levels, as reported by an outside expert, who recommended substantially more patrol officers and revamped patrol assignments.
19-31 Page 1
Although overall crime on BART is up only slightly from 2014 to 2018, the incidence of violent crime more than doubled during that time. All crime is serious, but the potential for violent crime is particularly frightening to riders. The high volume of lesser offenses, especially thefts of items like phones, computers, wallets, etc., dramatically affects riders’ perceptions of safety and well-being on the BART system.
19-32 Page 1
Public concern about fare evasion has been one of the top issues on every customer satisfaction study since 2014. The lack of enforcement erodes confidence in BART and costs upwards of $25 million, or 5% of passenger revenue.
19-33 Page 1
Cleanliness of BART trains and stations was the concern most cited in the Customer Satisfaction Study from 2012 through 2018. BART introduced several initiatives to target cleaning resources where most needed and to prevent messes in the first place (e.g., elevator attendants, Pit Stop program). However, continuing dissatisfaction with cleanliness was repeatedly cited in the most recent survey, in large part due to an increase in the homeless population using BART facilities.
19-34 Page 1
Board-related documents are difficult to find on the BART website because some, especially those related to the board, are not searchable.

Recommendations 33

Conclusions 39

No Responses Found 1

Government entities assigned to respond to this report. No response documents have been linked in our database.

Alameda City