Final Report 1999 - 2000

Conclusions 28

• CL1 Page 88
  Despite Use-of-Force training, there have been lapses and serious failures by individual officers in the field that have led to the deaths of some mentally disturbed persons. In part, the committee attributed this to: a. Insufficient training designed to equip officers to respond to a growing mental crisis. b. The absence of meritorious programs such as the Long Beach MET program in other police agencies. Both the Los Angeles Police Department and the Sheriff’s Department have specially trained officers who work with mental health clinicians qualified to identify and respond to the complex needs of the mentally ill. But, in Los Angeles City, for example, only one team went to just one of thirty- seven shootings involving the mentally ill.
• CL2 Page 88
  The homeless, while understandably irritating to many and an embarrassment to society, are apparently being treated with understanding by Los Angeles County law enforcement. Volunteer organizations agree that the police are very helpful, compassionate, and they even volunteer for special programs such as “Thanksgiving in the Street” and the “Christmas Carnival.” 8. The use of canines is a police tactic that reflects credit on the departments. The few earlier complaints are no longer heard. The K9s in all departments are now trained to “find and bark”. Money and time are saved and criminals are apprehended. 9. Domestic disputes continue to represent troubling, and at times, highly dangerous police calls. Increased awareness and efforts are being made in LA County. However, the meritorious DART program is only operational in about 50% of Los Angeles City. While supported by the Chief of Police, it has not been uniformly mandated. Thus, it largely is dependent upon individual division commanders to implement. Moreover, DART depends upon quality shelters which may have a variety of priorities and goals. Fortunately, there are many highly motivated police in the program, but there is a shortage of resources. Ancillary to training related to domestic violence, sworn officers receive guidance related to their own possible family violence. Guidelines and departmental standards are reflected in both roll call and advanced training. LASD Family Violence policy for deputies extends to 5 pages. Noteworthy is the Beverly Hills Chaplaincy Program that utilizes civilian volunteers, who are able to provide guidance and counseling to department members.
• CL3 Page 89
  There are consistent policies and guidelines stating that “bullets do not stop cars” and, in most instances, vehicles are not used to ram. According to one expert, “police are asking for more power from their cars, not more skills from the officers.” While numerous car chases are shown on television, the good news is that the incidence of these cases is not increasing.
• CL4 Page 22
  Probation Costs and Charges A. Formal Probation B. Summary Probation
• CL5 Page 22
  Revocation and Measures of Probation Effectiveness A. Formal Probation B. Summary Probation
• CL6 Page 25
  Ensure risk assessment consistency, by ensuring that at least 60% of all cases have an initial Risk & Needs Assessment completed, and that 35% of all cases be reassessed at the mid-term of probation.
• CL7 Page 25
  Establish mechanisms to ensure that at least 70% of active cases, where probationers have failed to report for orientation, will be reported to the courts within 30 days for violation of probation.
• CL8 Page 25
  Establish mechanisms to ensure that at least 60% of active cases, where probationers have new arrests, will be reported to the courts within 30 days for violation of probation.
• CL9 Page 25
  Ensure that at least 60% of existing cases, where probationers have outstanding financial obligations, will be reported to the courts for violation, at least 90 days prior to the end of the probation term.
• CL10 Page 25
  Establish controls to ensure that 94 percent of all court reports will be submitted to the courts two days prior to scheduled hearing. In order to achieve these goals, the Probation Department has implemented an Adult Compliance Team (ACT) program, which is designed to ensure that monitoring activities for minimum supervision caseloads are current, the processing of notifications of new arrests on all active probation cases are expedited, and probation officers assigned to certain specialty caseloads are assisted. In addition, the Department is in the process of modifying its automated probation violation tracking capability within APS. To accomplish this, modifications to the existing system will be implemented, and new functionality will be added. To a large extent, these improvements will automate current manual processes. In addition, new processes will be established to track cases and identify probationers that are in violation of conditions of probation, thus providing probation officers with an added tool for identifying probation violation activity. These changes are being made possible, in part, because of increases in resources appropriated to the Department in recent years. For example, the Probation Department received funds in FY1999-2000 to lower caseload to probation officer ratios for Domestic Violence, Child Threat and Minimum Supervision case types. Other process improvements, including the establishment of a kiosk system to expand client-reporting tools and validate reporting authenticity, are also being implemented. It is the hope of the Department to meet or exceed all of these goals within the next 18 months to two years. In addition, the Department would like to receive additional funding for probation officer personnel to further reduce caseload to probation officer ratios. To support continuous process improvement, the Department would also like to establish a Research & Evaluation Unit. We support the Department’s goals and objectives, and believe the
• CL11 Page 29
  The circumstances of the offense for which the individual was placed on probation, including whether the conviction was for a violent crime. Points are assigned for each characteristic. Any person who scores 15 points or higher will be assigned to one of the more intensive supervision caseloads. If the score is 14 points or less, the person will be assigned to an AMS caseload unless there are factors that suggest a specialized caseload may be more appropriate. In these instances, the risk score of 14 points or less may be set aside by the probation officer, with approval from his/her supervisor, and the probationer may be assigned to one of the Department’s more intensive supervision caseloads. In FY1998-99, the Probation Department provided services to 90,968 individuals, who were distributed between supervision categories, as shown in Table 1.1 below. Table 1.1 Distribution of Misdemeanor and Felony Cases by Case Category – FY1998-99 CASE MISD FELONY TOTAL % MISD % FELONY % CLIENTS/ CATEGORY CLIENTS CLIENTS CLIENTS CLIENTS CLIENTS CATEGORY HRO 550 1 5,891 1 6,441 3.3% 96.7% 18.1% DOM 996 2 ,046 3,042 32.7% 67.3% 3.3% CTH 245 1 ,852 2,097 11.7% 88.3% 2.3% NTU 198 1 5,488 1 5,686 1.3% 98.7% 17.2% GNG 26 716 7 42 3.5% 96.5% 0.8% OTH 27 587 6 14 4.4% 95.6% 0.7% AMS 16,449 35,897 52,346 31.4% 68.6% 57.5% TOTAL 18,491 7 2,477 9 0,968 20.3% 79.7% 100.0% HRO = High Risk Offender; DOM = Domestic Violence; CTH = Child Threat; NTU = Narcotics Testing Unit; GNG = Gang; OTH = Other; AMS = Automated Minimum Supervision To assess the differences between formal and summary probationers, a profile of formal and summary probationers was requested from the Probation Department and the courts detailing the number of counts per probationer and the number of prior convictions by type of offense. This information was provided by the courts and is presented later in this section. The Probation Department could not electronically compile the information and manual compilation was not feasible. As a result, the only formal probation profile information available is as presented in Table 1.1. As shown in the table, 52,346 persons, or approximately 57.5 percent of all Probation Department clients were assigned to Automated Minimum Supervision (AMS) caseloads in FY 1998-99. Of these, approximately 68.6 percent had been convicted of felony offenses and 31.4 percent had been convicted of misdemeanor offenses. In the high risk and specialized caseload categories, over 95 percent of all clients had been convicted of felonies, with the exception of domestic violence and child threat categories, which were assigned 67.3 percent and 88.3 percent felons respectively. Based on a review of the scoring criteria employed by the Probation Department’s risk assessment tool, the data included in Table 1.1, interviews with Probation Department and Municipal Court managers and judges, and other factors, the AMS misdemeanant client profile appears to most closely correspond with that of persons who are placed on summary probation in Los Angeles County. Accordingly, the analysis of formal probation caseload and practices focuses on the AMS population rather than the case categories that generally receive more intensive supervision. This is discussed more fully, below. Probation Department Automated Minimum Service Workload The Adult Services Field Bureau and Adult Special Services Bureau of the Probation Department operate 14 Area Field Offices which are geographically dispersed throughout the County. The Directors at thirteen of these Area Field Offices manage probation officers who are responsible for HRO, Gang and AMS cases. Also housed at all 13 of these locations are probation officers responsible for Narcotics Testing, Domestic Violence and Child Threat specialty cases. Unlike the other specialty cases, Narcotics Testing is managed centrally. Probation officers at the fourteenth location–the La Madera Office (which recently moved and has been renamed the Riverview Office)–are responsible solely for AMS cases. During the period of this study, the La Madera Office monitored AMS probationers who resided within the boundaries of the Foothill, Pasadena, Pomona, Rio Hondo and San Gabriel Area Field Offices. In FY1998-99, probation officers at the La Madera Office monitored an average of 16,165 AMS probationers, which was approximately 37 percent of the total County AMS caseload at that time. According to the Director of the La Madera Office, cases are now being accepted from an additional five Area Field Offices: Firestone; South Central; Long Beach; Long Beach-Harbor; and Santa Monica. Once the full transition of these caseloads occurs, the Director anticipates that the La Madera Office will be responsible for a total of 25,000 to 30,000 AMS cases—or up to 70 percent of the County’s total AMS caseload. The Field Services Bureau Director has confirmed this estimate. This is significant because the La Madera Office operates a program that relies heavily on compliance data that is entered into the Department’s Adult Probation System (APS) by clerical personnel. This data is monitored by probation officers, who use the information to prepare progress reports for the courts, determine probationer compliance with conditions 90 days prior to the end of their probation term, and report on any other violations which may surface during the period of probation. After initial probationer orientation, there is no requirement that the probationer meet with the probation officer, nor does the probation officer make a field visit to the probationer’s home or work location. Instead, the probationers are generally required to report monthly, by mail. Given the scope of this investigation, it was not practical to evaluate AMS probation monitoring practices at all of the Area Field Offices. Accordingly, the evaluation focussed on the La Madera Office because (a) the probation officers at that location are responsible solely for an AMS caseload, (b) the operation is highly routine, and depends heavily on automated reporting of probationer compliance, and (c) the Department is migrating toward the La Madera Office model for managing AMS cases in the future. In addition to the review of the La Madera office, also reviewed were AMS case management functions at the Firestone and Pomona Area Field Offices since they have both implemented new procedures that the Department is considering replicating at La Madera and at other offices. A profile of each office follows. Firestone Area Field Office – The Firestone Office has established an Intake process for all new AMS and NTU cases referred by the courts. Under this new process, an Intake Officer at the Firestone Office performs initial probationer orientation, and may retain supervision over an AMS case for up to 30 days to monitor initial compliance with the court order. If an AMS probationer meets these interim conditions of probation, the Intake Officer then transfers the case to La Madera. If interim conditions are not met, the Intake Officer may report violations to the court. In other locations, cases are transferred directly to the La Madera Office from the courts, and probation officers at the La Madera Office conduct initial orientation and compliance monitoring. Although it is too early to reach conclusions regarding the effectiveness of the Firestone Area Office model, it is the Department’s reported intention to increase probation success by initially providing more intensive supervision of AMS probationers prior to transfer to a banked caseload. Pomona Area Field Office – The Pomona Area Field Office has developed a computerized AMS case management system known as the Compliance Tracking System (CTS). Every day, the system automatically flags cases where a probationer is out of compliance with the terms and conditions of probation (e.g., financial, program, and community service conditions). This system automatically produces probationer notification letters, instructions, and other correspondence after clerical prompts. Using these features, clerical staff are able to produce packets of documentation for each probation officer which (a) identify non-compliant probationers, (b) provide detailed case information for the preparation of court reports and, (c) supply form letters and other materials that aid with probation enforcement. However, this system does not automatically interface with the Department’s APS system or other supporting data systems relied upon by the Department, so all probationer case data must be independently researched and input into APS by clerical personnel. This is a labor intensive process, which increases the potential for data input error and inconsistencies between the APS and CTS databases. Accordingly, the Department is presently engaged is a project to export CTS to other Area Field Offices, and to implement an automated interface between CTS and APS. When implemented, this effort will provide an enhanced tool for probation officers, and should increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the AMS monitoring process. Given the complexities of these processes, and the changes being undertaken by the Department, flow charts were prepared of AMS caseload management at four locations:
• CL12 Page 88
  The academies are staffed with highly qualified, motivated, dedicated professionals committed to excellence; their leadership adds to this excellence.
• CL13 Page 88
  The curricula in the academies significantly exceeds the required California Peace Officers’ Standards and Training (POST) hours and in spirit clearly exemplifies the goals of POST.
• CL14 Page 88
  Emphasizing contemporary techniques and concepts, the academies subject the students to rigorous standards combining learning with the imperative that today’s peace officers are dedicated to becoming part of the community and share with that community the responsibility of crime prevention.
• CL15 Page 88
  Academy and subsequent law enforcement training and policy consistently recognizes that peace officers are confronted daily with the necessity of using force to effect arrests and protect the public safety. Nevertheless, force may not be resorted to unless other reasonable alternatives have been exhausted or would clearly be ineffective. Force must be reasonable and necessary, remembering that the sanctity of life is uppermost.
• CL16 Page 88
  Doctrine additionally provides that any force used must be the minimum necessary, and that verbalization should be continued at all times in an effort to defuse the circumstance.
• CL17 Page 88
  The use of canines is a police tactic that reflects credit on the departments. The few earlier complaints are no longer heard. The K9s in all departments are now trained to “find and bark”. Money and time are saved and criminals are apprehended.
• CL18 Page 89
  Domestic disputes continue to represent troubling, and at times, highly dangerous police calls. Increased awareness and efforts are being made in LA County. However, the meritorious DART program is only operational in about 50% of Los Angeles City. While supported by the Chief of Police, it has not been uniformly mandated. Thus, it largely is dependent upon individual division commanders to implement. Moreover, DART depends upon quality shelters which may have a variety of priorities and goals. Fortunately, there are many highly motivated police in the program, but there is a shortage of resources. Ancillary to training related to domestic violence, sworn officers receive guidance related to their own possible family violence. Guidelines and departmental standards are reflected in both roll call and advanced training. LASD Family Violence policy for deputies extends to 5 pages. Noteworthy is the Beverly Hills Chaplaincy Program that utilizes civilian volunteers, who are able to provide guidance and counseling to department members.
• CL19 Page 100
  In the latter part of September 1999, the DPSS started a pilot Home Call Visit program in Belvedere, East Valley, Exposition Park, and Lancaster. The results in these four districts effectively show a marked increase in denials of aid in spite of the fact that the program didn’t start until October 1, 1999. For the months of September, October, & November 1999 versus the same months of 1998, denials increased by 165 cases (22%). Of that number, 98 cases (59%) were denied based upon the Home Call Visit program. Using the following statistics that have been provided and agreed to by the DPSS, if the Home Call Visit program were expanded to the entire 23 districts of Los Angeles County, substantial savings would occur. Assuming an average of three people on aid at a grant of $626 monthly would equal for 12 months $7,512 and assuming that life on aid averages 30 months in Los Angeles County, the grant amount equals $18,780 for 30 months. The pilot program which has been initiated in the above mentioned 4 districts has accounted for approximately 100 denials for a 2 month period. This would equate to 600 denials in a 2 month period for the 23 districts, which would result in 3600 cases being denied annually as the result of home call visits. Translating this into dollars, those 3600 home call visit denials multiplied by the average applicant grant of $18,780 for 30 months would equate to savings of $67,608,000 for that period. This is just a beginning. The program should produce far greater savings as it matures.
• CL20 Page 101
  The following conditions must be incorporated into the program. • Welfare Fraud Investigators must be under the operational control of the District Attorney’s office. • Welfare Fraud Investigators must make the Home Call Visits. • Welfare Fraud Investigators are limited status peace officers within Penal Code §830.35. • All applicants for welfare must have a home call visit prior to approval. • The EW has final control of the decision reached on each applicant, but confers with the Investigator in reaching the proper conclusion. • The EWs and Investigators should occupy the same offices and/or buildings. • Each EW and each Investigator must have their own computer. The automated, integrated information system (designated by DPSS as LEADER) needs to be fully implemented at the time Home Call Visits go into effect. Follow up of Grand Jury 1998-1999 Welfare Fraud Audit Report
• CL21 Page 101
  Major philosophical differences become apparent when systems proven in other jurisdictions are rejected outright or not given serious consideration.
• CL22 Page 101
  Taking into consideration economic variations, long range planning is required to ensure the resources necessary for future DPSS operations.
• CL23 Page 101
  The tardiness as detailed in Issue 2 is reflective of the DPSS resistance to change. This tardiness by the DPSS is totally unacceptable.
• CL24 Page 44
  The profile of the formal probation population differs significantly from that of the summary probation population in Los Angeles County. While nearly 58 percent of all formal probationers were assigned to minimum supervision caseloads in FY1998-99, the remainder were assigned to various high risk and specialty caseloads because of offense and behavior characteristics that suggested increased risk to the community. Out of the formal probation minimum supervision population in that year, only 31 percent had been convicted of misdemeanors. The remainder had been convicted of felonies. In comparison, nearly all summary probationers had been convicted of misdemeanors. These characteristics suggest that the formal probation minimum supervision client population contains persons who pose a greater risk to the community than persons sentenced to summary probation. Yet, this assumption is based solely on the conviction profile of probationers. For example, Superior Court judges routinely receive detailed sentencing recommendations from Probation Department investigators. However, such services to the municipal courts are limited. Instead, municipal courts must generally rely on information provided by the attorneys from the prosecuting jurisdictions, victims and defendants. The Probation Department should work with the courts to develop a standardized risk screening tool and judicial guidelines for sentencing persons to formal and summary probation. By implementing such a tool, the courts would also have more assurance that they are making informed sentencing choices.
• CL25 Page 59
  The average cost per summary probation case ranges between $103 and $137 based on costs and caseloads reported for the Los Angeles Municipal Court. The average cost per formal probation minimum supervision case ranges from $153 to $324 for the two offices reviewed for this study. Because the Probation Department charges fees for services, the net costs of formal probation at these offices can be adjusted to between $75 and $247 per case. The courts do not charge a fee for summary probation services. The wide range of costs for probation services occurs for a variety of reasons, including: (a) differences in the level of probation supervision services provided to formal versus summary probationers; (b) differences in the mix and number of positions allocated to probation functions; and, (c) differences in supervision and compliance monitoring procedures. For example, the higher costs for formal probation results, in part, because probation officers prepare progress and violation reports for the courts. No such reports are prepared for summary probation cases. Higher costs within the courts occur because some judges require more summary probation progress reports than other judges. Neither the Probation Department nor the courts systematically collect and analyze cost and outcome data to determine if the additional costs produce better outcomes. Although the Probation Department prepares cost analyses of formal probation services, the methodology does not distinguish between operations with high clerical worker to probation officer ratios.
• CL26 Page 75
  The utility of revocations as a measure of probation effectiveness is limited, and statistics such as revocation rates may only be a partial measure of probation system effectiveness. Therefore, violation and revocation rates for both probation systems need to be regularly measured and reported. A low revocation rate does not necessarily mean that there are few violations. It may mean that the system is ineffective at identifying its violators and that some violations are going undetected. A high revocation rate may indicate that violations are being identified, but it does not reveal whether revocation results in subsequent compliance. For example, probation revocations that result from issuance of a bench warrant that is never served will most likely end up as an inactive case with compliance never achieved, unless the probationer is arrested on other charges. Each year, thousands of bench warrants are issued in Los Angeles County but never served unless the probationer is arrested on other charges. Unfortunately not even revocation rate data, with its limitations, is systematically collected and reported to court and County managers and decision-makers. Given that there are close to 600,000 defendants assigned to formal and summary probation during a year, the outcomes and effectiveness of both systems need to be maintained and reported to ensure the accountability and continual improvement of both systems. State law precludes assignment of convicted felons to summary probation and allows assignment of convicted misdemeanants to either summary or formal probation. As a result, convicted felons determined by the Probation Department to be low risk and assigned to the minimum supervision caseload can end up receiving less supervision than misdemeanants assigned to summary probation who are required to regularly make progress reports in court. Some low risk convicted felons may be better served on summary probation and some high-risk misdemeanants may be better served on formal probation. A consistent approach to risk assessment and determination of supervision requirements by the courts and the Probation Department would allow for a more cohesive probation system. Changes in State law are needed to allow sentencing low risk felons to summary probation. By State law, summary probation is currently not a sentencing option for convicted felons. Therefore, legislative changes would be necessary for the courts to be provided with this degree of sentencing latitude. Accordingly, as a longer term strategy for developing a risk-based program for assessing and supervising probationers, the Board of Supervisors may wish to direct County Counsel to determine specific changes in law which would be required to provide the courts with the legal foundation for this change. Once the County is confident that a risk-based measurement system has been successfully implemented, it should then advocate to the State legislature for changes in law to provide the courts with broader sentencing alternatives for certain convicted felons.
• CL27 Page 229
  On the basis of the above findings, the Committee on Health and Human Services concludes that there is a growing number of fully accessible performing and visual arts venues owned by the County of Los Angeles and the various cities within the county. Since Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act ten years ago, there has been much greater sensitivity by public officials to the issue of making public buildings more accessible to employees by providing ‘reasonable accommodations’. Although there is an improvement, the same level of sensitivity is sometimes not displayed to patrons of City and County performing and visual arts facilities. Patrons normally do not complain about the City or County owned venue in those cases where there is a lack of parity of access to the venue, thus there is less incentive for the City or County to make these venues accessible. Unlike the private sector, where more paid admissions allow for an expansion of future programming, some of the administrators of the venues studied did not look for a correlation between increased accessibility and increased ticket sales. There are more disabled members of the community than is commonly realized, as not all disabilities start at birth nor are they all permanent. A drummer from a rock band may have a significant hearing impairment, and may not attend a concert unless there are assistive listening devices available. A skiing accident may confine a patron to a wheelchair for one performance of several purchased. A pregnant patron may be safer when there are handrails available. A teenaged soccer player may be temporarily in a leg cast. Based upon all the findings presented, it is the conclusion of this committee that the vast majority of the hundreds of venues audited are accessible to persons with visual, hearing, or mobility impairments.
• CL28 Page 248
  STRENGTHS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT This section outlines the key conclusions, including strengths and opportunities for improvement, of the study. MAJOR STRENGTHS During the course of the study, several observations were made that are clear strengths for LASD as it strives to improve its administration and use of the IWF funds. With annual revenues of approximately $35 million, the sheer size of the IWF fund presents opportunities that a smaller fund would not be able to consider. LASD has aggressively pursued contract negotiations with IWF vendors to maximize available funds through commissions on sales. As a result, LASD is in the enviable position of having an IWF with annual revenues that are greater than many other departments’ annual budgets. As a Special Fund, whose purpose is defined in Section 4025 of the California Penal Code, the size of the IWF fund could support significant initiatives that could result in meaningful change in inmate programs. A relatively small amount of the funding, dedicated annually to new program research, development, pilot implementation, and outcome measurement, could enhance and solidify a leadership position for LASD in the nation. The County and LASD view IWF as an important source of funding. IWF represents a significant incremental funding source that may be expended primarily for the benefit, education, and welfare of inmates confined in the County jails. If IWF did not exist, efforts to fund inmate programs through the General Fund would be routinely subjected to the realities of limited resources and the competing demands of different programs. The existence of IWF makes support of inmate programs easier. Furthermore, because funds not needed for the welfare of inmates may be used for the maintenance of County jail facilities, IWF can fund jail maintenance programs that may have otherwise been deferred. The IWC is comprised of committed civilians with diverse backgrounds. The IWC is made up of a diversified, cross-section of nine civilians, representing a broad range of professional backgrounds, business experience, community leadership, and ethnic diversity. The variety of Commission member professions includes: accountant, architect, banker, businessman, dentist, journalist, law enforcement, and medical doctor. In addition to their professional experiences, Commissioners have been active in their communities. Commissioners bring their own perspectives and hopes for what the IWC can accomplish and how they may be of service to the Sheriff. They are sincerely interested in: (1) providing leadership and new ideas in their advisory role to the Sheriff, (2) supporting the Sheriff’s efforts to develop effective programs that work toward rehabilitating inmates and reducing recidivism, and (3) serving the Sheriff and the inmates as well as the Los Angeles community at large. Other California sheriff’s departments contacted — Fresno, Orange, Sacramento, San Diego and San Francisco — either have no advisory commission or just a commission comprised of sheriff’s department personnel. The fact that the County of Los Angeles IWC is made up of civilians enables it to bring a valuable non-Departmental perspective to the funding requests that it is asked to review and approve. This independent, civilian commission is easily a "best practice" that other sheriff's departments should consider. The new Sheriff, elected in 1998, prides himself in the important leadership role he has adopted in providing a vision for LASD. The newly created Correctional Services Division (in which the Inmate Services Unit is found) is tasked with placing more focused attention on the breadth of correctional services provided to inmates. The new leadership — starting with the new Sheriff and cascading down through the ranks — brings a commitment to championing new ideas and a willingness to explore new and different ways to do things. A renewed energy and a potential for change has accompanied this new leadership. New approaches and new programs should be considered and adopted before this nurturing environment, full of excitement and hope, is dissipated by the din of daily routines. LASD has assigned staff to manage and administer IWF. The Inmate Services Unit is dedicated solely to the management and administration of the IWF. With its clear focus on the IWF funds and the programs funded by it, the Inmate Services Unit can work on programs and operations without distraction. Through the development of internal expertise and the funding of external resources, LASD is well positioned to implement the recommendations outlined in this study, such as measurements of program success and ongoing incremental improvements based on program monitoring. (Note: Much of the staff focus has been on processing payments, accounting for funds, tracking revenues, etc. As discussed later, our recommendations require an additional focus on the strategic use of IWF funds.) The County Counsel, through its Legal Advisor, assumes an active role in IWF. The County Counsel’s office has assigned a Legal Advisor to LASD to: (1) ensure that requested uses of IWF funds meet the legal requirements of Section 4025 of the California Penal Code, (2) serve as an advocate for LASD in how IWF funds are used, (3) clarify the role and actions of the IWC, and (4) protect the integrity of the process used to determine how IWF funds would be allocated. (Note: With such active involvement, the Legal Advisor will need to take care to focus on giving legal advice versus making business decisions.) The document flow for processing a funding request for IWC review and approval is well defined. In June 1999, the Legal Advisor helped IWF staff to document the workflow for obtaining approval for the expenditure of IWF funds. The procedures detail the document flow and steps to be taken beginning with the submission of a written request to the Inmate Services Unit through review and approval by the IWC. These procedures are an important first step to ensure clear understanding and encourage compliance. A number of IWF-funded programs are considered excellent models for other law enforcement agencies. On the basis of interviews within the County of Los Angeles and with other sheriff's departments, a number of IWF-funded programs are referred to as excellence models, including TALK (a visitation program, “Teaching And Loving Kids”) and the Biscailuz Recovery Center. OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT In the past, IWF has had financial audits conducted that focused on financial transactions and fund balances. The County's Auditor-Controller and others are comfortable with the integrity of the contracting procedures and financial checks and balances that are in place. Therefore, the focus of this study has been on opportunities for strengthening its management practices. In identifying the opportunities for improvement, the Grand Jury considered IWF's historical context, the recent growth and use of funds, and the shortcomings for IWF in best using these funds in future years. Therefore, the opportunities are presented as constructive directions for IWF to embark on rather than a report card of its past performance. There is no formal IWF Strategic Plan in place that provides a long-term vision of how IWF will contribute to the success of LASD. No Strategic Plan exists for IWF. Because there is no plan, IWF expenditures are made based either on the anticipated needs when the IWF budget is prepared or as individual requests are submitted for consideration to the IWC. During interviews with LASD personnel, none knew of a Strategic Plan for IWF. Although Inmate Services has complied a “wish list” document, an enumeration of projects that might be funded through IWF, it is not a Strategic Plan. The lack of a Strategic Plan may be explained by the evolution of IWF. Although in existence some fifty years, revenues for IWF were limited until 1987. Once IWF had access to revenues generated by telephone commissions and bonuses, the size of the fund increased. And with each round of new contracts, the revenue stream has increased. Telephone-based revenue grew from nothing before 1987, to approximately $4 million in 1991, to about $11 million in 1995, to more than $31 million in FY 1998-1999. Total revenues for IWF in FY 1998-1999 were more than $43 million (including the refund from HLPUSD). The approved FY 1999-2000 budget for IWF is in excess of $72 million, which includes carryovers from prior years. IWF has changed from a relatively small fund, to one with a budget substantially larger than whole departmental budgets. Prior to 1993, the uses of IWF funds were limited to the “benefit, education, and welfare” of inmates. With the amendment of Section 4025 in 1993, maintenance of county jail facilities became an appropriate use of IWF funds. At the same time, the County of Los Angeles was experiencing an economic downturn and funding shortages. Many County departments chose to defer maintenance and facility investments because of these shortages and the need to maintain ongoing operations. Within LASD, competition for available IWF funds increased. Moreover, the Office of the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) viewed IWF as an important source for funding LASD's needed maintenance efforts. Since 1993, dollar amounts (and the percentage of total IWF dollars) allocated to maintenance-related efforts at LASD have increased significantly. Without a Strategic Plan, the projects funded by IWF will be determined by “who gets there first”, “who writes a better justification”, “how much money is left”, “what important project can’t get funded through the General Fund”, and a host of other reasons. As a result, funding may or may not be based on LASD’s vision and goals, and how IWF can support that vision and those goals. The IWC does not review all funding uses of IWF. LASD divides uses of IWF funds into two general categories: (1) ongoing operational uses and (2) special requests, which are submitted to the IWC for approval. The ongoing operational uses include both routine recurring expenditures (e.g., “admission kits” for newly booked inmates) and larger major renovation, maintenance, data systems, supplies needs, or "Other Financing Uses". For example, Other Financing Uses include such items as funding for the Jail Hospital Information System (JHIS), Title 15 Staffing Reimbursement, or Custody Facility Maintenance. On the basis of a review of the logs listing items presented to the IWC for review and approval, the dollars approved by the IWC were significantly less than IWF funds expended. After the election of a new Sheriff, the IWC was dissolved. Between October 1998 and July 1999, items requesting IWF funding were reviewed and approved by the LASD Budget Authority. Furthermore, even when the IWC does convene, certain items contained in the IWF Budget are not brought before the Commissioners for review. Clearly, if no IWC is sitting, it cannot review or approve funding requests; moreover, LASD should not delay requests pending the formation of a new IWC. Because the IWC acts only in an advisory capacity, the approval of requests without its review is well within the authority of the Sheriff. If the IWC is to be effective in acting as a consistent sounding board for the Sheriff, however, the IWC should, if at all possible, review all funding requests. Having different individuals or groups approve IWF funding requests, especially without the benefit of being able to refer to clearly communicated priorities and guidelines or funding patterns of the past, will possibly generate the appearance of a capricious and inequitable review process. As the IWC, or for that matter any other reviewer, considers a request for IWF funding, the following information is lacking: (1) a formal Strategic Plan and (2) written policies that clearly define what types of expenditures are appropriate for IWF funds. Without such information, it will be difficult to ensure that programs funded by IWF will consistently support the vision and goals of LASD. There is no written documentation that provides clear funding guidance regarding what categories of expenditures — "funding mix" — are appropriate for IWF. Documentation that provides guidance regarding what are appropriate IWF expenditures is primarily limited to Section 4025 of the California Penal Code displayed earlier as Exhibit 1. The Section 4025 provisions are general in nature, providing the needed flexibility for a state such as California with 58 very different counties, but do little to clarify exactly how a given county might apply it to its particular situation. In discussions with LASD personnel, Section 4025 was almost always the referenced source for what IWF funds could be used. When asked to clarify how the language in Section 4025 should be applied by LASD, however, there was no uniformity in responses. Title 15, Section 1043, Inmate Welfare Fund — Accounting, was helpful in providing some insight and guidance, but was repealed in 1998. To the best of our knowledge, there is no case law that is applicable to this issue. The Custody Division Manual, §3-75/020.00 — Inmate Welfare Fund Expenditures, offers some guidance in the following: "Inmate Welfare Fund monies and supplies shall not be used to offset necessary and required expenses of confinement such as meals, clothing, housing or medical services." Clarification is needed as to what comprises “required expense of confinement”. That clarification does not exist. A draft of a revision to this section, dated January 5, 2000, further dilutes any clarification by using only “meals or housing” rather than “meals, clothing, housing or medical services.” The lack of any clear guidelines can be attributed to many things. Prior to 1993, IWF funds could only be used for the benefit, education, and welfare of inmates. IWF has grown from a special fund with limited revenues and application into one with significant revenues and considerable latitude – maintenance of county jail facilities – as to what expenditures are possible. Indeed, IWF has been cast in the role of provider of substantial incremental funds for jail maintenance. Since 1993, IWF has helped offset a General Fund budget that inadequately addressed the “deferred maintenance” of LASD physical plant and facilities. As a result: q The vagueness of Section 4025, coupled with little clarification at the Los Angeles County level, complicates the review and approval process and increases the number of requests submitted for review. Not having a clearly stated policy regarding appropriate uses of IWF funds generates IWF requests that needlessly go through the review process only to be denied. Additional resources are used to respond to questions about what may or may not be acceptable and how to document requests. Requests submitted and denied are returned, often without a helpful explanation as why the request was denied (e.g., “Not an appropriate request.”). Once denied, however, funding requests can be reworked and resubmitted. With the benefit of some wordsmithing and the addition of appropriate phrases, the re-worked request can end up being approved. With little or no change to the actual project, a project, previously denied, is approved. Resources, which might otherwise be put to more productive uses, are used to provide individualized request-by-request help, covering appropriate uses of IWF funds and how to document and submit funding requests. q Section 4025 is vague regarding projects to be funded by IWF, allowing for broad interpretation. As already discussed, Section 4025 is vague in how IWF funds may be used, and internal IWF documents do little to clarify how Section 4025 will be applied within LASD. As a result, LASD has used IWF to fund a broad range of programs and items. Although the vagueness of Section 4025 offers LASD significant flexibility in how funds are expended, this flexibility has downside risks. Without clear guidelines, IWF funding decisions are subject to second-guessing by outside agencies. Continued use of IWF funds for certain items, seen as “pet projects” but of little perceived value, subjects LASD to outside pressures. Such outside criticism, justified or not, takes the focus of IWF away from its primary purpose — education, benefit, and welfare — and may needlessly redirect resources that could otherwise be better used. q Because of the lack of clear guidelines, IWF-funded projects may come under debate as to whether they meet the spirit of Section 4025. Penal Code Section 4025 was amended in 1993 so that any funds not needed for the welfare of the inmates may now be used for the maintenance of county jail facilities. The statute lists permissive expenditures to include the salary and benefit of personnel used in the programs to benefit inmates, including education, drug and alcohol treatment, welfare, library, accounting, and other programs deemed appropriate by the Sheriff. But the first question would normally be, “Are there programs for the benefit of inmates that should be funded that are not?” The 1993 amendment gives much wider latitude to the permissive uses of IWF funds. To date, the use of these funds has not been challenged in court. In the event the courts were to determine that funds needed for the inmates’ welfare were instead used for jail maintenance (or other needs outside this open-ended definition), the remedy could be to replace the wrongfully expended funds. As Penal Code Section 4015 makes most costs associated with jail operations a county charge, the County General Fund would likely be the source for the funds. Because IWF currently represents a major source of possible funding for large dollar projects, multiple year projects have been funded through IWF. Some may not fully comply with at least the spirit – if not also the letter – of Section 4025. For example, is the development of systems for inmate tracking, inmate property management, and inmate record management for the “benefit” of inmates, a “maintenance” item, or a “necessary and required expense for confinement”? How would an inventory control system for food services be viewed, “a necessary and required expense for confinement”? Smaller projects are also subject to the gray area of what is appropriate for IWF funds. Would the installation of a new video monitoring and recording system be considered a “benefit” to inmates, or "a necessary expense for confinement"? Another example of a major project that could be argued from different perspectives is the Jail Hospital Information System (JHIS) – clearly a worthwhile project that needs to be done. Funding through IWF will exceed $15 million and perhaps it would not have been done without the use of IWF funds. Nevertheless, some could argue that JHIS is potentially "a stretch" to include the design, development, testing, and implementation of the JHIS, including labor costs, as an example of “jail maintenance”. It meets a general test of being for the “benefit and welfare” of the inmate population, but could fail the test of offsetting “necessary and required expenses of confinement,” such as medical services. In conclusion, without clear guidelines on what are appropriate uses for IWF, justifications becomes labored and further bring into question compliance with the spirit of the fund (see Exhibit 1). So when funds are used to purchase suicide blankets or concertina wire, is that an example of a required expense of confinement? There is no formal orientation for new IWC Commissioners. For many years, the IWC had a fairly stable membership. In 1998, the sitting IWC submitted their resignations and a new IWC was formed. Of the nine sitting Commissioners, only three had previously served on the IWC. The six newly appointed Commissioners have approached their new positions with energy and a desire to contribute, but with no formal training or orientation. Moreover, they are not interested in being "a rubber stamp" for items brought before the IWC for consideration and approval. All new Commissioners participated in focus groups that addressed various IWF related- topics. The topics of greatest concern to the Commissioners were: IWC orientation; IWF purpose and mission; and IWC strategic planning, including decision-making criteria, inmate program development, programmatic performance measures, and funding mix. The reported way to come-up-to-speed regarding the IWC was to attend meetings, listen, and ask questions. Each of the Commissioners reported that they had received a document that provided them an overview of IWF, covering background information about some current programs, vendors, and contracts. But each also thought that a formal orientation would have been valuable. The Commissioners have been selected, and have so volunteered, because of their desire to serve their community. Their ability to do so is determined by what they know about IWF. Some of the questions that an orientation may address are: What is its purpose, how does it work, what has it accomplished, what is it planning to accomplish, and what is the job of a Commissioner? Commissioners asked about personal liability and insurance. The Commissioners’ ability to be effective — to bring to bear their experience, their professional knowledge and judgment, and their position within their community — is diminished, subject to their understanding of the role of the IWC and their role on the IWC. LASD does not systematically share experiences and successes with other law enforcement agencies. LASD willingly and routinely shares information about its IWF and its programs when approached. When designing new programs, LASD seeks out "best practices" and successful programs to model from other large law enforcement agencies, such as those found in New York, Chicago, Miami-Dade, etc. Participation in formal or informal exchanges of information with other sheriff's departments in California on the management of IWF or on programs funded by IWF also occurs, but not in a systematic way. For example, previously more active, LASD has not actively participated in the California Jail Program Association since the mid-1990s. Several of the other counties contacted spoke highly of such LASD programs as TALK, which was well regarded and copied. But LASD was not currently looked to as an active participant, although the smaller State jurisdictions believed they would benefit from LASD's experiences. The rewards of participation in associations or other groups with similar IWF legal requirements, operational considerations, or programmatic interests are not always easy to define. Participation does, however, help an organization keep from falling victim to the “not invented here" syndrome. Sharing ideas among program professionals brings a new perspective. Moreover, because other sheriff's departments are trying to make improvements, they can benefit from LASD's leadership role in sharing its experiences. In many ways, the size of LASD's IWF permits it to contribute significantly to the development and piloting of innovative programs that can become Statewide and national models. Conversely, LASD can benefit from the successes of other sheriff's departments. At times, smaller sheriff's departments are better positioned to try and refine innovations on a smaller scale that might then be applied and expanded in the County of Los Angeles. Financial audits are limited to financial standards and paper trail audits. The last audit performed on IWF was completed in 1998 for the Fiscal Year ending June 30, 1997. It was a financial audit of the balance sheet, statement of revenues and expenditures, and the statement of changes in the balance fund. The audit looked at the financial operations of the fund. According to the Los Angeles County Auditor-Controller’s office, there is currently no requirement to audit the IWF. With the repeal of guidelines in Title 15, Section 1043, it is not clear if an audit of IWF is even suggested anywhere. As important as financial audits are, more meaningful audits also look at the operation of a function and determine if it is in compliance with the policies, procedures, and practices that govern the function. Having an outside auditor periodically review both IWF's accounting records and operational activities helps ensure that the pressures of day-to-day operations do not diminish the focus on adhering to IWF’s purpose and generally good business practices.

Observations 1

• OB1 Page 128
  There is inconsistent understanding and implementation of the role of FFAs in the care of foster children. While DC&FS documents clearly specify the role of FFAs in terms of meeting the needs of children with special and unique needs that cannot be serviced in a licensed foster home, the actual use of FFAs is considerably different. q CSWs report preferring certified foster homes over licensed foster homes, primarily due to the additional oversight and services, regardless of the child’s needs. q CSWs’ placement of children who have just been removed from their homes will have insufficient time to learn about special needs or conditions. q High caseloads force CSWs to focus on finding a bed – not on a careful clinical assessment of a child’s special needs or problems. q TAs who make the initial calls typically lack complete information about the child and have no way of knowing whether the child has special needs or is severely emotionally disturbed. q Because so much information about the child is withheld, FFA administrators and social workers frequently accept placements without knowing the scope of a child’s condition or problems. q DC&FS states that the majority of FFAs are “treatment FFAs” that are required to provide any therapeutic treatment within the monthly rates. In contrast, most FFAs interviewed did not define themselves in terms of providing direct psychological or related services and state they are not allowed to conduct independent evaluations or provide psychological or other related treatment. § FFA social workers integrate application of their skills and expertise – all FFA social workers are required to hold master’s degrees – when working with foster parents and foster children. Although they may be trained to conduct clinical assessments and make recommendations, they do not provide “therapy” in the traditional sense of spending 45 to 50 minutes in a confidential session with a patient. Indeed, their primary job is to provide support for foster parents. § While some FFAs have psychologists on staff, most rely on local community agencies to provide the treatment specified in the child’s Needs and Treatment Plan. § One of the 25 FFAs interviewed has alternative staff who support and monitor foster parents, which permits the FFA social workers to provide treatment directly to the children in their assigned homes. q None of the foster parents who participated in the eight focus groups indicated they had been recruited specifically to provide homes for severely emotionally disturbed children. DC&FS OPERATIONS DC&FS has numerous organizational and management problems, exacerbated by the sheer volume of work and understaffing in such critical areas as Operations (CSWs) and Quality Assurance (OHCEU investigators). Although many of the Department’s internal problems have been described in detail in the 1998 Management Audit and are also addressed in the DC&FS Management Transition Assessment submitted by the Interim Director in November 1999, organizational structure, systems, and DC&FS-FFA communication and information flow merit emphasis in this report. The current DC&FS organizational structure does not support internal collaboration or communication. DC&FS is currently organized in six bureaus, including Administration and Management Services, Executive Services, Specialized Programs, Operations, Fiscal Services/Revenue Enhancement, and Resources. Approximately 2,500 CSWs carry cases out of eight regional offices within the Bureau of Operations, while the Out-of-Home Care Programs Division, which recruits FFAs and monitors their contracts, is in the Bureau of Resources. Quality Assurance, which investigates complaints in certified foster homes, is in the Executive Services Bureau. Finally, services directly related to children in foster care, such as Emancipation Services (for foster children who are 14 years old or older and are unlikely to return to their biological parents) are in another bureau, Specialized Programs. As a result, the current organizational structure of the Department does not support collaboration and communication among the various bureaus and divisions providing direct services to children. The new Director has indicated that a reorganization to meet the needs of the children more effectively is a high priority. DC&FS lacks a systems infrastructure to maintain and track data. DC&FS lacks both computer-based and manual systems to maintain even the most basic data, such as up-to-date lists of certified foster families and their addresses. As a result, the Department does not know in aggregate where all the children in its care are on any given day. In other words, every caseworker knows where his or her assigned children are, but a centralized, accurate, and complete list of children in aggregate does not exist. In the course of this management audit, the Grand Jury reviewed and compared documents in which significant numbers were inconsistent or inaccurate. Specifically: q The number of FFAs varied (from 76 to 79). q The number of children in FFA foster care varied, according to various undated documents. q Lists of current FFAs varied, with the result that some lists were incomplete or inaccurate. q Telephone numbers were wrong, primarily because area codes had not been updated. q The names of FFA directors or other administrators had changed and not been updated. Furthermore, DC&FS was unable to produce a complete listing of certified foster homes (to use as a base document for randomly selecting 300 foster parents to attend focus groups): q Initial requests at the beginning of the management audit, in October 1999, resulted in being told “they were working on it.” q Follow-up requests (throughout November and December 1999) resulted in being told the information was unavailable. Subsequent follow-up revealed that DC&FS’s County Counsel recommended against providing the data. q Finally, on January 20, 2000, once a supportive letter was obtained from the FFABCK Steering Committee, the Department provided a list of 300 randomly selected foster parents that had been produced on December 21, 1999. q When invitations to participate in the voluntary focus groups were mailed, the FFAs informed us that invitations had been sent to foster parents that had been decertified or had moved out of the County. Of the 300 mailed invitations to FFA foster families, 22 or 7% were sent to wrong addresses or to decertified foster homes: § Nine were returned by the U.S. Post Office due to incorrect addresses. § Ten of the families had been decertified. § Three were not current (e.g., had moved out of the area or were no longer foster parents). The Grand Jury was able to conduct only three of five foster family visits coordinated by DC&FS Special Programs staff and CSWs: q The fourth family was not at home on the day selected for the visit. There is no way of knowing if the CSW contacted the family ahead of time and the family was not responsive or if the CSW never contacted the family. q The fifth family had not been correctly identified, and although at home, had no knowledge of the case being tracking. Data on ongoing investigations for OHCEU were lost when the system went down (due to a “Y2K” computer breakdown). The lack of taped backups (per the contract) was a surprise to OHCEU, due to ineffective contract monitoring. DC&FS may pay FFAs for non-current placements. Although a financial audit of DC&FS and FFAs was not conducted, it is possible that DC&FS may be paying for non-existing or non-current placements. Given the lack of up-to-date and accurate information regarding the placement of children and the status of FFA foster parents, DC&FS has no way of knowing whether FFAs are purposely or inadvertently billing the Department for children no longer placed in their foster homes. The relationship between DC&FS and FFAs is largely uncooperative and adversarial, with frequently adversarial relations between CSWs and FFA social workers. From the CSW perspective, FFAs may be too close to the foster parent and unable to evaluate the child’s needs objectively. In social work, CSWs or FFA social workers may become overly emotionally involved with foster parents or foster children, inhibiting objective evaluation and decision-making. From the perspective of FFA social workers, FFA input is not valued and child safety concerns may be ignored by the CSW. According to FFAs, going up the DC&FS chain of command to resolve such problems frequently results in blanket supervisor support of the CSW and subsequent informal “blacklisting” of the FFA. For example, FFAs report that in some cases CSWs will help foster parents get an emergency CCL license when the FFA recommends moving the child and decertifying the home against the CSWs wishes. q Information, including the children’s Needs and Treatment Plans and medical history, is routinely withheld from FFA social workers, making it difficult for them to make optimal placements, provide appropriate psychological or medical treatment, or ensure compliance with Needs and Treatment Plan objectives. As a result, they cannot provide the foster parents with complete information. § 47% and 48% of the foster parents who completed the survey report they get the support and information they need from their CSWs all or most of the time for routine and serious problems, respectively. § 59% believe that DC&FS withholds information most of the time or sometimes compared to 46% who believe that FFAs never withhold information. q A lack of understanding regarding the legal nature of client confidentiality and an apparent lack of familiarity with contract and DC&FS policies results in CSWs using “confidentiality” as an excuse to withhold critical information from FFAs. § Treatment services must be approved by CSWs who may not process the required paperwork in a timely manner, resulting in children not getting the treatment they require. For example, prescriptions for psychotropic medications (e.g., anti- depressants) do not follow children who change homes, thereby causing them to be abruptly taken off their medication. § Foster parents are not informed if children are (or potentially are) HIV positive, have Hepatitis C, or other highly contagious diseases that can be handled with appropriate information. § Foster parents are not informed about significant behavioral problems, such as sexualized behavior or extreme oppositional or violent behavior. § Foster parents report that children are aware of and exploit the lack of teamwork among CSWs and FFA social workers. q CSWs may bypass the FFA and contact preferred foster parents directly, thereby undermining the terms of the contract. q Despite a colorblind policy regarding the race or ethnicity of children, CSWs and FFA social workers make placements based on their own biases and preferences. q FFA social workers report frustration when they do much of the legwork, prepare the reports, turn them over to the CSWs, and are not acknowledged for their efforts or expertise. FFA OPERATIONS Despite the DC&FS contractual standards, the quality of FFAs varies significantly in these key areas: q Recruitment and selection practices and processes. q Orientation and training. q Quality of foster parents. q Quality assurance practices and processes. The quality and thoroughness of foster family recruitment and selection varies considerably from FFA to FFA and is ultimately a subjective process. Despite similar guidelines for the recruitment and selection of foster parents at most FFAs, deciding which foster parents to certify is largely subjective. Furthermore, some base their outreach efforts on a limited perspective: q Some limit their outreach to a single method (e.g., the Penny Saver or a particular church). q One FFA recruits only Hispanic families (“because they make the best foster parents”). q Another FFA reports a preference for single welfare mothers (“because they’re always home and it’s what the children are accustomed to”). Combined orientation and training programs may be less effective than separate processes. FFAs that combine orientation programs with initial training may be less willing to continue the “weeding out” process, despite assurances to the contrary. Initial training and ongoing training are not standardized. Training programs are not standardized, so there is no assurance that training is equally rigorous. Furthermore, FFAs lack testing or assessment processes to gauge the extent to which foster parents understand or retain the material presented. Furthermore, the 1998 management audit of DC&FS supports our finding that there is no standardized curriculum or approach to DC&FS parenting classes. Because of differing recruitment, orientation, and training approaches and standards, the quality of foster parents varies significantly. Some foster parents are much better than others are in terms of attitude, understanding of their roles and responsibilities, understanding of child development, mastery of “parenting skills,” and ability to cope with difficult situations. The “worst” FFAs are those which do not decertify the “worst” foster parents. In the focus groups, certified foster parents described the following situations: q Teenage children who sneak out of the house repeatedly, indicating a lack of supervision. q Keeping their knives “in a box on a high shelf” versus under lock and key, indicating lack of compliance with established rules. q Putting the needs of biological children ahead of foster children, indicating the potential for emotional neglect. FFA social workers described these less-than-optimal foster home situations: q Children who are “too” well-behaved, indicating an over controlling and fearful environment. q Children who are frequently truant from school, indicating a lack of supervision. q Children who spend too much time watching television or playing video games, indicating an unstimulating home environment that lacks adequate emphasis on reading, education, physical activities, music, and other forms of entertainment. FFAs are in the difficult position of finding the correct balance among their conflicting needs: q Recruiting an adequate supply of foster parents to meet DC&FS demand versus recruiting the most qualified foster parents available. q Providing support for foster parents who have an admittedly difficult job versus advocating for foster children whom may be very difficult. q Providing support for foster parents versus monitoring foster parents to ensure compliance with rules and regulations. In theory, all FFAs believe they certify high quality foster parents, provide the support and training required, and move quickly to resolve problems, either by recommending removal of the child or decertification of the home. In practice, FFAs may keep sub-standard foster parents because they are willing to work with difficult-to-place children, to meet DC&FS demand, or the FFA has low quality standards. FOSTER PARENT ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES Foster parents have perhaps the most demanding role within the child welfare framework. Foster parents must: q Provide a safe and nurturing environment for children who may be emotionally fragile or have severe problems. q Open their hearts, yet not get “too” attached. q Modify their daily routines to comply with extremely stringent rules and regulations q Open their homes to intrusive scrutiny and examination. Nevertheless, foster parents have the fewest rights or protections and often have the least amount of information about the children in their home and about the system overall, despite mandatory training. FFAs and foster parents report the following situations: q Foster parents are typically left out of critical decision-making processes (e.g., they are not allowed in court), although they spend the most time with the child. q While only 28% of foster parents who completed the survey agree that complaints about the condition of their homes or treatment of the children in their care were legitimate: § 66% report they are informed quickly and completely about the nature of the problems. § 65% report that they have adequate time to resolve the problems. § 76% agree they get the help and support they need to solve the problems. q Nearly 80% of surveyed foster parents believe they are treated fairly by their FFAs all or most of the time. In contrast, only 60% believe they are treated fairly by DC&FS all or most of the time. q CSWs and FFAs are not allowed to inform foster parents when they are under investigation. Once completed, foster parents who have been investigated are stigmatized, even if the investigations ultimately reveal they are not to blame for a child being removed from their homes. q A child may go to court and be reunified with his or her biological parents, but foster parents are not notified – the child simply never comes home. q Biological parents may encourage their children to lie about their foster parents, in the mistaken belief that they will get their children back. This strategy backfires – the foster parents may be investigated, and the children will be moved to another foster home. The CWS/CMS system does not differentiate between foster homes decertified for non- compliance and those foster parents who decided to “take a break” from fostering. Foster parents operate in a “zero tolerance” environment in which there are no “time outs” to evaluate issues before taking the drastic step of removing the child from the home. While the safety of the child is paramount, every tragedy spawns a new regulation. While no one denies that foster parents should be held to a higher standard, foster parents also have no opportunity to use their common sense or judgment for specific children. q If all knives have to be locked up, how will teens learn to cook for themselves and be more independent? q If there are only infants in the home, why can’t knives be placed out of the way instead of being locked up? q If a teen isn’t suicidal, why can’t she have regular access to a razor to shave her legs? q If a teen is well behaved and attends school regularly, why can’t he or she attend a prom unescorted by his or her foster parents? Although one goal of foster home placement is to provide a more normal, day-to-day life for foster children (versus group home or institutional living), many regulations make normal life nearly impossible: q Spending the night at a friend’s home would require the friend’s parents to be fingerprinted. q Shopping with friends at the mall would require the foster parent to be present at all times. This lack of flexibility discourages many potential foster parents or encourages others to comply only superficially. Emancipation programs are not universally available. Teenagers in foster care face special problems. If they have been in the system a long time, it is unlikely they will ever return to their biological parents. Emancipation services are designed to assist these children to prepare for independent, adult living; however, all FFAs do not provide such services. Furthermore, within DC&FS, Emancipation Services is not in the same bureau as case-bearing CSWs. As a result, both teenagers and their foster parents may not get the information or support they need. Because Title 22 regulations are extremely restrictive, foster parents may not be permitted to provide the opportunities to build confidence or prepare children for the transition to independent living. Furthermore, teenagers who by nature are testing their abilities (and the world around them) are increasingly likely to test the limits of foster family rules and regulations (which are significantly more restrictive than those in a “normal” home). Foster parents of teenagers report high turnover, due to the difficulty in ensuring compliance. In contrast, foster parents of teenagers participating in Emancipation Programs report a greater ability to keep the children in their home. OHCEU MONITORING AND INVESTIGATIONS OHCEU is charged with auditing FFA compliance and investigating allegations of abuse of children in FFA certified foster homes, as well as licensed and group homes. Formal monitoring is required because: q CSWs may not have the time or opportunity to observe subtle problems through informal, on-the-job monitoring. q FFAs have financial and “customer service” incentives to maintain placements and may overlook or discount the severity of problems. Staffing is inadequate to handle the workload as it has been defined by the OHCEU. Formal monitoring is hindered by inadequate staffing as well as the lack of effective policies and procedures to ensure that allegations of complaints and abuse in FFA-certified homes are monitored and investigated thoroughly and on a timely basis. Investigations that begin much later than four weeks after the alleged incident diminish in importance, reliability, and effectiveness. (CSWs and FFAs reported that investigations might take up to six months to initiate.) Although the estimates should be verified by a complete workload study, we estimate that it takes approximately 2.5 days per case to complete an investigation cycle, including all major tasks already described under Findings: Current Situation. Exhibit 11 dramatizes the gap between work coming in and the available staff days to handle it. Exhibit 11 OCHEU Projected Workload 4,000 3,500 3,000 2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000 500 0 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 Number of Weeks to Complete snoitagitsevnI fo rebmuN Workload projected with no changes Staff days available Each week the unit will fall 60 workdays farther behind. While it is possible to use tools, such as overtime and suspension of vacation authorization, to overcome a temporary backlog, they are not effective long-term strategies to handle a significant gap between ongoing workload and available staff days. Investigator efficiency can be improved through improving the databases and system resources of OHCEU. Access to reliable and accurate databases with interfaces designed to reduce multiple entries of the same data could significantly reduce the amount of the time spent on the initial incident response. In most cases, the information gleaned by the investigators is largely consistent with the information gathered by the CSWs and FFA social workers during their initial reviews of the allegations to assure child safety. Nevertheless, case notes and a final investigation report prepared by the OHCEU investigator are typically typed separately, largely duplicating records already available in the file. OHCEU staff spend a great deal of time entering Special Incident Reports (SIRs) into the ITRAK system (OHCEU’s data-tracking database). The system was intended to help identify patterns of problems at foster care homes. All historical data in that system were lost because of a Y2K problem. At the time of the management audit, OHCEU staff was working with vendors to correct the problem. Although senior staff states that they were assured that back-ups were in place and restoration was possible, this was evidently not the case. The incident has sensitized OHCEU senior staff to the importance of data security and restoration protocols. The operation of the unit is hampered by the lack of access to the data, and efforts to assure rapid restoration or data re-entry should be negotiated with the vendor. Beyond this problem, there is an additional statewide data system, the CWS/CMS system that also provides current and historical data on foster care facilities and children. Included in most of the case files was a copy of the CWS/CMS system report associated with the subject facility. Particularly for the earlier cases, some of the information included in the system did not seem to be reliable. For example, there is a report listing all current and historical child placements in the subject facility. In earlier cases, that listing usually did not list any children in the home. OHCEU often had to rely on FFA files to determine who was placed in the home. Because of these issues of reliability, duty workers still verify placements by contacting staff at the FFAs to assure that all involved children are accounted for and their CSWs are notified. DC&FS monitoring is limited to FFA administrative offices. While the State regulations specify CSW visits for children, DC&FS is not required to monitor FFA-certified homes for Title 22 compliance. As a result, DC&FS FFA monitoring has been limited to FFA administrative offices. The CCL and OCHEU are responsible for investigating allegations, yet there are no processes or systems in place to facilitate coordination or collaboration (e.g., a cross-referenced list of certified homes under investigation by either CCL, OCHEU, or both). In short, DC&FS lacks both the tools and the information to determine the level of care foster children actually receive, the full extent of harm children may face in foster care, and how to prevent children from harm in the future.

No Responses Found 2

Government entities assigned to respond to this report. No response documents have been linked in our database.