Napa County Grand Jury
2011-2012
From the annual report
The consolidated year-end volume. The individual investigations it contains are listed separately below.
📑 Year-End Report
The full consolidated volume; individual reports are listed below.
Individual reports (5)
Findings & Recommendations
10 findings
F3:
Having the CAL FIRE 6 County Unit Chief who, at the same time, is also the NCFC creates a less than full time commitment and attention to Fire and Emergency services for Napa County and its taxpayers. The nine (9) volunteer fire department chiefs agree with the finding. Response #1 The 2008 Grand Jury report determined a similar need for a dedicated Napa County Employee to coordinate, focus and support the NCFD Volunteer members of the NCFD. As described in the 2008 response (Recommendation #2), a position was created and filled by a CAL FIRE employee. Unfortunately, this model has not resulted in meeting the intended goals. Lack of coordination, focus and support is also identified in the current GJR and addressed not only the volunteer firefighter contingency, but the NCFD as a whole. We strongly believe that cultural differences exist between the career members (union CAL FIRE employees), and the volunteer members of NCFD. CAL FIRE staff focuses more on issues within the Lake/Napa/Sonoma Unit and the State, where the priority and commitment of the volunteer member is dedicated to their local community. These differences of vision and lack of a dedicated central position have not resulted in forward progress in the evolution of the NCFD. A dedicated Napa County employee whose allegiance is to the citizens and taxpayers of Napa County will enhance emergency services in Napa County.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
Napa County write a job description and employ a NCFC who will be independent and separate from CAL FIRE employment, before contracting CAL FIRE services for the agreement year 2013-2014. While in agreement, the nine (9) volunteer chiefs have no authority to implement Response #1 this recommendation. A model of a CALFIRE employee in a similar position is currently in place. This position has not had the anticipated affect on NCFD. The volunteer chiefs strongly recommend that this position should be a Napa County employee wholly dedicated to the NCFD. See Finding #3 response.
F5:
If Napa County had a standalone Fire Department, without the CAL FIRE Agreement, Napa County residents could experience similar services as to what is now provided, at a significant savings to the County as demonstrated in Sonoma County. Response #5 The nine (9) volunteer fire department chiefs partially agree with the finding. While the taxpayers of Napa County "could" receive similar services, the savings are unknown. To compare the Napa County and Sonoma County fire departments is difficult and the complexities are many. With the significant cost of the CALFIRE contract, a cost benefit analysis should be completed to determine if the Napa County taxpayers are receiving their best value. A dedicated Napa County Fire Department focused primarily on promoting emergency . services in Napa County, rather than the Lake/Napa/Sonoma Unit and state, would enhance the services to our citizens.
Related Recommendations (2)
R5:
Replace CAL FIRE Dispatch services for Napa County Fire/EMS with the existing Napa Central Dispatch services which will not alter CAL FIRE dispatch of CAL FIRE units. Response #5 The nine (9) volunteer chiefs have no authority to implement this recommendation. We believe further analysis is required.
R6:
Napa complete a CBA, by an independent firm, of all fire protection services provided by CAL FIRE and NCFD before contracting CAL FIRE services for the agreement year 2014-2015. Response #6 While in agreement, the nine (9) volunteer chiefs have no authority to implement this recommendation.
F6:
There is a reasonable probability of saving a major part of the $8,267,184 CAL FIRE contract budget if Napa County transitions CAL FIRE services to the NCFD. Response #6 The nine (9) volunteer fire department chiefs partially agree with the finding. Much of the Napa County lands are State Response Area (SRA). As explained by CALFIRE staff with regards to the November 2011 "Soda" Fire in the Loma Vista/Soda Canyon area, "The SRA Fire is the responsibility of CAL FIRE to mitigate, investigate, and provide explanations and helpful information to the affected citizens." NCFD is described as a cooperating agency. CAL FIRE is RESPONSE TO GRAND JURY FINDINGS Napa County Volunteer Fire Chiefs responsible for these areas whether they receive county funds or not. This also is a complex issue as other non-fire related emergency services are included in the current contract. A cost benefit analysis should be to be completed to determine the value of the contract.
Related Recommendations (2)
R5:
Replace CAL FIRE Dispatch services for Napa County Fire/EMS with the existing Napa Central Dispatch services which will not alter CAL FIRE dispatch of CAL FIRE units. Response #5 The nine (9) volunteer chiefs have no authority to implement this recommendation. We believe further analysis is required.
R6:
Napa complete a CBA, by an independent firm, of all fire protection services provided by CAL FIRE and NCFD before contracting CAL FIRE services for the agreement year 2014-2015. Response #6 While in agreement, the nine (9) volunteer chiefs have no authority to implement this recommendation.
F12:
CAL FIRE has made decisions which are self serving to CAL FIRE and not in the best interest of Napa County. The nine (9) volunteer fire department chiefs agree with the finding. Response #12 It appears that the trend by CALFIRE is an effort to minimize or diminish volunteer response by ٠ reducing volunteer response areas, changing of dispatch models and "mandating" excessive training requirements so that volunteers are not allowed to, or have a limited opportunity to respond to emergencies. These changes have underutilized the volunteer resources and could have a negative impact on the citizens and visitors of Napa County. These changes also support an argument that today's volunteer responses are diminishing, thus the need for an increased CALFIRE role. When cover assignments are needed, or equipment for hire is requested, in lieu of staffing ٠ county fire apparatus with NCFD volunteers as was past practice, County equipment is typically now staffed with CALFIRE employees. The purchase of the most effective types of emergency vehicles for some of the more remote, ٠ unique areas in Napa County have not been supported, unless pressured by an outside influence (Patrol units by the 2008 GJR). The CALFIRE/NCFD staff usually support the purchases of apparatus that blend into the state mutual aid system in which CALFIRE plays a significant role. These are not always the best vehicles for Napa County, but certainly support the CALFIRE response capability. County training staff have been utilized for state purposes, whether it is training state ٠ employees (often times the seasonal state firefighters), or used on state incidents. This affects NCFD training and NCFD. A recent example was a NCFD training staff member cancelled required training due to playing a role in the February 2012 Soda fire. One of many others could have filled the role at the fire, but the choice was made to cancel NCFD training, and the county funded employee to remain on the SRA fire.
F14:
The Volunteer Departments in Napa County are very cost effective providers of Fire/EMS services. The nine (9) volunteer fire department chiefs agree with the finding. Response #14 The Napa County Volunteer Fire Departments are cost effective providers of emergency services if supported and managed. Volunteer emergency resources could have an increased role in the delivery of emergency services and provide a quality service to the citizens and visitors of Napa County. Volunteers can perform station coverage, or backfill in their response areas, when large RESPONSE TO GRAND JURY FINDINGS Napa County Volunteer Fire Chiefs The nine (9) volunteer fire department chiefs agree with the finding. Response #15 The use of volunteer stations for local coverage assignments has decreased, thus underutilizing these valuable resources. Recent CAD (computer aided dispatch) reprogramming changes have shown that some volunteer departments are not dispatched to incidents in their response areas. As a result, the closest emergency resource is not always sent to the incident, thus delaying intervention. For medical incidents, which are 80-90% of the emergency responses, volunteers will often respond in their personal vehicles. CAD does not seem to recognize this type of response, assuming that all responses will be by a fire apparatus. This underutilizes the volunteers and could prevent quicker medical assistance. Some volunteers are certified fire instructors and many others are qualified to instruct. However, the training division prefers the use of a career station to instruct rather than using qualified volunteer instructors. The assistance provided from the career stations is appreciated, but the opportunity of the qualified volunteer instructor to provide quality training, to lead, to gain ownership of NCFD and to develop their management skills are lost. A change in initial volunteer firefighter training has taken place that often times greatly exceeds • the number of training hours required by State and Federal laws. This has negatively effected recruitment and discouraged those wishing to be volunteer emergency responders in their communities. The NCFD training plan has focused more toward the volunteer seeking a future fire career ٠ rather than the volunteer seeking to provide safe, effective emergency response to their local community. This has significantly increased the number of hours required to respond to emergency events and reduced the ability of the volunteer departments to provide responders.
F15:
In Napa County, CAL FIRE has discouraged the use of volunteers. RESPONSE TO GRAND JURY FINDINGS Napa County Volunteer Fire Chiefs The nine (9) volunteer fire department chiefs agree with the finding. Response #15 The use of volunteer stations for local coverage assignments has decreased, thus underutilizing these valuable resources. Recent CAD (computer aided dispatch) reprogramming changes have shown that some volunteer departments are not dispatched to incidents in their response areas. As a result, the closest emergency resource is not always sent to the incident, thus delaying intervention. For medical incidents, which are 80-90% of the emergency responses, volunteers will often respond in their personal vehicles. CAD does not seem to recognize this type of response, assuming that all responses will be by a fire apparatus. This underutilizes the volunteers and could prevent quicker medical assistance. Some volunteers are certified fire instructors and many others are qualified to instruct. However, the training division prefers the use of a career station to instruct rather than using qualified volunteer instructors. The assistance provided from the career stations is appreciated, but the opportunity of the qualified volunteer instructor to provide quality training, to lead, to gain ownership of NCFD and to develop their management skills are lost. A change in initial volunteer firefighter training has taken place that often times greatly exceeds • the number of training hours required by State and Federal laws. This has negatively effected recruitment and discouraged those wishing to be volunteer emergency responders in their communities. The NCFD training plan has focused more toward the volunteer seeking a future fire career ٠ rather than the volunteer seeking to provide safe, effective emergency response to their local community. This has significantly increased the number of hours required to respond to emergency events and reduced the ability of the volunteer departments to provide responders.
F16:
CAL FIRE has ignored volunteer chiefs' recommendations. Response #16 The nine (9) volunteer fire department chiefs agree with the finding. Page #15 of 2011-2012 GJR, a middle management correspondence with regards to volunteer chief opinions/recommendations, "...it seems incredible that the future organization of NCFD hangs on a decision made by individuals who work as a gardener, vintner, school teacher, fire extinguisher serviceman, etc." Unfortunately, this opinion is not isolated and seems to be held by some of the middle management and senior staff, and through their examples, has proven to have a negative systemic effect on NCFD. While it is true that these four referenced individuals are not full time career fire employees, they provide valuable insight as embedded community members, bringing over 120 years of NCFD fire experience to the Advisory Board. The nine volunteer chiefs bring well over 200 years of experience. Important decisions in areas such as apparatus/equipment purchases, training requirements and response/dispatch models often times appear to be ignored. The process for soliciting
F17:
The NCFC does not sufficiently encourage volunteer recruitment. Response #17 The nine (9) volunteer fire department chiefs partially agree with the finding. The volunteer academy schedule has little flexibility, and the training content is excessive. When compared to established Federal/State mandates, the required number of training hours is greatly exceeded and is increasingly burdensome. This not only discourages recruitment of volunteers, but also the ability to retain volunteer resources. A stipend program to reimburse volunteer members for participation is in place. However, the firefighter recruits that put in approximately 200 hrs of training over a 4 month period, not including travel times throughout the county, can have significant fuel costs and are not compensated. This can be a financial burden and discourages new prospective volunteers. In the past year, NCFD career and volunteer staff have worked to obtain a grant to assist with ٠ recruiting volunteer firefighters. Career staff has also been assisting volunteer staff with developing a recruitment flyer. These actions are appreciated and are steps in the right direction.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
The NCFC immediately and actively support recruitment of new firefighter volunteers. While in agreement, the nine (9) volunteer chiefs have no authority to implement Response #3 this recommendation.
F18:
Some volunteer fire departments need outreach to their community, and their community needs to be directly involved with the Volunteer Fire Department boards and operations. Response #18 The nine (9) volunteer fire department chiefs partially agree with the finding. Some communities benefit from members being involved with the fire department boards. We support each department involving community members in roles that best serve their community. However, community boards are not viable for every department.
F19:
A balanced volunteer fire department governing Board of Directors should require a significant community representation. Response #19 The nine (9) volunteer fire department chiefs partially agree with the finding. Not all departments have a Board of Directors or community oversight council. However, community involvement should be encouraged at all levels of the local department.
Additional Recommendations
2
Not linked to specific findings.
R2:
The NCFC immediately and actively support the local Volunteer Fire Department Chiefs, their Advisory Board, and governing boards. While in agreement, the nine (9) volunteer chiefs have no authority to implement Response #2 this recommendation.
R7:
Within three years, or on the schedule outlined by the CBA, implement the CBA recommendation regarding the CAL FIRE Agreement. Response #7 The nine (9) volunteer chiefs have no authority to implement this recommendation. If the CBA determines a more cost effective way to provide similar emergency services, we should evaluate those recommendations to ensure that we provide the best value to the taxpayers.
Findings & Recommendations
16 findings
F1:
Construction of the Mt. Washington water storage tank is a build out of the City’s water infrastructure. It supports growth and will store NBA water, both of which are counter to the letter and spirit of Measure A.
F2:
Construction of the Mt. Washington water storage tank should have been listed in the 1998 Ordinance as an “approved project” or should have gone through the “replacement project” process.
F3:
Solage Resort Drainage Project should not have been paid with Measure A funds as the City of Calistoga had no duty to pay that $600,000 cost.
F4:
As the defense of a lawsuit by a municipality is a general governmental function, the legal fees paid by the City of Calistoga for the Kimball Creek Bypass litigation was an improper use of Measure A funds.
F5:
The invoices for the fees paid by the City of Calistoga for the Kimball Creek Bypass litigation provided inadequate information to allow the FPWIA to make an informed determination as whether the billings were reasonable and appropriate.
F6:
The City of Calistoga should have acknowledged its breach of public trust much earlier in the bypass litigation .
F7:
The Measure A Ordinance did not explicitly describe how the approval process should operate and as a result the Organizational Chart was arbitrarily drawn. To the degree the chart is used as a schematic model for Measure A projects, its flaws are transferred into the approval process.
F8:
The County Public Works Director improperly certified the legality of several Calistoga Measure A projects.
F9:
County Counsel is on the Flood Protection Funding Flow Chart to put agreements into proper form, but has no formal role reviewing proposals for compliance with Measure A. In practice County Counsel sometimes reviews proposals but does not review all proposals, and even as to reviewed proposals, County Counsel renders no formal opinion as to compliance with Measure A.
F10:
The approval process is ineffective since the Flood Protection Water Improvement Authority (Board of Supervisors) has approved projects that lack compliance to Measure A requirements. Greater care should be taken to examine in reasonable detail the compliance of projects and their expenses.
F11:
The Financial Oversight Committee exemplifies the disability of the system by being placed at the end of the approval process. The Ordinance intended the Financial Oversight Committee to “Ensure ongoing community input in the finalization of all projects...” (Emphasis added.) 22
F12:
The Financial Oversight Committee is the community “watchdog” for Measure A projects and should constantly monitor the projects in all stages, instead of only after the termination of those projects.
F13:
The Financial Oversight Committee is improperly constituted and has passively performed its role.
F14:
County projections forecast a 23% population reduction with evidence-based practices. If achieved, this could translate into a cost savings for the taxpayers of Napa County since the cost of the monitoring and treating out-of-custody offenders is less than the cost of incarceration.
F15:
The County’s Criminal Justice team is challenged on a daily basis to manage the prisoner population to stay within the bed-rated capacity.
F16:
Commitments of State financial support have been very limited, funding provisions included in the Assembly Bills expire in June 2012. A long-term solution is dependent on future legislation. 16
Additional Recommendations
11
Not linked to specific findings.
R1:
Flood Protection and Water Improvement Authority (Board of Supervisors) more carefully evaluate Measure A proposals and take steps to ensure that all proposals for the expenditure of Measure A tax revenue meet Measure A requirements from a legal standpoint as well as from a technical standpoint.
R2:
Flood Protection and Water Improvement Authority redefine the approval process and the corresponding County flow chart, so that after “the Auditor/Controller ensures adequate Measure A funds exist to meet request” and before “County Counsel prepares funding agreement,” both the Director of Public Works and County Counsel certify that the requested expenditure meets Measure A requirements, rather than just the Director of Public Works so certifying.
R3:
Flood Protection and Water Improvement Authority redefine the approval process and the corresponding County flow chart, so that after “the Auditor/Controller ensures adequate Measure A funds exist to meet request” and before the proposal is “presented at meeting of Flood Protection and Water Improvement Authority,” the Financial Oversight Committee be given a copy of the proposal to, pursuant to their charge, review and “advise the public whether it is consistent with the purpose, spirit, intent, and language of Measure A.”
R4:
County Counsel certify every proposed expenditure as in compliance with Measure A.
R5:
Financial Oversight Committee receives the information on proposed expenditures prior to approval by the Flood Protection and Water Improvement Authority.
R6:
Immediate, concerted and ongoing effort to fill Financial Oversight Committee vacancies by Financial Oversight Committee and Board of Supervisors; specifically, the vacancies for representatives from: Board of Supervisors Business Community Local Media Napa County Taxpayers 23 Environmental Community Agricultural Industry Health and Human Services
R7:
Auditor-Controller prepare an annual audit as per Section 23 of Ordinance in addition to the annual Financial Oversight Committee audit.
R8:
Financial Oversight Committee be granted authority to require jurisdictions requesting Measure A funds to present proposed expenditures to that Committee prior to final approval by Flood Authority.
R9:
Financial Oversight Committee receive and examine itemized invoices billed to Measure A projects in addition to the summarized data currently provided it.
R10:
Financial Oversight Committee establish subcommittees in order to more effectively fulfill its responsibilities under the Ordinance, namely: a. Provide the public with information regarding the manner in which Measure A tax proceeds have been spent; b. Prepare an annual audit regarding the use of Measure A proceeds; c. Review the financial impact of each project and advise the public whether it is consistent with the purpose, spirit, intent and language of Measure A; d. Inform the public of any expenditure which is inconsistent with the purpose and intent of Measure A; e. Make recommendations to the Napa County Flood Control and Water Conservation District regarding proposed replacement projects if a project indentified in Measure A is determined not feasible.
R11:
Any further requests by the City of Calistoga for Measure A funds for the Mt. Washington tank and Solage projects be denied and the City be required to return any unspent Measure A tax revenue forwarded to it for these matters.
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Findings & Recommendations
8 findings
F1:
The Napa Police Department is delinquent in not publishing the results of its Administration Investigation in a timely manner.
F2:
Richard Poccia’s body was left on the street over thirteen hours, an inordinate and unacceptable amount of time.
F3:
There is a need for more effective collaboration between Napa County Mental Health and the Napa Police Department in crisis situations.
F4:
There is no civilian review board in Napa County for OIS incidents.
F5:
Much of the Alta Heights community is estranged from the Napa Police Department as result of police actions during and after the Richard Poccia event.
F6:
It is commendable that the Napa Police Department provides access to psychological counseling for its officers following traumatic situations such as an OIS.
F7:
Adequate psychological counseling is not currently available to Napa communities following traumatic situations that occur in public.
F8:
Mental Health’s two unanswered phone calls without more follow-up to Richard Poccia were inadequate.
Additional Recommendations
8
Not linked to specific findings.
R1:
The Napa Police Department explain the reason(s) the Administrative Investigation Report of the OIS of November 28, 2010, is delinquent, and release the report within 60 days.
R2:
The Napa Police Department publish future Administrative Investigation Reports within 180 days of the incidents giving rise to them.
R3:
Within 90 days the City of Napa establish procedures to utilize appropriate screening for sensitive crime scenes.
R4:
Within 180 days the law enforcement departments in Napa County and Mental Health Department establish more effective coordination in situations of crisis intervention by (1) engaging in joint training exercises, and by (2) maintaining instantaneous communication and patching capability. 8
R5:
Within one year the Napa County Board of Supervisors and all Napa County incorporated local governments establish a civilian review board to examine all investigation documents of this incident and all future Officer involved shooting (OIS) incidents to provide feedback from a civilian point-of-view.
R6:
Within 90 days the Napa Police Department provide its staff effective public interface and/or appoint a liaison officer to inform and reassure the public during tense events.
R7:
Within 180 days the Napa County Mental Health Department (1) establish support programs for communities involved in traumatic incidents, and (2) establish additional programs to promote community awareness of resources for crisis support.
R8:
Within 180 days the Napa County Board of Supervisors provide the necessary funding resources to assist Napa County Mental Health with (1) appropriate staff levels for crisis situations, and (2) effective communication routing and patching links with Napa Police.
Findings & Recommendations
16 findings
F1:
The recent hiring of a new NCDC Director and the cooperative working relationships in the County’s Criminal Justice Community has resulted in an efficient administration of justice that is certainly a plus for Napa County.
F2:
The NCDC Director has demonstrated a high level of professionalism and leadership, while improving jail operations, and staff morale.
F3:
The Napa County Criminal Justice Committee has promoted evidence based programs to reduce recidivism and has implemented alternatives to jail sentences for lower level criminals.
F4:
There are frequent overcrowding issues in the current jail facility. NAPA COUNTY JUVENILE HALL INSPECTION BACKGROUND The facility was built in 2004 as a state of the art detention and rehabilitation center and was designed to house up to 50 juveniles, supervised by 27 permanent staff assisted by additional part time staff members. The Napa County Probation Department oversees the operation of NCJH. The Chief Probation Officer serves as its Director, responsible for the overall operation of NCJH. NCJH provides for juvenile detention and rehabilitation providing custody, counseling, medical care, and guidance of delinquent and custodial children in a variety of short- and medium-term evidence based programs and assessments. Juvenile probation oversight delivers various levels of supervision that are based on protection of the community, risk/needs assessments, out-of-home placements, and amenability to rehabilitation. The juvenile supervisors collaborate with the Napa County Health and Human Services Department in the supervision of selected cases wherein mental health issues are a major factor. The supervisors also collaborate with other community and government agencies such as Juvenile Drug Court, Wolfe Center and Aldea Inc. Detainees receive treatment including mental health evaluations and services provided by a mental health professional 40 hours per week. General nursing care is provided seven days per week. DISCUSSION The Grand Jury found that NCJH is a secure facility that provides safe custody, counseling, medical care, and guidance to delinquent youth. The Grand Jury found the NCJH to be well managed and maintained with programs designed to engage and rehabilitate youth, and instill the values of treating others with respect and courtesy. The facility provides residents the opportunity to continue school through on site teachers and classrooms. In cooperation with other County agencies and non-profits, the NCJH provides programs addressing alcohol and drug abuse, mental health, conflict resolution, religious services and art. The Grand Jury was satisfied with the facility operations, and the high level of professionalism and respectfulness of the administration and staff. FINDINGS The 2011-2012 Grand Jury finds that:
F5:
The NCJH is providing a safe and secure environment for delinquent Napa County youths.
F6:
The Juvenile Hall facility is well designed, maintained and has a dedicated management team.
F7:
Administration and staff demonstrate a high level of professionalism and respectfulness while carrying out their duties.
F8:
Administration and staff are making use of evidence based drug abuse, alcohol abuse, and mental health rehabilitation programs. CALIFORNIA PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT BACKGROUND As shown in the table below, California's prison population grew rapidly over the past two decades. From 1990 to 2011, the population in the state’s prisons grew from 97,000 to nearly 161,000. At the same time, the cost of incarceration rose from $20,562 per inmate to $49,190. 1990 2011 Change Prison Population 97,000 161,000 +166 % Cost of Incarceration $20,562 $49,190 +239 % With a greater than 70 percent state prison recidivism rate, most observers would rate the state’s prison system challenged. These were clearly unsustainable trends. Many factors influenced this increase in the state’s prison population. The two most significant contributors were mandatory sentencing laws and tougher drug enforcement policies. The ultimate recognition of the rising prison population, combined with the economic factors of prison expansion programs, and soaring labor costs, began to gather attention. Researchers, lawmakers, fiscal analysts and corrections officials recognized that the rehabilitation process was not working and that the system could not sustain this growth. Thus the Realignment legislation shifted the responsibility for monitoring, tracking and imprisoning low-level offenders, previously bound for state prison, to county jails. Unfortunately it did so without necessarily providing all of the equivalent funding to the county governments. Criminals arrested after October 1, 2011, who qualify under the so- called “triple non” qualification (non-violent, non-serious, non-sex offenders), will serve their sentences in county jail rather than the state prison. This puts offenders under the management of local officials who may have a greater stake in their rehabilitation than distant state prison employees. Napa County’s response to this legislation, in essence, began in 2004 when seeking a long-term solution for overcrowding conditions at the jail. A study illuminated trends at the jail and made recommendations for improvements. These recommendations evolved into a two phase Master Plan identifying correction system needs for the next 20 years. Subsequent reports presented to the BOS in 2007 and 2008 by the Criminal Justice Committee concluded the County was not implementing evidenced based programs that 8 could reduce recidivism, and recommended the County begin planning for a jail that would meet population projections. In December of 2010, the BOS was presented with a Major Facilities Preliminary Financing Plan and Feasibility Analysis that, among other items, recommended a two phase Jail Replacement Project. The CEO’s office conducted community meetings in early 2011 to solicit public comment on this new Downtown Campus Redevelopment Plan. By then it was obvious these earlier projections for jail population increases would be impacted by the legislature’s enactment of the Realignment Act. While the legislation neither transfers nor orders early release of any inmates, it does shift custody of newly convicted felons sentenced for non-violent, non-serious, non-sex offenses to county control unless excluded by statute. In the near term, this bill will affect Napa County by impacting both the number of prisoners in the jail and the severity of their crimes. It will also impact the probation monitoring requirements. This necessitated a re-evaluation of previous projections. In June 2011, a presentation, Napa County Jail Expansion Design Concepts and Split Operations Analysis, was made to the BOS taking into consideration the projected Realignment impact over the next several years, detailing the cost estimates of three jail construction alternatives. In addition to the revised jail population projections and cost estimates, the analysis explored access to Courts, proximity to other County Departments and services, land use, compatibility for other jail sites, law enforcement access and parking. The report also explored construction complexities associated with each prospective site and capacity for expansion if necessary in the future. The staff recommendation to the BOS is for the jail to maintain its current position, that the downtown site is the preferred location for the jail. However, staff recommended delaying a final decision until further analysis can be conducted. The two primary issues driving the delay are related to the downtown location; limited future expansion capacity and complexities associated with new construction at the existing site. An updated report to the BOS is anticipated later this year. The State has allocated $1 billion to the 58 counties to administer the Realignment program, but this initial funding will end on June 30, 2012. The money comes after lawmakers converted part of the state sales tax to a local sales tax. Counties also will receive $453 million from the state's vehicle license fees that used to go to the Department of Motor Vehicles. The State allocates a relatively low dollar amount to Napa County versus other counties, based on the number of offenders the county has sent to state prison in the past. The Governor has pledged to put a constitutional amendment before voters in November 2012 to guarantee that local governments get this money regardless whether the state runs into more fiscal difficulties. Despite these promises, funding remains one of the many concerns for Napa County as well as the other counties. It is uncertain whether there will be enough money from the state to implement and manage the upcoming changes. If not, this burden could shift to the Napa County taxpayers. DISCUSSION JAIL EXPANSION ALTERNATIVES The Master Plan recommendations to the BOS, as well as the subsequent studies and analysis, have identified a need for an updated jail facility. Based on these
F9:
The various agencies involved within the County’s criminal justice system are working well together as a team to solve the many issues imposed by the new Realignment legislation and current jail overcrowding conditions.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
County Criminal Justice Community report each year to the citizens on how the alternative programs are working, including current information on average jail population, alternative program statistics, and recidivism rate along with the annual crime rate report.
F10:
These stakeholders are finding a common ground, implementing jail alternatives such as the Community Corrections Service Center and the use of home detention and electronic monitoring.
F11:
Napa's alternative programs to incarceration are up and running and have been recognized statewide.
F12:
Alternative programs have been shown to reduce recidivism and modify criminal behavior, potentially increasing the safety of our community and saving taxpayers’ funds.
F13:
Current overcrowding conditions could be exacerbated by the influx of new prisoners; expansion solutions remain several years away.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
County administration continue to reach out at public forums, and solicit community input regarding jail design and location, while looking at jail expansion alternatives.
F14:
County projections forecast a 23% population reduction with evidence-based practices. If achieved, this could translate into a cost savings for the taxpayers of Napa County since the cost of the monitoring and treating out-of-custody offenders is less than the cost of incarceration.
F15:
The County’s Criminal Justice team is challenged on a daily basis to manage the prisoner population to stay within the bed-rated capacity.
F16:
Commitments of State financial support have been very limited, funding provisions included in the Assembly Bills expire in June 2012. A long-term solution is dependent on future legislation. 16
Related Recommendations (2)
R3:
The County prepare to assume greater financial responsibility for Realignment, in the event State funding is not forthcoming.
R4:
The County study alternative funding strategies, in the event State funding is not forthcoming.
Findings & Recommendations
19 findings
F1:
The Fire Station Deployment Analysis and Master Plan Implementation for Napa County Fire Department, Citygate Report was not a cost benefit analysis.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6:
Napa County complete a CBA, by an independent firm, of all the fire protection services provided by CAL FIRE and NCFD before contracting CAL FIRE services for the agreement year 2014-2015. 18
F2:
Presently, there is no job description for the NCFC. The NCFC operates under the State CAL FIRE 6 County Unit Chief job description.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
Napa County write a job description and employ a NCFC who will be independent and separate from CAL FIRE employment, before contracting CAL FIRE services for the agreement year 2013-2014.
F3:
Having the CAL FIRE 6 County Unit Chief who, at the same time, is also the NCFC creates a less than full time commitment and attention to Fire and Emergency services for Napa County and its taxpayers.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1:
Napa County write a job description and employ a NCFC who will be independent and separate from CAL FIRE employment, before contracting CAL FIRE services for the agreement year 2013-2014.
F4:
An assessment of CAL FIRE services vs. cost of a full service NCFD as a result of a Cost Benefit Analysis has not been completed.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6:
Napa County complete a CBA, by an independent firm, of all the fire protection services provided by CAL FIRE and NCFD before contracting CAL FIRE services for the agreement year 2014-2015. 18
F5:
If Napa County had a standalone Fire Department, without the CAL FIRE Agreement, Napa County residents could experience similar services as to what is now provided, at a significant savings to the County as demonstrated in Sonoma County.
F6:
There is a reasonable probability of saving a major part of the $8,267,184 CAL FIRE contract budget if Napa County transitions CAL FIRE services to the NCFD.
Related Recommendations (1)
R7:
Within three years, or on the schedule outlined by the CBA, implement the CBA recommendations regarding the CAL FIRE Agreement.
F7:
The transition from CAL FIRE to an independent Sonoma County Fire Department has resulted in reduced fire protection expenses in Sonoma County.
F8:
Currently dispatch of Fire/EMS is provided by CAL FIRE at $230,000 annually. The existing Napa Central Dispatch could provide these fire dispatch services at a savings to the County.
Related Recommendations (1)
R5:
Replace CAL FIRE Dispatch services for Napa County Fire/EMS with the existing Napa Central Dispatch services which will not alter CAL FIRE dispatch of CAL FIRE units.
F9:
The very complex economics and multifaceted fire protection services of Napa County need to be better understood by the Napa County residents.
F10:
The very complex economics and multi faceted fire protection services of Napa County need to be clearly understood by the leadership of the County.
F11:
The current CAL FIRE agreement with Napa County is $8,267,184 which includes an "Administrative Charge" of 11.96% equaling $988,755 in the 2011-12 FY. This $988,755 savings could be allocated for administration of a NCFD.
F12:
CAL FIRE has made decisions which are self serving to CAL FIRE and not in the best interest of Napa County. 17
F13:
Substantial accumulated County Fire Protection funds, of approximately $10,000,000, are available that could be used for transition from CAL FIRE services to a full service volunteer and career NCFD.
F14:
The Volunteer Departments in Napa County are very cost effective providers of Fire/EMS services.
F15:
In Napa County, CAL FIRE has discouraged the use of volunteers.
F16:
CAL FIRE has ignored volunteer chiefs' recommendations.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2:
The NCFC immediately and actively support the local Volunteer Fire Department Chiefs, their Advisory Board, and governing boards.
F17:
The NCFC does not sufficiently encourage volunteer recruitment.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3:
The NCFC immediately and actively support recruitment of new firefighter volunteers.
F18:
Some volunteer fire departments need outreach to their community, and their community needs to be directly involved with the Volunteer Fire Department boards and operations.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4:
The NCFC immediately and actively assure the volunteer fire departments governing Boards include at least 1/3 representation of community (non- firefighter) members on their Boards.
F19:
A balanced volunteer fire department governing Board of Directors should require a significant community representation.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4:
The NCFC immediately and actively assure the volunteer fire departments governing Boards include at least 1/3 representation of community (non- firefighter) members on their Boards.
* This report's PDF did not contain easily extractable text and required Optical Character Recognition (OCR) for analysis. There may be minor errors in the extracted findings and recommendations due to OCR limitations with scanned documents.