Monterey County Grand Jury

2012-2013

6 reports

Findings & Recommendations 8 findings
F1: Currently, the CAWD appears to be more proactively maintaining the wastewater infrastructure of the district than in past years.
F2: Sufficient cash reserves are on hand for planned and unplanned repairs.
F3: The CAWD has a reasonable number of employees and efficient work practices.
F4: The CAWD has established overall rates and fees that are competitive with other districts.
F5: The CGJ found the BOD hired the most qualified internal candidate based on the job description for the position, although no external candidates were solicited or interviewed.
Related Recommendations (1)
R5: In the future, the BOD should make every effort to consider both internal and external job applicants for senior managerial positions.
F6: After reviewing the employee satisfaction survey conducted in 2011, the CGJ finds that the lack of timely performance appraisals was undoubtedly a contributing factor to low employee satisfaction and a lack of communication between management and treatment department staff.
Related Recommendations (3)
R2: Management should heed results and recommendations from 2011 employee surveys, specifically communication between management and staff and increased cooperation between departments will help improve morale.
R3: Management should make every effort to ensure that all employee performance appraisals are current and conducted every 12 months in the future. This is absolutely necessary for effective communication between management and staff.
R4: A new employee survey should be conducted in 2013 to gauge success of improvement programs currently underway that address low employee morale.
F7: Overall, we find that the relationship between the CAWD and the PBCSD is mutually beneficial.
F8: The CAWD will need to raise user rates in upcoming years to provide additional funds for capital improvement.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1: When complete, the 15 year Master Capital Improvement Plan should be closely followed to ensure that adequate service and response is provided in the future.
Findings & Recommendations 8 findings
F1: Because of the SVSWA's debt, it is regularly challenged to balance its annual budget. Raising rates to cover their operating costs have been very difficult to accomplish and will continue to be problematic as waste volumes continue to decline.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1: The SVSWA should give proper notice of topics of presentation to County EHB on public meetings so that the public receives correct answers on County questions.
F2: From its investigation of both landfills in Monterey County, SVSWA and MRWMD, the CGJ has found that both are on target towards goal of 75% waste diversion by 2020 as per AB341. The reduction of landfill tonnage and the decrease in revenues has forced SVSWA and MRWMD to look at other sources to gain lost income.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2: The CGJ recommends that the staff of both SVSWA and MRWMD continue to work on the common area of interest and benefit to address waste in Monterey County to the betterment of its citizens. It is the CGJ's recommendation that a consolidation of the two agencies should occur.
F3: Because of Cal Recycle's reversal of the Plasco RPS certification, SVSWA is unable to proceed with its goal of waste-to-energy conversion.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3: The CGJ recommends shutting down the residential waste re-handling process at SSTS. The CGJ further recommends that SVSWA cease in its desire to replace the SSTS with a site on Work Street. The CGJ feels the Work Street location is not feasible for this site as it is similar to SSTS. The location has two motels, a car lot, agriculture warehouses, and offices within a 1/4- 1/2 mile radius. Work Street is also a heavily traveled route to Hwy. 101 north and south exits.
F4: The CGJ found on several occasions SVSWA failed to notify or give proper notice to County EHB of upcoming meetings. The EHB plays an important role in SVSWA's monthly county meetings. The SVSWA's lack of notifying the County's EHB and LEA of meeting agenda prior to meeting could affect the future permit process.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4: The CGJ recommends that SVSWA cease its funding for research and analysis of any type of conversion technology.
F5: The CGJ has found that Waste Management's Madison Lane Transfer Station accepts solid waste from self-haul customers. These are self-haul customers that prefer to go to this site rather than the SSTS or Johnson Canyon landfill.
Related Recommendations (1)
R5: The CGJ recommends that the City of Salinas and unincorporated NE Monterey County utilize the Madison Lane Transfer Station site as a self-haul and Materials Recovery Center.
F6: The SVSWA's need to use the Recology South Valley revenues to balance its budget has put a strain on future funds for landfill capacity.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6: The CGJ recommends that SVSWA and the City of Salinas work closely with its citizens and businesses by creating an advisory committee to address issues of the recommended closures of SSTS and the utilizing of a facility already in place, Madison Lane Transfer Station.
F7: The CGJ feels that SVSWA's financial decision making policies affect the well-being of many businesses in its jurisdiction. The SVSWA is not looking out for the citizens of the Salinas Valley and north east Monterey County.
F8: The County's notice to withdraw from the SVSWA will put a financial burden on the remaining members of the SVSWA.
Findings & Recommendations 4 findings
F1: The CGJ found several instances where at least one member of the MCC acted in an administrative capacity with the general public on issues that should be in the purview of the City staff, thus causing confusion between the public and city officials. We reviewed specific written complaints from the general public complaining of MCC member interfering in the negotiations for the development of business opportunities between themselves and the appropriate city official.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1: The MCC should review the violations of the Brown Act by the MEC Ad Hoc committee with special emphasis on whether the violations call for specific cures to be adopted.
F2: The MCC did not follow one of the key guidelines for the use of an "AD HOC" committee, namely, they are temporary committees. The MCC established the MEC Ad Hoc Committee on August 19, 2008 after officially suggesting its formation as of February, 2008. While members have changed over time and the City staff was removed from working with the Ad Hoc committee, the committee is still operating--more than four years later. The CGJ observed little progress in completing the intended purpose of the MEC Ad Hoc Committee. By eliminating the staff support for the committee (essentially the source of professional help to this important project) the MCC reduced its expenditures on labor during part of this 4 year plus period. However, the MCC has recently authorized $33,500 to hire outside consultants to move the project along.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2: The MCC should develop and enact an ethical code of conduct for all City of Marina officials.
F3: Of the four members on the MEC Ad Hoc committee, 2 are members of the MCC. There were at least 2 violations of the Brown Act during the past year with regard to this committee. The minutes of the meetings were not made readily available to the public and only became available when a member of the public made an official request with City staff. Second, a member of the committee was denied access to portions of the official report of the committee that was to be presented to the MCC.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3: The MCC should coordinate and fully participate in training emphasizing the specific boundaries between the work of the MCC and the City Staff and ensure that no members of the MCC "cross the line" and interfere with City staff work
F4: The handling of the MEC Ad Hoc Committee has put the MEC site at possible risk of loss to the City of Marina. The City of Marina was given the property by the Federal Government in 1993, with the proviso that it must implement a plan to ensure it is used as a public park. Public access to the property is a significant component of meeting the Federal guidelines. Eighteen (18) years later, the City of Marina has not only failed to complete such a plan, but has not even provided a contemporary plan that meets the demands of the Federal Government. The Federal Government has suggested that this valuable asset could be at risk if the city of Marina does not comply with the covenants of the land transfer.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4: The MCC should encourage the City Attorney to take a more pre-emptive role in helping the MCC conduct its meetings. If procedural errors are identified and corrected immediately, the public will gain greater confidence in the operation of the MCC. The City Attorney has the experience to be helpful in this effort.
Findings & Recommendations 7 findings
F1: The allegation that voter fraud is "rampant" is unfounded. California already has a law in place that requires voters to produce ID when they register to vote. The present procedures of setting up multiple check points in voter registration and validation of a voter's identity that is conducted by MCED appears more than adequate to safeguard voter fraud.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1: We recommend that all county supervisors and every elected official in the county visit MCED to become thoroughly acquainted with the complex procedures in voter registration, validation of identity and vote tabulation that assures election integrity. The MCED reports to the Monterey County Board of Supervisors and it is understood that only one of the five sitting members has officially visited the MCED office.
F2: MCED has made strong efforts to carry out the "one man, one vote" mandate by regularly updating its database, reaching out to every eligible voter and trying to make every vote count. But despite its effort, almost 6.6% of eligible voters failed to provide updated personal information (such as change of address, change of name) to the MCED or to the Department of Motor Vehicles and may therefore disenfranchise themselves.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2: We recommend a robust voter education campaign that not only urges voters to register and vote, but urges voters to update their personal information with MCED if they change address or names, or if a family member has become deceased. Clearer instruction should be given on how to vote by mail or use the ballot. Lastly, voters should also be urged to read the voting materials mailed to them, so they become better informed voters on the issues.
F3: MCED relies primarily on county health officer's monthly report of death in the county, and on obituaries published in local newspaper to update its voter register. The Secretary of State also depends on the State Department of Health Services database to provide the counties with records of deceased voters.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3: We recommend that MCED and the Secretary of State utilize the Social Security Administration's master death index to regularly update the voter registration database.
F4: 13.7% of the ballots cast by voters in the most recent election were damaged and unreadable by the optical vote tabulating scanner, primarily because voters failed to follow voting instructions. MCED had to duplicate over 7,000 ballots in order to capture the voter's intent. The process is both costly and time consuming.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4: Because of the high rate (13.7%) of damaged ballots due to voters' failure to follow balloting instructions, we urge the consideration of a better designed and more user-friendly ballot for future elections. One alternative may be the redeployment of touch-screen voting machines once public confidence in tamperproof electronic devices is fully restored. A different way of tabulating votes should also be considered, because the three central optical high-speed scanners had problems "reading" a high percentage of ballots in the last election.
F5: In 2002, the county spent almost $4 million of tax-payers money purchasing touch-screen voting machines, software and auxiliary equipment such as printers. The voting machines were decertified by the Secretary of State in August 2007, but can be certified if they are modified to meet specific conditions. Most of them are sitting idle in the office of MCED, only some are used by the disabled during election day.
Related Recommendations (1)
R5: The city of Carmel-by-the-Sea should consider all costs and the level of service provided by the competing choices when making the decision on who to use to conduct their elections in the future.
F6: Although a private contractor appears to cost less than MCED's bid for running Carmel-by- the-Sea's stand-alone municipal elections in April 2010 and 2012, city officials did not take into account the actual costs of paid staff time for their own city clerk and staff.
Related Recommendations (1)
R6: We recommend that the Board of Supervisors support a proposal by the MCED for a different facility with at least 25,000 square feet space mentioned earlier in order to provide adequate space during the election period and to provide on-site storage of all MCED property and records.
F7: The office of MCED in Salinas on Highway 68 E is inadequate for its operation. Possibly usable equipment lies idle. The department has to budget an extra $20,600 annually for leasing three storage facilities and the expense of staff time traveling to them to retrieve materials.
Related Recommendations (1)
R7: The MCED should work with the Secretary of State to resolve the issue of the idle Sequoia Voting Machines.
Findings & Recommendations 3 findings
F1: The Monterey County Board of Supervisors did retain a trauma system consultant who drafted a new plan, entitled the 2011 Trauma Care System Plan.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1: The 2013 Civil Grand Jury and the 2014 Civil Grand Jury should consider investigation of the progression of the proposed revision of the Monterey County Trauma Care System from essentially no system to having a Level II trauma center in the County as set forth in the attached Trauma System Calendar to determine whether the time schedule as set forth in the attached Trauma System Calendar (Appendix B) has been met.
F2: Pursuant to this plan Monterey County has designated a Level II trauma center with a timeline for putting the facility into operation.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2: There should be no further extensions of the trauma system timeline (Appendix B) and the schedule of events listed therein should be met as written.
F3: This time line has been extended approximately six months.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3: If both of the potential designees, Natividad and SVMH, should withdraw their intention to go forward as a Level II trauma center, Monterey County should consider designating a Level III trauma center.
Findings & Recommendations 4 findings
F1: If the proposed cap of 56 hours of work a week is implemented in the Sheriff Department, it will still allow 16 hours of overtime per week. However, certain employees will have their total hours worked reduced.
Related Recommendations (1)
R1: The Sheriff Department should implement a proposed cap of 56 hours of work per week.
F2: Insufficient control of nonproductive time off by Sheriff's deputies resulted in excessive overtime.
Related Recommendations (1)
R2: All Monterey County departments should be required to highlight their overtime in their annual budget requests.
F3: Because the County does not request clearly defined budgeting for overtime nor provide clear reports by departments showing overtime costs, we believe the issue does not receive the regular financial scrutiny it deserves.
Related Recommendations (1)
R3: The County budget should show the percentage (%) of overtime versus payroll and publish this figure in the Final Budget.
F4: The Sheriff's department is not utilizing the CAO's "on loan" positions to cover their long term Worker's Compensation leave vacancies.
Related Recommendations (1)
R4: Departments that are able to utilize more part-time employees to reduce overtime should make an effort to do so.

* This report's PDF did not contain easily extractable text and required Optical Character Recognition (OCR) for analysis. There may be minor errors in the extracted findings and recommendations due to OCR limitations with scanned documents.